Shafaq News- OPINION

By Nick Kossovan

Whether you're walking through a major Western city, browsing social media, or on a university campus today, you can't miss it. Stenciled on brick walls, plastered on light poles, draped from balconies, or blasted through megaphones, the slogan is everywhere: “Free Palestine!” It's become the go-to move for self-proclaimed activists and armchair moralists to virtue-signal their support for Palestinians' right to statehood, self-determination, and fundamental human dignity.

What you won't see or hear during your walk or campus visit are flags, painted signs, or chanted slogans for the Kurds; that's assuming you're even aware they're stateless as well. While Western outrage rallies in support of Palestinian self-determination, over 40 million Kurds remain the largest ethnic group without a country of their own. Spread across Turkiye, Iran, Iraq, and Syria, they've spent more than a century fighting for the same rights as Palestinians: basic human rights and a homeland.

Why does the Palestinian plight provoke wall-to-wall outrage across the West, while the Kurds are treated as a geopolitical footnote?

It's certainly not for lack of human suffering. After the Ottoman Empire collapsed, the 1920 Treaty of Sèvres promised the Kurds a state of their own, only for Western powers to renege three years later, carving up their homeland into four pieces to satisfy newly drawn borders, without consulting a single Kurd. What followed was a century of horror: Saddam Hussein's chemical attacks in Halabja, brutal military campaigns and language bans in Turkiye, execution squads in Iran, and forced displacement in Syria.

None of this horror moves the Western conscience. The silence isn't accidental; it’s a calculated blend of geopolitical self-interest, media-driven algorithms, and an open secret: antisemitism rebranded as moral virtue.

Let's start with the geopolitical game: NATO's convenience. Turkiye, a key NATO ally guarding Europe's southern flank, treats any hint of Kurdish self-rule as a threat that must be crushed. When Western armies needed ground forces to fight the Islamic State (ISIS) in Syria, they armed Kurdish fighters and praised them as heroic defenders of democracy. Kurdish men and women died by the thousands doing the West's dirty work. But once ISIS was defeated, Western leaders discreetly withdrew their support, effectively turning their backs on the Kurds and handing the keys back to Turkiye.

Western outrage, as much as it may be virtue-signaling, is easy when there's no invoice attached. Condemning Israel carries almost no real cost; it's a low-risk, high-reward exercise in self-righteousness. Championing the Kurds, however, requires calling out allies, rattling NATO, and challenging borders drawn by Western powers. The sobering truth for the Kurds: they're useful on the battlefield but invisible at the negotiating table.

Second, the Kurdish struggle doesn't fit the cartoonish contrasts that pass for "Western activism." Today's protest culture thrives on oversimplified, black-and-white formulas: oppressor versus oppressed, white colonizer versus indigenous victim. Western media tends to narrate the Palestinian cause through this framework —casting Israel as a colonial outpost rather than a sovereign nation, a narrative that's then echoed on red carpets, social feeds, and concert stages. It's a convenient, off-the-rack story that requires neither fine distinctions nor historical literacy.

Applying an 'anti-colonial' lens to the Kurds' struggle quickly falls apart. The states oppressing the Kurds —Turks, Persians, and Arabs—are not 'Western colonizers.' They're native Middle Eastern groups whose right to govern is rarely challenged. Without the fuel of a Western proxy to blame, the outrage simply fails to ignite. Acknowledging that Middle Eastern regimes can be brutal imperialists would undermine the story the Western outrage system depends on.

The double standard is baked into the global diplomatic system. International law treats Palestinians as a population under foreign occupation, granting them the legal right to break away and build their own nation. The Kurds, however, are classified as "national minorities" trapped within existing sovereign borders. Under international doctrine, Kurds are entitled only to local cultural rights, not to full independence. Sovereign nations guard this legal loophole religiously, not out of principle but out of fear of encouraging their own minority groups to secede.

Recent history is littered with this hypocrisy. Spain still refuses to recognize Kosovo out of fear for Catalonia; Canada's Supreme Court legally restricted Quebec to internal autonomy in 1998; and when 93 percent of Iraqi Kurds voted for independence in 2017, neighboring regimes immediately deployed tanks to crush the vote. Protecting lines drawn on a map will always matter more to politicians than human beings' freedom to self-determination.

Third, 21st-century journalism has an undeniable self-interest: manufacturing rage-driven narratives to keep the lights on. The Israeli-Palestinian conflict is media crack —reliable, high-octane engagement for newsrooms and algorithms alike. We saw this circus explode when American rapper Macklemore shouted, "Free Palestine!" on stage while opening for Ed Sheeran. After venue owners allegedly pressured Sheeran to drop Macklemore, Sheeran's entire lineup —including his long-time backing band, Beoga, and openers such as Finneas— quit the tour in protest.

Seeing a clear monetization opportunity, Macklemore immediately announced his "Free Palestine Tour," revealing everything you need to know about the rapper's moral compass. (Yes, I'm aware that Macklemore is calling it a "charitable tour.") The media eagerly turned the fallout into a viral feeding frenzy, amplifying every tweet, boycott, celebrity stance, and drop in Sheeran's concert attendance and Instagram followers as social proof of collective outrage.

Beneath newsrooms serving their self-interests lies a demographic reality. Advocacy for Palestinian self-determination commands a built-in global network of nearly two billion Muslims, whose shared identity drives emotional investment across every time zone. It's a ready-made, transnational megaphone. No such global alliance exists for the Kurds. Because their struggle is ethnic and regional rather than pan-religious, the Kurdish cause attracts no international bloc, no global movement, and no sympathy on the world stage, much as nobody outside Britons and ethnic Irish genuinely cared about the Northern Ireland conflict.

Here's where trading in comforting lies needs to stop, and an uncomfortable truth needs to be recognized: the core divide between pro-Palestinian advocacy and the Kurdish fight for self-determination boils down to a simple formula: who pays the price for statehood and who's allowed to monopolize the world's sympathy.

If Israel bequeaths an independent Palestine, Jews pay the price. If Turkiye, Syria, Iraq, and Iran bequeath an independent Kurdistan, Muslims pay the price. That's the entire equation. Western performative outrage explodes in the first scenario because demanding sacrifices from others costs nothing, but evaporates in the second because holding Muslim-majority regimes accountable disrupts their neat, selective anti-colonial script.

This divide exposes the selective morality that governs public commentary. While antisemitism remains an undeniable reality, anti-Israel sentiment provides a sanitized front for age-old prejudices. In a politically correct Western society, echoing overt anti-Jewish conspiracy theories, such as "Jews control the banks" or "Jews start wars for profit," rightly invites condemnation. Disguising those same attitudes as "anti-Zionist critique," however, earns applause in self-identified progressive circles. Israel has simply become a socially permissible surrogate for targeting Jews.

The Kurdish fight carries no repackaged malice to propel its narrative into the global spotlight. It's a localized struggle against neighboring Muslim states. For governments in Ankara, Damascus, Baghdad, and Tehran, surrendering territory for a Kurdish homeland would mean relinquishing land under Muslim control, a zero-sum compromise no regional power is willing to make. Furthermore, Kurds in Iraqi Kurdistan and Rojava have established notably secular, modernized systems centered on pluralism and women's rights. To traditionalist regimes, supporting Kurdish statehood means watching a progressive, egalitarian model thrive at the expense of traditional religious authority.

The final diplomatic nail in the coffin is a matter of regional perception: the Kurds are seen across the Middle East as far too cozy with Israel. In a region where anti-Israel animus is an entry requirement for political legitimacy, any group labelled friendly to the Jewish state is instantly radioactive to surrounding regimes and to Western ideological echo chambers.

Universal values such as self-determination, anti-imperialism, and basic human dignity lose meaning when applied selectively. Deciding who deserves a state based on geopolitical convenience, media hype, or hidden bias destroys the very concept of justice. Loudly demanding freedom for one group while looking away from forty million Kurds isn’t moral courage. It is performative solidarity rooted in double standards.

It’s time for Western governments, cultural icons, media pundits, and street-level marchers to hold their proclaimed moral convictions to a consistent standard. If “Free Palestine!” is the defining rallying cry of today’s selective moral crusade, then moral consistency demands that the uncomfortable question be asked: Why not also “Free Kurdistan!”?

*Nick Kossovan, a self-described connoisseur of human psychology, writes about what's on his mind from Toronto.

Disclaimer: This article is a guest opinion. The views and opinions expressed are solely those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views or editorial position of Shafaq News.

Shafaq News

Iraq's dependence ona single shipping lane for its oil revenue has left it among the countries mostexposed to a prolonged regional war, as analysts warn that the confrontationinvolving Iran is reshaping trade routes, alliances and the balance of global power.

For Iraq, thosecosts are concrete. Almost 90 percent of its oil exports pass through theStrait of Hormuz, and oil accounts for about 90 percent of government revenue.Shipments slumped after tanker traffic was disrupted when the war began in February.They have since recovered: the oil minister said exports exceeded 3.4 millionbarrels per day in October, moving through Hormuz, Turkiye's Ceyhan port andtanker trucks via Syria. An analysis reported by Shafaq News on October 25warned that a renewed closure of the strait could cut Iraq's oil revenues by up to 80 percent, putting salaries, public services, and the dinar at risk.

The Cost Of A LongWar

Myles Caggins, aformer military spokesperson for the US-led Coalition, said that the war andeconomic crisis in Southwest Asia affect the entire world. Rising prices fordiesel, fertilizer and helium in the United States weigh on the Americaneconomy, he said, and the effect extends to Europe and Asia.

Ending the warquickly, Caggins argued, is the best way to limit both economic and humanlosses. He called on the leaders of the United States, Israel and Iran to worktoward a negotiated settlement.

“A deal couldinclude sanctions relief for Iran under agreed terms,” he said, allowing itsreintegration into the global economy and easing the hardship facing affectedfamilies. He noted, however, that talk of an agreement has recurred for monthswithout a clear outcome, and that ending the war depends on whether the partiesare genuinely ready to reach understandings.

Jordanian politicalanalyst Adel al-Ashram described the current period as one of the mostdangerous the world has faced, with conflicts running from the war in Ukraineto the Middle East, Sudan and Ethiopia.

“These conflicts areno longer local because the interests of international and regional powers arenow entangled in them, carrying their effects into energy, trade and the pricesof basic goods,” he said.

The war in Ukraine,followed by the confrontation in the Gulf, pushed up the prices of oil, diesel,gas and food, he said, placing pressure on economies far from any front line.

Al-Ashram warnedthat parties clinging to their goals and refusing concessions could turn tomore dangerous options if they come to believe defeat is near, particularlywith major nuclear powers involved. “Without compromise, the risk of escalationrises, and the course of the conflict becomes harder to predict.”

Read more: Can Iraq’s economy weather a wider regional shock? Experts differ

Corridors AndAlliances

Turkish politicalanalyst Cevat Gök said that rivalry between global powers is increasingly aboutreshaping alliances and controlling the sea lanes and logistics routes thatlink production centers to markets. He pointed to the Strait of Hormuz, the Babel-Mandeb at the mouth of the Red Sea and the Suez Canal, as well as projectsdesigned to strengthen trade links between East and West.

The world isdividing into multiple blocs, Gök said, including NATO, the BRICS group ofemerging economies and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. “Countries thatmaintain varied relationships rather than tying themselves to one camp, citingTurkiye, Brazil, India and the Gulf states, have more room to maneuver and maybenefit from the shifts under way.”

He expects newagreements and broader regional cooperation as states seek to diversify theirpartnerships, though the direction of those alignments will depend on how theconflict develops.

That logic appliesdirectly to Iraq. Its Development Road project, a planned 1,200-kilometer railand highway corridor from the Grand Faw Port in Basra to the Turkish border andon toward Europe, was launched under an April 2024 agreement between Iraq,Turkiye, the United Arab Emirates and Qatar. The first section near the port isalready in use, and the transport ministry says the project remains a priority.Baghdad is also building a state tanker fleet: in early October, its statetanker company moved crude beyond Hormuz for the first time in decades, and theoil minister has pressed for faster purchases of supertankers.

Iraq's room todiversify is narrower on its eastern border. On October 21, Baghdad closed theal-Sheeb crossing with Iran until further notice, officially citing technicaland logistical shortcomings. The move came amid broader US pressure on Iraqover its economic ties with Tehran, while Iran said Iraqi officials hadthemselves referred to US pressure behind problems surrounding the crossing.

Who Gains FromAttrition

Ahmed Fouad, a CairoUniversity professor specializing in Zionist thought, said that the currentconfrontation exceeds the scale of the Cold War but has not reached the levelof a declared third world war. Conflicts stretching from Ukraine to West Africa,Libya, the Palestinian territories, Lebanon and Yemen reflect competitionbetween powers that keep backing their allies whenever fighting eases or thebalance shifts, he said.

The United Statesand Russia are carrying growing military and economic burdens, Fouad argued,while China watches without direct involvement. “Continued attrition of itsrivals could shift the global balance, much as the United States strengthenedits position after entering the Second World War.”

He linked thefailure to settle the confrontation with Iran quickly to political consequencesthat may extend beyond the battlefield, and urged Arab states to coordinatetheir positions, warning that the warring powers could eventually reachunderstandings that serve their own interests at the expense of the region'sstates, resources and strategic corridors.

Mahdi Azizi, anIranian affairs expert, said the current upheaval follows from the events afterthe October 7, 2023 attacks: the war in Gaza, the fighting in Lebanon,political change in Syria and the strikes on Iran. In his view, these form partof an effort to redraw the map of the region and of the Arab and Islamicworlds, with effects that reach regional balances and the future of alliances.

Azizi argued thatthe losses suffered by leaders and factions in the Iran-aligned "Axis ofResistance" do not mean the end of the axis, which he described as an ideanot bound to geography or individuals. “Iran's endurance under US and Israelimilitary pressure pointed to a change in the balance of power, and China'sweight in the international system may grow while Iran remained an influentialregional actor.”

An Open Question ForBaghdad

The analysts'assessments converge on one point: The longer the war continues, the more itscosts will be measured in shipping routes, commodity prices, and the alliancesstates are forced to choose. For Iraq, which earns almost all of its revenuethrough a single strait and is building a corridor meant to bypass it, theoutcome will shape more than its foreign policy.

Read more: Iran’s undersea cable threat raises risks for Iraq

Written and editedby Shafaq News staff.

Shafaq News (Updated on Oct. 28, at 16:37)

Iraq beganintegrating the Sinjar Resistance Units (YBŞ), a Yazidi armed group linked tothe Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK), into federal security forces on Monday,taking control of the highest point on Mount Sinjar. The handover delivers thesecurity half of the 2020 Sinjar Agreement, the half Turkiye demanded, whilethe accord’s administrative terms remain stalled and Erbil, its co-signatory,says Baghdad acted without consulting it.

The mountain holds aparticular place in Yazidi memory. In August 2014, tens of thousands ofYazidis, followers of an ancient monotheistic faith whose heartland is Sinjar,fled up its slopes as ISIS overran the district. The group killed and enslavedthousands in a campaign the United Nations has recognized as genocide. The YBŞemerged from that siege as Yazidi volunteers defended civilians trapped on themountain, trained and supported by the PKK and by Syria's People's ProtectionUnits (YPG). It remained there for a decade outside the state's chain ofcommand, in a border district that links PKK strongholds in Iraq's northernmountains to northeast Syria. That location drew repeated Turkish strikes onits commanders.

Haji Terash, thegroup's representative, told the ceremony that more than 4,000 men and womenhad joined federal forces. Giving up the YBŞ's status as an armed faction, hesaid, "honors the victims of the Yazidi genocide and strengthens Iraq'ssovereignty and stability."

Lt. Gen. SaadHarbiya, representing Prime Minister Ali Al-Zaidi, said taking up arms had beena temporary necessity, and that "weapons must now be held within thebounds of the law and the constitution."

Lt. Gen. Saad Maan,head of Iraq's Security Media Cell, said the process had moved "from negotiationto actual implementation." Committees will assign fighters to the Interiorand Defense ministries, and federal forces are set to take over furtherpositions, including the Qal'a area.

The deal follows ashift that began outside Iraq. In 2025, the PKK announced its dissolution inresponse to an appeal by its jailed leader, Abdullah Ocalan. The YBŞ welcomedthe call and denied any affiliation with the group, yet it still refused tosurrender its weapons in September 2025, according to QasimShesho, then a Peshmerga commander in Sinjar. In February, Yazidi lawmaker Murad Ismael of the Yazidi Cause Allianceproposed folding the force into state institutions. Al-Zaidi announced thehandover after receiving Ismael and YBŞ leaders on September 11.

The Syrian Precedent

The YPG connectionplaces Sinjar inside a wider regional pattern. In Syria, the YPG-led SyrianDemocratic Forces (SDF), which controlled the country's northeast, completedtheir integration into the Syrian army on August 25, according to commanderMazloum Abdi. That deal absorbed SDF brigades as whole units and requirednon-Syrian fighters to leave. Even so, Kurdish politician Ilham Ahmed told aforum in Erbil this month that the process remains in a testing phase.

Thepublished terms in Sinjar are thinner. Baghdad has pledged to integrate "qualified" fighters without saying whether they will serve together in Sinjaror be dispersed, who will command them, what happens to those found ineligible,how heavy weapons will be handled, or whether the salaries they have long drawnthrough the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF), the state-funded umbrella ofmostly Shiite armed groups, will follow them.

The Yazidi CauseAlliance has already staked out its reading. In a statement on Monday, it saidintegration does not mean dissolving the units or ending their members’ role, andinsisted that Sinjar’s residents continue to share in securing their own areas,with respect for the district’s particular character. The alliance creditedmediation by the Norwegian Centre for Conflict Resolution (NOREF) in reachingthe deal. Baghdad has yet to say if its terms will meet that expectation.

Security expertMukhalad Al-Darb told Shafaq News that the fighters' knowledge of the terraincould strengthen state control and help federal forces coordinate with thePeshmerga, the Kurdistan Region's armed forces, in the areas betweentheir zones of responsibility.

Ankara's Conditions

On September 23 in New York, Al-Zaidi and TurkishPresident Recep Tayyip Erdogan agreed to restore full state authority in Sinjarand end the presence of "proscribed foreign armed elements." Theagreement paired the gradual handover of Turkiye's Bashiqa-Zilkan camp nearMosul with that progress. Ankara has since said any broader reduction of itstroops in Iraq depends on dismantling the PKK and affiliated structures,particularly in Sinjar.

Ankara has signaled it is satisfied. On Wednesday, Turkiye’sDefense Ministry welcomed Baghdad’s moves in Sinjar as serving the goal of a "terror-free region," and said security progress there had allowed arrangementsto move ahead for handing over Bashiqa-Zilkan under the agreed mechanism andtimetable.With the US-led coalition gone since September 30, Turkiyenow maintains the main foreign military presence left in Iraq.

For Al-Zaidi, Sinjaris the cleanest result of a disarmament drive that has moved slowly elsewhere.He has set June 30, 2027, as the deadline for armed factions, most of themIran-aligned groups within the PMF, to place their weapons under state control,and talks with them center on handing arms to the PMF Commission. The YBŞ isheading the opposite way, out of the PMF's orbit and into the regularministries. A small minority force, isolated by the PKK's dissolution and undersustained Turkish pressure, settled first. The powerful factions are stillnegotiating terms.

Erbil Outside TheRoom

Erbil's absence cutsagainst the Sinjar Agreement itself. Signed by Baghdad and the KurdistanRegional Government (KRG) with UN backing, the accord required unofficial armedgroups to leave the district. It handed security to federal and local policeand the National Security Service, and called for an independent mayoracceptable to both sides.

Sinjar lies at thewestern end of an arc of disputed territories, running through Kirkuk toKhanaqin, that Baghdad and Erbil both claim. Article 140 of the constitutionset out normalization, a census and referendums to settle their status, andnone has taken place. Peshmerga forces held Sinjar until October 2017, whenfederal troops backed by the PMF took control after the Kurdistan Region'sindependence referendum.

Security acrossthose areas has since rested on overlapping forces. In 2021, Baghdad and Erbilagreed on a joint plan for four coordination centers in Kirkuk, Diyala, Makhmurand Mosul, to close the gaps between federal troops and the Peshmerga. The planis now suspended; each side blames the other, and ISIS has continued to exploitthose gaps. The YBŞ itself called state control of weapons essential topreventing ISIS's return, while the mechanism designed to secure the groundbetween the two forces sits idle.

KRG InteriorMinister Reber Ahmed said on Tuesday that Baghdad’s deal with Ankara overBashiqa is unlikely to succeed without Erbil, noting that the camp "lies behindPeshmerga lines.” “Experience has shown that such arrangements will not succeedwithout consulting and coordinating with the Kurdistan Regional Government," hesaid.

The objection concerns process rather than substance: Ahmed called the PKK’spresence in the Kurdistan Region "unlawful from the outset" and backed itsdisarmament.His ministry went further in a statement,saying Baghdad had imposed security arrangements in Sinjar unilaterally,without consulting Erbil, in violation of the 2020 agreement. Arrangementsimposed outside legitimate institutions and without local acceptance, itwarned, would further complicate the situation. It called full implementationof the accord the only viable solution.

Erbil’s distance extends to the forces on the ground. HaidarShesho, commander of Peshmerga forces in Sinjar, told Shafaq News that hisunits were not party to the agreement. "Our forces took no part in thenegotiations, and we do not know to what extent the Peshmerga Ministry wasinvolved," he said. With Peshmerga and army positions overlapping in severalareas, securing the border and the district’s troubled pockets depends oncoordination between the two forces. Haidar Shesho said the deal could benefit Sinjar ifit brings stability and Baghdad takes responsibility for protecting residents,and that no security or administrative arrangement should be imposed on themwithout their participation. He also urged Baghdad and the KRG to let theSinjar Peshmerga operate officially in coordination with federal forces,leaving the YBŞ as only one of the district’s armed forces whose status has yetto be resolved.

Lt. Gen. (ret.) Jabbar Yawar, former secretary-general ofthe KRG’s Peshmerga Ministry, argued that only police should operate insideSinjar town. Brig. Gen. (ret.) Adnan Al-Kinani proposed a joint committee ofcommanders from both governments so the new arrangement doesn't remain aset of temporary field measures.

A District Without ASettled Administration

Within Nineveh, thefight over who runs Sinjar has frozen the administrative track. On theprovincial council, the Babylon Movement, a Christian party linked to a PMFbrigade, has faced off against the Unified Nineveh Alliance and the KurdistanDemocratic Party (KDP), the dominant party in Erbil, over the district's topposts.

On October 22, KDP council bloc head Ahmed Al-Kiki pushed for freshnominations and rejected any single figure's claim to speak for all Yazidis. Aday later, a parliamentary committee ordered the council to stop. It saidneither post was vacant because courts had upheld the incumbents' election, Sido Khairi and Dawood Jundi, and it opened a fact-finding inquiry. Haidar Shesho called for a competent administrator for Sinjar andits Sinuni subdistrict, chosen on merit rather than party quotas.

