Shafaq News

A rare eyeless fish still survivesin Al-Anbar's stable groundwater while mass die-offs spread across Iraq'srivers, marshes, and farms. The contrast frames the country's central failure:not that its fish are dying, but that Iraq often cannot say why.

The evidence points to no singlecause. Water scarcity and oxygen depletion are documented in some areas;pollution is suspected but unconfirmed in others; salinity, disease, anddestructive fishing add further pressure. In most cases, the testing needed toisolate one factor from another was never done, and the diagnostic gap, morethan any single toxin or drought, is what leaves each die-off unresolved.

The losses come amid a steepcontraction in the industry. Iraqi Fish Producers Association head Iyadal-Talibi told Shafaq News that annual production has fallen from more than900,000 metric tons in 2018 to an estimated 250,000–300,000 today. That collapse—roughly two-thirds of national output in under a decade— turns the issue froman environmental concern into a broader food-security problem.

The Green Iraq Observatory estimatedon August 8 that more than 1,000 metric tons of fish had been lost nationwideduring 2026.

Maysan: Scarcity Suspected, LabEvidence Lacking

Maysan offers the most consistentcase for linking deaths to falling water levels, though the evidence restslargely on official attribution rather than measurement.

Fish began dying in the Al-AmshanCanal in early August after water releases dropped sharply, according to theprovincial council's Agriculture and Water Committee. Environmental activistMortada al-Janubi attributed deaths in the Al-Ezz River and central marshes toreceding water and falling oxygen. Maysan lawmaker Duha al-Sadkhan told ShafaqNews that hundreds of tons were lost in Al-Mejar Al-Kabir district, with damageestimated at three billion to five billion Iraqi dinars ($2.28M – $3.80M).

The stronger evidence is historical.In August 2024, testing after extensive mortality in Al-Huwaizeh Marsh, on theIraq-Iran border, identified critically low water levels and oxygen depletionas the principal factors; environmental expert Ahmed Saleh put mortality therenear 95 percent. That episode was measured. The 2026 Al-Amshan deaths have beenattributed to the same mechanism, but Shafaq News found no publicly availabletesting confirming it. The distinction matters: a plausible explanation is notnecessarily a proven cause.

The World Bank warned in 2022 thatdams, water abstraction, and wetland drainage were cutting river flows andthreatening inland fisheries. For fish held at high density in cages or ponds,reduced flow compounds the danger: poor circulation drives oxygen stress anddisease.

Wasit: Pollution Is Credible ButUnproven

If Maysan points to scarcity, theApril die-off in Wasit remains genuinely unsettled, with attention fixed onwhether contaminated water moving from the Diyala into the Tigris caused thelosses.

The Green Iraq Observatoryattributed the episode to untreated sewage and industrial waste carrieddownstream after releases from Hamrin Dam rose, and it documented more than 20cases of poisoning and skin injury requiring hospital treatment. Al-Talibi blamedsewage entering the Tigris through the Diyala and estimated that about 95percent of Kut's floating cages were affected.

But no public laboratory datareviewed by Shafaq News reported the measurements that would separate pollutionfrom oxygen depletion, infection, or several causes acting together: dissolvedoxygen, ammonia, heavy metals. Iraq's 2018 mass mortality shows why that gapmatters: an international investigation concluded that Koi Herpesvirus was theprincipal cause, with poor water quality and overcrowding raisingsusceptibility rather than triggering the deaths. The obvious culprit was notthe killer.

Pollution remains a real threatregardless. A World Bank document in May 2026 estimated that more than 70percent of sewage in Iraq's urban areas enters rivers untreated. WaterResources Minister Muthanna al-Tamimi announced legal action in July against partiesaccused of polluting the Tigris and Diyala, citing joint inspections with theEnvironment Ministry. Months later, no public information identifies thedefendants or indicates whether the cases have advanced.

The South: Salt Changes The Habitat

The same loss of freshwater thatstarves fish of oxygen creates a second pressure farther south, where weakerriver flows let saltwater push deeper into the Shatt Al-Arab and connectedwetlands.

A 2025 study by researchers from theuniversities of Basrah and Babylon recorded a salinity of 29.9 practicalsalinity units in Al-Hammar Marsh, where every fish sampled at one stationduring the intrusion was a marine species. At Abu Al-Khaseeb, at 25 units,marine species made up 82.8 percent of recorded abundance. The findings do notname salinity as a cause of the recent die-offs, but they show how sharplydeclining flows can rewrite which fish a habitat can hold.

Read more: Hawizeh Marsh faces catastrophic fish die-off

Illegal Fishing Keeps Removing Stock

Destructive fishing also continuesto strip breeding populations already weakened by water loss.

Iraq's Law No. 48 of 1976 banspoisons, explosives, chemicals, and electrical devices, with penalties up toimprisonment and confiscation of boats and catches. Yet the Supreme JudicialCouncil found electrofishing, explosives, pesticides, and illegal nets still inuse in 2024 and urged consolidating provisions scattered across separate laws,a legislative fix that has not come.

The World Bank likewise flaggedelectrofishing and breeding-season fishing as persistent, poorly enforcedthreats. Agriculture Ministry spokesperson Qusay al-Hattab told Shafaq Newsthat teams document violations with GPS equipment, but no public nationwidefigures show how many were recorded in 2025 or 2026, or how many led toconvictions.

Read more: Death in the current: Pollution decimates Iraq’s river ecosystems

Millions Released, SurvivalUntracked

Against these combined pressures,the government's most visible response is restocking. The Agriculture Ministryreleased about 155 million fish in the 2026 season, al-Hattab said —up fromroughly 95 million the year before— including more than 11 million into AnahLake in Al-Anbar in April alone. The Animal Resources Directorate produced morethan 1.5 million native fish between 2023 and 2025, among them Binni, Qattan,and Shabout.

What happens next is unknown. Nopublished data reviewed by Shafaq News show how many released fish survive tomaturity or form breeding populations. The releases are countable andimmediate; the water they enter is often the same unmeasured water where fishhave been dying. Restocking may replace some of the losses without addressingthe conditions behind them, while no publicly available data show whether theprogram is producing sustainable fish populations.

That is the shape of the problem. InMaysan, insufficient water and oxygen depletion. In Wasit, pollution that isplausible but unconfirmed. In the south, salt is reshaping habitats. Behind allof them, disease that has turned catastrophic before and illegal fishing thatnever stopped. The investigation finds no single nationwide killer, and, moreoften, no test capable of naming the local one.

Until that changes, Iraq risksreplacing dead fish faster than it can explain why they died, treating thelosses without fully understanding their causes. In Al-Anbar's caves,meanwhile, the blind fish endures in something increasingly scarce elsewhere: stableconditions.

Written and edited by Shafaq Newsstaff.

Shafaq News

A lawyer filed a formal complaint on Wednesday askingprosecutors in the Iraqi province of Wasit to summon Hadi al-Ameri, leader ofthe Badr Organization, over public remarks describing Iraq's 2019 Tishreenprotests as "strife" that armed groups he called "the resistance"had confronted.

Families of protesters killed during the demonstrations areseparately pursuing court action, according to relatives who spoke to ShafaqNews.

Al-Ameri, who is also a prominent leader of the CoordinationFramework, a coalition of mainly Iran-aligned Shia parties that dominatesIraq's government, made the comments on Sunday at a ceremony marking the deathof Grand Ayatollah Mohammed Baqir al-Hakim, a senior Shia cleric killed in a2003 bombing in Najaf. In a video that circulated widely, al-Ameri said the resistance"bravely stood against the Tishreen strife and preserved the state and thepolitical system." 

Read more: Iraq’s protests after Tishreen: A system that learned how to contain the street

The Tishreen (October) protests were the largestanti-government movement in Iraq since 2003, beginning in Baghdad and southernprovinces on 1 October 2019 over corruption, unemployment and failing publicservices. Rights groups including Amnesty International said at least 541protesters were killed and more than 20,000 wounded,

Amnesty said successive governments had formed numerousinvestigative committees but had made no findings public. Despite at least2,700 criminal cases being filed over abuses during the protests and theiraftermath, few people have been brought to trial and “next to no justice hasbeen delivered,” the organization said, adding that many sentences had beenoverturned.

