Kurdistan’s 10th cabinet: Interlocking alliances and persistent political differences
Shafaq News
More than a year and a half after the Kurdistan Region’s parliamentary elections, the formation of the tenth cabinet remains stalled amid ongoing political disputes between the two main parties, the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK).
As rounds of dialogue and negotiations continue, questions are mounting over the real reasons behind the delay in forming the government, and whether the crisis is rooted in the election results themselves or in how those results are being translated into a political partnership capable of managing the next phase.
Parliamentary Seat Map
The Kurdistan Parliament elections, held on October 20, 2024, produced a new political landscape that reshaped the balance of power inside parliament. However, no party secured a comfortable majority that would allow it to form a government on its own, making consensus among the major political forces a prerequisite for establishing the new cabinet.
According to the official results, the KDP won 39 seats, while the PUK came second with 23 seats. The New Generation Movement (Al-Jeel Al-Jadeed) made significant gains, securing 15 seats. The Kurdistan Islamic Union won seven seats, the National Position coalition obtained four seats, and the Kurdistan Justice Group secured three seats. The remaining were distributed among other political parties and quota representatives of minority communities.
The results clearly showed that the KDP maintained its position as the largest political force in the Region but failed to secure an outright majority that would enable it to form a government independently. The PUK remained the second-largest force capable of influencing the government formation process.
At the same time, the rise of the New Generation Movement added further complexity to the political landscape after it became the third-largest bloc in parliament, creating new political equations that had not existed in previous legislative terms.
Read more: Kurdistan Region’s political deadlock: Impact and perils
Electoral Entitlement or Political Partnership?
Saadi Ahmed Pira, a member of the PUK Political Bureau, said the crisis surrounding the formation of the Kurdistan Region’s government is linked less to the election results themselves than to how those results are being handled and translated into genuine political partnership within the executive authority.
“The PUK believes that electoral entitlement should be the foundation upon which the government formation process and the distribution of responsibilities and positions are built,” Pira told Shafaq News.
He argued that the KDP does not adequately adhere to this principle and instead seeks to form the government according to its own vision before allocating positions to other parties, without involving them effectively in drafting the government’s program, determining its structure, or defining how powers should be distributed.
“The real problem is not the number of seats won by political parties, but the absence of full recognition of the principle of partnership based on electoral entitlement.”
He called on the KDP to apply within the Kurdistan Region the same standards of balance, consensus, and partnership that it demands from the federal government in Baghdad, ensuring that the new cabinet reflects the election results and the political will of voters.
Regarding calls for new parliamentary elections, Pira stressed that such a step would not solve the current crisis because a new vote would not produce a fundamentally different political reality and would impose high financial costs.
He said the PUK does not fear new elections and believes it is politically and organizationally stronger today than it was before the last vote, arguing that resorting to elections would not address the root problem, which lies in disagreements over the government formation mechanism and respect for parties’ electoral mandates.
Pira noted that the PUK continues to call for dialogue and negotiations aimed at forming a government based on genuine partnership, political balance, and electoral entitlement, ensuring the participation of all forces represented in the Kurdistan Parliament in managing the next phase.
He also described current regional and international involvement in Kurdish affairs as positive, saying it “contributes to encouraging dialogue and bringing political parties closer together.”
PUK President Bafel Talabani has stated that a government similar to the current one cannot be formed, reiterating that his party seeks a cabinet based on partnership and balance, “one that understands the demands of the Kurdish public and works to improve relations between Erbil and Baghdad.”
Meanwhile, Kurdistan Region Deputy Prime Minister Qubad Talabani, a PUK leader, has likewise stressed the readiness of political forces to reach a genuine agreement on forming the new regional government.
Crisis Predates the Elections
The KDP rejects accusations that it is responsible for the stalled negotiations and insists that the current crisis is linked to political positions that predate the elections, as well as new alliances formed afterward inside parliament.
Kamran Gharib, a KDP official, affirmed that the party had invited the PUK to enter negotiations over the formation of the tenth cabinet before Iraq’s parliamentary elections, “but the PUK did not respond to the invitation.”