Baghdad has proposed its own way out. Sabah Al-Numan, spokesman for the commander-in-chief, saidonWednesday that the operations on the mountain had been conducted entirely underfederal authority, and that the government aims to end displacement and pavethe way for local elections in Sinjar, so residents can choose anadministration that represents them. The KRG’s statement arrived at a similarend point from the opposite side: if the 2020 agreement proves difficult toimplement, it said, the decision should rest with Sinjar’s residents, particularlyYazidis. Baghdad and Erbil disagree over how the handover was carried out, yetboth now name the same final arbiter.

Return Remains TheMeasure

For displacedYazidis, the test is return. About 110,000 Sinjar residents still live in campsin the Kurdistan Region's Duhok province, according to Duhok's displacementdepartment, and another 170,000 live displaced outside them. Fewer than 30percent of Sinjar's pre-2014 population had returned by last year.

Violence hasreversed past returns: after clashes between the army and the YBŞ in March2025, families who had gone home moved back into the camps. The current returnprogram, run with the International Organization for Migration, gives eachfamily 1.5 million dinars (about $1,144) and transport for its belongings, withno money for home repairs.

"Even withreduced aid, camp life here is still more stable than returning to a place withno security, no schools, and no services," Dian Jafar, head of the Duhokdepartment, told Shafaq News last year.

Nineveh GovernorAbdul Qader Al-Dakhil told the ceremony that the province is preparing acomprehensive plan to rebuild Sinjar, warning that security will remainincomplete without reconstruction and basic services. Yawar listed the minimum:rebuilt roads, water and electricity networks, and restored hospitals, schoolsand homes.

Baghdad now holdsthe summit where Yazidis sought refuge in 2014. Governing the town belowrequires a mayor residents accept, police they trust and homes worth returningto. All three depend on a settlement with Erbil and within Nineveh thatMonday's ceremony left untouched.

Read more: Yazidis struggle to return home a decade after ISIS atrocities: report

Written and editedby Shafaq News staff.

Shafaq News- Baghdad

After weeks of debate over a proposed ban on Waze in Iraq, the Communications and Media Commission (CMC) has ruled out blocking the Google-owned navigation app, shifting attention to whether Iraqi developers can build local alternatives capable of competing for users rather than relying on government restrictions.

Waze has been used in Iraq for years for route planning and real-time traffic monitoring. Drivers, transport and delivery workers, as well as other users, rely on the application for their daily journeys.

Communications Minister Mustafa Sanad had announced plans to ban Waze because of its Israeli origins, initially setting the beginning of 2027 for the move before bringing the date forward to the end of December 2026.

On Thursday, October 22, however, Sanad said there was currently no ban, while maintaining his previous position and predicting that Waze use would decline as Iraqi alternatives entered the market.

A more definitive position came from Baligh Abu Kalal, head of the Executive Body of the CMC, who ruled out banning the application, noting that Waze is now owned by Google, whose services are widely used in Iraq. At the same time, he called for the development of competing Iraqi applications while leaving users free to choose.

Speaking at the Internet Governance Forum in Baghdad, Abu Kalal said banning a Google application because of the nationality of its original developers was not under consideration.

He said the commission supports the Communications Ministry and Iraqi developers in efforts to create local alternatives, while acknowledging that developing competitive applications would not be easy.

Iraqi Alternatives

Amid the debate over Waze, Sanad told Shafaq News that several Iraqi programmers and local companies had approached the ministry with proposals for mapping and traffic-monitoring applications.

The ministry had received several proposals from local developers, he said, predicting that the emergence of such applications would reduce reliance on Waze and eventually leave it with only limited use.

The proposed ban has also drawn interest from Iraqi programmers, some of whom have presented local projects and applications on social media, prompting debate over whether such initiatives could be developed into products capable of meeting users' needs.

Software developer Muamal Tahseen Ali said the issue should be viewed from two perspectives: digital sovereignty and the interests of citizens, while distinguishing between building a strong national alternative and imposing one by banning existing applications.

“Having a national mapping and geographic data system would be an important step toward building an independent digital sector,” Ali told Shafaq News.

He called for support for Iraqi companies and programmers to develop applications capable of competing internationally rather than limiting their ambitions to alternatives designed only for the domestic market.

At the same time, Ali warned that banning an application used by citizens every day required prior technical assessment, particularly because any local alternative would first have to demonstrate that it could provide a reliable and secure service.

“A local application is not necessarily safer or more efficient simply because it is local,” he said, arguing that digital sovereignty cannot be reduced to banning a foreign application but requires an integrated national system for data protection and service development.

Ali said the best way to support Iraqi products was to provide reliable alternatives, publish the results of technical testing and allow local companies to compete under clear standards rather than directing users toward a single option.

User Trust

The challenges facing Iraqi navigation applications extend beyond map design and user interfaces to positioning accuracy, road and congestion updates, service reliability and the protection of personal data.

Programmer and game designer Mustafa Basil Mohammed told Shafaq News that the real measure of an Iraqi application's success was neither its designation as a national product nor the promotional campaigns accompanying its launch, but users' actual experience and the value the service provides.

Iraqi programmers are capable of developing competitive applications, Mohammed said, but their success would depend on demonstrating strong data protection, meeting security standards and ensuring system stability without problems that interfere with daily use.

A successful developer, he added, must offer a product that solves a genuine problem and provides a level of service comparable to established applications. New applications should be available free of charge and should not become platforms dominated by promotional advertising that provides little value to users.

Mohammed called on the government to give Iraqi developers room to present their ideas and allow several competing applications to enter the market, avoiding monopolies or forcing citizens to use a particular program.

The problem, he said, was not a lack of capability among Iraqi programmers but a weak support environment and insufficient investment in software development as a productive economic sector capable of generating jobs and creating scalable local services.

National Digital Policy

Dr. Roshna al-Jaf, an expert in programming and computer technology, said the Waze debate should provide an opportunity to reconsider policies supporting digital applications and help Iraqi developers turn their ideas into practical projects.

Al-Jaf told Shafaq News that the Communications Ministry should open the way for Iraqi programmers to submit credible local projects and applications. Implementing such projects, she added, “did not necessarily have to be limited exclusively to local developers,” as long as Iraqi ideas and initiatives contributed to building national services.

She stressed the importance of involving specialists in programming and cybersecurity in digital projects to “ensure technical efficiency and protect user data.”

Al-Jaf also called for a clear Iraqi policy to govern the internet and digital-services sector, saying she was prepared to provide studies, data and maps to the Communications Ministry “free of charge” if serious steps were taken toward establishing secure Iraqi digital infrastructure and developing the telecommunications sector.

Shafaq News

Iraq's parliament appointed Laith al-Khazali, a seniorleader of the Iran-aligned armed faction Asaib Ahl Al-Haq, as deputy primeminister on October 15, three weeks into a government plan to bring all factionweapons under state control by June 30, 2027. The appointment illustrates whatappears to be a central feature of Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi's approach:factions that cooperate with the state's weapons-control plan gain greater roominside formal institutions, while the most heavily armed groups continue toreject deadlines they did not negotiate.

The factions are where Iraq is most exposed to theconfrontation between the United States and Iran. Most of them run brigadesinside the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF), a state-funded umbrella of mostlyShiite armed groups formed in 2014 to fight ISIS, while keeping their ownchains of command. They are also a major force in parliament. Their politicalwings and allies hold roughly 60 to 70 of the chamber's 329 seats, according tocommon estimates, and up to 97 when broader faction-linked forces are counted.

Since the conflict between Iran on one side and the UnitedStates and Israel on the other began in February, statements issued under thebanner of the Islamic Resistance in Iraq (IRI), an umbrella name used by themost hardline factions, have claimed hundreds of operations against US sites inIraq and the region.

Individual factions have generally not claimed attacks intheir own names. Washington and the Kurdistan Regional Government have accusedIraqi factions of attacks on US forces and on the Kurdistan Region, whileIran's Revolutionary Guard has claimed some strikes on Iranian Kurdishopposition camps there. US and Israeli strikes have also hit faction positionson Iraqi soil.

For years, the factions tied the future of their weapons tothe presence of foreign troops. That argument lost its anchor on September 30,when the US-led Coalition ended its military mission in Iraq. The governmenthad first set the same date as its disarmament deadline, then separated thetwo. Al-Zaidi's staged plan opened on October 1 with a 90-day de-escalationperiod, during which the factions refrain from attacks and receive guaranteesthat US forces will not strike them. Weapons handovers follow, to be completedby the end of June.

The Coordination Framework, the alliance of Shiite partiesthat nominated al-Zaidi and holds a parliamentary majority, endorsed thetimetable at an emergency meeting called by the prime minister on October 2.The alliance includes the political wings of several armed factions, and itsstatement welcomed "the armed factions' commitment to the agreement."

Three weeks in, the truce has held. No attacks on US sitesor facilities have been reported since October 1, and no Iraqi faction hasentered the wider regional conflict. Kataib Hezbollah, the most powerful of thehardline groups, announced on October 1 that it would halt military operationsin Iraq following the US withdrawal, and Sabah al-Numan, spokesman for thecommander-in-chief of the armed forces, said the factions had pledged torespect the 90-day window.

Whether this reflects the plan's success is less clear. Theperiod has also coincided with a pause in military escalation across theregion, which has given the factions little reason to act.

Read more: Iraq's second US troop withdrawal shifts the test to armed factions

Inside The State

Al-Khazali's path into government shows how the plan worksin practice. He is the brother of Asaib Ahl Al-Haq's leader, Qais al-Khazali,and the group is designated by the United States as a terrorist organizationover its ties to Iran's Revolutionary Guard. The group sought the deputypremiership in May and pledged in June to cut its ties with its three PMFbrigades. In August, it handed equipment from two of them to a committee of theinterior and defense ministries, the National Security Advisory and the PMF ata base in Yusufiyah, south of Baghdad.

Sources told Shafaq News at the time that the transferincluded fewer than ten drones, none carrying munitions, and no missiles. Thecommittee's benchmark is the surrender of missiles with a range of 300kilometers or more.

Washington had objected to al-Khazali's nomination, asinitially had former prime minister Nouri al-Maliki's State of Law coalition, asenior partner in the Coordination Framework. According to Shafaq News sources,al-Zaidi secured tacit US acceptance during his September visit in exchange forcommitments on disarmament.

US sanctions on al-Khazali remain in force, and CongressmanJoe Wilson condemned the appointment on the day of the vote. In a reportpublished on October 19, the Middle East Forum, a US think tank, argued thatthe American bet on al-Zaidi had failed once he agreed to bring Iran-alignedforces into the machinery of government.

The government's public account of progress remainsincomplete. Foreign Minister Fuad Hussein told reporters in Washington,including a Shafaq News correspondent, that three of the seven factionsnegotiating with the government had accepted the plan. Al-Zaidi later put thefigure higher, saying five factions had agreed and three had already handedover weapons. He did not name them, say what had been surrendered, or saywhether any transfer met the missile benchmark.

Asaib Ahl Al-Haq, Kataib al-Imam Ali and Saraya al-Salam,the armed wing that Shiite cleric Muqtada al-Sadr separated from his PatrioticShiite Movement earlier this year, have each announced steps towardintegration.

Pressure is also building inside the ruling coalition. OnOctober 6, a political source told Shafaq News that al-Zaidi had warnedCoordination Framework parties with armed wings against failing to meet theircommitments. A week later, at the Middle East Research Institute forum inErbil, al-Numan said the Coalition's withdrawal "had removed allpretexts" for refusing to place weapons under state control.

The Holdouts

On the day it announced the pause, Kataib Hezbollah deniedreaching any disarmament understanding with the government, saying its weapons"will remain as a trust in the hands of our mujahideen." JaafarAl-Husseini, the group's spokesperson, said the "resistance" was notbound by any timetable issued by a government or political body. The factions'price, he said, is "full sovereignty": the departure of every form offoreign military presence.

Harakat Hezbollah al-Nujaba now rejects any Americanpresence under any label, including military advisers and private securitycompanies. Kataib Hezbollah, whose political wing, the Hoqooq Movement, holdssix parliamentary seats, has gone further. On September 28, its security chief,Abu Mujahid al-Assafi, threatened to work to bring down the government.

The group's secretary-general, Abu Hussein Al-Hamidawi, setout his own model of the state on the day the last Coalition troops left.Having "resistance" forces alongside the official security serviceswas nothing to be sensitive about, he said. "Many countries in the worldhave more than one army."

Even the refusals are formally conditional. Falehal-Khazali, head of the Montasiroun bloc, the political wing of Kataib Sayyidal-Shuhada, told Shafaq News that four factions, Kataib Hezbollah, KataibSayyid al-Shuhada, al-Nujaba and Harakat Ansar Allah al-Awfiya, were preparedto place their weapons under state control if their conditions were met,including the departure of foreign forces and foreign armed groups from Iraq.

Kataib Sayyid al-Shuhada declared its adherence to the planon October 1, provided the other side honors its obligations, although itsspokesman, Kazem al-Fartousi, told Shafaq News that bringing weapons understate control cannot be separated from achieving full sovereignty.

Harakat Ansar Allah al-Awfiya made a similar pledge. Alial-Fatlawi, one of its leaders, told Shafaq News that the factions would handover their weapons voluntarily if Washington respects Iraqi sovereignty, andcould not do so if it does not. "The resistance is a reaction, not anaction," he said.

Jawad al-Dahlaki, a security expert, told Shafaq News thatevery faction had privately accepted the 90-day window and that the publicrefusals were aimed at a domestic audience. The record so far supports him onlyin part: the halt in operations has held, but the hardline arsenals remain inplace.

The factions' conditions also reach beyond Washington. Theydemanded the withdrawal of Turkish troops from northern Iraq, where Ankara haskept military positions for years in its campaign against the KurdistanWorkers' Party (PKK), the Kurdish militant group that has fought the Turkishstate since 1984 and is now in a peace process. That withdrawal has so far beenpartial. On September 23, al-Zaidi and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoganagreed that Turkish forces would gradually hand the Bashiqa-Zilkan camp nearMosul to Baghdad, an arrangement limited to that base. Ankara has tied anythingbroader to the PKK.

Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan linked furtherreductions to Baghdad's plan to disarm the group and its affiliates in Sinjar,and on October 20 Defense Minister Yasar Guler said Turkiye would keep itsforces in Iraq, estimated at 800 to 1,000 troops, until its border security isfully guaranteed. The PKK said on October 8 that it had evacuated fourpositions in Iraq's Metina area. The factions' demand that Turkish forces leavebefore they disarm now meets Ankara's demand that Baghdad disarm the PKK beforeTurkish forces leave.

Iran's position remains a decisive variable. Sources toldShafaq News in August that Esmail Qaani, commander of Iran's Quds Force, urgedthe factions not to disarm for now, while warning them against armedconfrontation with the government.

US analysts disagree on what Tehran wants from them next.Ross Harrison, a senior fellow at the Middle East Institute and author ofDecoding Iran's Foreign Policy: Strategic Interests, Power and Influence, toldShafaq News that Iran now intends to project deterrence through its ownmilitary capabilities rather than relying mainly on regional allies.

Jason Campbell, also a senior fellow at the Middle EastInstitute, reads it the other way. With Lebanon's Hezbollah weakened, he said,Tehran is leaning more heavily on Yemen's Houthis and the Iraqi factions topreserve its influence. In this view, Iran has little reason to let itsstrongest Iraqi allies disarm.

Read more: How Iran’s ‘unity of fronts’ strategy is changing across the Middle East

The Road To June

Much of the substance will be settled in the legislationgoverning the PMF. On September 30, the cabinet approved a PMF bill and sent itto parliament. Abu Turab al-Tamimi, a lawmaker from the Badr Organization, oneof the oldest Iran-aligned groups, with both a parliamentary bloc and brigadeswithin the PMF, told Shafaq News that talks run on two tracks: laws on thePMF's structure and its members' service, and a "sovereignty"proposal under which factions would transfer their arsenals into the PMF ratherthan surrender them.

Senior Coordination Framework leaders have preferred todescribe the process as "regulating" weapons rather than disarmament,language intended to ease faction resistance. Critics say the formula wouldlegalize the weapons; supporters say it would bring them under state command.Abdul Qader al-Nayel, an Iraqi political researcher, warned that the bill couldentrench a dual structure in security decision-making, the arrangementAl-Hamidawi describes as normal.

The decisive date is therefore not June 2027 but the end ofthe truce, around the turn of the year. Until recently, it faced two risks: aUS strike or a faction attack. A third has since emerged. Concern over renewedUS-Iran fighting is growing, and on October 20, Baghdad ordered the Al-Sheebcrossing with Iran closed from the following morning until further notice,officially citing technical reasons.

Campbell described Washington's wider demand to seal theborder as unrealistic. Iraq serves as an economic outlet for Iran, he said, andclosing the frontier would require a complex military effort in areas whereIran-aligned factions hold influence on the ground. The border and thedisarmament plan now depend on the same actors. If war resumes, the factionswill not need to break the truce themselves to renew their case for keepingtheir weapons.

Written and edited by Shafaq News staff.

Shafaq News- OPINION

By Ali HusseinFeyli*

Kurdish concernsover Iraq’s political and security landscape are not merely emotional ortemporary, but reflect a deeper sense of existential anxiety and a realisticassessment shaped by historical tragedy, the hard numbers, and harsh geographicrealities. Any observer viewing this equation from outside the Kurdistan Regionwill struggle to understand such concerns without examining the events thatcontinue to carry considerable weight in the Region’s collective memory.

The politicalhistory of Iraq’s Kurds is marked by a succession of broken promises andagreements that lacked effective guarantees. Kurdish experience has reinforceda belief that decision-making centers in Baghdad, regardless of the ideology ofthe ruling authority, tend to impose their dominance and retreat from previousunderstandings once they regain strength.

From the violationof the March 11, 1970 agreement to the 1975 Algiers Accord, followed by theAnfal campaign and the chemical attack on Halabja, these episodes have contributedto a political consciousness that views the absence of international guaranteesas a warning sign for Kurdish national gains. Written commitments, in thisview, remain vulnerable when they are not supported by a balance of power onthe ground.

Read more: Kurdistan Region faces air-defense gap as US troops leave Iraq

Despite thebitterness of this legacy, Kurdish leaders have continued to extend a handtoward peace and dialogue, particularly since 2003, when they helped build Iraq’snew institutions and draft its Constitution, with figures such as KurdistanDemocratic Party (KDP) leader Masoud Barzani and former Iraqi President JalalTalabani playing central roles in bringing political forces together andbuilding national consensus.

Kurdistan RegionPresident Nechirvan Barzani’s address at Baghdad’s “Sovereignty Day” ceremonyon Oct. 1, 2026, reflected the same approach, as he wore an Iraqi flag pin anddelivered a roughly seven-minute speech in Arabic aimed at Iraqis across thecountry rather than a specifically Kurdish audience.

On the securityfront, the departure of US-led Coalition forces could leave a vacuum throughwhich security threats may emerge. During the war against ISIS that began in2014, the Kurdistan Region lost more than 1,800 Peshmerga fighters and sawaround 10,000 others wounded along a frontline stretching more than 1,000kilometers.

Today, thosesecurity concerns overlap with continuing disputes over the Kurdistan Region’sbudget and the deliberate obstruction of the full implementation of Article 140of the Iraqi Constitution. More than two decades after the Constitution wasadopted, leaving this obligation unresolved has reinforced Kurdish perceptionsthat a policy of imposing faits accomplis is taking precedence over legal andequitable solutions.

In the Kurdishpolitical consciousness, this obstruction goes beyond administrative failureand has become a threat that recalls policies of demographic change and theseizure of agricultural land, deepening doubts over commitment to the nationalsettlement on which post-2003 Iraq was built.

Read more: The evolution of Kurdish power in Iraq

Another source ofconcern is the activity of armed groups operating outside the state and itsofficial chain of command. Such groups have targeted the Kurdistan Regiondozens of times as a means of military signaling and pressure, strikingeconomic infrastructure, airports and energy facilities with rockets anddrones, weakening the investment environment and disrupting Erbil’s economicand political situation.

Internationalprotection therefore occupies an important place in Erbil’s strategiccalculations as a security necessity at the current stage. Historically, suchinvolvement was not the result of a unilateral Kurdish decision: the policiesof Saddam Hussein’s government prompted the international community toestablish a “safe haven” for the Kurds in 1991, while the Coalition formed in2014 entered Iraq at the formal request of the federal government in Baghdadand in partnership with Erbil.

Over the past twodecades, the international presence has also served as one factor in balancingexternal influence inside Iraq. As that military umbrella recedes, concerns aregrowing that internal pressure could converge with pressure from neighboringstates, particularly given the Kurdistan Region’s geopolitical position as alandlocked territory.

Yet the experienceof international protection confronts the Kurdish leadership with a basicreality: external support shifts with changing interests and offers nopermanent guarantee, making its value dependent on the time it provides tobuild domestic safeguards, resolve disputes, and consolidate a constitutionalpartnership capable of enduring changes in international positions.

The other side ofthe dilemma is the transition of pressure from military threats to legal andfinancial restrictions, weakening the Kurdistan Region as a political entityand threatening to reduce it to a constrained local administration whilestripping Iraq’s federal system of its constitutional substance. Such a coursewould undermine the principles of consensus and national partnership and openthe way for majority dominance.

At the same time,the Kurdistan Region bears responsibility for addressing its internal problemsand developing a more stable strategy for managing relations with Baghdad.Internal Kurdish divisions have weakened its ability to preserve the politicalweight it once held as a “kingmaker” and reduced its leverage in confronting anincreasingly uneven balance of power.

These concerns,however, do not amount to shirking national responsibility, nor are they a toolfor political maneuvering or an attempt to diminish Iraq’s standing; rather, theyhighlight a test facing the country at a rare opportunity without external “guardianship”:whether sovereignty can become a guarantee for the security of all itscomponents and federalism can move from constitutional text to a genuinepartnership that protects rights and gives coexistence a stable foundation.

Read more: Nearly four weeks of attacks on the Kurdistan Region of Iraq

* Ali Hussein Feyli,Chairman of the Shafaq Foundation for Culture and Media and former member ofthe Kurdistan Region Parliament.

This article wasoriginally written in Arabic.

Shafaq News

Theco-leader of the Iranian Kurdish opposition Party of Free Life of Kurdistan(PJAK), Amir Karimi, has set no date for his party to give up its weapons, butsaid they would fall silent once Kurds in Iran can pursue their demands throughdemocratic politics and the law, within “a decentralized, democratic andfederal Iran free of ethnic or religious domination.”