The Complaint

Lawyer Hazem Mazen al-Badri submitted his complaint to thehead of the Public Prosecution Office in Wasit, seeking to open a case andsummon al-Ameri. According to the filing, al-Badri asked prosecutors toauthenticate the original video and verify its date, location, and context, tohear al-Ameri's account of which groups he meant, and to compare his statementswith earlier investigations and the case records concerning protesters. 

Read more: Iraq's Coordination Framework is weakening, but no rival is ready to replace it

Families of the dead have voiced similar demands. Alial-Dahamat, brother of prominent civil activist Amjad al-Dahamat, who wasassassinated in the southern province of Maysan during the protests, toldShafaq News that victims' families were not surprised by the remarks butconsidered them significant because they came publicly from a senior politicaland security figure. He said families had appealed to the Supreme JudicialCouncil and the Public Prosecution to act, and that some had already filedlegal complaints against al-Ameri.

Bahaa al-Sarai, brother of activist Safaa al-Sarai, who wasalso killed during the protests, said on Tuesday that he intended to file suitover the remarks.

Ali al-Abadi, head of the Iraq Center for Human Rights,called on the Supreme Judicial Council and government bodies to open atransparent investigation, and urged the United Nations and the InternationalCriminal Court to take up the case, according to a statement he issuedWednesday.

The Badr response

The Badr Organization rejected interpretations of al-Ameri'sremarks as an admission of involvement in suppressing the protests.Abdul-Hussein al-Zalimi, a Badr official, told Shafaq News that al-Ameri hadnot meant the protest movement or its early demands for services and reform,which “drew support from the Shia religious authority and broad sections ofsociety.”

Read more: Explainer: Iraq’s Coordination Framework and Its Rise to Power

Al-Zalimi said al-Ameri was instead referring to those heaccused of later diverting the movement and introducing outside agendas, andthat Iraqi leaders had spoken at the time of “a foreign hand” behind some ofthe killings of protesters and security personnel.

The dispute revives a contested account from 2019, whenofficials spoke of an unidentified "third party" targeting bothprotesters and security forces, while rights groups and activists attributedkillings, abductions and assassinations to security forces and armed factions.No comprehensive, public judicial ruling has since assigned responsibility forthe full range of abuses committed during the protests.

The Tishreen movement forced the resignation of PrimeMinister Adil Abdul-Mahdi's government in November 2019 and led to earlyelections in October 2021. Al-Badri's complaint now rests with the Wasit publicprosecutor, who has not announced a decision on whether to summon al-Ameri. 

Shafaq News

By Ali HusseinFeyli

When this country’s water,land, and skies are in their worst condition, the plans and statistics placedon the desks of environmental policymakers are not enough to grasp the depth ofthe crisis. Official reports may measure falling water levels in the Tigris andEuphrates or concentrations of dust and fine particles over cities, but thelong-term risks are far greater than figures and indicators alone can capture.

What Iraq faces today is notmerely environmental degradation, but a decline in the historical awarenessthat shaped a culture of adapting to nature over thousands of years. Mesopotamiancivilization was built around the value of land and rivers as foundations oflife and stability, and as resources to be preserved rather than depleted,because society’s prosperity was always tied to its ability to manage itsresources and live within nature’s limits.

That balance began to breakdown when oil extracted from beneath the ground became the center of theeconomy, while the value of resources above it —water, agricultural land,orchards, and other natural assets— declined. Over decades, short-sighteddecisions subjected the environment to unregulated exploitation and turnedlarge areas of Iraq’s fertile landscape into sites of uncontrolledconstruction, without a long-term vision to protect what remained of the country’sresources.

Read more: Iraq’s water crisis: A structural rewrite of agricultural governance

Large areas of orchards thatonce served as natural lungs for cities and as shields against heat, dust, anddesertification were removed, while concrete development expanded at theexpense of green land, reducing cities’ ability to withstand the effects ofclimate change and rising temperatures.

This painful shift went beyondpoor management, leaving society with pollution, declining water resources, andshrinking vegetation while creating a cultural disconnect between youngergenerations and the natural environment that once formed part of Iraq’s memoryand identity. Today, younger generations are growing up less connected torivers, orchards, and clean air, and more accustomed to dust, pollution, andurban congestion.

Environmental decline is notsimply the result of temporary administrative failures, but a sign of a deeperproblem in how responsibility toward the country and future generations isunderstood. Addressing it requires more than superficial water agreements withneighboring countries or budgets for projects that lack planning, oversight,and effectiveness; it demands a change in how Iraq manages its land, water, andcities.

Read more: Salinity and drought ravage Iraq’s historic farmlands

Baghdad today offers a painfulexample of the consequences: polluted land, dust-laden air, and water undergrowing pressure show that the environmental crisis is no longer a marginalissue, but has become part of the crisis affecting quality of life itself.

When nature is depleted andthe country itself is turned into a commodity, the cost of repair becomes fargreater than the cost of protection, with some losses eventually reaching apoint where money alone, regardless of how much is spent in the future, can nolonger compensate for them.

This article was originallywritten in Arabic.

Shafaq News

Iraq’s Dawn Crackdown, or Sawlat al-Fajr, has moved beyond the dramaticraids that marked its opening weeks, evolving into a broader campaign reachingmunicipal offices, land registries, electricity institutions, banks, provincialadministrations and senior political figures.

Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi launched the nationwide anti-corruptiondrive on June 28. By August 9, Shafaq News had documented the detention of atleast 210 officials, lawmakers, public employees and business figures duringthe campaign’s first six weeks. The government has not issued a continuouslyupdated consolidated arrest count.

The operation did not end with the first waves of arrests. A Shafaq Newsreview between August 11 and August 31 identified more cases involvingcorruption, bribery, embezzlement, illicit enrichment, forgery, fraud, misuseof public funds or closely related investigations and convictions.

Dhi Qar Stands Out

Among cases tied to specific provinces, Dhi Qar appeared most frequentlyin Shafaq News' August 11–31 review, with most involving Nasiriyah and itsmunicipal administration.

The cases included arrests of municipality employees, allegationsinvolving public land, forged documents, suspected damage to public funds,bribery and manipulation of property transactions.

On August 17, a former head of Nasiriyah Municipality’s PropertyDivision was sentenced to six years in prison for taking bribes andmanipulating land transactions. Authorities said hundreds of documents —includingdeeds, receipts, sale agreements and official correspondence— had been seizedduring the investigation.

Two days later, a municipal employee facing several corruption warrantsevaded an attempt to arrest him. Authorities were examining allegedmanipulation involving tens of thousands of residential plots as well assuspected waste in investment and health contracts.

The pressure continued through the end of the month, when securityforces and Federal Integrity Commission personnel raided the NasiriyahMunicipality building and arrested a surveying expert over alleged misuse ofpublic funds.

By then, Shafaq News had documented more than 23 arrests in Dhi Qarsince the Dawn Crackdown began, in addition to the dismissal of severaldirectors-general.

The pattern made Dhi Qar —and Nasiriyah Municipality in particular— oneof the most prominent provincial centers of the campaign in Shafaq News'review.

Baghdad ranked second in the August 11–31 review, while other cases werereported in Al-Muthanna, Saladin, Babil, Najaf, Maysan, Al-Anbar, Basra,Nineveh, Al-Diwaniyah and Al-Sulaymaniyah.

Other cases were national in scope or did not belong cleanly to a singleprovince.

Read more: Iraq detains 35 officials in weekly corruption sweep

Municipalities, Land And Property Dominate

Municipal government, local administration, land and property accountedfor the largest cluster of cases reviewed by Shafaq News. Other cases involvedthe electricity, oil, health, security, culture, investment, transport andindustry sectors, as well as other public institutions.

Some cases involved finance, banking, pensions and currency offices aswell as senior political or public offices.

Land appears repeatedly as both a public asset vulnerable tomanipulation and a mechanism through which suspected illicit gains can beconcealed.