Speaking to Shafaq News, Gharib said the election results and the KDP’s clear gain, not only within the Kurdistan Region but also compared with other Iraqi political forces, prompted the PUK to search for alternative political options and alliances, noticing that this was reflected in the PUK’s move toward coordination with the New Generation Movement and the formation of a joint bloc inside the Kurdistan Parliament.
“A large portion of New Generation’s votes came from al-Sulaymaniyah, Garmian, Halabja, and areas within the PUK’s sphere of influence.”
He argued that those votes primarily represented “dissatisfaction with PUK policies” and that many voters who supported New Generation had previously been part of the PUK’s support base before shifting to an opposition political project.
Addressing demands for the distribution of positions according to a “50-50” formula, Gharib stressed that the arrangement belonged to a previous political phase and “has been overtaken by current political and electoral developments.”
He insisted that the present stage requires respect for each party’s electoral entitlement based on its representation in parliament rather than adherence to traditional formulas that prevailed in earlier periods.
“The KDP, when it calls for partnership, balance, and consensus at the federal level, does not do so for the benefit of the party itself but rather in defense of the rights of the Kurdish component within the Iraqi state,” Gharib said in response to Pira’s remarks regarding partnership.
He also recalled the period following the rise of the Gorran Movement in Al-Sulaymaniyah, Garmian, and Halabja, when the PUK’s electoral results declined to a level that, according to electoral entitlement standards, did not qualify it to hold the position of Kurdistan Region Prime Minister.
Back to history, Gharib said, the KDP decided, at the request of the late President Jalal Talabani, to grant the position to the PUK, leading to the appointment of Barham Salih as Prime Minister of the Kurdistan Regional Government.
Gharib highlighted that the “new PUK” is currently advancing demands and issues that the KDP believes are not based on clear legal or democratic foundations, adding that any successful political process must be based on dialogue, understanding, and respect for electoral entitlement, “not on imposing conditions or dictates by any party.”
Regarding the possibility of new parliamentary elections, Gharib said “all options remain on the table” to reactivate the legislative institution and form a new government, “except for any options that lead to escalation or confrontation.”
Like Pira, Gharib pointed to the external dimension, saying neighboring countries view the stability of the Kurdistan Region as a shared interest and seek a strong government capable of managing political, security, and economic affairs efficiently.
Roots of the Crisis
Between the competing narratives of the two parties, observers interviewed by Shafaq News believe the crisis extends beyond current disputes over positions and ministerial portfolios and is linked to a long history of political rivalry and differing visions regarding the governance and future of the Kurdistan Region.
Political analyst Abu Bakr Karawani told Shafaq News that the failure of the KDP and PUK to reach an agreement stems from four main factors that intersect and directly affect the government formation process.
The first factor is the historical legacy of political disputes and conflicts between the two parties, dating back decades to the 1960s. The second involves current political disagreements and unresolved issues that remain points of contention. The third relates to differing views on local, regional, and international issues, as well as contrasting perspectives on the future of the Kurdistan Region and its administration. The fourth factor concerns conflicting political interests tied to the distribution of positions and powers within the next government.
Karwani said the absence of a unified institutional framework across the Region, combined with the administrative and political divisions based on party influence in certain areas, “has deepened internal disagreements,” adding that this reality has created an environment that allows external actors to intervene and exploit these divisions to advance political, national, factional, or sectarian interests.
The political forces in the Kurdistan Region, particularly the KDP and PUK, must recognize the scale of the risks that could result from the continuation of political division and disagreement, he stressed, identifying the absence of an effective constitution for the Kurdistan Region as one of the key factors shaping the current reality. “There is no constitutional framework that clearly defines government formation procedures or designates the authority responsible for assigning that task.”
He said these factors make an understanding between the KDP and PUK essential for successfully forming a government and ensuring its stability. “The most realistic option at the current stage is the formation of a consensus government that includes the two main forces and is based on political partnership and national consensus, Karwani said, concluded that the nature of the political system in the Kurdistan Region, together with weak institutional structures compared with the level of party influence, necessitates consensus-based solutions rather than a political majority approach.
“This makes a partnership government the best option for ensuring political and administrative stability and moving conditions toward greater stability and development.”
Written and edited by Shafaq News staff.