In an exclusive interview with Shafaq News in Erbil, Karimi discussed Iran's future if the IslamicRepublic falls, the party's ties with foreign powers, the prospect of a newmilitary confrontation, and its relations with Baghdad and Erbil. He insistedthe party is independent and denied receiving support from the United States orany other foreign power, while saying it has the right to diplomatic relationswith any party.

His remarkscome at a sensitive time for Iranian Kurdish opposition groups, which face twoparallel challenges: securing a place in any change of power in Tehran, andmounting security pressure on their headquarters in the Kurdistan Region ofIraq, where their sites have come under repeated missile and drone attacks inrecent months.

A FederalIran

Karimi doesnot envision simply rebuilding a centralized state under different leadership."Our project for the Iran of the future is to establish a decentralizeddemocratic Republic of Iran," he said, with power distributed through afederal system based on the will of the population and direct democracy inlocal government.

He framedthe project as a matter of self-determination, a principle he said the partiesin the coalition of Iranian Kurdish groups had adopted unanimously.

Askedwhether that right could ultimately lead to independence, Karimi did not ruleout secession outright, but said the party was ready to accept a united Iran ifnational identity were redefined and the rights of its peoples guaranteed in anew constitution.

"Iranianidentity needs to be redefined so that all identities can find themselves init," he said, adding that the legitimacy of any future state would dependon the free participation of its communities and guarantees of self-government,women's rights, and freedom of organization and expression, without ethnic orreligious discrimination. “An Iran that meets those conditions will be a commonhomeland for all the diversity within Iran's geography.”

The visionis not limited to Kurds, Karimi said, but extends to Arabs, Baluch, Azeris andIran's other ethnic and religious communities, each sharing in running thecountry while keeping the right to govern itself. The Kurdish issue, in hisview, is less an ethnic conflict than the result of an absence of democracy andthe dominance of a centralized nation-state, and solving it depends on changingthe nature of Iran's political system.

Read more: Baghdad, Tehran step up coordination on Iranian armed groups in Kurdistan

Weapons AsSelf-Defense

The futureof PJAK's armed wing has drawn new attention since the Kurdistan Workers' Party(PKK), with which it has historically shared ideological and organizationalties, announced in May 2025 that it was dissolving and ending its armedstruggle against Turkiye. Karimi rejected any automatic link. "The PKKmakes its own decisions, and PJAK's decisions are made by our leadership,"he said, stressing that his party does not adopt armed struggle as a strategyfor national liberation in the manner of 20th-century movements.

The Kurdishcause in Iran is political at its core and needs a political settlement, Karimisaid, but Iranian authorities treat Kurdish demands as a security and militarymatter, which he said makes self-defense necessary in the face of repression.

"Forus, weapons are not a strategy but a means of self-defense," he said. “Thereal problem is not that Kurds carry arms, but the absence of political andlegal channels to address their demands.”

"Wheneverdemocratic politics and the law become the main mechanism for resolving ourpeople's cause, the weapons will fall silent and will no longer beneeded," Karimi said, without offering a timetable or specific mechanismfor moving from armed activity to politics.

Read more: Iranian Kurdish opposition rejects disarmament in Iraq

WashingtonAnd Israel

Karimidenied that his party had received aid or support from any party, including theUnited States. "We have the right to have diplomatic dealings with anypower or party," he said, but drew a line between political relations anddependence on outside powers. "We are an independent movement, and wemaintain that independence."

Any foreignrelations, he said, must be measured against the rights and interests of theKurdish people and the future of democracy in Iran.

Asked aboutpossible contacts with Israel, Karimi did not say directly whether any channelsexist, stressing only the party's right to deal diplomatically with variousparties out of “political realism rather than ideology.”

He alsodeclined to commit in advance to joining any new war between Iran and theUnited States or Israel. PJAK is present and active inside Iran and is notwaiting for any foreign power to open the way, he said. "We don't needanyone to make room for us. We create our own opportunity." The party willact "wherever and whenever it is needed for freedom and to protect theexistence of the people," he added, describing its fight as "a warthat is ours and for us."

TestingKurdish Unity

In February2026, five Iranian Kurdish parties announced the Coalition of Political Forcesof Iranian Kurdistan: PJAK, the Democratic Party of Iranian Kurdistan (KDPI),the Kurdistan Freedom Party (PAK), the Khabat Organization of IranianKurdistan, and the Kurdistan Toilers Association (Komala)

Karimidescribed the coalition as the product of a shared reading of opportunities andrisks but said that was not enough to hold it together. "We should notunite only based on shared opportunities or risks," he said, calling for asolid political program and deep dialogue on the parties' roles and strategy.“Their ideological and political differences should remain but serve as groundsfor dialogue rather than exclusion. “

He calledthe coalition "a special experience and a training ground fordemocracy" that he hopes could serve as a model for Iran after anypolitical transition.

Baghdad andErbil

The presenceof Iranian Kurdish opposition groups in the Kurdistan Region has long been asensitive issue between Baghdad and Tehran. In March 2023, Iraq and Iran signeda security agreement on border control and preventing Iraqi territory frombeing used for attacks on neighboring countries. In September that year,Baghdad said it had moved the groups away from the border, ahead of treatingtheir members as civilians. Tehran has continued to demand that they bedisarmed, and a joint high-level security committee discussed the issue againin May 2026.

Severalheadquarters of Iranian Kurdish parties in Erbil and Al-Sulaymaniyah have beenattacked this year, and Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) hasclaimed some of the strikes. Political sources told Shafaq News on Wednesdaythat Iraqi leaders are discussing a proposal to move the groups out of theKurdistan Region to a center elsewhere in Iraq, with Al-Muthanna province inthe south among the options.

Karimi saidthat his party has never used Iraqi territory for operations against Iran andhas had no disputes with either Iraqi authority. "Over 22 years of ourstruggle, we have had no problem with either the Kurdistan Regional Governmentor the Iraqi government," he said, adding that the party's forces andmembers are based and active inside Iran. "We have never used Iraqiterritory for activities against the Islamic Republic."

Read more: Iraqi–Iranian Security MoU rekindles a decade of border deals—and old controversies

After theIslamic Republic

Toppling theIslamic Republic of Iran alone is not enough, Karimi warned, if the rules ofgovernance are not rewritten, as a new government could reproduce political andethnic domination in a different form. "No group or identity should beallowed to impose its dominance for any reason," he said, calling forpublic and local administration to rest on councils and institutions so that noindividual or group can monopolize power.

He alsorejected what he called a "dictatorship of the majority," calling forconstitutional and legal guarantees to protect minorities even under ademocratic electoral system. In such a system, he said, his party would seeitself as part of the political process "whatever the electionresults."

Karimiacknowledged that his party also fears that rivalry between ethnic groups andarmed parties could turn into a new conflict if the Islamic Republic'sinstitutions collapse. “Iran's ethnic and religious diversity is a source ofrichness, but could become a source of conflict if combined with extremenationalism, religious extremism and a weak culture of dialogue, especially ifforeign powers exploit the divisions.”

For thatreason, he urged that a new social contract be negotiated before any transferof power rather than after the fall of the government, pointing to his party'srole in the Free Congress for Iran, a front with pro-democracy Iranian forcesthat “allows such disputed questions to be discussed.”

Founded in 2004, PJAK is one of the main IranianKurdish groups opposed to Tehran. It follows the doctrine of "democraticconfederalism" developed by PKK founder Abdullah Ocalan, and its armedwing has fought intermittent clashes with Iranian forces, particularly theRevolutionary Guards, from bases historically in the Qandil mountains on theIraq-Iran border. Tehran accuses it of armed activity against the state, andthe US Treasury designated PJAK in 2009 under

Read more: Interior Minister: Attacks target KRI from all sides

Shafaq News

A series of ISISattacks in and around Kirkuk between October 5 and 14 has renewed concern overthe ability of small cells to exploit rugged terrain and gaps between Iraqiforces, in the first weeks after the US-led Coalition ended its militarymission in Iraq.

The incidents rangedfrom armed attacks on security positions and surveillance equipment to roadsidebombings. On October 5, militants attacked a Federal Police position in Hawijadistrict, southwest of Kirkuk, killing one officer and wounding four. The nextday, they hit a Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) position in the same village.Both times, they went after thermal cameras.

The deadliest cameon October 14, when a roadside bomb struck troops inspecting the site of anIraqi airstrike on ISIS hideouts in Wadi Zghaitoun, southern Kirkuk. It killedBrig. Gen. Ahat Yasser Khudair Hussein, communications chief of the army's 11thInfantry Division, and two soldiers. Iraqi forces have responded with searchoperations and airstrikes against suspected ISIS hideouts.

Weakened, NotDefeated

ISIS has not beenfully eliminated, but it is at its weakest since 2014 and lacks the militaryand financial means to seize territory or rebuild its so-called caliphate,according to Lt. Gen. Jabbar Yawar, the Kurdistan Region's adviser on militaryand security affairs and a former secretary-general of the Ministry ofPeshmerga Affairs.

Since 2017, mostISIS attacks have been concentrated in Diyala, Saladin and Kirkuk, Yawar toldShafaq News, carried out by small cells of three to five members who use theirknowledge of the area to stage ambushes, bombings and kidnappings beforedisappearing. “Such attacks demand vigilance and stronger intelligence work,but do not show that the group can regain its former influence, given theimproved capabilities of Iraqi and Peshmerga forces and the changes in Iraq andSyria.”

Calls foraccountability

Ahmed Dagheral-Moussawi, a member of the Iraqi parliament's security and defense committee,said the repeated attacks are "a serious security indicator" thatrequires a review of security and intelligence plans and of the performance ofmilitary commanders.

ISIS is trying tosend a message that it still exists, al-Moussawi told Shafaq News. He calledfor commanders to be held accountable for any breach that went undetected orthat exposed a misjudgment of the situation, and for the attacks to beinvestigated. Parliament, he said, should summon the commanders responsible,demand detailed reports on the breaches and set deadlines for carrying outsecurity recommendations.

Where The CellsOperate

Most of the attackshave been concentrated in specific areas, particularly southwest of Kirkuk,where ISIS has been active before, according to security expert Sarmadal-Bayati. Their proximity to the lines dividing federal and Kurdistan Regionforces (Peshmerga) lets the group exploit the complexity of the securitydeployment, he said, while rugged and wooded terrain offers places to hide andmove.

ISIS's remainingnumbers are too small to hold ground but large enough to inflict harm on forcesdeployed there, al-Bayati said. He called for more search operations and dronesurveillance, especially over valleys, reed beds and high ground that are hardto watch continuously.

A Battle OfIntelligence

Security expertMukhled al-Darb said ISIS remnants near Kirkuk were exploiting "weakspots" in areas that, according to him, had previously benefited fromCoalition aerial surveillance before the military mission ended on September30. He warned against reading the attacks as a return to the group's formerstrength, saying its “era of controlling territory is over.”

Iraq now needs toreorganize its intelligence work after the coalition's exit, expanding itssources, stepping up surveillance and setting ambushes to detect militantsbefore they reach their targets, al-Darb said, adding that the Iraqi forceshave plans to pursue ISIS and their ground readiness is high, but the currentfight "is a battle of intelligence and security, not a militaryconfrontation" in the traditional sense.

“Iraqi aircraftcould partly make up for the US-led Coalition's surveillance, though the airforce's readiness still needs to be completed.”

Testing The Response

Retired Maj. Gen.Jawad al-Dahlaki said Kirkuk, areas north of the Hamrin Mountains and Al-Azim,and the routes linking them to border areas give ISIS room to move and maintainsupply lines. He explained that cells travel along the Zab, near Kirkuk andErbil, through the al-Dibis and Kuwair junctions and along the Kirkuk–Azimaxis, taking advantage of difficult terrain and areas too vast to garrisonpermanently.

Iraq has not eliminatedall ISIS cells since 2017, al-Dahlaki said, and their members' knowledge of theareas where they operate remains one of the biggest challenges. “Some of therecent attacks may be attempts to test how quickly Iraqi forces respond andwith what firepower, ahead of a change in tactics or targets,” he said, warningthat attacks could increase in the coming period as the group takes advantageof weather and hard-to-reach terrain.

He called for betterintelligence-gathering, including surveillance and interception, to locatecells and track their routes before they reach their targets.

Read more: Discover Iraq: Kirkuk, a city of oil, culture, and conflict

Shafaq News

From ancient Assyrian heritage and Mosul's post-ISISreconstruction to Sinjar's displaced communities and a recovering economy,Nineveh embodies both Iraq's extraordinary past and the challenges shaping itsfuture.

Nineveh has long stood at the crossroads of Iraq's history,culture, and identity. The province takes its name from the ancient city ofNineveh, which became the capital of the Neo-Assyrian Empire and ranked amongthe largest cities of the ancient world.

Today, the province presents striking contrasts. Mosul, itscapital and one of Iraq's largest cities, has regained much of its urban lifedespite the scars of war, while the surrounding plains remain among thecountry's important agricultural areas. To the west, Sinjar continues tostruggle with the legacy of the ISIS genocide against the Yazidis and years ofdisplacement, political disputes, and slow reconstruction.

Across the province, ancient heritage exists alongside thecontinuing effort to rebuild communities devastated by conflict.

Legacy and People

Ancient Nineveh reached its height as the capital of theNeo-Assyrian Empire in the seventh century BCE. Archaeological sites includingKuyunjik and the remains of royal palaces associated with rulers such asSennacherib and Ashurbanipal testify to a civilization known for itsadministrative organization, military power, monumental architecture, andcultural achievements.

The remains of the ancient city's walls and gates stillstand alongside modern Mosul, connecting the contemporary provincial capital toa history stretching back thousands of years.

That heritage suffered another destructive chapter afterISIS seized Mosul and large parts of Nineveh in 2014. The occupation andsubsequent military campaign caused mass displacement, widespread destruction,and extensive damage to religious, cultural, and archaeological sites. Iraqiforces declared Mosul liberated in July 2017, but reconstruction and the returnof displaced communities have continued for years.

Nineveh remains one of Iraq's most ethnically andreligiously diverse provinces. Its population includes Arabs, Kurds, Turkmen,Shabak, Yazidis, Assyrians and other Christian communities, alongside smallerminorities. The province also includes Sunni and Shia Muslim communities aswell as Christians, Yazidis and other religious minorities, with manycommunities concentrated in particular towns and districts.

Arabic is widely spoken, alongside Kurdish, Syriac, Turkmen,and Shabaki, reflecting a social landscape shaped by centuries of migration,coexistence and conflict.

Dr. Layla Salih, head of the Nineveh Antiquities Section,told Shafaq News that the province's diversity remains central to its identity."The diversity of Nineveh is both its strength and its challenge. It iswhat allows the province to survive and rebuild, even after devastatingconflicts," she said.

Read more: Nineveh Council lifts building restrictions on Mosul outskirts amid demographic dispute.

Land and Lifelines

Nineveh stretches from the Tigris River valley and theNineveh Plains to the Sinjar Mountains in the west. It borders the KurdistanRegion and Syria and has for centuries served as a corridor for trade,migration and cultural exchange.

Its geography also shapes its economy. The plains producewheat, barley, vegetables, and other crops, while livestock farming remainsimportant in rural areas. Successive years of drought, declining rainfall andwider water shortages across Iraq have placed increasing pressure onagricultural communities and forced farmers to adapt to more difficultconditions.

The province also contains significant energy and mineralresources. The Qayyarah oil field south of Mosul returned to production aftersuffering extensive damage during the war against ISIS, while limestone, gypsumand sulfur deposits support construction and other industries.

The Mosul Dam on the Tigris, Iraq's largest dam, remainsvital to water management, irrigation and electricity generation. Its operationrequires continued monitoring and maintenance because of longstandinggeological challenges beneath its foundations.

Work and Recovery

Agriculture remains an important source of employment andincome across Nineveh, particularly in the fertile plains surrounding Mosul.Wheat and barley dominate much of the cultivated land, alongside vegetables,orchards, and livestock.

Industry is another part of the province's recovery. TheQayyarah oil field remains an important energy asset, while cement, foodprocessing and other industries provide employment. In Mosul's Old City,workshops and small businesses have also returned as neighborhoods damagedduring the fighting are rebuilt.

Trade has gradually recovered as markets and commercialactivity have returned across Mosul. New roads, rebuilt bridges and therestoration of Mosul International Airport have improved connectivity afteryears of war-related disruption.

The airport was formally inaugurated after reconstruction inJuly 2025, and domestic commercial flights resumed that November. Its firstinternational flight since reopening departed for Medina, Saudi Arabia, inJanuary 2026. Full operations, however, have continued to face licensing andtechnical requirements.

Unemployment, particularly among young people and returnees,continues to challenge a province where years of conflict destroyed businesses,disrupted education and displaced large parts of the workforce.

"Jobs are still scarce, and the scars of the pastoccupation linger. Sustainable diversification is essential to prevent renewedinstability," Mosul-based economist Jamal Shafiq told Shafaq News.

Sinjar's Unfinished Recovery

No account of Nineveh's recovery is complete without Sinjar.

In August 2014, ISIS attacked the predominantly Yazididistrict, carrying out mass killings, abductions, and enslavement in atrocitiesrecognized by the United Nations and several governments as genocide. More thana decade later, thousands of families remain displaced, and many Yazidis arestill searching for relatives who disappeared during the assault.

Return efforts have continued. In 2026, hundreds of familiesregistered or prepared to leave displacement camps in Duhok and return toSinjar with assistance from Iraqi authorities and the InternationalOrganization for Migration. But homes and infrastructure still requirereconstruction, while security and administrative disputes have complicatedefforts to restore normal life. The 2020 Sinjar Agreement between Baghdad andthe Kurdistan Regional Government was intended to address security,administration, and reconstruction, but its implementation remains incomplete.

The result is one of Nineveh's sharpest contrasts: whileMosul has seen visible reconstruction and the restoration of major landmarks,many families from Sinjar are still waiting for the conditions that would allowthem to return permanently.

Read more: The long shadow of Sinjar: Twelve years after the ISIS genocide

Spirit and Heritage

Mosul's Old City offers one of the clearest signs ofNineveh's recovery.

Much of the historic district was devastated during ISIS'soccupation and the battle to retake the city. Since 2018, UNESCO's Revive theSpirit of Mosul initiative, supported by Iraq and international partners, hasundertaken one of the largest cultural reconstruction programs in the city'smodern history.

The Al-Nouri Mosque and its Al-Hadba Minaret, the Convent ofOur Lady of the Hour, and Al-Tahera Church were rebuilt, while the projectrehabilitated 124 heritage houses. UNESCO also rehabilitated 404 classrooms andsupported cultural, educational, and vocational programs as part of theinitiative.

UNESCO has framed the initiative as more than physicalreconstruction, linking the restoration of heritage to cultural recovery,education, and social cohesion.

Music, poetry, visual arts and traditional crafts, includingweaving, woodwork and metalwork, have returned to public life as Mosul'scultural scene recovers. Religious and cultural observances, including theYazidi New Year in Lalish, Christian Easter celebrations and Islamic Eidholidays, remain important markers of Nineveh's diverse social life.

Meanwhile, education is both a casualty of war and afoundation for recovery. The University of Mosul has also continued itsrecovery, with damaged facilities restored and academic life revived. UNESCOhas supported the rehabilitation and modernization of its Central Library,providing digital equipment, preservation systems, and training for librarystaff.

Yet resources are still tight, and many students bearpsychological wounds. Wafaa al-Zubaidi, a primary school teacher in the OldCity, told Shafaq News, "It is not just about teaching; it is abouthealing the minds of children who have lived through destruction."

Read more: Beyond the ruins: Rediscovering Mosul’s spirit

Written and edited by Shafaq News staff.

Shafaq News

By Bakhtiar Sadjadi, University Professor and Cultural Critic

Nechirvan Barzani’s political career is often cited through the language of stability, development, negotiation, and regional diplomacy. These themes are in close association and thoroughly connected. Economic development requires a measure of security; security is difficult to sustain without political understanding; and political understanding becomes harder to achieve when communication gives way to confrontation. In a region marked by numerous conflicts, competing national projects, and the concerns of powerful external actors, Barzani has built much of his public identity around the belief that political problems must be addressed through communication and practical compromise.

This approach should not be understood as a claim that dialogue can resolve every dispute or that Barzani’s political record is beyond criticism. Relations between the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) and the federal government in Baghdad remain complicated, regional tensions continue to shape Kurdish politics, and questions about governance, party influence, and democratic accountability remain important. Supporters argue that Barzani’s willingness to maintain channels of communication, including with actors with whom he might disagree, has helped preserve opportunities for political solutions. This emphasis on dialogue is also reflected in Barzani’s own words: “Iraq’s strength lies in addressing issues through dialogue and understanding” (Presidency of the Kurdistan Region, 2026a). Critics, however, ask whether diplomacy has produced enough concrete progress and whether the same commitment to dialogue is always reflected in domestic political life.

The controversy that followed the MERI Forum provides a significant reason to further examine these questions. The discussion was not simply about one event or its guest list; it raised a wider issue about representation and inclusion. If dialogue is presented as a central political principle, how should that principle be applied when Kurdish parties or political voices believe they have been overlooked? This essay considers Barzani’s central role in Kurdish diplomatic affairs while treating the MERI Forum episode as a turning point for examining the relationship between dialogue abroad and inclusion at home.

1. Nechirvan Barzani’s Approach to Diplomacy

Dialogue is sometimes portrayed as a soft alternative to political power. In a region as complex as the Middle East, however, it can be a demanding form of political work. It requires leaders to keep channels open when public opinion is angry, to recognize that opponents have interests that cannot simply be dismissed, and to seek agreements that may not satisfy every constituency. Barzani’s diplomatic style rests on the premise that political differences are rarely resolved by refusing to speak to those who hold opposing positions. Even when negotiations do not produce a complete settlement, continued contact can reduce misunderstandings and leave room for future agreement.

His relationships with political leaders in Baghdad, Ankara, Tehran, Western capitals, and the Persian Gulf countries have helped him present the Kurdistan Region as a place capable of communicating across competing interests. Such relationships can be useful to a region whose geography and political circumstances make isolation difficult. They can create opportunities to explain Kurdish concerns, seek support, and manage tensions before they develop into larger crises. Yet diplomatic access should not be confused with mediation in every dispute, nor should the ability to meet influential figures automatically be treated as proof of successful conflict resolution.

The strongest case for Barzani’s method is therefore not that conversation alone can overcome every conflict, but that sustained engagement gives political actors a better chance of managing disagreements without violence or permanent rupture. Barzani expressed this principle directly in August 2026, stating that “peace and dialogue are the best options, and that the era for arms and military solutions has come to an end” (Presidency of the Kurdistan Region, 2026b). Its limitations are equally important. Dialogue must be accompanied by clear commitments, institutional follow-through, and accountability. Without these, it can become a performance rather than a means of resolving problems. The relevant question is not simply whether meetings take place, but whether they help produce practical outcomes and whether the people affected by political decisions have a meaningful voice in the process.