In Baghdad, authorities foiled an alleged attempt to seize state landusing forged ownership documents.

In Basra’s West Qurna area, investigators uncovered an alleged networkusing forged documents in land-compensation claims.

In Najaf, a bribery investigation involved a forged municipal barcodeconnected to the ownership of a land plot.

The largest single land-related operation reported during the periodcame in Al-Muthanna, where the National Security Service announced the arrestof 61 people over an alleged property-record forgery network.

Investigators said more than 90 transactions had been manipulated orforged, causing losses estimated at around two billion dinars, or about $1.5million. The suspects included government employees, lawyers and real-estateoffice owners.

The repeated appearance of municipalities and land offices suggests thatthe campaign is increasingly reaching the administrative level where citizens,investors and government employees interact directly with state property,permits, records and public contracts.

Electricity Emerges As Another Pressure Point

The electricity sector was the second major institutional cluster. Thecases ranged from arrests and bribery convictions to allegations of illicitenrichment and financial violations involving current or former officials.

One investigation led to the seizure of millions of dollars and goldfrom an electricity official. Other cases involved employees of electricitydirectorates, officials at generation and distribution companies, andconvictions over bribery or illicit gains.

By the second half of August, electricity had clearly become one of thecampaign’s most visible institutional fronts.

Read more: Corruption arrests in Iraq pass 210 under PM al-Zaidi

Banks, pensions and public money

A further part of the campaign centered on banking, pensions, currencyor other state financial systems.

The cases stretched from an employee of state-owned Rafidain Bankaccused of misuse of public funds to allegations involving pension paymentsissued in the name of deceased beneficiaries.

An Integrity Commission audit announced in August identified 16,384deceased beneficiaries whose pension payments had not been stopped, alongsidearound 40,000 biometric payment cards issued using outdated records.

In Najaf, investigators separately detained Rasheed Bank employees overpension payments allegedly embezzled for years in the name of a deceasedretiree.

Authorities also opened reviews into losses at state-owned banks, whilesecurity forces announced operations against counterfeit currency, fake dollarsales and digital-wallet fraud.

From Local Employees To Senior Figures

At the same time, enforcement has continued to reach higher levels ofpublic office.

The August cases included former lawmakers, a former governor, a formerdeputy minister and other senior officials.

Shafaq News also documented that a wider corruption review had reachedformer prime ministers and lawmakers, while the Central Bank later orderedasset restrictions involving political figures under investigation.

On August 30, a former MP and a former oil official were reportedsentenced in separate corruption cases involving illicit enrichment.

Saladin: From Public Fees To Hidden Property

Saladin provides another example of how investigations have widened fromindividual transactions to accumulated wealth.

Cases during the period included the conviction of a former governor,alleged embezzlement involving the Traffic Directorate and the arrest of 21people in an investigation into unauthorized parking areas and fee collection.

Then, on August 29, the Federal Integrity Commission disclosed recordsconnected to about 95 properties during an investigation involving a seniorReal Estate Registration official.

Investigators said properties had been registered in the names ofrelatives and intermediaries and were examining allegations of bribery, misuseof office, illicit enrichment and money laundering.

Authorities seized property records, contracts, cash, gold, computersand other materials during the investigation.

The case illustrates another shift in the campaign: from identifyingsuspect payments to tracing how alleged proceeds may have been converted intoreal estate, gold and other assets.

Asset Recovery Becomes A Second Front

The Dawn Crackdown has increasingly been presented not simply as anarrest campaign but as an effort to return stolen money to the state.

By August 9, an estimated 482.6 billion dinars (about $371.6 million)had been recovered in cash and assets, according to figures cited by the EcoIraq Observatory. The total included cash as well as roughly half a ton ofgold.

International specialists in tracing stolen and smuggled funds alsojoined Iraqi teams in Baghdad in August, with authorities seeking to track assetstransferred abroad and pursue suspects outside the country.

Separately, the Iraqi National Security Service said on August 27 thatit had recovered more than 93 billion dinars (around $70 million) for the statetreasury during the first half of 2026, while also reporting seizures ofdollars and Iraqi currency in its operations.

A Campaign Shifting From Raids To Prevention

During a visit to the Federal Integrity Commission, Prime Ministeral-Zaidi ordered the implementation of a reward system for corruptionwhistleblowers, tighter monitoring of border crossings and greater publicdisclosure of those implicated in graft.

He also called for monthly and quarterly progress reports and increasedscrutiny of high-value provincial and federal contracts.

The Integrity Commission said field teams had been established to auditcontracts throughout state institutions and that reviews had already beencompleted at eight ministries, with others continuing.

Officials also announced completion of Iraq’s National Integrity andAnti-Corruption Strategy through 2030.

That development marks an important evolution in the Dawn Crackdown.

The first phase was measured largely through who was arrested.

The next may increasingly be judged by which systems are changed, howmuch money is recovered, whether major cases reach final court judgments, andwhether the same forms of corruption return after the raids end.

Read more: Iraq detains top officials in anti-corruption sweep: What we know so far

Written and edited by Shafaq News staff.

Shafaq News- Khanaqin

The map around Khanaqin looks markedly different from what it did a generation ago. In northeastern Diyala, near the Iranian border and southeast of the Kurdistan Region, administrative boundaries have shifted, familiar areas have come under different jurisdictions, and disputes over land and population have made every change more consequential.

What began on the map has gradually reached further into the life of the city. Agricultural contracts remain unresolved, families arriving from elsewhere have changed the commercial landscape, Arabic has become more prominent on shop signs, and some parents are reconsidering whether Kurdish-language education offers their children the future they want.

All of this has unfolded alongside a political struggle of its own. Kurdish parties retain a substantial base in Khanaqin, but their votes remain divided, while residents often find themselves navigating between Baghdad's administrative authority and Erbil's longstanding political and social ties to the city.

A Shrinking Map

For people who remember Khanaqin's former reach, the change is visible in the territory itself. Qaratepe, Jabbarah, Jalawla and Saadiyah were once part of the district, according to Muhaymin al-Agha, a senior official in the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK). The conversion of Qaratepe and Jalawla into separate districts removed them from Khanaqin's administration and reduced the territory under its control.

''The PUK has challenged some of those decisions through legal channels,'' Al-Agha said, arguing that objections were not adequately addressed before some of the changes moved through Diyala's provincial institutions.

The story, however, reaches back further than the events of Oct. 16, 2017. Those events came weeks after the Kurdistan Region held an independence referendum, which Baghdad rejected as unconstitutional. On Oct. 16, Iraqi forces, backed by Popular Mobilization forces (PMF), moved into several disputed areas, including Khanaqin, after Kurdish Peshmerga forces withdrew, shifting control of territory that had been held by Kurdish forces.

Serbest Barzo, a member of the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), traces an earlier turning point to 1992, when the subdistricts of Bamu and Maidan were separated from Khanaqin and attached to Kalar. Further changes came after Oct. 16, 2017, affecting Mandali, Jalawla, Qaratepe, Jabbarah and Saadiyah.

"Khanaqin was one of the largest districts in Iraq in terms of area and administration," Barzo recalled.

Its territory once extended east toward Iran, north toward Halabja and al-Sulaymaniyah. Today, the city is largely a district center with almost no subdistricts remaining under its direct administration.

Sarwan Mohammed, a Khanaqin resident, sees more than administrative reorganization behind that transformation. He links some of the later changes to competition among influential Sunni Arab political forces in Diyala, associating the administration of Qaratepe and Jabbarah with the influence of the Taqaddum (Progress) Party, led by Mohammad Al-Halbousi, and developments involving Jalawla and Saadiyah with the Sovereignty Alliance (Al-Siyada), led by Khamis Al-Khnajar.

Land and Identity

For Barzo, the consequences are particularly visible in the changes that have taken place since 2017. He describes them as "Arabization and demographic change," pointing to Arab families from other areas who moved into Khanaqin and bought shops, homes, and land.

He further connects those developments to Article 140 of Iraq's constitution, which provides a framework for resolving the status of disputed territories and addressing the consequences of earlier demographic policies. Nearly two decades after the deadline originally set for completing the process, Article 140 remains unimplemented.

The unresolved status of the disputed territories has also left land and agricultural contracts in limbo. Legislation and decisions introduced after 2003 were intended to address earlier policies and restore rights to their owners, Barzo argues, but significant parts of that process have not been fully implemented in Diyala, particularly in Khanaqin.

Some contracts granting the use of disputed agricultural land have continued to be renewed rather than being settled through a final determination of ownership. For Barzo, the issue is not the ethnicity of the person using the land, but the legal basis of the right itself.

The population side of the dispute is harder to separate from everyday life. Abu Marwan, a former educator, has noticed more people from outside Khanaqin in its markets, restaurants, and public spaces. Some settled after the October 2017 events, he told Shafaq News, while others arrive to work, trade, shop, or complete government transactions.

For Barzo, those movements matter partly because of where Khanaqin sits, describing the city as part of a strategically important belt linking the Iranian border with the Kurdistan Region and central Iraq, further calling it the "Gateway to the Zagros."

"The location gives the administrative changes a significance that extends beyond the city itself," he said, stressing that control of Khanaqin and surrounding areas can affect the geographic continuity of Kurdish-majority territories outside the Kurdistan Region's formal administration.

That broader contest, however, is not confined to maps, property records or constitutional provisions. It is increasingly visible in the way the city looks and functions.

Changing Khanaqin

Walk through Khanaqin's markets and another part of the transformation comes into view. Arabic has become increasingly common on commercial signs, according to residents and shopkeepers interviewed by Shafaq News.

For many shop owners, the reason is practical. A growing number of customers come from outside the city, and Arabic is the language most likely to reach them.

The same kind of calculation is beginning to influence education.

Abu Marwan has watched some families reconsider whether to send their children to Kurdish-language schools. For them, the decision is not simply about language or identity, but also about what happens after graduation.

Financial difficulties have limited employment opportunities within Kurdistan Region institutions, while salary delays and other pressures have affected the education system.

Garmian University has become part of that uncertainty. The university once had about 4,000 students, but concerns over national recognition of its degrees have made some families uneasy about the prospects facing graduates.

For students, Abu Marwan sees two difficult paths: limited employment opportunities inside the Kurdistan Region or potential obstacles when they seek to enter federal institutions.

Language, in that sense, has become tied to the wider economic and political choices facing families. The changes are subtle enough to appear ordinary —a different language on a shop sign, a family choosing one school over another, a customer arriving from another part of Diyala— but together they point to a city whose social and economic landscape is shifting.

Divided Strength

Those shifts are taking place while Kurdish political forces remain divided over how best to respond. Ahmed Mohammed, a political observer of Kurdish affairs in Khanaqin, describes the relationship between Kurdish political forces as having moved from "integration" to "erosion."

The PUK and KDP frequently enter elections separately, and their rivalry can continue after the votes have been counted. Among their supporters, Mohammed argues, defeating the other Kurdish party can sometimes become almost as important as winning a seat.

The numbers illustrate the dilemma. Mohammed estimates that the KDP has more than 10,000 votes in the area, while the PUK has more than 30,000. Together, those figures represent a substantial electoral bloc, but separate lists divide its political impact and make it harder to convert that strength into equivalent representation in the Iraqi parliament and Diyala Provincial Council.

Mohammed argues that Kurdish political competition risks weakening the city's ability to defend its interests at a time when Khanaqin already occupies an ambiguous position between Baghdad and Erbil authorities.

That ambiguity is familiar to residents. When people from Khanaqin turn to Baghdad, artist Abbas al-Zahawi says, they can encounter the view that the city is politically connected to the Kurdistan Region. When they turn to Erbil, they can receive the opposite response: Khanaqin falls administratively under the Iraqi government.

The result is a sense of being caught between two systems without a clear political home.

Between Two Capitals

For residents who remember the years after 2003, that feeling is especially pronounced because the relationship between Khanaqin and the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) was once much more visible.

The city received reconstruction projects and substantial support from the KRG during that period. Barzo estimates that roughly 14 years of projects helped Khanaqin recover from some of the destruction and deterioration in services inherited from the previous Baath regime.

Al-Zahawi remembers the city before 2017 as "a beautiful mosaic" of people, languages and customs. The events of Oct. 16 that year, he believes, marked a turning point.

"The KRG and Kurdish political forces cannot be exempted from responsibility," he said, calling what followed "political erosion."

He also estimates that the KRG's service presence in Khanaqin fell by as much as 90% after the events, arguing that Kurdish parties devoted too much attention to internal competition instead of using their political and financial resources to protect the city's position and address residents' needs.

Al-Agha, meanwhile, places responsibility elsewhere as well as within the Kurdish political camp. While holding Baghdad primarily responsible for the administrative changes, he believes Kurdish divisions have weakened the ability of the parties to respond effectively.

The result, therefore, is a problem that can no longer be reduced to a single dispute over boundaries. For Khanaqin, the uncertainty surrounding its borders and political status continues to shape everyday life. As Baghdad and Erbil maintain competing ties to the city, residents are left waiting for greater clarity over the institutions and decisions that govern them.

Written and edited by Shafaq News staff.

Shafaq News

Iraq is stepping up efforts to place weapons under statecontrol as talks with armed factions continue ahead of the September 30 end ofthe US-led Global Coalition’s military mission in the country.

The government announced on August 21 that September 30would mark the deadline for bringing weapons under state control. Two dayslater, however, National Security Adviser Qasim al-Araji clarified that thedate referred to the end of the Coalition’s presence and that the process ofbringing weapons under state control would continue gradually afterward. On thesame day, military spokesman Sabah al-Numan confirmed that talks with armedfactions were ongoing and that the central committee overseeing the issue hadmade significant progress.

Agreement On Principle, Differences Over Timing

Hasan Fad'am, a senior member of the Al-Hikma Movement led byAmmar al-Hakim, told Shafaq News that placing weapons under state control hadmoved beyond a government program to become a political project supported bymajor political forces and endorsed by Iraq’s religious leadership.

Fad'am stressed that all sides, including armed factions,agree in principle that weapons should be controlled by the state. Differences,he explained, concern the timing and mechanisms of implementation rather thanthe principle itself.

He described the talks with the factions as having madesubstantial progress, adding that he was not aware of any faction openlyrejecting the principle of state control. The Al-Hikma figure expects negotiationsafter September 30 “to become more serious and clearly defined, particularlyover how the policy should be implemented.”

Read more: Al-Zaidi at 100 days: Iraq's toughest tests still ahead

From Disarmament to Weapons Management

Security expert Adnan al-Kinani maintained that thegovernment was clearly seeking to reinforce state authority and restrictweapons to legally authorized bodies, while some armed factions were seeking todelay the process because of concerns about possible regional developmentsaffecting Iraq.

In an interview with Shafaq News, al-Kinani emphasized thatthe central issue was not the existence of weapons but whether their useremained outside state authority.

He called for a process that avoids confrontation and allowsfaction members to join official formations, including the Popular MobilizationForces (PMF) or the regular armed forces.

“Factions could pursue political and national roles throughalternative channels while protecting their members from becoming targets,” heargued, warning that external pressure could push Iraq toward dangerousescalation.

On August 23, political sources told Shafaq News that someShiite political leaders were seeking to replace the term “disarmament” with“weapons management,” with the use of weapons placed under the authority of thecommander-in-chief of the armed forces. The proposal also links weaponstransfers to the withdrawal of foreign forces and the passage of legislationgoverning PMF service and retirement arrangements.

Read more: Iraq's disarmament deadline pits Baghdad against Iran-aligned factions

A Coordination Framework (CF) source separately revealedthat weapons handed over by factions could be transferred to PMF storagefacilities rather than to the Defense or Interior ministries. The source alsopointed to political agreement on accelerating legislation governing PMFservice and retirement, including ranks, career progression and rights forfallen and wounded members.

State Institutions Prepare for The Next Phase

Iraqi state institutions have also begun preparing for amore formal enforcement phase.