This distinction is central to assessing Barzani’s diplomacy. Maintaining relations with different governments is a strategic necessity; however, the credibility of a dialogue-based approach also depends on how it faces disagreements within Kurdish society. Recognizing that tension makes it possible to assess his diplomatic record without either idealizing it or dismissing its potential value.

2. Baghdad and the Significance of Political Partnership

Relations between Baghdad and Erbil have long been among the most difficult challenges facing Iraqi politics. Disputes over the federal budget, oil and gas, disputed territories, border administration, security, and the interpretation of the Iraqi Constitution have repeatedly strained relations between the Kurdistan Region and the federal government. Nechirvan Barzani has generally sought to address these disagreements through negotiation rather than confrontation. His approach reflects the understanding that neither side can secure lasting political stability by ignoring the other’s interests.

A significant recent moment in this relationship came with Barzani’s presence in Baghdad at a ceremony marking the conclusion of the Coalition’s military mission in Iraq, where he delivered a speech in Arabic. The appearance carried significance beyond the occasion itself. It was for the first time in a formal event that he presented his ideas in Arabic. His remarks were framed around the importance of Iraq strengthening its sovereignty and developing confidence in its own institutions. The broader point was that Iraq should be able to manage its affairs and determine its future through its own political institutions, while continuing to engage constructively with international partners where necessary.

Read more: The mediator in the room: President Barzani

This perspective has direct implications for relations between Baghdad and Erbil. A stable Iraq requires a workable partnership between the federal government and the Kurdistan Region, grounded in the Constitution, mutual respect, and a willingness to negotiate unresolved questions. At the MERI Forum in 2023, he put the point succinctly: “The solution to our problems is in Baghdad and nowhere else” (Presidency of the Kurdistan Region, 2023). Strengthening Iraq as a whole need not come at the expense of Kurdish rights or the Kurdistan Region’s constitutional status. On the contrary, cooperation between Baghdad and Erbil is essential to the country’s long-term stability, particularly when disagreements over resources, authority, and security are handled through political engagement rather than threats or unilateral action.

At the same time, dialogue alone cannot resolve disputes when commitments are not followed by practical measures. Critics may reasonably ask whether negotiations have delivered sufficient progress on budget payments, the management of natural resources, and other longstanding questions. The alternative including allowing disagreements to deepen without sustained communication, carries further serious risks. Barzani’s continued engagement with Baghdad is best understood not as evidence that all differences have been overcome, but as a conviction that negotiation remains indispensable to a more stable relationship between the Kurdistan Region and the Iraqi state.

3. Turkey: Supporting a Political Settlement

Turkey represents one of the most sensitive dimensions of Barzani’s regional diplomacy. The conflict involving the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) has shaped Kurdish politics and regional security for decades. It has affected communities on both sides of the border, influenced relations between Ankara and Kurdish political actors, and complicated the position of the Kurdistan Region. For leaders in Erbil, the challenge has been to protect the region’s interests while avoiding a wider confrontation with Turkey, an important neighbor and economic partner.

Barzani’s approach has generally emphasized communication, restraint, and support for political efforts that could reduce the human and security costs of conflict. In a meeting with an Imrali delegation in February 2025, he reiterated that “we have consistently advocated for the peace process and the resolution of issues through dialogue,” adding that history shows “conflict and violence do not resolve disputes” (Presidency of the Kurdistan Region, 2025a). Backing dialogue does not erase the difficult questions surrounding the PKK, Turkey’s security concerns, or the rights and political aspirations of Kurdish communities. Nor does it guarantee that negotiations will succeed. Peace processes can stall, trust can be lost, and political leaders may face pressure from constituencies that regard compromise as a concession. Nevertheless, a negotiated process offers a possibility that military confrontation alone cannot provide: a way to address underlying political grievances and reduce the likelihood of further suffering.

Read more: Nechirvan Barzani: The Man with the Map

The Kurdistan Region must also navigate its own security and economic interests. Its relationship with Turkey has been significant for trade, investment, and energy exports, while military operations connected to the conflict have imposed costs on border communities. A policy of dialogue is therefore both a political principle and a practical necessity. It seeks to preserve relations with a powerful neighbour without treating security concerns as the only questions that matter. Its success, however, depends on whether the parties involved are prepared to move beyond statements and take verifiable steps toward a more durable settlement.

Turkey has a decisive level in Nechirvan Barzani’s diplomatic practice. Maintaining communication can help prevent misunderstandings and preserve opportunities for negotiation; however, constructive relations with Ankara do not automatically resolve the underlying Kurdish question. The measure of diplomacy is not simply whether relations remain cordial, but whether political engagement contributes to a reduction in violence and creates space for a more lasting settlement.

4. Syria: The Challenge of Kurdish Representation

Syria presents a different but equally important test for Kurdish diplomacy. The conflict has displaced millions of people, weakened state institutions, and drawn regional and international powers into overlapping struggles. Kurdish political actors in Syria have sought recognition, security, and a meaningful role in the country’s future, while neighboring states have viewed some developments through the lens of their own security concerns. In this environment, a durable political settlement will require more than a military balance. It will depend on constitutional arrangements, protection for communities, and a political process capable of accommodating Syria’s diversity.

Barzani’s public emphasis on dialogue and political inclusion provides a framework for approaching this challenge. His position and relationships in the Kurdistan Region give him opportunities to encourage communication among Syrian Kurdish actors and to support efforts to ensure that Kurdish concerns are heard in discussions about Syria’s future. Such engagement matters because questions of decentralization, constitutional protection, political participation, and the future governance of Kurdish-populated areas cannot be resolved sustainably if relevant political constituencies are excluded. At the same time, Syria’s circumstances differ from those of the Kurdistan Region of Iraq, and its future cannot simply be modelled on the Iraqi Kurdish experience.

An important part of this discussion concerns the Kurdish National Council in Syria, commonly known by its Kurdish acronym ENKS, a Kurdish political umbrella representing a distinct current within Syrian Kurdish politics. Its political identity and relationships differ from those of other Kurdish forces, and its participation matters because Syrian Kurdish society is not politically uniform. Any serious effort to develop a broadly accepted Kurdish position on Syria’s future must recognize these differences and provide room for competing political organizations to take part.

Barzani’s efforts to encourage dialogue among Syrian Kurdish actors should therefore be assessed in terms of whether they help create conditions for meaningful participation. This emphasis also appears in the Presidency’s account of his June 2026 meeting with ENKS, which said that he “highlighted the influential role of ENKS” and stressed “the importance of ongoing dialogue and understanding among all Kurdish factions” (Presidency of the Kurdistan Region, 2026c). The objective should not merely be to bring representatives together for meetings, but to make dialogue substantial enough that disagreements can be addressed and common positions can emerge where possible. Such efforts are especially important when divisions among Kurdish parties risk weakening their ability to influence discussions about Syria’s future. Dialogue among Kurdish actors and dialogue with Damascus are connected: a representative Kurdish position is more likely to carry weight when it reflects a genuine process of consultation and debate.

At the same time, critics argue that ENKS has been neglected or has not received sufficient inclusion in the political discourse surrounding the Syrian Kurds. This concern deserves consideration rather than dismissal. If a process is presented as an effort to promote Kurdish dialogue but an important political organization believes its voice has been marginalized, questions naturally arise about the breadth of representation and the steadiness of the process. The existence of dialogue initiatives alone does not establish that all relevant parties have been included on equal or satisfactory terms.

It is important to distinguish between encouraging dialogue in principle and ensuring inclusive representation in practice. Barzani’s efforts to promote communication among Syrian Kurdish actors may contribute to a more constructive political environment, but their effectiveness must also be evaluated. The broader lesson is that Kurdish political unity cannot be established simply by asking different organizations to cooperate. It requires recognition of their distinct political identities, a willingness to address disagreements, and a process that participants regard as sufficiently fair and representative. For Barzani, the challenge is not only to encourage dialogue between Syrian Kurdish actors and Damascus, but also to help create the conditions for dialogue among the Syrian Kurds themselves. The credibility of this effort will depend in part on whether ENKS can participate meaningfully in shaping the outcome.

5. Iran: The Difficult Test of Barzani’s Diplomacy

Relations with Iran present a particularly delicate challenge for the Kurdistan Region. Geography, trade, shared borders, and long-standing political connections make engagement with Tehran unavoidable, while regional rivalries and security concerns can place Erbil in a difficult position. The Kurdistan Region must maintain workable relations with Iran without losing the ability to pursue its own interests or preserve its relationships with Baghdad, the United States, and other international partners. This requires a careful balance rather than automatic alignment with any one external power.

Iran is not simply another neighboring state in the region’s diplomatic landscape. It has significant political, economic, and security influence in Iraq, and developments in the wider confrontation between Iran and the United States does have direct consequences for Iraqi territory and Kurdish security. The Kurdistan Region may find itself exposed to pressures that it did not create. Its leaders must therefore consider how to preserve channels of communication with Tehran while avoiding actions that could unnecessarily intensify tensions or compromise the region’s constitutional position within Iraq.

Barzani’s diplomatic approach has generally favored maintaining communication even when the regional atmosphere is tense. Speaking about Iran in 2023, he described it as “an important neighbor” and said that he wanted concerns arising from the shared border “to be resolved through dialogue” (Presidency of the Kurdistan Region, 2023). Such engagement can help reduce the risk of misunderstanding and protect channels that may be needed during a crisis. The value of diplomacy lies in creating room for the Kurdistan Region to explain its position, protect its interests, and avoid becoming a battleground for wider rivalries. Simultaneously, Barzani has called for the resolution of the Kurdish question in Iran. At the MERI forum, he clearly said “the Kurdish question in Iran is not resolved through the refusal of the question.”

A diplomacy of dialogue in relation to Iran must also be judged by its practical results. Maintaining communication can be valuable, but it cannot substitute for clear principles, effective institutions, or a realistic assessment of power. The Kurdistan Region needs to protect its security, economic interests, and constitutional rights while avoiding unnecessary escalation. The wider challenge is to preserve the Kurdistan Region’s room for manoeuvre. Its security and prosperity depend on relationships that cross political divides. Barzani’s approach can be understood as an attempt to preserve options in a dangerous regional environment. Iran is perhaps the clearest example of why dialogue is necessary, and why dialogue, on its own, is never enough.

6. The MERI Forum: Representation and Inclusion

The controversy surrounding the MERI Forum is central to the questions explored in this essay. The issue raised by the event and the subsequent response from Barzani’s headquarters was not only about the organization of a forum; it touched on the broader question of which Kurdish party is represented in political discussions about Syria and Iran, and whose voices are given space. The statement from Barzani’s headquarters disapproving of the forum’s treatment of other parts and political parties of Kurdistan brought the question of inclusion into sharper focus.

Supporters of the forum may argue that diplomatic gatherings operate within political and organizational constraints, and that no event can be comprehensive. Critics, however, may see exclusions as evidence that the language of dialogue is applied selectively, especially when political groups believe that their views or constituencies have been overlooked. Whie we should pay attention to the practical limits of event organization, we should also ask whether the process was sufficiently representative. Therefore, the wider significance of the MERI episode lies in the relationship between diplomatic openness and domestic political inclusion. These are not identical tasks, but they are connected by a common principle: dialogue is most credible when those affected by decisions have a meaningful opportunity to express their views.

In its statement on the forum, ENKS argued that invitations to discussions on Kurdish affairs “should include all political sides” and called for participation “without discrimination or exclusion” (Rudaw, 2026). The statement should be read as a concern about the forum’s arrangements. At the MERI Forum, Barzani again emphasized cooperation between Syria and Kurdish parties on strategic questions. The significance of such discussions depends not only on their subject matter, but also on whether they allow meaningful disagreement and contribute to practical outcomes. Dialogue should not be measured solely by the number of meetings held or by the visibility of the participants. It should also be judged by whether competing views and political engagements help build trust rather than deepen perceptions of exclusion.

7. Political Responsibility and Kurdish Unity

Nechirvan Barzani’s political identity is marked with his long experience of developing KRI and constructive diplomacy. His political legacy too is closely associated with the Kurdistan Democratic Party and particularly that of President Masoud Barzani, to whom he is a deputy in in KDP. These features have helped provide him with an established political base and relations with influential regional and international political figures.

A balanced assessment must recognize both the practical value of his diplomatic approach and the limitations of the regional framework in which he acts. Supporters point to his ability to maintain relationships across competing interests, seek dialogue during periods of tension, and present the Kurdistan Region as a partner in regional stability. Critics ask whether these efforts have translated into stronger democratic context and lasting solutions to constitutional disputes.

Political unity is often invoked as a necessary goal for the Kurds, particularly when regional decisions may shape their future. A similar principle appears in Barzani’s comments on Iraqi political participation: “All Iraqi communities must consider themselves as participants in the political process in the country” (Presidency of the Kurdistan Region, 2022). The future of Barzani’s diplomacy will depend on whether dialogue can be converted into durable results. The Kurdistan Region’s interests will be better served if diplomacy is supported by stronger domestic governance and a political environment in which criticism can be freely expressed.

Conclusion: Kurdistan as a Bridge, Not a Battlefield

Nechirvan Barzani’s political approach is built around a clear proposition: in a region shaped by conflict and competing interests, dialogue is a necessary instrument of political survival and progress. His engagement with Baghdad, his approach to the Turkey–PKK question, his interest in Kurdish participation in Syria, and his efforts to maintain relations with Iran while addressing the Kurish question in Iran all reflect an attempt to preserve room for negotiation in circumstances that often reward confrontation.

His approach should not be romanticized. Dialogue can be slow, compromise can disappoint supporters, and diplomatic visibility does not by itself resolve disputes over rights, resources, or accountability. The strongest assessment of Barzani’s record must therefore consider both his willingness to maintain channels of communication and the concrete results those channels produce. It must also consider the quality of inclusion in political processes, including the questions raised by the recent MERI Forum concerning Syrian an Ianian Kurdish discourse.

The Kurdistan Region has often found itself at the intersection of larger regional struggles. In his October 2026 speech in Baghdad, Barzani described the aspiration as a constitutional, federal, stable, and fully sovereign Iraq that serves “not as an arena for regional tensions but as a platform for constructive dialogue” (Presidency of the Kurdistan Region, 2026a). Barzani’s vision presents it instead as a potential bridge between political actors who need ways to communicate despite their disagreements. Lasting security is more likely to emerge from negotiation, mutual recognition, and accountable governance than from a permanent cycle of confrontation. The challenge is to turn that principle into practical political achievements.

This article was originally published by Kurd Press

Disclaimer: The views and opinions expressed are solely those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views or editorial position of Shafaq News.

Shafaq News

Iran’s threat to target undersea internet cables inthe Gulf signals a push to widen its leverage in any renewed war with theUnited States, four experts told Shafaq News. They warned that a fight overdigital infrastructure could inflict economic and security damage well beyondthe warring parties, including on Iraq.

Mohsen Rezaei, secretary of Iran’s Supreme NationalSecurity Council, warned last Sunday in an interview with state-run Press TVthat communications cables, data centers and artificial intelligence facilitiesacross the region could be destroyed if war resumes. A day later, HosseinShariatmadari, editor of the hardline Kayhan newspaper and the supreme leader’srepresentative there, backed the threat, calling attacks on fiber-optic cablesin the Gulf a “legitimate right” for Iran. He claimed that about seven majorcable systems run along the Gulf seabed and through the Strait of Hormuz, andthat even limited damage could disrupt more than 80% of commercial, banking andmilitary communications.

Saleh al-Qazwini, a writer and researcher on Iranianaffairs, said the threats fit a “like-for-like” approach in the event of afull-scale war against Iran. Tehran could widen its target list if it comesunder full-scale attack, prioritizing US interests, bases and companies in theregion, he told Shafaq News, adding that the scale of any response would dependon Washington’s actions.

Firas Elias, an academic specializing in Iranianaffairs, said the threats point to a shift in modern warfare, withcommunications networks and data flows joining military sites and energyresources as strategic targets.

“Iran is trying to use its position near vital sealanes, as it has with the Strait of Hormuz and oil markets,” Elias said. Hewarned that hitting several cable routes at once could disrupt internationalcommunications, banking and e-commerce, as well as government institutions andcompanies that rely on digital services. But the real impact would depend onwhich targets are hit and whether alternative routes exist, he said, notingthat damage to a single cable would not necessarily cause a wider outage.

Regarding Iraq, Elias said the country would not bespared despite its overland links with neighboring states, as connectionquality, banking services and electronic transfers could suffer if disruptionspreads to more than one regional route. “Communications security should now betreated as part of national and economic security, not merely a technicalmatter,” he said.

Haitham Numan, a lecturer at the University of Exeterin Britain, said Tehran sees the Gulf as a “front line” in its confrontationwith Washington, while pressure on Gulf states may be intended to raise doubtsabout US protection. “Such threats could also push Gulf governments to warnWashington of the risks of a wider US-Iran conflict,” he told Shafaq News,describing the digital threats as a warning that Iran could reach foralternative pressure points, given its limited ability to strike US territorydirectly, and linked them to US threats to cut Iran off digitally afterisolating it economically.

Strategic expert Ahmed al-Sharifi said the threat addsa new dimension to pressure in any new confrontation between Iran, the UnitedStates and Israel, with effects reaching well beyond the telecommunicationssector. Disruption could hit financial markets, bank transfers and theelectronic systems used to manage oil exports, he warned.

According to Al-Sharifi, Iraq is exposed because itsfinancial, administrative and economic services rely on digital connectivity,and wider disruption could strain cash transactions, transfers andenergy-sector services.

Iraq signed an agreement in September with Qatar’sOoredoo to carry data from Gulf countries to Europe across its territory. InSeptember 2025, two cables were cut near Jeddah, slowing internet access acrossthe Middle East and South Asia.

Shafaq News

For Iraqi trader Saleh Salam, a single government decisioncame with a staggering price tag. He lost 300 million dinars (about $197,400)in just one day after Iraq devalued its currency, as importers face a newfinancial reality in which securing dollars through official banks can come atextra costs.

Iraq raised the official dollar selling rate for the publicfrom 1,320 to 1,520 dinars on October 7. Prime Minister Ali Al-Zaidi defendedthe adjustment as a response to mounting fiscal pressures and said speculatorshad benefited from the previous exchange-rate gap, but traders interviewed byShafaq News argued that the decision had increased their costs withoutresolving difficulties in obtaining dollars through official banks.

Higher Costs and Banking Delays

Trader Ali Al-Uqayli said that buying $100 through a bankcosts 152,000 dinars at the new rate, but an additional 12,000 dinars (about$7.90), which he attributed to government requirements, brings the effectivecost to 164,000 dinars per $100.

Bank transfers could take three days or longer, exposingtraders to additional costs, while the Dubai market charges $400 for each dayof delay, he said, reporting an additional burden of 12 million dinars (around$7,895) per kilogram of gold.

Al-Uqayli accused the government of failing to supporttraders and importers, arguing that the additional costs and transfer delaysencouraged businesses to obtain dollars through the parallel market. He warnedthat greater demand outside official banking channels could push the dollarhigher and benefit currency speculators.

Disputed Transfers and Financial Losses

The devaluation also triggered a dispute over paymentsarranged before the exchange-rate change.

Importers and gold company owners protested outside theCentral Bank of Iraq (CBI) in Baghdad over demands for additional payments ontransfers that had received preliminary approval at the previous rate of132,000 dinars per $100. They warned that applying the new rate to earliertransactions could expose businesses to substantial financial losses and calledfor government intervention.

The CBI had clarified on October 10 that traders should not bear exchange-rate differences on transfers purchased and covered at theprevious rate before October 7, adding that it had provided financialinstitutions with funds for eligible transfers and urging traders facingadditional charges or unjustified delays to file complaints through itsofficial platform.

Salam told Shafaq News that the CBI had previously requiredtraders and gold companies to provide additional funds at the new exchangerate. He said those demands stopped after the protest but argued that endingthem was insufficient to protect businesses from losses caused by the suddenadjustment.

Some traders and importers had suffered losses worth“hundreds of millions of dinars,” he said, warning that abrupt governmentdecisions could disrupt businesses supplying food and other goods to Iraqimarkets.

Read more: Why Iraq's dinar keeps sliding despite fresh US cash

Fiscal Relief, Economic Risks

The devaluation came as Iraq faced mounting pressure on itsoil-dependent finances. Finance Ministry figures showed oil revenues falling53% year-on-year during the first seven months of 2026, contributing to a 45.7%decline in total federal revenue.

Addressing parliament on October 8, Al-Zaidi saiddisruptions to oil exports had strained government finances, leaving his administrationfacing alternatives including compulsory savings, paying salaries every 45days, or further borrowing.

The CBI defended the adjustment as a response to pressure onforeign reserves. On October 13, its director general of statistics and research,Samir Fakhri Nima, said Iraq retained sufficient reserves to cover at least ayear of imports despite the oil revenue shock.

Meanwhile, academic Abdul Razzaq Al-Bahadli told Shafaq Newsthat the devaluation primarily aimed to offset the budget deficit by generatingmore dinars from oil revenues earned in dollars. The additional local-currencyrevenue will “help” finance government operations and public-sector salariesbut he described the measure as temporary fiscal relief rather than sustainableeconomic growth.

The weaker dinar, Al-Bahadli cautioned, would reduce thepurchasing power of public- and private-sector employees, leading consumers tolimit or postpone purchases as prices rise. Lower demand could also slowcommercial activity and force producers, factories, and businesses to cut jobs,increasing unemployment and creating wider economic and social pressures.

Shafaq News market checks on October 8 further recordedprice increases of up to 15.4% for selected food staples. The government subsequentlyexempted imported food and medicines from customs duties and reopened importsof potatoes, tomatoes, and onions to ease pressure on household costs.

Written and edited by Shafaq News staff.

Shafaq News- Baghdad

Political blocs in Baghdad are discussing a new ministry for artificialintelligence, yet Iraq's own National Artificial Intelligence Center reportsthat only 19 of the 64 state institutions it assessed have clear plans toprepare for the technology. The issue points to a recurring dilemma in Iraqigovernance: whether new institutions are built to deliver services or todistribute posts.

The idea entered public debate this week when former lawmaker Amiral-Maamouri told Shafaq News that blocs had reached understandings to add newportfolios to Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi's unfinished cabinet. They include aministry for artificial intelligence or digital investment and the division ofthe Ministry of Culture, Tourism and Antiquities into two. Nine of al-Zaidi's23 ministries, Planning among them, are still run by acting officials fivemonths after he took office.

In Iraq, cabinet portfolios are traded under muhasasa, an informalpower-sharing system that divides the state among sectarian and ethnic partiesaccording to their parliamentary weight. Each new ministry adds posts to thatmarket. That is why critics read the AI proposal as a question of politicalbargaining as much as technology policy.