On Wednesday, Supreme Judicial Council President Faiq Zidandiscussed with US Chargé d’Affaires Joshua Harris judicial procedures againstindividuals and entities carrying weapons in violation of the constitution andlaw, as well as mechanisms for enforcing the rule of law after the Coalitionmission ends.

On the same day, Iraqi security forces described placingweapons under state control as a matter of national sovereignty and confirmedthat the Coalition withdrawal was progressing according to its timetable. TheDefense Ministry has also been working to strengthen air-defense systems aheadof the next security phase, while security agencies announced that they hadfoiled an attempt to manufacture drones inside Baghdad.

Factions Take Different Positions

Saraya al-Salam, Asaib Ahl al-Haq and Kataib Imam Ali haveindicated a willingness to adjust their relationship with state institutions,while consultations continue with other groups, including Kataib Hezbollah,Harakat al-Nujaba and Kataib Sayyid al-Shuhada, according to political andmedia sources cited by Shafaq News.

On August 21, a source told Shafaq News that Asaib Ahlal-Haq had handed over weapons, including drones, at one of its bases south ofBaghdad. The operation was overseen by a committee including representatives ofthe Interior and Defense ministries, the National Security Advisory and the PMFCommission.

Other factions, however, continue to defend what they callthe “resistance weapons,” tying their future to the complete withdrawal offoreign forces from Iraq and guarantees that the country can defend itselfagainst external attacks. Shafaq News has reported that Kataib Hezbollah,Harakat al-Nujaba and Kataib Sayyid al-Shuhada remain among the groupsinsisting on retaining their military capabilities.

Regional Pressures Shape The Debate

The weapons issue is also connected to wider securitychanges across the Middle East since Hamas’ October 7, 2023, attack on Israel.

Ardeshir Pashang, a senior researcher at the Iranian Centerfor Strategic Studies and the Iranian Association for West Asia Studies, notedthat Iraq has spent years balancing relations with Iran and the United Stateswhile at times becoming a venue for competing interests between the two powers.

Read more: Iraq and the Mecca Defense Pact: Strategic neutrality or growing isolation?

He outlined a difficult balancing act for Baghdad:preventing armed factions from taking unilateral military decisions whileavoiding a process that could create a new source of instability amidcontinuing regional tensions.

“The end of the Coalition’s military mission could removeone of the main arguments used to justify keeping weapons outside the state’sdirect control,” Pashang observed, adding that strengthening state authority“could reduce the risk of Iraqi territory being used again in regionalconflicts.”

He maintained that aligning the PMF’s institutional statuswith a unified chain of command under state authority would strengthen Iraq’ssovereignty and stability. Meanwhile, negotiations continue over how factionweapons would be managed and over legislation governing the PMF.

Read more: Iraq under regional pressure as neighbors threaten to strike Iran-aligned factions

Shafaq News- Baghdad

Baghdad and several other Iraqi provinces are seeing wave after wave ofprotests, by some counts three to four a week, demanding appointment to publicjobs, permanent tenure for contract staff, and better professional rights. Yetthe protests keep coming without clear results, and a sharper problem comesinto focus: is demonstrating still an effective way to pressure the government,or has it lost some of the weight it once carried?

The past few months trace the pattern. On May 18, 2026, around 5,000older graduates filled central Baghdad to demand appointments. Protests byholders of higher degrees followed in late June, then in August, by rotatingresident doctors and medical-profession graduates, alongside furtherdemonstrations by older graduates and contract employees pressing for permanentplacement on the state payroll. Some of these gatherings ended in friction withriot forces and injuries among protesters from various groups —echoing thememory of the 2019 Tishreen protests, the mass anti-government movement overunemployment and corruption that was met with a lethal crackdown.

Haider Ali Kazim, a representative of the older graduates, told ShafaqNews that "the current government responded to our demands after threeprotests and met with representatives of the protesters, but it set no deadlinefor resolving the issue."

The protesters, he added, "will wait for a limited period, but nota long one. If no clear solutions emerge, they will return to demonstrating,and perhaps to sit-ins and other forms of protest."

Kazim noted that the latest demonstration was the fifth since theolder-graduates movement began, and the third under the government of PrimeMinister Ali Al-Zaidi. Protesters knew, he said, that the appointment issueunder previous governments had been tainted by corruption and the sale of jobgrades, but they hope the current government will be different, especiallygiven its talk of fighting corruption. He put the number of older graduates ataround 150,000, some now near retirement age and still searching for jobsecurity.

Read more: Iraq: 250K graduates annually amid 20% youth unemployment

Pressure, Or A Temporary Fix?

Political scientist Qasim al-Rubaie said repeated protests reflect “structuralfailure in the political system and in the performance of state institutions,”particularly in the equitable distribution of wealth and public-sectoropportunities.

Protest, al-Rubaie told Shafaq News, "has become the most effectivetool for demanding rights, especially since the political system passed throughthe Tishreen uprising and its aftermath in a state of threat and instability.That pushed state agencies to respond to protesters' demands, whether generalor sectional, until demonstrations gradually turned into a means of obtainingrights amid the absence of planning and fairness in distributingopportunity."

Why A Government Job Is Worth Protesting For

In Iraq, a public-sector appointment is not one option among many; it isthe main road to a stable income. According to government data, the statesupports around 4.2 million public employees, more than 3 million retirees, androughly 3 million people in the social protection network, leaving over 10million Iraqis dependent on monthly government transfers. That dependence helpsexplain why successive groups of graduates continue returning to the streetswhen promised jobs fail to materialize.

But the state they are pushing has little room to move. Oil suppliedabout 84% of Iraq's revenues in the first quarter of 2026, while publicsalaries and wages formed the single largest expense at 15.32 trillion dinars(nearly $11.8 billion) in that quarter alone. Across the year, Iraq spendsroughly $70 billion on salaries and pensions. With payroll already swallowingthe budget, financing tens of thousands of new appointments runs straight intothe treasury's limits, the structural bind al-Rubaie describes.

In the older-graduates file alone, only about 8,600 positions areavailable through the Federal Public Service Council, even though roughly43,000 graduates have already received official employment codes, withappointments tied to the approval of the 2026 federal budget. By late May, aBaghdad demonstration marked the 27th consecutive protest organized bygraduates and advanced-degree holders since 2023.

That leverage, al-Rubaie said, has since faded: "The securitysituation stabilized, the pressure protests can exert declined, and the state'sown capacity to meet demands, much of which centers on appointments or requiresfinancial allocations, fell as well. Together, that made the response toprotests limited, if not absent."

If planning built on fair distribution keeps failing, he expectscitizens to reach for more forceful tools: strikes and organized, legal workstoppages by employees and unions; organized economic boycotts of certain goodsor services where appropriate and lawful; and recourse to the courts to challengedecisions that break the law. He also points to parliamentary and mediapressure, turning demands into concrete oversight and legislative files, and tounions and professional and student associations as channels more durable thanspontaneous gatherings.

Used together, al-Rubaie said, these tools could help build a state ofinstitutions grounded in citizenship and national identity, through justice andequality before the law, and away from discrimination by party, ethnicity, oranything else. That last point is a reference to the post-2003 power-sharingsystem, known as muhasasa, under which state jobs and posts have long beenparceled out among political blocs.

Mustafa Saadoun, director of the Iraqi Observatory for Human Rights,said governments often treat protests either as political challenges or asdemands confined to particular groups, even when they reflect broader publicgrievances.

Failing to respond "creates dysfunction and widens the trust gapbetween the citizen and state institutions," Saadoun told Shafaq News,adding that demands usually go unmet because governments cannot deliver them,are stalling, or believe the demands do not serve the state's interest. Whenthe same demands, needs, and people keep returning to the street, he said, itreveals that the mechanisms for handling protest are sometimes momentary,designed to contain and quiet a protest rather than address the real demands orthe causes that drove people out in the first place.

Read more: Iraq’s protests after Tishreen: A system that learned how to contain the street

From Hope To Frustration

Social researcher Ahmed al-Dhahabi said protests that drag on leave amark on those who join them, particularly as the wait grows long.

Sustained protest, al-Dhahabi told Shafaq News, does not mean only onething: it can express the strength of a demand and an awareness of rights, butit can equally reveal accumulated frustration and the weakness of institutionalchannels in absorbing those demands. Many of the recent protests drew youngpeople demanding appointment, alongside others tied to delayed salaries andsimilar issues.

Protest, he explained, usually begins with a psychological charge suchas hope, directed anger, a sense of the power to change things, and the feelingthat the protester is no longer alone. The presence of others generates whatsocial psychology calls "collective efficacy": the belief that agroup, acting together, can bring about change, which can deepen anindividual's sense of empowerment, belonging, and social support.

The trouble begins, al-Dhahabi said, when the protest becomes open-endedwith no clear response. The protester can move, psychologically, from hope towaiting and then to frustration and anger, which may erode trust or lead towithdrawal. “The most dangerous thing about waiting is not its length butwaiting without a horizon. When people repeat an action and feel it produces noresponse, feelings of helplessness, disappointment, and lost faith ininstitutions can set in.”

By contrast, al-Dhahabi said, successful protests can lift levels ofempowerment, identity, and cohesion among participants, while repeated failuretends to bring stress, burnout, and a sense of lost power. A long protest canalso strengthen protesters' social identity: a person moves from saying "Ihave a problem" to "I have a cause," and individual sufferinghardens into collective awareness.

A Crisis That Sharpens The Deadlock

This wave is building against a fresh fiscal shock. Iraq missed Julysalary payments for many public employees after oil revenue collapsed, withexports falling from about 100 million barrels in February to 32.1 million inMay and June amid the closure of the Strait of Hormuz. Officials are nowweighing payment every 45 days, with one told Shafaq News that "We willpay whenever we have cash." A government struggling to pay the workers italready has is in no position to appoint the tens of thousands demanding tojoin them.

Between the repetition of protest and the retreat of the government'sresponse, the equation looks more complicated than a simple question about thestreet's capacity to demonstrate. Demands that persist without solutions mayturn protest from a pressure tool aimed at a specific result into a continuouscondition, one that reflects a wider crisis of trust between the citizen andthe institutions of the state.

Read more: Classroom to street corner: Degree holders stranded in Iraq's job drought

Written and edited by Shafaq News staff.

Shafaq News

By Ali Hussein Feyli

The Communications and Media Commission (CMC) wasestablished in 2004 under Order No. 65. Article 103 of Iraq’s 2005 Constitutionlater guaranteed its financial and administrative independence and placed itunder parliamentary oversight. The central objective was to establish aprofessional regulatory body capable of managing the telecommunications andmedia sectors away from direct government and political-party interference.

In reality, however, this independence has repeatedlycollided with Iraq’s system of political power-sharing and partisandistribution of public positions, placing the Commission’s institutionallegitimacy under continued strain and contributing to a state of paralysiswithin its Board of Trustees.

Read more: Media regulator imposed at least 18 bans in 2026

A brief look at the CMC’s record reveals a clearcontradiction in its performance, as the Commission has played an effectiveregulatory role in telecommunications and internet services by addressingtechnical obstacles, allocating frequencies, licensing companies, introducingnewer generations of mobile internet technology, and securing a steady sourceof revenue for the state treasury.

Yet in the field of media regulation and theprotection of access to information, the Commission faces a more fundamentalcrisis, as Iraq’s media space is witnessing a clear decline in the quality ofpublic discourse, with standards based on attracting the largest possibleaudience increasingly replacing substantive intellectual and cultural values.

The dominance of what is commonly described in Iraq as“immoral content” is not merely the result of audience preferences, but alsoreflects a digital business model built around “click-driven revenue.” Somemedia institutions, through irresponsible practices, have contributed tolong-term cultural and educational harm, deepening a crisis of credibility andaccountability.

Read more: Legal pursuits in Iraq over blasphemy and “immoral content”

The consequences are not limited to culture. In adiverse and sensitive society such as Iraq, the decline in public discourse cancreate greater space for hate speech and pose risks to social cohesion andnational security. One direct consequence is the diversion of public attentionaway from fundamental questions and citizens’ daily concerns —includingcorruption, unemployment, deteriorating public services, water shortages, andelectricity— and toward superficial issues of little public value.

When meaningful debate is restricted in the publicsphere, the CMC’s reliance on penalties and the closure of controversial pagesand programs can produce only a temporary effect. Such measures have largelyremained within a punitive and security-oriented framework, without addressingthe intellectual and economic roots of the problem.

The ambiguity surrounding the applicable legalstandards has also made the dividing line between protecting public standardsand restricting freedom of expression increasingly troubling and unclear. TheCommission’s decisions may suppress the most visible manifestations of theproblem, but they cannot eliminate its underlying causes, which continue toreappear in different forms.

Creating a healthier public sphere cannot be achievedthrough administrative orders alone: the future effectiveness of the CMCdepends on separating its technical responsibilities from political disputesand establishing clear standards that guarantee the protection of freedom ofexpression. Addressing the problem at its roots also requires strengtheningindependent professional institutions, including the Iraqi JournalistsSyndicate.

Media regulation must not become a pretext forrestricting criticism or silencing voices that scrutinize those in power anddemand accountability. At the same time, weakening the Commission or subjectingit to political bargaining does not serve freedom of expression, but it givesthose who benefit from weak oversight greater room to fill the public spherewith marginal disputes that divert citizens’ attention from corruption, publicservices, rights, and government accountability.

Read more: Iraq's press freedom falls amid record violations

This article was originally written in Arabic.

Shafaq News

US pressure on Iran is no longer a matter concerning Tehran alone. Assanctions enter a new phase and their scope widens to cover sectors,individuals, entities, and vessels linked to the Iranian economy, Iraq findsitself facing a test that directly affects three critical areas: energy, tradeand the financial sector.

In its latest punitive measures, Washington expanded the scope of itstargets to around 60 individuals, entities, and vessels, while the US TreasuryDepartment announced the launch of “Operation Economic Outcast,” warningcountries, companies and financial institutions that continue dealing withtargeted Iranian sectors that they could face secondary sanctions andrestrictions on access to the dollar-based financial system.

The new measures extend beyond oil and finance. They also cover digitalassets, technology, gold, aviation and shipping, alongside individuals,entities and vessels linked to Iranian oil, financial, military, nuclear andcyber networks.

For Iraq, the stakes are particularly high. Economic ties with Iran arenot marginal; they run from the movement of goods through border crossings togas and electricity, and ultimately to funds and banking settlements.

Official figures indicate that bilateral trade reached around $13 billion in 2025, with the possibility of rising to $25 billion annually onceagreements covering border markets, joint economic zones and shared industrialcities are completed.

hat leaves Baghdad with a difficult choice: how can it preserve itseconomic relationship with Tehran without turning that relationship into adirect point of friction with the renewed US sanctions regime?

Sanctions: Baghdad’s Narrow Room for Maneuver

Iraqi political science professor at Al-Mustansiriyah University, IssamAl-Faili, considers the US measures, in part, a “warning shot” aimed at shadowcompanies and networks involved in money laundering and the smuggling of oiland currencies. In his assessment, Iraq will need to ensure that its dealingswith Iran pass through official channels and the international banking system,particularly as the expanding sanctions raise the level of risk for entitiesdealing with targeted Iranian parties.

Al-Faili says Baghdad would be “forced to deal seriously” with thesanctions if Washington moved to further restrict dealings with Iran, warningthat continued transactions with sanctioned entities could expose Iraqi partiesto penalties. He described the measures as part of a broader US effort to cutoff sources of funding to Tehran.

For Iraq, however, the most pressing question is whether it can secureUS exemptions, particularly for gas and electricity. Baghdad therefore needs,according to Al-Faili, to move early and establish mechanisms to protect itseconomic interests.

Read more: Record Arbaeen crowds, thin returns: Iran's collapse drains Iraq's religious tourism

Gas and Electricity: Key Vulnerability

Iraq relies on Iranian gas to operate a significant part of itspower-generation system, while annual payments for gas range, according toIraqi estimates cited in previous reports, between $4 billion and $5 billion.Washington has granted Baghdad temporary exemptions in previous years to allowenergy imports from Iran, but those exemptions have gradually become one of thetools used to pressure Iraq to diversify its energy sources.