Read more: Iraq weighs new ministries two days after dinar devaluation

A Proposal Without A Sponsor

No one has yet put the ministry forward formally. Hassan Wraiwishal-Asadi, head of the Al-Nahj Al-Watani parliamentary bloc and a member of theparliamentary Electricity and Energy Committee, told Shafaq News that the ideahas not been formally submitted to parliament, arguing that austerity and thecurrent economic conditions weigh against creating new ministries or splittingexisting ones. AI policy, he said, could sit within the Ministry ofCommunications or the Ministry of Higher Education and Scientific Research.

A government source, speaking on condition of anonymity because he wasnot authorized to comment, said some political figures had raised the idea tokeep pace with global developments. The source said it is not an approvedgovernment project, and there is no current intention to name a minister. Itcould return under a future government.

Government spokesman Haidar al-Aboudi did not respond to Shafaq News'request for comment. The National Artificial Intelligence Center, which isattached to the Prime Minister's Office, also had not responded by the time ofpublication.

What The State's Own Data Shows

The strongest case against moving quickly comes from the government'sown figures. According to data published by the National AI Center and cited byresearcher and academic Saif al-Karawi, most institutions covered by itsreadiness assessment have no clear plan for adopting AI. The updated nationalAI strategy has been prepared for circulation to ministries only afterrevisions to meet Ministry of Planning requirements. That ministry currentlyhas no confirmed minister.

The strategy's history shows how slowly Iraq moves from intention toimplementation. Baghdad began developing its first national AI strategy inAugust 2024 under a supreme committee chaired by the prime minister. Two yearsand one change of government later, the document is still being refined.

International benchmarks show the same picture. Iraq ranked 107th of 188countries in Oxford Insights' 2024 Government AI Readiness Index, scoring 40.91out of 100, up from 133rd globally in 2023.

The breakdown in the 2024 index was particularly revealing. Iraq scored32.60 on the government pillar, which covered strategy, regulation, andinstitutional capacity, and 35.87 on technology. Its strongest score, 54.25,came in data and infrastructure. The figures suggested that government capacitywas a greater weakness than physical and data infrastructure —precisely theinstitutional gap a new ministry would be expected to address.

In the latest edition, Iraq ranked 128th in Oxford Insights' 2025Government AI Readiness Index, with an overall score of 29.37. Oxford Insightsrevised the index's methodology that year, meaning the 2024 and 2025 scores arenot directly comparable.

Al-Asadi pointed to a constraint that no institutional chart can solve.Iraq's chronic electricity shortages, he said, pose an additional obstacle torunning the computing systems AI requires. Data centers need stable power, andmuch of Iraq still lives with daily outages.

Read more: Brainpower and bytes: Iraq's race for AI supremacy

The Case For An Institution

Former lawmaker Hussein Arab told Shafaq News that an e-governance or AIministry could serve a practical purpose, because "Iraq still lacks anintegrated electronic system linking its ministries, and most currentconnections are partial." He proposed staffing it with existing civilservants rather than building a new bureaucracy.

Haidar Shalal Mutab, an academic specializing in media andcommunication, said a national AI institution could help Iraq keep pace withglobal change, but only after a realistic assessment of the country'sinfrastructure, telecommunications, education and data integration.

He told Shafaq News that a phased approach drawing on universities andresearch centers was more likely to succeed. “A ministry would be judged bywhether it turns plans into working applications backed by sustainable funding,national expertise and measurable targets, not by the fact that it exists.”

No Single Regional Model

Al-Karawi noted that governments have organized AI policy in verydifferent ways. Kazakhstan has a Ministry of Artificial Intelligence andDigital Development, combining AI with e-government, data management,telecommunications, and information security. The UAE assigns the file to aminister of state for artificial intelligence, the digital economy, and remotework applications rather than a standalone ministry. Lebanon took a similarroute in 2025, appointing a minister of state for information technology andartificial intelligence affairs rather than creating a standalone ministry.

Saudi Arabia chose a different path. It built its effort around anational strategy for data and AI with quantified goals: investment of roughly75 billion riyals, training more than 20,000 specialists and supporting morethan 300 startups. A dedicated authority implements the strategy.

According to al-Karawi, these experiences show that what matters is anintegrated system of data, research and digital transformation, not a ministrycarrying the technology's name. The debate in Baghdad, he said, should movefrom what to call the institution to how its budget would be spent. “The realchoice is whether money goes into technical and research capacity, or into anew administrative structure with posts, directorates and operating allowances.”

Regulation Without A Ministry

Part of the work a new ministry would claim is already underwayelsewhere in the state. Iraq's Communications and Media Commission (CMC), thefederal regulator for broadcasting and telecommunications, has said it ispreparing regulations to govern AI applications. In July, CMC spokesman Haidar Najmal-Allaq told Shafaq News that investment in data centers, cloud computing andcommunications networks should come first, alongside training national staffand bringing AI into education.

Posts before capacity

Parliament is expected to meet on Thursday to fill the vacantportfolios, and disputes over several of them persist. If politicalnegotiations create demand for additional cabinet posts, a digital or AIportfolio could become one option. If al-Zaidi holds to his stated interest inmerging ministries to cut costs, the idea is likely to return to the drawerwhere the 2024 proposal ended up.

Either outcome leaves the underlying problem untouched. Iraq already hasa national AI center, a strategy still in draft, and a regulator writing rules.Fewer than a third of the state institutions surveyed know how they would usethe technology. So, would a fourth body succeed where the first three have notyet finished their work?

Read more: Digital leap, analog floor: Iraq traverses the AI divide

Written and edited by Shafaq News staff.

Shafaq News- Baghdad

Two days after Iraq devalued the dinar amid mountingpressure to keep public salaries flowing, former lawmaker Amir al-Maamourirevealed that political blocs had reached understandings to add new ministriesto Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi's unfinished cabinet.

According to al-Maamouri, the plans include a ministry forartificial intelligence or digital investment, and splitting the Ministry ofCulture, Tourism and Antiquities into separate culture and tourism portfolios.“The new posts would be shared out under the quota system to satisfy theparties.” Separately, Al-Zaidi considered merging ministries to cut costs.

The talks come at a moment of acute fiscal strain. OnOctober 6, the Council of Ministers raised the official end-user rate from1,320 to 1,520 dinars per dollar. Iraq earns nearly all its revenue in dollarsfrom oil, so a weaker dinar gives the treasury more local currency for everybarrel sold. The same change raises the cost of imports for a population whosesalaries, pensions and savings are held in dinars.

The Cost Of Keeping Salaries Paid

Finance Ministry data on budget execution through the end ofJuly put total revenue at 39.1 trillion dinars. Oil supplied 30.4 trillion ofthat, or 78%. Spending reached 65.4 trillion dinars over the same period,leaving a deficit of 26.3 trillion, about $17 billion at the new official rate.Central bank reserves fell from $97.4 billion at the end of 2025 to $80.6billion by the end of July. Over the same months, the US war with Irandisrupted the Strait of Hormuz, the main route for Iraqi crude.

Al-Zaidi defended the devaluation before parliament onOctober 8. He said his government faced three alternatives: compulsory savingsthat would leave employees waiting on promises of future payment, payingsalaries every 45 days, or borrowing on top of a public debt already above 208trillion dinars. The state needs about 10 trillion dinars a month to function.

Read more: Iraqi dinar devaluation sparks backlash from blocs inside the cabinet

The 2027 draft budget, due in parliament by October 15, setsspending at 217 trillion dinars against a projected 50 trillion deficit. Itassumes oil at $58 a barrel and fixes the exchange rate at 1,500.

A government source told Shafaq News that party leaders hadendorsed the rate change in meetings with al-Zaidi before it was announced.Many of the political blocs are now negotiating the size of his cabinet.

How Ministries Become Currency

Iraq allocates cabinet posts through muhasasa, an informalpower-sharing system that divides the state among sectarian and ethnic parties.Each bloc earns points according to its parliamentary seats and spends them onportfolios. Legal researcher Saif al-Saadi said that a "sovereign"ministry such as Interior or Defense can cost 15 to 20 points, and a serviceministry 10 to 12. Every new portfolio adds supply to that market, givingnegotiators more posts to trade.

Al-Zaidi, a businessman with no party of his own, tookoffice on May 14 as the nominee of the Coordination Framework, the alliance ofShiite parties that won the most seats in the November 2025 election.Parliament confirmed 14 of his 23 ministers. Nine portfolios, includingDefense, Interior and Planning, are still run by acting officials five monthslater.

The vacancies have drawn in other demands. Several partiesback four new deputy prime minister posts, and a broad agreement provided thedeputies hold no ministry. The candidates include Laith al-Khazali, brother ofAsaib Ahl al-Haq leader Qais al-Khazali, whose nomination drew US objections.

The disarmament talks have also fed into the bargaining. Asource told Shafaq News on October 1 that one armed faction, negotiating withthe four-member committee charged with bringing weapons under state control,had asked for a new ministry to support the security ministries.

The Cost Beyond The Minister

Nouri al-Dulaimi, a former planning minister, told ShafaqNews that Iraq needs to restructure the institutions it already has. A newministry, he said, brings deputy ministers, advisers, directorates, offices,buildings, security details and operating budgets, far more than oneministerial salary. “New bodies without clear mandates and measurable targetsdeepen disguised unemployment.”

Read more: $45B deficit looms over Iraq’s draft 2027 budget

He also pointed to2015, when Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi abolished the posts of vice presidentand deputy prime minister and cut protection details after protests againstwaste and corruption.

Political analyst Mujasha al-Tamimi also said thatadditional ministries “mean new positions, allowances, guards and buildingswith no guarantee of results, at a time when Iraq should prioritize austerityand the efficiency of existing institutions.”

Former lawmaker Hussein Arab said a ministry fore-governance or artificial intelligence could serve a real administrativepurpose, because “Iraq still lacks an integrated electronic system linking itsministries, and most current connections are partial.” He proposed staffing itwith existing government employees rather than building a new apparatus.

Former lawmaker Mahma Khalil added a differentconsideration. He doubted any new ministry was urgent and warned that disputesover the vacant posts could open the door to extra portfolios created toplacate rival parties. He has, however, called for a ministry for Iraq'sminority communities, including Yazidis, Christians, Sabean-Mandaeans and FeyliKurds, “as a statement of respect for the country's historical diversity.”

What comes next

A source told Shafaq News that parliament is expected tohold a session next week to complete the cabinet. Disputes persist over theLabor, Youth and Sports, Planning, and Construction and Housing portfolios.Nouri al-Maliki's State of Law Coalition has formally nominated Yasser Sukhailfor Interior. For Higher Education, it has put forward Haider Bahaa, dean ofthe College of Pharmacy at Al-Nahrain University.

In parallel, the Hoqooq bloc, affiliated with the armedfaction Kataib Hezbollah, has asked the Federal Supreme Court to overturn thedevaluation.

Iraq has adjusted its currency repeatedly in recent years.It devalued in 2020, partially reversed course in 2023, and has now devaluedagain, each time citing fiscal necessity. The last time Baghdad trimmed the toptier of government, in 2015, it acted under pressure from protesters. Thistime, the expansion is being negotiated while the cost of a weaker dinar isonly beginning to reach Iraqi households.

Written and edited by Shafaq News staff.

Shafaq News

Nearly 6 million cubic meters of wastewater flow directlyinto Iraq’s Tigris and Euphrates rivers every day, according to lawmaker GhaithShabaa. The discharge is intensifying a water crisis already sharpened bydrought and climate change: as river flows decline, less water remains todilute sewage and industrial contaminants.

The consequences are becoming harder to contain. Fieldinspections and laboratory tests have uncovered serious pollution in rivers,while samples from some treatment plants have failed to meet requirements forhuman use. Across the country, sewage, medical waste, and industrial effluentare entering waterways that remain essential to drinking-water supplies,agriculture and the wider ecosystem.

For Iraq, the danger lies not only in the volume of wastebeing released, but also in what the water carries and where it ends up.Contamination can move downstream, pass through inadequate treatment systems,and reach irrigation networks, extending the consequences far beyond theoriginal discharge points.

Read more: Legacy of the ‘Two Rivers’: Iraq races to save the remains of Mesopotamia

Toxifying the Flow

Speaking to Shafaq News, Shabaa of the Al-Asas Alliancecited official data from government departments, including test results showing "exceptionally high pollution levels" in water supplied through treatmentplants intended to meet drinking-water standards.

The latest findings reviewed by the parliamentary HealthCommittee showed failure rates of 100% in Maysan, 99% in Al-Muthanna and 97% inBasra. The results prompted the committee to call for urgent governmentintervention.

A substantial share of the wastewater enters rivers beforetreatment. Ordinary sewage is only one part of the problem: medical andindustrial waste, together with discharges from power stations and oilrefineries, introduce chemical and microbial contaminants that existingdrinking-water treatment plants are not equipped to remove adequately.

The Health Committee submitted a comprehensive file toParliament documenting pollution sites, their causes, possible treatmentmethods and proposed remedies. Parliament subsequently approved a specialsession to hear from the ministers of Health, Water Resources, Oil,Construction, Housing, Municipalities and Public Works, and Environment. At thetime of the original report, the session was expected to take place early thefollowing week.

Baghdad illustrates how these failures become visible alongthe waterways themselves. On April 29, 2026, a parliamentary committeeestablished under Parliamentary Order No. 63 to investigate pollution in theTigris identified 24 contaminated outlets and discharge points across thecapital. They included sites associated with the sewerage directorate,hospitals, refineries, and power stations, as well as pollution linked toresidential activity.

Read more: Death in the current: Pollution decimates Iraq’s river ecosystems

One of the main routes carrying contaminants into the Tigrisis the Diyala River. Committee chairman Yusuf Al-Kilabi identified it as amajor pollution hotspot, linking the problem partly to the failure of theAl-Atariyah project* after 2003. He said the theft of its pumps left liquid andsolid pollutants flowing into the Diyala, from where they can reach the Tigriswhen water levels rise.

The pollution does not originate solely upstream. The GreenIraq Observatory reported that large quantities of chemical and organic sewagefrom wastewater discharge stations in Al-Rusafa flow through the river beforereaching the Tigris.

Shafaq News documented sewage pipes discharging directlyinto the Tigris near Al-Ahrar Bridge in central Baghdad in June 2026. Fieldobservations identified more than 10 similar outlets elsewhere along thecapital’s riverbanks, particularly between Bab Al-Muadham and Al-Karrada.

By August, the Green Iraq Observatory had identified about500 permanent pollution sources along the Tigris, including 23 acute pollutionhotspots in Baghdad involving sewage outlets and medical waste. The findings,reported by Shafaq News, pointed to a problem spread across the river systemrather than confined to a handful of visible pipes.

Nor is the material entering the water limited toconventional sewage. The Observatory warned of compounds includingpolychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs) and phthalates such as diethylhexyl phthalate(DEHP), which can be difficult to remove through conventional treatment.According to the environmental watchdog, exposure to these substances canincrease risks associated with chronic diseases and endocrine disorders.

Read more: The cost of filth: Iraq among the world’s most polluted nations

Widespread Poison

The evidence gathered outside Baghdad suggests thatcontamination takes different forms across Iraq’s rivers. Pollution expertIqbal Latif Jaber reported chemical, microbial, and radioactive contaminationat several locations, based on samples collected from different waterways andsurrounding areas.

In Diyala, samples from the Wand River and soil collected inHassan Qolay village, in Khanaqin district, contained mercury, iron, lead,zinc, copper, nickel, cadmium and chromium at levels above internationallypermitted limits. Jaber singled out mercury as a particular concern. Aradiation-detection device also indicated radioactive contamination in theBaladruz River.

Tests from the Khurasan River revealed another combinationof hazards. Samples collected opposite Al-Batool Hospital and a COVID-19isolation hospital contained several heavy metals at concentrations exceedinginternational limits and Iraqi standards for river water. Elevated nitratelevels, alongside low phosphate levels, pointed to human biological activityand organic matter associated with sewage from the health facilities. Copper,cadmium, lead, and mercury were also detected.

These findings matter beyond the immediate condition of therivers. Heavy metals can enter irrigation supplies, be absorbed by plant rootsand move through the food chain, potentially carrying the consequences ofcontaminated water into agricultural production and public health.

Pollutants also cross provincial boundaries. Water enteringBaghdad through the Tigris and Diyala brings contamination from other areas,while pollution has been reported at Saadiyat Al-Shatt in Saladin and at theSumer outlet in Diyala, where polluted water enters the river system.

Farther south, the contaminants encounter already difficultwater conditions. The Green Iraq Observatory said Basra receives polluted waterfrom upstream provinces while facing rising salinity and the advance of thesaltwater tongue. In Wasit and Maysan, contaminated sediments carried fromBaghdad and the Diyala River create further pressure, with pollutantconcentrations able to increase as water levels fall. Deteriorating waterquality and accumulated pollutants also affect the lower basin, marshes and tributarynetworks in Dhi Qar.

Following contamination from one location to another exposesa central difficulty: authorities must address not only the pollution alreadypresent in the rivers, but also the activities that continue to introduce it.That requires reliable monitoring, functioning treatment facilities, andenforcement capable of preventing further discharges.

Action Over Audits

Jawad Al-Jubouri, the ministry’s technical undersecretary,said field teams and monitoring stations track pollution sources in Baghdad andother provinces, including industrial activity, health-care waste, sewagedischarges and other environmental violations affecting the Tigris andEuphrates.

The ministry has called for a strategic plan to establishand develop sewage treatment plants and reduce the discharge of untreated waterinto rivers. Its monitoring network includes 67 water-monitoring stations: 34on the Tigris, 22 on the Euphrates and five on the Shatt Al-Arab, alongsideother monitoring points.

Al-Jubouri has also called for the integration of monitoringdata and closer coordination with the Ministry of Water Resources and otherinstitutions to identify faults and address them. Field operations extendacross Baghdad and the provinces, while an electronic air-pollution monitoringnetwork operates in the capital, with expansion plans.

The ministry’s work further covers pollution beyond thewater system. Monitoring has recorded elevated air-pollution indicators inareas affected by traffic congestion, while fuel quality and dust stormscontribute to poor air quality. Findings are referred to the relevantauthorities under existing laws.

Water pollution is therefore part of a broader environmentalchallenge involving air, soil, biodiversity and ozone. Addressing thesepressures calls for coordination across government, not a response confined toany single ministry.

Broader meetings involving local governments, ministries,the Federal Board of Supreme Audit, the Supreme Judicial Council and the PrimeMinister’s Advisory Office have produced recommendations ranging from theformation of a national emergency team and the removal of environmentalviolations to river dredging, sewage treatment and improvements to plantefficiency.

Parliamentary action has since advanced beyond the specialsession initially planned. On September 24, the Council of Representativesvoted on recommendations from the committee established under ParliamentaryOrder No. 63 to investigate Tigris River pollution. The ministers ofEnvironment and Water Resources attended the session, and the parliamentaryleadership urged both ministries to accelerate projects and establish a jointgovernment task force. The Iraqi Parliament published the update.

Illusion of Safety

The condition of the rivers is only one part of Iraq’s waterproblem. Equally important is whether the systems designed to treat and deliverthat water can reliably make it safe for consumption.

In Basra, a Federal Board of Supreme Audit report cited bythe Green Iraq Observatory found that drinking water between 2021 and 2024failed to meet Iraqi drinking-water standard No. 417 because of high levels oftotal dissolved solids (TDS). Some household samples also showed microbialcontamination.

The audit found that most water-treatment projects andplants in the province lacked fully equipped laboratories capable of conductingphysical, chemical, and bacteriological tests. Without these facilities,operators face limitations in monitoring water quality continuously andidentifying contamination before supplies reach consumers.

Similar weaknesses affect other provinces. According to theGreen Iraq Observatory, most water-treatment projects across Iraq had reachedthe end of their design life, with many operating for more than 25 years. Thesituation was particularly evident in Babil, Wasit, Al-Anbar and Saladin.

Read more: Al-Anbar: An unfinished chapter in Iraq’s water story

Citing Federal Board of Supreme Audit data, the Observatoryreported treatment-related failure rates of 49% in Al-Muthanna and 41% inMaysan, the highest among the provinces it examined. These figures come from aseparate assessment of treatment infrastructure and should not be conflatedwith the much higher sample-testing failure rates reported earlier by theparliamentary Health Committee.

The weaknesses help explain why access to a water supplydoes not necessarily mean access to water that is consistently safe to drink.UN-Water data cited by Our World in Data in July 2026 showed that about 60% ofIraq’s population had access to safely managed drinking-water services. UnderSustainable Development Goal 6, that designation applies to an improved watersource that is available when needed and free from contamination.

Meanwhile, the volume of wastewater being dischargedcontinues to place pressure on the same system. The Green Iraq Observatoryestimated that about 5 million cubic meters of sewage enter Iraqi water sourcesevery day without adequate treatment, warning of heavy metals and highly toxicsubstances and their potential effects on public health.

That estimate differs from the nearly 6 million cubic meterscited by Shabaa. The two figures come from different sources and coverdifferent scopes; they are not measurements of precisely the same volume. Both,however, indicate the scale of untreated or inadequately treated wastewaterentering Iraq’s water system.

Securing the Source

For water strategy and climate-change expert Ramadan Hamza,pollution cannot be separated from the broader question of water security.

Read more: Iraq’s water crisis deepens: Reserves collapse, mismanagement continues

Hamza believes Iraq has the technical capacity to addressthe problem, but that capacity must be matched by implementation, oversight andsustained action. His proposed approach begins before pollutants enter therivers: protecting waterways, expanding sewage treatment, rehabilitatingdrinking-water networks and continuously testing water from its source to theconsumer.

That would mean intercepting wastewater before it reaches ariver, ensuring that treatment plants can handle the waste they receive andsafeguarding distribution networks against further contamination. Reliabletesting is also essential, allowing authorities to identify failures andintervene before pollutants travel farther downstream.

"The pollution problem does not begin with the smell orcolor of contaminated water, and it does not end when a sample is taken," Hamzasaid.

He urged authorities to apply the "polluter pays" principleand impose deterrent fines and penalties on individuals, institutions, andindustrial or agricultural activities responsible for polluting water sources. "Greater environmental awareness and closer coordination among the ministriesof Water Resources, Environment and Health, as well as local administrations,are also needed," he added.

Read more: Drop by drop: Can Iraq avert a thirsty future?

*The Al-Atariyah project is a wastewater treatmentinitiative located in the Al-Atariyah region, aimed at refining and treatingsewage water away from the Diyala River.

Written and edited by Shafaq News staff.

Shafaq News

Iran’s “unity of fronts” strategy is being reshaped across theMiddle East as allied armed groups in Iraq, Lebanon, Yemen and elsewhere adaptto changing military and political conditions, while maintaining varyingdegrees of coordination and a shared strategic outlook.

The concept, also known as “unity of the arenas,” gained widerpublic prominence in the Palestinian arena in 2022 before expanding into abroader regional framework linking Iran-aligned actors across Lebanon, Iraq,Yemen and Syria, particularly after the events of October 7, 2023.

Following the completion of the withdrawal of US forces and theUS-led Coalition from Iraq on September 30, 2026, “unity of fronts” appears tobe entering a new phase. The concept has not disappeared for all Iraqifactions, but its methods are being reshaped in response to changing powerdynamics and the challenges ahead.

Read more: Iraq's second US troop withdrawal shifts the test to armed factions

The US withdrawal has not ended the debate over weapons or resolveddivisions between factions that have declared their readiness to operate withinstate institutions and others that continue to reject giving up theirindependent military capabilities.

Unity Through Different Means

The region is entering a complex phase as the war between the USand Iran, which began on February 28, 2026, continues. Given its geographicalposition and ties with both Tehran and Washington, Iraq faces the challenge ofavoiding direct involvement in the war while preserving its regionalrelationships and political and security interests.

Lebanese writer and political analyst Ali Alaaeddine saidcoordination among the fronts “remains in place,” pointing to continuedcommunication among Iran, Iraqi factions, Lebanon’s Hezbollah, and Yemen’sAnsarallah, also known as the Houthis.

Speaking to Shafaq News, Alaaeddine added that recent militarydevelopments had necessitated “a different tactic,” with each front managingits confrontation according to its own circumstances and assessments whilemaintaining a shared strategic objective.

For Alaaeddine, differences in the level of involvement across thefronts do not signal the end of the concept, but rather its adaptation tochanging conditions.

Reshaping the Fronts

In Iraq, the departure of US forces has not resolved the issue ofarmed factions. Kataib Sayyid al-Shuhada and Ansarallah al-Awfiya have declaredtheir commitment to the government’s vision, while Kataib Hezbollah and Harakatal-Nujaba continue to reject the same course.

Read more: Iraq's armed factions sit at the center of a Middle East war, experts say

Security expert Saif Raad told Shafaq News that developments onother fronts, particularly in Lebanon, had prompted Iran’s IslamicRevolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) to reconsider its operational and militarymethods. He described a shift away from reliance on large formations towardsmaller groups linked directly to IRGC leadership figures and operating withgreater independence from established factions, attributing the change todevelopments on the Lebanese front during the 40-day war and the events that followed.

Raad said the varying levels of Iranian support across the regioncould be understood in light of this shift. Iran sought to avoid being drawninto a prolonged war of attrition, he explained, and might therefore turn tosupporting smaller groups operating within a structure that preserves theconcept of “unity of fronts,” but through methods different from those usedpreviously.

According to Raad, this shift gives Iraq particular importance inIran’s emerging strategic vision because of the country’s geographicalposition, political significance, and ties with Tehran.

Since October 7, 2023, the Islamic Resistance in Iraq (IRI), anumbrella group of Iran-aligned Iraqi armed factions, has claimed responsibilityfor repeated drone and rocket attacks on US military bases in Iraq and Syria,initially citing Washington’s support for Israel’s war in Gaza and the presenceof American forces in the region.

The group later expanded its operations to Israeli targets,announcing drone and missile strikes on sites in the Golan Heights, northernand southern Israel, and areas including Haifa and Tel Aviv. The attacksintensified during the Israel-Hezbollah war in Lebanon in 2024, as the factionsframed their operations as support for Palestinians and Lebanese fighters.

This campaign prompted US retaliatory strikes against Iran-alignedfaction positions in Iraq and Syria, while Baghdad sought to contain theescalation and prevent Iraq from being drawn further into regional conflicts.

Read more: Arms and ballots: Iraq's armed factions test constitutional boundaries

Keeping Iraq Out of the Conflict

Political researcher Suhad al-Shammari offers a differentperspective, focusing on the Iraqi state’s position.

In an interview with Shafaq News, al-Shammari said Iraq “is not aparty to the ongoing war between Iran and the United States,” adding that thegovernment, with the support of political forces, was working to prevent theregional conflict from affecting Iraq’s security and economy.

“Iraq has paid a heavy economic and security price in recentyears,” al-Shammari said, warning that disruptions to oil exports or threats tovital infrastructure could create additional crises that Baghdad does not needat this stage.

Read more: Iraq factions resist disarmament as coalition exit nears

Al-Shammari indicated that Iraqi factions will not become directparties to the confrontation for now, citing “domestic political understandingsand a government commitment to preventing Iraqi territory from being used as alaunchpad for attacks.”

She argued that the departure of US forces had changed Iraq’spolitical and security environment and could open the way for a new phase inwhich the prime minister, as commander-in-chief of the armed forces, becomesthe main decision-maker on security matters. This shift could be supported bypolitical forces that believe Iraq’s interests lie in avoiding becoming anarena for regional conflict.

Yemen’s Perspective

In Yemen, Adel Rajeh, a member of the Alliance of Parties AgainstAggression, described “unity of fronts” as remaining in place at both thepolitical and military levels, with coordination continuing among Iran, Iraqifactions, Hezbollah, and the Houthis.

Rajeh distinguished this regional framework from the nature of thecurrent conflict in Yemen. He said the ongoing confrontation there was domesticin character, with Houthi military capabilities addressing local adversariesand mobilizations linked to Saudi Arabia independently.

Read more: Iraq's Sovereignty Days: Coalition mission ends, factions keep their weapons

This does not mean “unity of fronts” has ended, but rather thateach front operates according to its own circumstances, he said, concludingthat direct US or Israeli involvement in a future confrontation with Yemencould lead to a wider application of the concept, potentially involving Iraqifactions and Iran.

Written and edited by Shafaq News staff.

Shafaq News- Baghdad

Iraq's new official exchange rate of 1,520 dinars per US dollar tookeffect on Wednesday, the country's first devaluation since 2020 and a fiscalresponse to oil revenues squeezed by the resumption of the US war with Iran.Within hours, the dollar's street price jumped. Two of Baghdad's main wholesalemarkets shut, and lawmakers began organizing to overturn a decision taken by acabinet in which nearly every major political bloc holds a seat.

The Council of Ministers approved the move on Tuesday night on anemergency recommendation from the finance minister and the governor of theCentral Bank of Iraq (CBI), Nizar Hussein. It gives the treasury more dinarsfor every dollar of oil sold. It also raises the local cost of almosteverything Iraq imports, in an economy where salaries, pensions and savings areheld in dinars. The government calls the step a precaution. Critics see it asshifting the war's cost from the state's books to household budgets. Thepolitical backlash suggests the dispute is as much about Iraq's unfinishedgovernment as about its currency.

A New Rate, An Old Gap

Under the new structure, the CBI buys dollars from the Finance Ministryat 1,500 dinars, sells them to banks at 1,510 and to end users at 1,520, upfrom 1,320. Every $100 now costs 20,000 dinars more at the official window. TheFinance Ministry paired the decision with a suspension of the advancecollection of customs duties and tax deposits on imports.

Iraq runs two exchange rates: the official one, at which the CBIsupplies dollars through banks for trade, travel and other approved uses, and aparallel street rate set by supply and demand. The parallel market respondedfirst. In Baghdad, the dollar climbed to around 168,500 dinars per $100 onWednesday morning, from 159,800 the day before, then eased to about 167,000 byevening. In Erbil, capital of the Kurdistan Region, it traded near 166,700.

The disruption reached beyond the exchange counters. Shops andwarehouses in Baghdad's Shorja market and the Alwat Jameela wholesale marketclosed temporarily, as did several exchange and money-transfer firms, becausetraders could not reprice goods and outstanding commitments.

Gold followed the dollar. A mithqal of 21-carat gold, the roughlyfive-gram unit Iraqi jewelers trade in, rose in Baghdad from 930,000 dinars onTuesday to 978,000 on Wednesday morning.

Before the decision, the parallel market sat about 21% above theofficial rate. On Wednesday, the distance narrowed in percentage terms, butonly because the official rate jumped. The street price rose as well.

A Revolt From Inside The Tent

The backlash in parliament came quickly. Lawmaker Uday al-Zamili of theKhadamat bloc told Shafaq News that parliament had decided to host the financeminister and the CBI governor on Thursday to examine the feasibility of thedecision. He said it would hit citizens already facing a wave of price rises,and that MPs want to expose files linked to the exchange rate and corruption.

Lawmaker Suzan al-Saad of al-Nahj Al-Watani bloc said she had gatheredmore than 50 signatures for a dedicated session on the decision's consequences.

At a press conference in parliament, lawmaker Saba al-Saadi of theReconstruction and Development bloc warned that raising the exchange rate tocover the deficit is a "red line."

The Kurdistan Democratic Party stopped short of demanding a reversal.Shakhawan Abdullah, head of the KDP bloc in the federal parliament, told localoutlets that the government's aim in adjusting the rate was to recover the20,000-dinar increase and turn it into revenue for the treasury. It should havetaken concrete steps to control markets and contain rising prices first, hesaid, rather than leaving citizens to face "this economic spiral"alone.

The Iraqi Contractors Union asked Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi to delayimplementation. It warned that the costs of materials, transport and serviceswould rise and erode companies' margins, and said dues linked to the 2020–21adjustment rate had still not been fully paid.

Afterturning Wednesday's sitting into a general debate on the decision, parliamentscheduled a special session for Thursday to question the finance minister andthe CBI governor. The presidency then cancelled it, moving the hearing to theFinance Committee instead. KDP lawmaker Siban Shirwani said the committee wouldmeet both officials at noon to discuss the reasons for the change, and mightalso take up the draft federal budget.

Former lawmaker Amir al-Maamouri challenged the outrage itself. Healleged that "most of the objectors knew the dollar would be raised andbought dollars from the market before the vote and the announcement of the 152rate and made large gains." He asked why they were pretending not to know.

The cabinet, he noted, includes representatives of all political blocs,and they voted for the adjustment: "Did the representatives of thepolitical blocs work in complete secrecy and hide the information?"

Al-Maamouri offered no evidence for the allegation of profiteering. Thebroader point, that the decision was no surprise inside the political class,finds support in the record.

The composition of the cabinet sharpens the contradiction. Al-Zaidi, abusinessman with no party of his own, was sworn in in May as the nominee of theCoordination Framework, the alliance of Shia parties that won the most seats inthe November 2025 election; since then, only 14 of 23 ministers have beenapproved. Finance Minister Falih al-Sari, who carried the recommendation tocabinet, belongs to al-Hikma, the movement led by Ammar al-Hakim, and is alongtime senior figure on parliament's Finance Committee. Other approvedministers come from the Islamic Dawa, Badr, Reconstruction and Development, andSadiqoon, Taqadum, the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), the Patriotic Union ofKurdistan (PUK), and the New Generation movement, among others.

The opposition to the devaluation appeared to have two strands: blocsinside the cabinet distancing themselves from a decision they share, and blocsoutside it using the exchange rate as leverage in a government formation thatremains incomplete, with nine portfolios still vacant.

Read more: Can Iraq’s economy weather a wider regional shock? Experts differ

The War Behind The Figures

Iraq's budget runs on oil, and the war has squeezed it. Exports throughthe Strait of Hormuz, the route for most of Iraq's crude before the conflict,have continued, but under disruption. Baghdad has added alternative routes,including overland shipments through Syria, which cost more and carry less.Those alternatives have not offset the shortfall.

The strain showed in the central bank's balance sheet well beforeTuesday. CBI data show foreign reserves fell from $97.4 billion at the end of2025 to $80.6 billion at the end of July 2026, a decline of about 17% in sevenmonths. Finance Ministry figures showed a gap of more than 29 trillion dinars($19.08 billion) between revenue and total spending during the first sevenmonths of 2026.

Spending commitments made in Baghdad's political bargaining compoundedthe revenue shock. The Finance Ministry warned parliament that it could notfund the 2026 budget without an adjustment. That budget includes 100,000 newpublic-sector jobs demanded by political blocs during government formation. Thedraft 2027 budget is built around the new 1,500-dinar rate.

The draft sets spending at 217 trillion dinars ($142.76 billion) with aprojected deficit of 50 trillion, assumes oil at $58 a barrel and exports offour million barrels a day, and fixes the exchange rate at 1,500 dinars perdollar, Finance Committee member Abbas Hayal told Shafaq News. The draft is duein parliament by October 15.

The Official Case

Mudhir Mohammed Saleh, the prime minister's financial adviser, framedthe decision as insurance rather than rescue. He told the state-run Iraqi NewsAgency (INA) that the measures do not reflect an imbalance in the economy. “Theyare pre-emptive hedging against a war that threatens oil exports throughHormuz, and with them public revenue, the budget and foreign-currency inflows.”

Saleh presented the exchange rate, customs, taxes, spending andsubsidies as one integrated protective system. He said monetary policy wouldkeep foreign currency flowing so that trade finance continues on a regular,stable basis.

Fiscal policy would absorb part of the external shock. Customs and taxmeasures, in his account, are meant to regulate imports, strengthen revenue,and ration foreign currency, not to burden citizens or produce unjustifiedprice rises, and to avoid passing their full cost to consumers.

Continued state spending on food, medicine, fuel and basic services, hesaid, would serve as the line of defense for living standards. "Thesemeasures do not aim at a sudden change in the exchange rate or at makingsociety bear the cost of the crisis," he told INA, "but at hedgingand building a financial and monetary safety margin."

The CBI called the move a strategic step to strengthen financialstability. It said its foreign reserves are sufficient to meet all requests tofinance trade, settle bank-card payments and sell cash dollars to travelers. Italso described the change as a positive adjustment that would make Iraqiproducts more competitive against imports, encourage factories to expand, drawinvestment into non-oil sectors and create jobs for young Iraqis. Thestate-owned Trade Bank of Iraq (TBI) began supplying foreign currency throughofficial channels on Wednesday to support the market.

Who Pays

Economists who spoke to Shafaq News accept the fiscal logic but disputewho carries the bill.

Economist Ahmed Abd Rabbo said the decision should be read as part of abroader economic package, estimating that the higher rate could bring thetreasury between 17 and 20 trillion dinars a year, depending on oil revenuesand how they are counted in the budget. That gain, he warned, would not beenough if import costs pass quickly into the prices of goods and services.

“A weaker dinar could give Iraqi industry and agriculture more room tocompete with imports, but that does not happen automatically," he said,adding that it would require energy, financing, infrastructure, protectionagainst dumping and simpler production procedures.

He proposed judging the decision against three indicators in the monthsahead: the spread between the official and parallel rates, inflation andcommodity prices, and whether productive sectors actually benefit from improvedcompetitiveness.

Nawar al-Saadi, a professor of international economics, put the questionmore bluntly: who will bear the cost? By his estimate, the move cuts thedinar's value by about 14.5%. The government will collect more dinars for itsoil, he said, but import costs will rise, pressing on purchasing power, especiallyfor people on fixed incomes. He identified inflation and a widening gap withthe parallel market as the greatest risks, while cautioning that prices willnot necessarily rise in step with the dollar.

The effect will vary with each product's dependence on imports, traders'margins, competition and monetary policy. Local industry may gain from a weakerdinar, he said, but Iraqi factories also depend on imported raw materials andequipment, which will push their own costs up.

Al-Saadi’s sharpest warning was against turning the exchange rate into apermanent tool for financing the budget deficit. Instead, he called forcontrolling current spending, limiting expansion of public hiring, raisingnon-oil revenue, and stimulating investment and production.

Manar al-Obaidi, head of the Iraq Future Foundation for economic studiesand consultancy, said the state has already secured significant fiscal space.

Applying Iraq's high customs tariffs at the same time, he argued, hitsimported goods twice, through a dearer dollar and steeper duties. The combinedeffect passes, to varying degrees, into the cost of food, medicine, factoryinputs, machinery, spare parts and transport, and finally to the consumer.

Al-Obaidi called on the cabinet and parliament to freeze the 2010Customs Tariff Law No. 22 for one year. In its place, he would revive themechanism of Coalition Provisional Authority Order 38 of 2003, theoccupation-era mechanism that imposed a 5% Reconstruction Levy on most coveredimports.

The finance ministry and customs authority would issue unifiedinstructions for all border crossings, and a review would follow after sixmonths to measure the effect on inflation, prices, imports, revenue andindustry. Protecting domestic producers, he said, does not require high tariffson thousands of goods; the Iraqi Products Protection Law can target dumping andharmful import surges directly.

“The state should not use the exchange rate and customs tariffs at thesame time as twin tools to raise revenue, loading the cost of both ontocitizens and the market.”

Al-Obaidi describes the combination of exchange rate and customs as theproblem, while Saleh describes the same combination as the protective design.

Third Reset In Six Years

Iraq has been here before, and each reset has followed fiscal need andpolitical bargaining. In December 2020, as the COVID-19 oil crash opened acrippling deficit, the central bank moved the rate from 1,182 to 1,450 dinarsper dollar. The Fatah Alliance and State of Law, both aligned with Tehran,rejected that devaluation and delayed the national budget. In February 2023,al-Sudani's government reversed course and revalued the dinar to 1,300. TighterUS controls on dollar transfers through Iraq's banking system had pushed the streetprice toward 1,690.

The latest move also follows repeated official denials. In February, thethen-governor Ali al-Alaq said there were no plans to change the rate. In June,the bank again denied reports of a planned increase. The parallel market didnot believe them.

The Eco Iraq economic observatory counted six waves of increases in2026, taking the street rate from about 150,400 dinars per $100 in January to apeak of 168,000 in October.

The Tests Ahead

The decision will be judged on terms its defenders and critics broadlyshare. The first is whether the parallel rate settles near 1,520 or keepsdrifting away from it. The second is whether prices rise in step with thedollar or, as al-Saadi and Saleh both suggest, by less. The third is whetherdomestic producers capture any of the promised competitiveness.

The draft 2027 budget, due within a week, will show if the governmenttreats 1,500 as a one-time adjustment or as the basis for a larger spendingplan.

Hours before the decision, Jabar Goran, spokesman for al-Sulaymaniyah'scurrency market, warned that setting the rate at 1,500 would provoke a verynegative reaction from citizens and the market. He did not expect thegovernment to do it.

The government did it the next day.

This time, unlike in 2020 or 2023, the oil shock comes from a warBaghdad does not control and cannot end. The exchange rate has become thequickest tool the state has, and the blocs that share the cabinet now mustdecide whether to defend that tool or protest against it.

Read more: Why Iraq's dinar keeps sliding despite fresh US cash

1 USD = 1520 dinar

Written and edited by Shafaq News staff.

Shafaq News- Kirkuk/ Saladin/ Nineveh

ISIS militants struck the same village in Kirkuk's Hawijadistrict twice in less than 24 hours, and both times they went after thecameras. The attacks disabled thermal imaging equipment that Iraqi forces useto watch open farmland and valleys at night. They have also renewed attentionon stretches of northern Iraq that local commanders concede are not fullycovered.

Hawija, southwest of Kirkuk city, was one of the last urbanareas ISIS held in Iraq before government forces retook it in October 2017. Thelatest attacks came less than a week after the US-led Global Coalition toDefeat ISIS ended its military mission in Iraq on September 30. None of theIraqi officials who spoke to Shafaq News linked the two.

Two Attacks, One Village

On the evening of October 5, militants attacked a positionheld by the 3rd Battalion of the Federal Police's 9th Brigade in al-Bargliya,in Hawija's al-Danadish sector. One officer was killed, four were wounded,and several thermal cameras at the site were destroyed.

Federal Police units, under Iraq's Interior Ministry, latersurrounded a group of ISIS militants inside a school in nearby al-Uraysha, inthe same sector. Authorities had not disclosed the outcome of the standoff bythe time of publication.

The following day, militants hit the 2nd Battalion of the61st Brigade of the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) in al-Bargliya. A snipershot out a thermal camera, and no casualties were reported.

The choice of target is telling. Thermal cameras let smallgarrisons monitor wide, empty terrain after dark, when ISIS cells usually move.Without them, those positions need far more manpower to see the same ground.

Kirkuk Operations Commander Maj. Gen. Maad Badai told ShafaqNews that his forces had arrested a senior ISIS figure in Hawija after trackinghis movements. Badai described the man as one of the group's most wantedtargets in the province.

The October attacks follow a run of incidents in Kirkuk thisyear. On September 27, ISIS mortar fire on al-Malha village killed a woman andwounded several civilians. In August, Iraqi F-16s destroyed an ISIS hideout inWadi Zghaitoun, killing those inside, and in July the Counter-Terrorism Servicekilled an ISIS member north of Kirkuk.

Seven-Kilometer Gaps

Badai acknowledged gaps of up to about 7 kilometers in hisarea of responsibility. In his view, closing them does not require troops fromother provinces. Redeploying existing units and adding posts where coverage isthin would remove the empty stretches between Iraqi forces and the Peshmerga,the armed forces of the Kurdistan Region.

He said the forces under his command were sufficient for thesector. Those forces include more than four army divisions, along with FederalPolice and special forces brigades.

The areas east of Altun Kupri and around Qara Salem are themost exposed, according to Badai, because their mountains and valleys offercover. In a joint Iraqi-Peshmerga operation there more than a month ago, oneISIS member and one member of the security forces were killed.

Villages Without Forces

Abdul Muttalib Najm al-Din, head of the Altun Kuprisubdistrict, said about four villages along the strip between Altun Kupri andthe Shwan subdistrict have no security presence at all. He called for an armyforce to be stationed there.

"About 12 farmers have been kidnapped from their landover the past two years," he said.

Read more: Iraq’s western desert from ISIS hideouts to new security challenges

A Belt Across Three Provinces

Security expert Ali al-Bayati said the problem extends wellbeyond one sector. The gaps run along the areas linking Kirkuk and Nineveh,from Altun Kupri toward the outskirts of al-Dibis and on to the edges ofMakhmur. They also follow the boundary between Kirkuk and Saladin, from Wadial-Shay and Wadi Zghaitoun to al-Zarga in Tuz Khurmatu district.

"Mountains, valleys and wide farmland in these areaslet ISIS cells move away from population centers," al-Bayati said. Heurged authorities to redeploy existing forces, step up surveillance andreconnaissance, and secure the corridors cells use to move between the threeprovinces.

The belt has a long history of armed activity. Groups linkedto al-Qaeda operated there before ISIS emerged. In 2014, ISIS absorbed many ofthem and turned the terrain between Kirkuk, Nineveh and Saladin into a base ofoperations. The group lost its hold on territory after the 2017 offensive, butthe landscape still favors small cells.

Much of the belt lies within the territories disputedbetween Baghdad and the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG). Article 140 ofIraq's 2005 constitution set out a process, ending in a referendum, to settletheir status, but it has never been completed. Federal forces and the Peshmergahold neighboring sectors there, and Badai's own account places the weak pointsin the gaps between them.

The Kirkuk Operations Command maintains that redeploymentcan close those gaps. Najm al-Din, whose subdistrict has lost a dozen farmersto kidnappers, wants a force that stays.