Parliamentary Foreign Relations Committee member Mukhtar Al-Mousawi saysthe government faces a difficult balancing act: it is, in his words, “forced”to comply with US sanctions, yet the scale of financial and commercial interestswith Iran makes the issue more complicated.

Al-Mousawi tells Shafaq News that Iraqi funds are held in Iranian banks,making the impact direct. At the same time, he believes Baghdad could secure “possibleexemptions” if the Iraqi government approaches its US counterpart, particularlybecause Iraq is “in dire need of Iranian gas.”

Al-Mousawi considers Iraq likely to be among the countries most affectedif the sanctions widen, making exemptions and negotiations with Washington acentral part of managing the crisis.

Electricity-sector figures illustrate the scale of dependence. In March2025, Iraqi Parliament Deputy Chairman of the Electricity Committee WalidAl-Sahlani said Iraq needed 1,800 MCM of Iranian gas, and that losing thisquantity would result in a loss of 8,000 megawatts from the electricity system.

With the US exemption ending, Iraq turned to alternative sources,including Qatar and Oman, while the Oil Ministry proposed importing around 600million standard cubic feet of liquefied gas through floating platforms atIraqi ports, providing around 4,000 megawatts, alongside the continuation ofthe agreement with Turkmenistan to import gas. The Gulf electricityinterconnection project was also on the table, with a capacity of up to 500megawatts, alongside efforts to strengthen interconnection with Jordan andTurkiye.

In November 2025, official figures indicated that Iraq’s electricityneeds reached around 50,000 megawatts during the summer, compared withproduction of approximately 28,000 megawatts at the time.

These figures explain why Iranian gas remains central to Iraq’scalculations: the gap between demand and production remains wide, whilealternatives require infrastructure, investment and time before they can bridgethe shortfall.

Iraq's exposure extends beyond gas. Iranian electricity itself hasremained part of the issue. In March 2025, Iran confirmed that electricityexports to Iraq would continue under an existing contract, alongside talks overoutstanding payments and their settlement. By May of the same year, Iraq wasstill importing Iranian electricity and gas while exploring alternatives fromthe Gulf states, Jordan and Qatar, as well as ways to make use of domesticallyproduced associated gas.

Hormuz Adds Another Layer of Risk

These calculations are unfolding as shipping through the Strait ofHormuz faces severe disruption. Fewer than 20 commercial vessels passed throughthe strait over the weekend of August 22 and 23, compared with levels beforethe war that began on February 28, 2026.

On August 22, Iran granted several Iraqi oil tankers permission to passthrough Hormuz following diplomatic contacts from Baghdad. Iraq’s risks,therefore, are not confined to energy imported from Iran; its own oil exportsare also exposed to the security and political environment surrounding themaritime corridor through which a large share of the region’s exports passes.

Read more: The end of a waiver: Iraq's struggle for energy independence

Banking: Sanctions from the Border to the Financial System

The secondary sanctions imposed by Washington force companies and banksto choose: continue dealing with targeted Iranian entities or risk losingaccess to the US financial system. That is particularly sensitive for Iraq,after Washington tightened its oversight of dollar transfers in recent yearsand acted against Iraqi banks over suspicions related to money laundering andthe financing of networks linked to Iran.

According to Al-Faili, Iraq cannot bypass official and internationalbanking channels in the gas and electricity files. “If US threats turn intodirect measures against those dealing with Iran, failure to comply with thesanctions could expose Iraq to penalties.”

On August 7, the US Treasury Department announced measures againstcovert Iranian currency networks operating across several countries, saying thenetworks had helped Iran move hundreds of millions of dollars as part of whatWashington describes as Iran’s “shadow banking system.” In another developmenton the same day, the Treasury said foreign financial institutions facilitatingsignificant transactions on behalf of sanctioned Iranian entities could facerestrictions on their banking relationships with the United States.

Against this backdrop, sanctions do not have to bring Iraq-Iran trade toa halt for their effects to emerge. The impact could begin with banks andmoney-transfer companies before extending to the costs of trade, insurance andshipping, as financial risks rise.

In July 2026, Baghdad and Washington agreed on a mechanism to addressone of the thorniest issues: Iran's outstanding gas payments.

Iraq and the United States reached an agreement allowing Iranian gas dues to be settled through the supply of goods, including food and medicine,rather than cash transfers. According to official data, Iran is seeking around$11 billion in outstanding payments, while part of the funds is held at theTrade Bank of Iraq and cannot be transferred because of US sanctions. Iran’scentral bank governor revealed that around $7 billion was held in Iraq, inaddition to more than $3 billion owed to Iran’s Oil Ministry, bringing totalreceivables to between $10 billion and $11 billion.

Under bilateral agreements, payments for Iranian gas and electricityimports are deposited into accounts at the Central Bank of Iraq (CBI) and theTrade Bank of Iraq, while the original contracts stipulated payment for gas ineuros and electricity in dollars. The US withdrawal from the nuclear agreementin 2018 and the reimposition of sanctions subsequently made it impossible tosettle these dues in foreign currencies, causing them to accumulate within Iraq’sbanking system.

Tehran: Sanctions Should Not Extend to Neighboring States

Iranian affairs writer and researcher Saleh Al-Qazwini says Iran “doesnot want any country in the region to be harmed because of its relations withIran or the sanctions,” stressing that Tehran is concerned about the interestsof neighboring states, foremost among them Iraq.

Al-Qazwini told Shafaq News that, from the Iranian perspective, USsanctions lack a legal basis and that pressure on regional states to join thesanctions forms part of the “economic aggression” against Iran.

Iraq’s calculations, however, extend beyond the political position onsanctions. Baghdad is tied to the global financial system and the dollar on oneside, while relying on Iran for a significant portion of its energy needs onthe other. Trade with its eastern neighbor, meanwhile, remains a major part ofIraq's domestic trade.

On August 20, Reuters reported that US President Donald Trump’s threatsto impose sanctions on Iran’s partners had raised concerns about globalsupplies, while shipping through the strait remained subdued. At the same time,Baghdad has begun exploring alternative routes for its oil exports, includingexpanding shipments through Turkiye’s Ceyhan port and other routes throughSyria and Jordan. Estimates indicate that constructing a new pipeline throughSyria could take years and require substantial costs.

Iran Seeks Alternatives, Iraq Seeks Space

In Tehran, the new sanctions are not viewed as separate from a broadercourse of economic and political pressure.

Iranian affairs expert Mahdi Azizi considers US sanctions nothing newfor Iran and views the latest measures within a framework of economic,psychological and media warfare, alongside moves and mediation efforts aimed atbringing the two sides back to the negotiating table.

In an interview with Shafaq News, Azizi acknowledges the possibility ofrepercussions and problems, but points to Iran’s reliance on a “barter economy”and the expansion of ties with neighboring countries, as well as China andRussia, while making use of its membership in and relations with institutionssuch as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and BRICS, alongside efforts tostrengthen domestic production.

China announced that it would take the necessary measures to defend itsinterests after Washington warned countries that continued to deal with Iran.Beijing maintained that economic pressure does not resolve problems and thatChinese-Iranian cooperation takes place within international law.

The options Tehran is exploring, however, do not necessarily provide adirect answer to Baghdad’s needs. Iraq requires alternatives of its own,particularly in energy and the financial sector.

For this reason, Al-Faili believes that “Baghdad needs to develop aclear vision for dealing with the repercussions and should not wait forsanctions to turn into an actual crisis in electricity, trade, or the bankingsector.” He points out that Iraq has explored options in recent years to reduceits dependence on Iranian gas, including floating gas-import platforms andelectricity interconnections with other countries, but these projects stillface implementation, technical, and financial challenges. He also maintainsthat grid interconnection and diversification of gas sources could give Iraqgreater room to withstand any potential disruption, “but this requires swiftdecisions and investment, because alternatives cannot replace Iranian gasovernight.”