Read more: Discover Iraq: Kirkuk, a city of oil, culture, and conflict

Shafaq News

When Iraq temporarily closed threecrossings with Iran in mid-September, the restrictions lasted only days, withtrade continuing through other routes before traffic gradually returned. Evenso, they offered a useful stress test for an economy whose room for maneuverdepends heavily on regional stability.

The restrictions followed SaudiArabia’s announcement that drones launched from Iraqi territory had struck itsEast-West oil pipeline, prompting Baghdad to tighten controls at Shalamcheh,Al-Sheeb and Mandali while investigating possible security breaches. SaudiArabia has since resumed operations on the pipeline after a nine-day shutdown,but the episode showed how quickly a regional security incident could forceBaghdad to safeguard economic channels at home.

MP Uday Al-Zamili, who representsthe Wasit Al-Ajmal bil-Khadamat bloc, framed the closures in precisely thoseterms, telling Shafaq News that they were “military more than commercial oreconomic” and reflected an effort by the government to keep Iraq outside theregional confrontation and “keep the specter of war and economic sanctionsaway.”

Read more: Saudi pipeline attack deepens pressure on Al-Zaidi over armed factions

Keeping Iraq outside the conflict istherefore an economic as well as a security calculation, because repeated linksbetween Iraqi territory and regional attacks could bring pressure extendingwell beyond temporary border restrictions.

Financial and economic expert SafwanQusay told Shafaq News that the Central Bank of Iraq (CBI) still has sufficientroom to support salaries, pensions and social welfare while defending theofficial exchange rate “for long periods,” adding that he sees no need torevalue the dinar.

The dollar market broadly supportsthat reading without removing the warning embedded in it. The parallel rateeased to around 163,000 dinars per $100 in Baghdad and Erbil on Tuesday butremained well above the official rate of roughly 1,300 dinars to the dollar,showing that the state can preserve its formal monetary anchor even asuncertainty commands a premium outside official channels.

Iraq also has alternatives if oneroute becomes harder to use, including the northern outlet through Turkiye aswell as overland corridors capable of absorbing part of the import flow. Theybuy Baghdad time but cannot replace the southern system: the overwhelming shareof Iraqi crude normally leaves through the Gulf, while disruption around Babal-Mandeb would raise costs for goods moving through the Red Sea, making otherroutes slower, more expensive and less capable of offsetting losses elsewhere.

Read more: Iran war spreads to Iraq and Red Sea as regional risks mount

Qusay expects inflation to remain“under control” through the end of the year. “There is no option but to dealwith land routes at this stage,” he said, acknowledging the higher costsinvolved. Iraq can absorb those costs and rely on central-bank buffers whilethe disturbance remains temporary; resilience becomes harder to sustain ifemergency measures “must become the economy’s normal operating condition.”

Economic expert Kareem Al-Hilou toldShafaq News that Iraq enters any regional shock with structural weaknesses thatshort-term buffers cannot erase, with public finances still overwhelmingly tiedto oil even as weak domestic revenue and limited refining capacity leave thecountry exposed, while an underdeveloped banking system restricts its abilityto mobilize savings and credit when pressure rises.

Read more: Banking without trust: Why Iraqis still keep their money in cash

The contradiction is particularlyclear in fuel, where one of the world’s major crude producers was still dealingwith gasoline shortages in Basra on Sept. 19 after similar problems elsewhere,forcing parliament to press for measures aimed at preventing further supplybottlenecks.

That does not mean the recent fuelshortage was caused solely by the regional confrontation, but it does show whya longer disruption would be harder to absorb than the border closures were. Aneconomy that already has weaknesses in domestic fuel supply has less room totreat higher transport costs or delayed imports as temporary inconveniences,particularly if the same regional crisis is also affecting the oil revenues onwhich government spending depends.

Al-Hilou also points to lowconfidence in banks and years of delayed government final accounts. Some ofthat backlog has begun to clear, with the 2012–2015 accounts moving through therequired process and work continuing in later years, but a government preparingfor a volatile oil and security environment still needs a clear view of what ithas spent, collected and carried forward; fiscal planning becomes moredifficult when it is still catching up with previous budgets.

The 2027 budget is therefore a keytest of whether Baghdad is preparing for a more difficult economic environment.The Ministerial Council for the Economy approved the draft in September andreferred it to the Council of Ministers, but as of October 6 the cabinet hadnot yet given final approval.

Read more: $45B deficit looms over Iraq’s draft 2027 budget

That unfinished process mattersbecause the border closures showed that, if regional pressure persists longenough to strain monetary defenses, raise the cost of alternative trade routes,and compound weaknesses in fuel supply, banking, and public finance, Iraq’sshort-term buffers could become increasingly difficult to sustain.

Written and edited by Shafaq Newsstaff.

Shafaq News

Iraq's second US military withdrawal in 15 years ended onSeptember 30, when the last US-led Coalition troops and equipment left ErbilAir Base in the Kurdistan Region (KRI), Iraq's autonomous, Kurdish-governednorth. Their departure closed the Coalition's military mission against ISIS,launched in 2014, nearly 15 years after the last American convoy crossed fromsouthern Iraq into Kuwait in December 2011.

Both exits raised the same doubt: whether the Iraqi statecould secure its territory, airspace, and borders without foreign forces. Thisone adds a harder test. For more than a decade, Iran-aligned armed factionsjustified keeping their weapons by pointing to the presence of foreign troops.That argument has now lost much of its premise, narrowing the factions' caseagainst a state monopoly over the use of force.

When President Barack Obama announced the first withdrawalin October 2011, about 39,000 US troops remained in Iraq, what was left of afar larger force. By September 2024, when Baghdad and Washington agreed to winddown the Coalition, the declared US contingent stood at about 2,500. Thedivergence between those figures reflects two different missions. The firstclosed a war of regime change. The second ended an advisory campaign launchedafter ISIS seized Mosul. In both cases, the combat role ended before the troopsleft: in 2010 the first time, and at the end of 2021 the second.

That first exit still shapes how Iraqi and Kurdish leadersread this one. Obama promised a normal relationship between two sovereignstates. Less than three years later, Mosul fell, and Baghdad asked foreignforces to return. The 2011 withdrawal alone does not explain the rise of ISIS,which also fed on Iraq's political crises and the war in Syria. But the speedof that collapse has made two questions part of every later debate about anAmerican departure: what Iraq's army can do, and whether it keeps access to USintelligence.

Like the first exit, this one was set by one USadministration and completed by another. Under the September 2024 agreementbetween the Biden administration and the government of then-Prime MinisterMohammed Shia al-Sudani, Coalition forces first left the areas under Baghdad'sdirect authority. That included Ain al-Asad air base in western al-Anbar, whoseevacuation Iraq's Higher Military Committee confirmed in January. A contingentstayed in the KRI to support operations against ISIS in Syria. That contingenthas now gone.

Where the troops went matters more than the departureitself. The US Central Command (CENTCOM) said the Combined Joint TaskForce–Operation Inherent Resolve (CJTF-OIR), the command that has led thecampaign against ISIS since 2014, remains operational from a new headquartersin Jordan. US forces, it said, will continue the counter-ISIS mission in Syriaalongside Coalition partners and the Syrian government.

Patriot missile batteries had already been moved to Jordan,according to Mohammed Saleh, a nonresident senior fellow at the Foreign PolicyResearch Institute's national security program. He told Shafaq News he did notrule out a limited presence, such as special forces, or a return of US troopsif a major crisis erupts.

Washington presents the exit as a change in form rather thanan end. The Pentagon described it as the end of the Coalition's militarymission, not of the relationship, and said targeted training and intelligencesupport would continue with Iraqi forces leading operations against ISIS cells.A senior White House official told Shafaq News in late August that Washingtonwas moving toward a permanent bilateral security partnership. Its terms remainopen, including what training, intelligence, maintenance, and weapons theUnited States will supply.

Read more: Iraqi factions hail US exit, some threatens attacks

The likely shape is technical rather than territorial.Training, advice, and maintenance for Iraq's F-16 fighter jets and C-130Jtransport aircraft could continue without permanent US deployments at Iraqibases, said Myles Caggins, a former military spokesperson for the Coalition.Nor is Washington asking Baghdad to seal its border with Iran, he told ShafaqNews. Its aim, in his description, is to curb Tehran's influence inside Iraqiinstitutions and the activities of the armed groups it backs.

The anxiety is sharpest in the KRI, which Iran andTehran-aligned Iraqi factions have attacked repeatedly since the war betweenIran and the US broke out on February 28. Days before the deadline, MasoudBarzani, leader of the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), the KRI’s dominantparty, recalled in a television interview the 2011 debates over whether Iraqiforces could protect the country. He warned against a repeat of the ISISscenario while acknowledging that conditions today are different.

KRI Prime Minister Masrour Barzani said the departure cameat a sensitive moment and that leaving the region without air-defense systemswas cause for concern. He thanked Coalition members and said Iraqi forces andthe Peshmerga, the KRI's armed forces, were ready for what follows.

Read more: Kurdistan Region faces air-defense gap as US troops leave Iraq

Saleh called the Kurdish concern justified. Washington hasbeen the KRI's main security guarantor for about 35 years, he said, a role thatdates to the no-fly zone imposed over northern Iraq after the 1991 Gulf War.Kurdish leaders have also watched what happened to the Syrian Democratic Forceswhen US support in Syria was abruptly scaled back. Even so, Saleh expects thepartnership between Erbil and Washington to continue.

Baghdad's answer is procurement. Maj. Gen. Sabah al-Numan,spokesperson for the commander-in-chief of the armed forces, said Iraq wasclose to acquiring air-defense systems from South Korea, Turkiye, and theUnited States, under plans that include covering the KRI's airspace. He gave nodelivery dates.

The Coalition's exit does not end every foreign militarypresence in Iraq. Turkish forces deployed in the north against the KurdistanWorkers' Party (PKK) operate outside the Coalition framework. Baghdad andAnkara have agreed to hand the Bashiqa-Zilkan camp near Mosul to the Iraqigovernment gradually, under an agreed timetable. Whether Baghdad can crediblydescribe Iraq as free of foreign bases depends on that separate process.

Across the region, the yardstick is the same: what Baghdaddoes next, not the empty bases. Ahmed Fahim, a Jordanian researcher, toldShafaq News that Jordan's interest lies in an Iraqi state able to protect itsborders, but he warned against reducing sovereignty to replacing one outsidepower's influence with another's.

Lezgin Ibrahim, a researcher at the Euphrates Center forStudies in Syria, said Damascus stands to gain from an Iraq with a unifiedsecurity command that helps police the shared border and fight ISIS."Factions acting independently of the state would leave more room forIranian influence and cross-border threats," he said.

Iran-aligned factions hailed the end of the mission, andtheir reaction points to the risk that Abdul Qader al-Nayel, an Iraqi politicalresearcher, identified. The end of the mission does not amount to fullsovereignty while US advisory, intelligence, and logistical roles continue, hetold Shafaq News, and the withdrawal could even help the factions hold on totheir influence. A departure they can present as their own victory makesdisarmament a harder sell.

Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi, who took office in May 2026,has set a deadline of June 30, 2027, for bringing those weapons under statecontrol, and the factions are divided over it.

Tehran's position is harder to read. On July 28, IraqiNational Security Adviser Qasim al-Aboudi said Iran had agreed to help bringweapons held outside state institutions under government control. Two weekslater, Esmail Qaani, commander of the Quds Force, visited Baghdad andreportedly urged Iraqi armed factions “not to surrender their weapons for now”while warning them against any armed confrontation with government forces.

Al-Zaidi marked the day of the withdrawal in Baghdad withthe Coalition commander at his side. "No weapons outside the umbrella ofthe law, and no force outside state institutions," he said.

In 2011, the test was whether Iraq could fight its own wars.This time the challenge is narrower and harder: whether the state can claim theauthority that the foreign presence allowed others to contest for over adecade.

Written and edited by Shafaq News staff.

*Operation Inherent Resolve is the US-led military campaignagainst ISIS, and its command, the CJTF-OIR, has advised, assisted, and enabledforces fighting the group in Iraq since CENTCOM established it in 2014.

Shafaq News- OPINION

By Nick Kossovan

In March 2019, the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF)raised their flag over the rubble of Baghouz, marking a symbolic victory thatWestern capitals hailed as the collapse of the Islamic State's terror regime.Yet behind the glossy press releases, the truth about those who endured andthose who lost their lives in the 2014–2019 conflict remained hidden.

It wasn't American or European boots on the groundsweeping through the desert dust. It was young Kurdish women and men, fightingalongside local Syriac Christians, Assyrians, and Sunni Arab tribesmen, doingthe brutal, door-to-door groundwork Western armies simply lacked the stomach toexecute themselves.

The price of that victory, which gave the West asemblance of security, was that more than 11,000 Kurdish and allied fighterslost their lives fighting ISIS, sacrificing themselves to protect the so-called"free world" only to be abandoned in the desert. Western countries,including Washington and European nations, shifted responsibility for detainingtens of thousands of hardened jihadist prisoners to the Kurds because theylacked the political resolve to repatriate their own radicalized citizens. Thisarrangement exemplifies Western hypocrisy: let the Kurds bleed for Westernsecurity today, then turn a blind eye when regional enemies come for themtomorrow.

Fast-forward to August 2026, and that blood-boughtself-governance in Rojava —the autonomous, democratic sanctuary carved out ofwar-torn northern Syria— has been systematically dismantled. Formally governedby the Democratic Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (DAANES), adecentralized, secular administrative framework that explicitly prioritizedwomen's leadership, multi-ethnic pluralism, and local self-determination, theregion no longer exists. Trapped in a vice grip between relentless foreign airstrikes, aggressive demands from Damascus, and backroom arm-twisting by Westerndiplomats, DAANES was officially dissolved. Self-defence forces were disarmed,and its institutions were absorbed into the Syrian central government.

This forced surrender exposes a callous, recurringpattern in Western foreign policy. As Washington recruited and then abandonedHmong fighters in Laos, using them as shields during the Cold War, Westernnations continue to repeat the same 'throw them back to the wolves' approach inthe Middle East. When Western nations need a dirty job done, they deem secular,heroic partners indispensable. But when the threat recedes, those same alliesbecome an inconvenience, prompting Western diplomats to quickly negotiate withwhichever rebranded regime promises central control.

Blood Equity and the Disposable Alliance

The Western-SDF alliance was always an asymmetricmarriage of convenience. When ISIS swept across Iraq and Syria, capturingMosul, threatening Western interests, and destabilizing NATO's doorstep,Washington urgently needed a reliable local force with real grit on the ground.The Kurds answered the call. They fought block by bloody block through Kobani,Raqqa, and Der Ez-Zor, all while building a pioneering governance modelgrounded in direct democracy, gender equality, and secular pluralism.

Yet as the immediate threat from ISIS receded, Westernpriorities shifted back to calculated self-interest.

The abandonment was gradual, not sudden. In 2018,Turkiye, a NATO ally, invaded Afrin, a Kurdish-controlled region, forcinghundreds of thousands of civilians to flee to make way for extremist proxies.By October 2019, President Donald Trump abruptly ordered US troops to withdrawafter a single phone call with Turkish President Erdogan. Trump claimed thewithdrawal was to end an 'endless war' and save money, but he knowinglygreen-lighted Turkiye to attack local ground partners of the US and the Westerncoalition.

By late 2026, Western envoys had stopped standing byas Rojava's autonomous institutions were dismantled to appease central stateauthorities and regional powers. The core message: Kurdish blood was essentialto crushing terrorists, but Kurdish self-governance was a diplomaticinconvenience.

The Rebranding of Extreme Ideology

Perhaps the most troubling aspect of this geopoliticalrealignment is how quickly Western capitals embraced rebranded warlords, to thedetriment of their secular allies.

At the centre of this whitewashing campaign arefigures such as Ahmad al-Sharaa. Under his former nom de guerre, Abu Mohammadal-Julani, al-Sharaa led Jabhat al-Nusra —al-Qaeda's official Syrian franchise—and later commanded Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), an armed group forged in thesame ideological furnace as ISIS.

That Western power brokers now court former extremistcommanders simply because they traded battle fatigues for tailored suitsreveals a glaring double standard: radicalism isn't the deal-breaker in Westernforeign policy; disobedience is.

Washington's quick willingness to lift terrordesignations and warmly welcome former warlords highlights a recurringhypocrisy. Changing appearance —trimming beards, wearing Western suits, andusing diplomatic language— doesn't erase a person's core ideology. Yet Westerndiplomats eagerly accept these surface-level makeovers in the name ofcentralized order, while demanding total capitulation from the Kurdish forceswho spent a decade taking bullets to stop those same extremists.

Paper Concessions Versus Structural Autonomy

Western rationalizers highlight symbolic gestures fromDamascus, such as formal acknowledgment of Kurdish language rights, restoredcitizenship, and official decrees marking Nowruz. But these paper concessionsare an insultingly cheap trade. Ink on parchment in Damascus doesn’t compensatefor the deliberate destruction of living, self-governing institutions, nor doesit shield a population when political winds shift, as they inevitably will.

In a centralized security state, language rights andcultural crumbs granted by decree don't ensure physical security. Withoutindependent military capabilities or enforceable federal structures underDAANES, regional minorities, including Kurds, Christians, Druze, and Alawites,are left entirely defenceless against state reprisal and violence from localmilitias. Liquidating the SDF didn't bring stability; it destroyed the onlycredible check on centralized dictatorship in northern Syria.

The Broader Precedent

What happened to Rojava and DAANES in August 2026transcends regional borders; it's a repeated warning to any future ally naiveenough to trust Western promises. By abandoning the very people who crushedISIS to satisfy the immediate whims of Middle Eastern authoritarian warlords,Western leaders are sending a message to freedom fighters everywhere thatshouldn't be ignored: dying for Western security earns warm gratitude while thebullets are flying, but those fighters are disposable once the smoke clears.

Rojava's destruction underscores the need to challengethe superficial morality of Western diplomacy. Sustainable regional stabilitycannot come at the cost of sacrificing vibrant, pluralistic democracies toappease autocrats. By trading away the DAANES secular experiment for short-termpolitical gains, Western leaders didn't secure peace; they merely demonstratedthe lethal price local allies pay when Western commitments are treated asdisposable currency.

*Nick Kossovan, a self-described connoisseur of humanpsychology, writes about what's on his mind from Toronto.

Disclaimer: This article is a guest opinion. Theviews and opinions expressed are solely those of the author and do notnecessarily reflect the views or editorial position of Shafaq News.

Shafaq News- Baghdad

In the early hours of June 28, Iraqi security forces fanned out across Baghdad and several provinces, detaining politicians, officials, public employees, and business figures in an anti-corruption operation the government called Dawn Crackdown. Three months later, the campaign's defining image is no longer the pre-dawn raid but the courtroom.

The opening phase was measured in arrests. Based on sources at the Federal Integrity Commission, Iraq's main anti-corruption body, Shafaq News documented 67 detentions in the first sweep. By August 9, it had recorded at least 210 people detained during the campaign's first six weeks. The government has not kept a continuously updated, consolidated count.

Read more: Iraq’s Dawn Crackdown spreads through state institutions

By September, the pattern had shifted. Arrests continued, corruption networks were still being exposed, and state institutions remained under investigation. But the large, concentrated arrest announcements of the early weeks faded from the cases reviewed by Shafaq News. In their place came court judgments, illicit-enrichment rulings, asset recovery and financial tracing, and investigations reaching deeper into individual institutions. That shift may prove more consequential than the raids themselves.

The change coincided with a crowded national agenda. On September 30, the US-led Global Coalition formally ended its military mission in Iraq, while the government continued the politically sensitive process of bringing armed factions' weapons under state control. Baghdad and Washington have shifted toward bilateral security cooperation.

Nothing in the record shows that the Coalition transition diverted attention from corruption. Dawn Crackdown now enters its fourth month, however, as security and sovereignty issues command much of the political agenda. That raises a broader issue: can a campaign launched under extraordinary public scrutiny keep producing results once the spotlight moves on?

From Mass Sweeps to Institution-Level Cases

September's record does not suggest that enforcement has stalled.

On September 2, the Integrity Commission said it had dismantled an 11-member network accused of forging loan files at the Real Estate Bank in Babil. Investigators identified manipulation in 56 files and put the damage to public funds at more than 543 million dinars (about $414,000). Investigators arrested five bank employees and two intermediaries, and warrants remained outstanding for other suspects.

Days later, Commission investigators announced arrests over alleged manipulation of land allocation in Nasiriyah, in Dhi Qar province. One case involved 104 valuable properties whose allocation and ownership procedures were suspected of forgery and other violations.

On September 21, authorities in Maysan reported finding 120 allegedly falsified land-allocation files in municipal and real-estate registration offices, detaining eight employees, and issuing further arrest warrants. The following day, a separate investigation targeted a nine-member network suspected of buying more than 170 properties in Babil and Baghdad and registering them in the names of relatives and associates to hide ownership and the origin of the money.

On September 29, the Commission announced the arrest of ten employees at a hospital in Samawah, in Al-Muthanna province, over suspected manipulation of payment receipts and misappropriation of collected fees. Investigators examined more than 1,000 patient records from 2024 through 2026.

Taken together, the cases point to enforcement that has dispersed rather than disappeared. Instead of a single national sweep producing dozens of arrests at once, September's cases unfolded institution by institution and province by province.

The Courtroom Takes Center Stage

The more significant change came once investigations reached the courts.

The courts have also ruled the other way. On September 12, a man detained in the investigation into Adnan al-Jumaili, the former deputy oil minister for refining affairs and former director-general of the North Refineries Company, who remains in custody, was released after investigators found no evidence that he knowingly participated in the transfer of two commercial properties into his name. Rulings in both directions change how the campaign should be judged: its credibility now rests on verdicts, not detentions.

On September 14, a court sentenced Alaa Samir Rashid, director general of the Electricity Ministry's Central Electricity Distribution Company, to seven years in prison for illicit enrichment. The Integrity Commission said he was also ordered to repay the illicit gains and pay an equivalent fine, bringing his total financial obligation to about 25.7 billion dinars.

Two days later, lawmaker Bahaa al-Din Noor Mohammed Hussein al-Nouri received a seven-year sentence for illicit enrichment. According to the Commission, the case involved illicit gains of more than 5.8 billion dinars and nearly $11 million, and repayment plus an equivalent fine pushed the total above 40 billion dinars.

September 23 brought seven-year sentences against two more lawmakers. Alia Nassif was sentenced to seven years for illicit enrichment. Hours later, Ashwaq Salem Hassan received a separate seven-year sentence for illicit enrichment and was ordered to repay illicit gains and pay an equal fine totaling nearly 11.95 billion dinars.

On September 29, the Central Anti-Corruption Criminal Court sentenced MP Mohammed Farman Shaher Salman al-Jubouri to seven years for illicit enrichment. It ordered him to repay the illicit gains and imposed an equivalent fine, together totaling more than 28.1 billion dinars. He was the fourth sitting MP convicted of illicit enrichment in September.

The same case shows how far that process still has to run. On September 29, a security force accompanied by an Integrity Commission team arrested a businessman at his home in Tikrit, in Saladin province, in connection with the al-Jumaili case, a security source told Shafaq News. The businessman was detained hours after returning to Iraq from abroad. Investigators have begun legal proceedings and questioning but have not disclosed the allegations.

Following The Money

On September 21, the Supreme Judicial Council, which oversees Iraq's courts, announced that a Baghdad court had recovered 51 billion dinars for the state-owned Rafidain Bank in a financial and administrative corruption case. Proceedings against those involved are continuing.

The government, for its part, has begun measuring its anti-corruption performance through broader indicators. On September 8, government spokesman Haidar al-Aboudi said more than 26,000 corruption reports had been submitted to the Integrity Commission and that recovered funds, properties and other assets had exceeded 1.359 trillion dinars. The government credited much of that activity to Dawn Crackdown, alongside contract audits, preventive oversight and rewards for reporting corruption.

Quieter, Not Necessarily Weaker

The September record points more strongly in one direction than the other. The operation's first weeks were defined by raids and rapidly climbing detention figures. September was defined by institution-level investigations and judicial outcomes. Four lawmakers received seven-year sentences for illicit enrichment, and a senior state official was jailed. Investigators continued to pursue land allocation, municipalities, banks and hospitals, and courts went after money and assets as well as defendants.

This new phase extends a trend visible by late August. Shafaq News reported on September 2 that Dawn Crackdown had moved beyond its dramatic opening raids and was spreading through land registries, municipalities, electricity institutions, banks, and provincial administrations. September's cases reinforce that reading. The campaign appears to be moving from a stage in which success was shown by the number of people detained to one in which success must be shown by what happens to their cases.

Beyond September 30

September 30 had become a focal point of Iraq's security debate because the Coalition's departure was closely tied to weapons outside state control. That process has now moved beyond the withdrawal date: Prime Minister Ali Al-Zaidi has set June 30, 2027, as the deadline for completing the weapons-control roadmap, a timetable the Coordination Framework formally backed on October 2.

Security, sovereignty and the armed factions are therefore competing for political attention just as Dawn Crackdown enters its fourth month.

If Dawn Crackdown's early momentum depended primarily on high-profile arrests, its visibility may fade as other issues take over. If it is developing into a sustained institutional effort, the evidence will surface elsewhere: in final judgments, recovered funds and confiscated assets, successful prosecutions and acquittals where evidence falls short, changes to procurement and administrative procedures, and fewer repeat cases inside the same institutions.

* Methodology note: The figures and cases reviewed in this story are limited to official announcements by Iraq's Federal Integrity Commission and corruption-related cases documented by Shafaq News during the review period. They should be treated as documented minimums, not a comprehensive count of corruption activity across Iraq. The review excludes cases pursued or announced solely by other government bodies, security agencies, courts or oversight institutions unless they were also reported through the Integrity Commission or documented by Shafaq News. Cumulative figures, updates to previously reported cases and later judicial developments were not counted as new arrests when assessing the pattern of enforcement.

Written and edited by Shafaq News staff.

Shafaq News

By Ali Hussein Feyli*

Amid blurred boundaries around professional journalismand the organized rise of “shadow media,” journalism in Iraq is facing a deepstructural crisis that affects both its independence and its role in shapingpublic awareness.

The problem has intensified with the retreat fromdemocratic promises and the continued weakness of professional protections.Even the Iraqi Journalists’ Rights Law No. 21 of 2011 has failed to providesufficient safeguards, while provisions of the Penal Code, enacted during theBaath era, continue to be used against journalists.

Iraqi journalists have neither gained the professionalfreedom to report independently nor faced the total suppression of earlierauthoritarian eras, instead finding themselves caught between partisan mediaand political money on one side and disinformation and the loss of facts on theother.

Under these conditions, many qualified journalistscontinue to work outside formal employment structures, without contracts oradequate professional guarantees. This places an additional burden onjournalists, who must confront the influence of various powerful actors whilealso trying to make a living under the threat of legal action and withoutadequate professional safeguards.

Alongside weak protections for professionaljournalists, another problem concerns the criteria for granting journalisticstatus. Loose standards have allowed hundreds of people without adequatequalifications to obtain press identification, while pages and platforms haveemerged that use microphones and media logos without adhering to professionaljournalistic standards.

Official figures indicate that Iraq, including theKurdistan Region, has more than 20,000 journalists, though the figure alonedoes not show how many are actively practicing or the level of theirprofessional experience. Iraq also has more than 100 television channels andhundreds of news websites and digital platforms. Some pursue programs andobjectives that do not align with the public interest, while the sources offinancing for others remain unclear.

This proliferation has not produced greaterjournalistic independence, leaving Iraq’s media environment deeply divided andheavily polarized.

Granting press credentials to people with no groundingin journalism, writing, professional values or media ethics is not merely anadministrative error, but can contribute to a broader decline in the standingof the profession. When journalistic work is placed in the hands of unqualifiedindividuals, the consequences extend beyond the media sector by underminingpublic confidence in the information people receive.

Such disorder opens the door to misinformation andmedia extortion, undermining society’s psychological well-being andintellectual integrity while exposing weaknesses in professional standards andthe mechanisms meant to protect the profession.

Read more:Iraq’s CMC: Between regulation and freedom of expression

Inviting people who lack professional and ethicalstandards to government press conferences as journalists, and paying them, alsoexposes shortcomings in the media policies of some state institutions.

Rather than applying professional and ethicalstandards, some government media departments focus on numbers and appearances,granting access and journalistic status to individuals and outlets with noprofessional record or that rely on fabricated news for promotion and extortion.

The problem is not limited to politics or security. Politicalfinancing in the media sector, combined with easier access for unqualifiedindividuals, has distorted independent journalism. The emphasis on images,online presence, and social media visibility is also no longer confined toparts of the younger generation. A considerable number of officials appear tohave adopted the same approach, allowing digital visibility to outweighprofessional competence.

Any serious attempt at reform requires updated legislationprotecting professional rights and ensuring those protections are enforced. Clearcriteria are also needed for issuing press identification to prevent abuse and preventjournalistic status from becoming a cover for people whose media presence restslargely on cheap microphones and logos, while the damage caused by theirpractices can be severe.

In practical terms, the Iraqi Journalists Syndicateand government media departments should act as safeguards against extortion,misinformation, and misuse of journalistic status, while upholding professionalethics and protecting independent journalists’ right to work and criticize.

In Iraq today, the appearance of being a journalistcan sometimes be created within hours: a microphone can be purchased, anidentification card printed, and a digital page launched, allowing a personwith little experience or commitment to journalistic standards to establish apublic presence. Years of education, professional work, and credibility canconsequently be overshadowed by tools and branding that provide immediatevisibility without producing journalism worthy of public trust.

Read more: Iraq's press freedom falls amid record violations

This disorder is no longer confined to televisionscreens or the online sphere, but has moved into the streets throughmicrophones and media logos unsupported by genuine professional practice. Whensuch disorder receives funding and institutional access, it can becomeorganized chaos that damages society’s collective conscience.

Professional journalists carry the heaviest burden inthis environment, as the fading distinction between those committed to theprofession and those who practice extortion forces them to defend both theircredibility and the meaning of journalism itself. A microphone and a logo maycost little, but the loss of public trust in the media carries a far greaterprice for society.

* AliHussein Feyli, Chairman of Shafaq Foundation for Culture and Media andformer member of the Kurdistan Region Parliament.

This article was originally written in Arabic.

Shafaq News- Baghdad

Iraq is marking the end of the US-led Coalition's military mission witha four-day public holiday, from September 30 to October 3, that the governmenthas named "Sovereignty Days." Five politicians and analysts who spoketo Shafaq News described the occasion as significant but incomplete, arguingthat while foreign combat forces have left, the Iraqi state has yet toestablish a monopoly on arms.

The Coalition, formed in 2014 to fight ISIS, wound down its mission inIraq on September 30. Baghdad once treated that date as the deadline fordisarming the country's armed factions as well. On September 21, Prime MinisterAli al-Zaidi separated the two. His phased plan opens with a 90-day pause inwhich the factions halt attacks in exchange for assurances that US forces willnot strike them, followed by a weapons handover due to end by June 30, 2027.Some factions are pushing for an even later deadline, at the end of 2027.

"Ending the foreign presence by agreement completes sovereignty onpaper," said Sami Oshana, a member of parliament's Foreign RelationsCommittee. "Bringing weapons under state control completes it on theground."

If the state succeeds on both fronts, Oshana told Shafaq News, nofaction operating outside the law could invoke "resistance" or"security necessity" to justify its arms. He warned, however, thatthe military action alone cannot settle the issue. It requires a political dealthat guarantees the factions a secure role in politics in exchange for thestate's monopoly on force.

Completing, Not Beginning

Adel al-Ghariri, an independent politician, argues that September 30marks the completion of Iraqi sovereignty rather than its birth. “Iraq'ssovereignty was never absent. Its most visible gap was the presence of foreignforces that Baghdad itself invited in 2014 to fight ISIS,” he told Shafaq News.The next step, in his view, is ending every foreign military presence on Iraqisoil, Turkish forces included, so that the state alone decides matters of war,peace and security.

Al-Ghariri does not tie disarmament solely to the foreign presence. Hecalls it a national demand resting on five pillars: public opinion, theconstitution, parliament, the judiciary, and religious leadership. “Shiite,Sunni and Christian religious authorities have all called for weapons to beheld by state institutions,” he noted, as has the Supreme Judicial Council,Iraq's top judicial body. The legal framework, he argued, must give thefactions and their members a route into official institutions, whether thesecurity services or the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF).

Safaa al-Asam, a security expert, points to a contradiction in thefactions' long-standing case. “They justified their weapons by the presence offoreign troops, yet the Iraqi state never described that presence as anoccupation.” It rested on the Strategic Framework Agreement that Iraq and theUnited States signed in 2008 under then-Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki. WithISIS reduced to sleeper cells that Iraqi forces can handle, the Coalition'smission no longer had a rationale, he said.

“Together with efforts to end the Turkish presence at Bashiqa, a basenortheast of Mosul, the exit removes the factions' justification for keepingarms outside the state.” In his view, Iraq has begun tying up the loose ends ofthe weapons question.

Read more: Rubio's "Balkanization" warning links Iraq's armed factions to the country's unity

Sovereignty Beyond The Ground

Political analyst Ali al-Nasser warns that sovereignty cannot bemeasured by the departure of ground troops alone. Al-Zaidi's government hastaken important steps, he told Shafaq News, but they need to go further,starting with control of Iraq's airspace: operational air-defense systems andradar, and the ability to stop any country from violating Iraqi skies. Heexpects the process to extend to Turkish positions, “including Bashiqa andMount Sinjar,” if withdrawal arrangements are completed.

Nasser also argues for economic sovereignty. Iraq depends almostentirely on oil revenue, and he says diversifying the economy should show up inthe 2027 budget. “That effort faces outside pressure, particularly over USdollar flows and American financial policy.”

On weapons, Nasser expects the end of the foreign presence to weakensome factions' case for keeping their arms, especially as armed groups moveinto politics and elections. “The hardest part concerns heavy weapons, missilesand drones. Other weapons are already registered with the Interior Ministry.”He believes the heavy arsenal could be handled gradually if the governmentbuilds more trust with the factions and with neighboring states.

One State, One Authority

Issam al-Faili, a professor of political science at Baghdad'sMustansiriya University, rejects any partial reading of the concept.Sovereignty cannot be divided, he told Shafaq News. It depends not only on theabsence of foreign troops but on respect for the law and the constitution, andon the absence of any authority outside the state. “No parallel entity has theright to carve up that sovereignty, and all armed groups must answer to theprime minister as commander-in-chief of the armed forces.”

Religious and sectarian particularities deserve respect, he added, butno creed or foreign loyalty can take precedence over the state.

Al-Faili argues that the US departure removes the last justification forweapons outside state institutions, citing a proposal under which the factions'weapons and fighters would be absorbed into the PMF, with thecommander-in-chief, not the armed groups themselves, deciding which weapons arehanded over. The state funds these groups, he noted, so the state should decidehow their weapons are used.

Resistance From Within

Political forces are negotiating with the factions over how the planwill be carried out. On September 23, al-Maliki, who heads the State of Lawcoalition, said the program and timetable would be announced on Sept. 30, butno such announcement had been made by publication time.

Some factions have hardened their position. On September 28, Abu Mujahidal-Assafi, security chief of Kataib Hezbollah, one of the most powerfulIran-aligned factions, whose political wing, the Hoqooq Movement, holds sixseats in parliament, threatened to work to topple al-Zaidi's government if “itfailed to serve the people.” He also threatened to close the crossings ofcountries he accused of taking part in a blockade of Iran.

He warned that if US aircraft continued to violate Iraqi airspace afterOctober 1, the group would monitor the skies, issue warnings, and then shootdown aircraft it deems hostile.

Read more: Iraq's armed factions sit at the center of a Middle East war, experts say

Written and edited by Shafaq News staff.

Shafaq News

In the earlyhours of Monday, three drones struck Azadi Camp in Koya, east of Erbil, asettlement that has housed families of the Iranian Kurdish opposition for morethan two decades. Nobody was hurt. The attack came two days before the US-ledcoalition ends its military mission in Iraq, and it brought into focus thequestion now dominating Erbil: who will defend the skies over the KurdistanRegion of Iraq (KRI) once the Coalition's military mission ends?

TheKurdistan Region Security Agency said the drones struck between 1:40 and 2:10a.m. No party claimed responsibility, and there has been no independentconfirmation of who carried out the attack. The camp shelters families offighters from the Democratic Party of Iranian Kurdistan (KDPI), an exiledopposition group that has been a target all month. On September 2, Iranlaunched a series of drone strikes on KDPI bases, positions and camps, seniorparty official Karim Barwazi told Shafaq News. On September 15, an unidentifieddrone fell inside a KDPI camp north of Erbil, he said. The following night,coalition aircraft shot down a drone over the Soran Independent Administrationin Erbil province, a local source said. Komala, another exiled Iranian Kurdish party,has faced similar drone attacks on its camps in recent months.

The KRI'sMinistry of Peshmerga Affairs said that the Kurdistan Region has faced morethan 1,000 drone and ballistic missile attacks since the US-Iran war began inFebruary, some of them deadly. It called the timing of the withdrawal"sensitive" and said the departure of US forces without leaving anair-defense system behind was "a cause for concern." It also drew aconstitutional line: the KRI's airspace is part of Iraq's, and protecting it isthe federal government's job.

A USoversight body has documented the same gap. The 44th Lead Inspector Generalreport to the US Congress on Operation Inherent Resolve (OIR), the US-ledcampaign against ISIS, found that the Peshmerga lack significant air-defensecoverage of their own. American systems protected US facilities in Erbil, thereport noted, but the KRI's security forces, civilians, and energyinfrastructure remained exposed to aerial attack. The report, which coveredJanuary through March 2026, also recorded escalating strikes by Iran-alignedarmed factions and a temporary drawdown of US advisory support to thePeshmerga.

Read more: Iraq's armed factions sit at the center of a Middle East war, experts say

The DeadlineThat Moved

Kurdishofficials have not publicly tied their concerns to the disarmament of Iraq'sarmed factions, but the two are hard to separate. Erbil has been explicit aboutwho is firing. On April 5, KRI Prime Minister Masrour Barzani condemned attackson the US Consulate and civilian areas in Erbil by "terroristmilitias" and urged Baghdad to act against the groups responsible.Community Peacemaker Teams (CPT), an independent monitoring group, documented751 attacks on the Kurdistan Region between Feb. 28 and May 28, includingstrikes attributed to Iran and Iran-aligned Iraqi groups.

Baghdadoriginally linked disarmament to the same September 30 date as the coalition'sexit. On September 22, Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi replaced that deadline witha phased plan. It opens with a 90-day pause in which the factions halt attacksin exchange for not being struck by US forces, followed by a weapons handoverdue to end by June 30, 2027. As a result, the Coalition mission ends this weekwhile the phased weapons-control process is scheduled to continue for anothernine months.

The USwithdrawal from the KRI is now complete, according to an Iraqi security sourcewho spoke to Shafaq News. Equipment moved overland through Duhok province andacross the Ibrahim Khalil border crossing into Turkiye, the source said. USequipment withdrawn from Erbil was transported to Incirlik Air Base near Adana,a US logistics hub in southern Turkiye that has supported American operationsacross the Middle East since the 1950s. Coalition forces had already left theirother Iraqi bases in January. Washington said on September 23 that the drawdownwas running on schedule under the plan agreed with Baghdad in 2024 to move to abilateral security relationship.

Read more: The evolution of Kurdish power in Iraq: Governance, oil, and constitutional ambiguity

A Gap, Not AVacuum

Ahmedal-Sharifi, an Iraqi strategic expert, told Shafaq News that the withdrawalwill leave real gaps in Iraq's combat and technical capabilities. “Manpoweralone does not win modern wars. They turn increasingly on technology,surveillance, electronic warfare and advanced systems,” he argued.

He separatesthe end of the coalition's mission from the end of American power in the MiddleEast. The coalition was formed in 2014 to fight ISIS and has been shrinkingsince 2017, he noted. “What matters is whether US support continues.”

US troopsand aircraft stationed elsewhere in the Middle East can still back Iraq withsurveillance, electronic warfare and air support if needed. For that reason,al-Sharifi rules out a complete vacuum.

Even so, hecalls Erbil's fears justified. The KRI was attacked by both Turkiye and Iranwhile American troops were present. It will now depend more heavily on Iraqiinstitutions that, in his words, remain unable to deter every form of attack.“The Peshmerga cannot carry that burden alone,” he said, adding that theconstitution defines them as a force for protecting the Kurdistan Region, whiledefending Iraq's airspace and sovereignty falls to the federal Ministry ofDefense.

MohammedZangana, a political analyst based in Erbil, is less reassured. The withdrawalshould have come with a defense system able to protect Iraq's airspace,borders, and territory, insulated from political rivalries, he told ShafaqNews, tracing Erbil's anxiety to three things: Baghdad has offered no clearguarantees for the KRI, the political process remains fragile, and power andweapons are spread across too many hands.

He points to2011, when US forces left. Three years later, ISIS swept across a third ofIraq. The Inspector General report separately warned of the risk of an ISISresurgence following mass prison escapes in neighboring Syria.

TheBarzanis' Warning

MasoudBarzani, leader of the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), which leads the KRIgovernment, made the same comparison on Al Sharqiya television on Sunday. Herecalled the debate in 2011 over whether Iraqi forces could take fullresponsibility for security. The Americans left, ISIS emerged three yearslater, and Baghdad had to seek international help again, he said, whileacknowledging that conditions today differ.

PM MasrourBarzani told the Financial Times that the withdrawal comes at a highlysensitive time and warned against leaving the KRI without adequate airdefenses. His office later accused the newspaper of misrepresenting hisremarks. It said his core concern was the lack of defensive means and repeatedthat the attacks had come from Iran and from "militias" inside Iraq.

Alial-Bidar, an Iraqi political analyst, told Shafaq News that Kurdish fears arewell founded, and that parts of the Sunni public and political class sharethem, given the turbulence across the Middle East and Iraq's own securityrecord. “The Barzanis' warnings deserve serious study,” he said, callingMonday's attack in Erbil province proof that the threat has not passed, andIraq may need American support again if its forces fall short of fullreadiness.

Read more: Kurdistan Region unifies Peshmerga, folding rival KDP and PUK forces into one army

Beyond TheWithdrawal

HaithamNumaan, a public relations assistant professor at the University of Exeter,sees Erbil's calculations shaped by Syria. He singles out the dissolution ofthe Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), the Kurdish-led force that controlled muchof northeast Syria, and its integration into the new Syrian state. “Relationswith Baghdad also hinge on divisions inside Kurdish politics,” he told ShafaqNews, where the KDP and its rival, the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), takedifferent approaches to the federal government.

Thewithdrawal has exposed that divide. While KDP leaders have issued publicwarnings, the PUK has not officially voiced similar concern. Party members,speaking to the press, have instead described a different strategy. The PUK,they say, prefers balanced and less confrontational relations with Iran and itsallies in Baghdad, to keep the KRI from becoming a battleground for regionalscore-settling. In their view, the KRI's real guarantee after the withdrawallies not in a lasting American military presence but in resolving outstandingdisputes with Baghdad over public-sector salaries, the budget and theadministration of disputed territories such as Kirkuk, alongside reliablesecurity coordination between the Iraqi army and the Peshmerga.

Geographyhelps explain the gap. The American military presence was concentrated in Erbilprovince, the KDP's heartland, at Harir Air Base and Erbil airport, near the USConsulate. The PUK's base in al-Sulaymaniyah hosted no comparable US presence,so the withdrawal is felt most directly in Erbil. Al-Sulaymaniyah has notescaped the drones, however. Komala's camps in the province have been among thetargets.

Numan alsolinks the American debate over Iraq's "Balkanization" to disarmament.Secretary of State Marco Rubio warned last week that Iraq must disarm itsfactions to avoid that outcome. Numan reads the warning not as a call forpartition but as a warning against fragmented state institutions and competingcenters of security and political power, and as pressure to bring weapons heldoutside official institutions under state control.

Read more: Rubio's "Balkanization" warning links Iraq's armed factions to the country's unity

Baghdad'sAnswer

Politicalforces in Baghdad reject the idea of a security vacuum. Fahad al-Jubouri, aleader in the al-Hikma Movement, a member of the Coordination Framework, theprincipal Shiite political alliance and a central force in governmentformation, told Shafaq News that the timetable for ending the coalition missionwas debated and agreed within the State Administration Coalition, thecross-sectarian alliance that formed the government. “The government is workingto strengthen control of Iraq's airspace and is buying air-defense systems.Iraq's security, intelligence and logistics institutions can handle internalthreats, and concerns will fade once the deadline passes.”

Bothcapitals point to signs of consolidation. Last week, Baghdad reached anagreement with Turkiye to take gradual control of the Zilkan base in Bashiqa, aTurkish military installation northeast of Mosul. In Erbil, a Sept. 21 ceremonyformally placed Peshmerga units under the Ministry of Peshmerga Affairs,marking a major step in a years-long effort to unify forces historicallydivided between KDP- and PUK-aligned commands.

Neither stepfully answers Erbil's central question. Al-Zaidi's initial 90-day phase runsuntil late December, followed by a weapons-control process scheduled toconclude by June 30, 2027. In the meantime, the Kurdistan Region will dependincreasingly on federal institutions for air defense while negotiationscontinue over weapons held by factions that Kurdish officials have blamed forrepeated attacks on the Region.

Read more: Experts doubt Baghdad can stop Kurdistan Region attacks

Written andedited by Shafaq News staff.