Religious Tourism May Prove More Resilient

Religious tourism represents a major economic channel in Iraq-Iranrelations. Around 80% of hospitality, transport, and accommodation activity inNajaf during pilgrimage seasons is tied to Iranian visitors, according to theNajaf Hotels Association.

During the 2026 Arbaeen pilgrimage, more than 22 million people tookpart, including more than 4 million foreign visitors from 172 countries.

Najaf also received around 5 million visitors for the anniversary of theProphet Muhammad’s death, while the pilgrimage marking the death anniversary ofImam Musa al-Kadhim in Baghdad drew around 15 million visitors during the sameyear.

These flows come as religious tourism contributes around 3.3% of Iraq’sgross domestic product. The impact of US sanctions on the number of visitorsitself is likely to be indirect, since the sanctions do not target religioustravel as such.

Financial restrictions and the decline in the value of the Iraniancurrency, which has lost more than half its value over a year, couldnevertheless constrain Iranian visitors’ spending, a trend that has alreadyaffected hotel and market revenues despite continued visitor numbers. Visitorflows may remain high while the economic return they generate declines iffinancial pressure on Iranians and difficulties with payments and transferspersist.

Read more: Iraq between two fires: Tehran and Washington eye Baghdad’ spost-election phase

Written and edited by Shafaq News staff.

Shafaq News

The last stars were still visible when Imad Al-Khafaji noticed somethingmoving across the sky.

It was just before dawn. The 41-year-old had set out with a group ofnomadic Bedouin friends on a hunting trip in the Iraqi desert. They had stoppedtheir vehicle on higher ground to watch the sunrise and were preparingbreakfast when the object appeared, drifting about 300 meters away.

Al-Khafaji asked his companions what they were looking at. Theyrecognized the balloons immediately. Similar ones had been used to move drugsacross the desert, often around dawn, when shipments could be collected withpeople waiting on the ground.

There was little time to think. The group decided to bring the balloonsdown. One of Al-Khafaji's companions retrieved a licensed firearm and aimed.Several shots struck the balloons carrying the load, and the craft began tolose altitude. It eventually came down at about 6:00 a.m. The men climbed intoa four-wheel-drive vehicle and followed it across the desert.

At the landing site, they found 126 bags containing about 126,000Captagon pills, Al-Khafaji recounted to Shafaq News. Each bag held 1,000 pills.“A security official told me the shipment was worth about 3.4 billion Iraqidinars [roughly $2.6 million].”

Then they realized they were not alone. The shipment had not simply beenleft in the desert. People were waiting for it.

Read more: From cell to center: Iraq tests a new answer to addiction

Al-Khafaji recounted that the group of would-be collectors was initiallyless than five kilometers from the landing site. Across open desert, that wasnot a great distance. At one point, he put the gap at about 1.5 kilometers.

The hunting trip had become a race: secure a multimillion-dollar drugshipment before the people who had come to collect it reached the site. “Ourdetermination, together with my nomadic Bedouin brothers and livestock owners,prevented them from forcing us to hand over the drugs. We delivered theshipment to the security authorities instead,” Al-Khafaji explained.

The episode also highlighted the unusual position of people who live andmove through Iraq’s desert. Nomadic communities know remote tracks, openstretches and isolated areas that can remain difficult for regular patrols tomonitor.

Al-Khafaji said the presence of the Bedouins and livestock owners helpedprotect the group until security forces arrived. “That is why we were notattacked or assaulted while carrying out the task,” he said.

Security forces eventually arrived. They opened the bags, counted thepackages, and identified the substances before completing the legal report andtransferring the shipment to the relevant authorities.

Skyfall to Handcuffs

As security forces have tightened controls along traditional traffickingroutes, drug networks have looked for ways to move narcotics beyond roads,checkpoints and conventional surveillance. The sky offers one such route, andthe balloon confiscated in the desert was part of a wider pattern.

Iraqi security forces have intercepted other balloons carrying narcoticsfrom Syria into Iraq. One intercepted in September 2025 contained 245,000Captagon pills, while another in November 2025 carried 22,000.

Brigadier General Akram Al-Rashid, director of Al-Anbar’s Anti-NarcoticsDirectorate, reported that security forces had intercepted every balloondetected so far.

The border has also seen attempts attributed to what Major General RahimYounis Rahim, commander of Iraq’s 5th Border Guard Division, described as “terroristorganizations.” Previous efforts involved balloons launched from Syrianterritory toward Iraq.

“Those attempts were completely thwarted through field monitoring andthermal cameras deployed along the border,” he recounted to Shafaq News.

But balloons are only one adaptation in a trade built aroundconcealment.

Traffickers have increasingly used ordinary objects to conceal drugs. InMarch 2024, security forces dismantled a network moving crystal methamphetamineinside hollowed walnut shells. The operation involved 11 traffickers acrossfour provinces.

Months later, methamphetamine was discovered baked into flatbread inBaghdad. Elsewhere, narcotics have been concealed in children’s toys and amonglivestock. In Babil, authorities found drugs hidden inside a shoe hanging froma motorcycle.

At the Baghuz crossing along the Euphrates, Captagon and hashish werefound floating downriver in sealed plastic containers. Some had been wrapped inreeds to blend with debris carried by the water.

Hussein Al-Tamimi, a spokesperson for Iraq’s General Directorate forNarcotics and Psychotropic Substances Affairs, characterized the traffickingnetworks’ methods as constantly changing alongside the authorities’ response.

“The methods may look increasingly unusual, but the logic behind them isconventional: find a route that is harder to watch,” he said, pointing to Iraq’sdeployment of radar systems and thermal drones with ranges of up to 80kilometers.

A Growing Drug Market

The ingenuity of individual shipments can obscure the size of the marketbehind them. The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime recorded a 3,380%increase in Iraqi Captagon seizures between 2019 and 2025.

In 2026 alone, the Directorate has seized about 2.18 tonnes of narcoticsubstances, according to Iraqi authorities. Crystal methamphetamine, Captagon,and Lyrica pills were among the substances most frequently seized.

The response has extended from the desert to the courts. More than 350trafficking networks have been dismantled this year, while 59 defendants havebeen sentenced to death and another 254 to life imprisonment, according to theInterior Ministry.

Yet seizures and convictions reveal only part of the trade. Behind everyintercepted shipment is a market: people who buy drugs, people who use themand, in some cases, people who begin selling them themselves.

Dr. Doaa Al-Basri, a researcher specializing in drug-related issues, hasencountered that market from the other end. During visits to prisons, she hasmet users from a wide range of educational and social backgrounds, includingyoung people and women whose paths into drug use were often very different.

For some, it began with friends or the influence of their surroundings.In other cases, there was no obvious economic hardship or psychologicaldisorder to explain why drug use began.

One case remains particularly striking to Al-Basri.

A young man had tattooed the name of his drug supplier on his forearm.The same person had helped him commit thefts and played a central role indrawing him into a life that eventually led to prison. Yet the young man remaineddeeply attached to him.

For Al-Basri, the affection and attention he received from the supplierwere things he had not found within his own family. What began as arelationship built around drugs had also filled an emotional void.

The case pointed to vulnerabilities that can exist long before drug usebegins: gaps in family support, awareness and emotional care. It alsoillustrated why drug use cannot easily be tied to a particular social class orlevel of education.

Among the users Al-Basri has encountered were doctors, universityacademics, pharmacists and religious reciters. Some turned to drugs whileexperiencing psychological distress.

For others, seeking help can be difficult. Stigma and fear of socialjudgment can discourage people from seeking psychiatric care or treatment,Al-Basri noted. “By the time they seek help, if they do at all, occasional usemay already have developed into dependence.”

That has pushed authorities to place greater emphasis on reaching peoplebefore drug use reaches that point. The Directorate has expanded its awarenesscampaigns through videos, television appearances, printed materials, seminarsin schools and universities, community and neighborhood meetings, andspecialist workshops.

The Directorate is also seeking to bring social media influencers andcivil society organizations into those efforts. At public events, it has usedmobile museums to warn about the dangers of drugs, extending the campaignbeyond police stations and courtrooms and into the communities where preventionbegins.

The shift reflects a broader reality of the trade. Seizures can removeshipments from the streets, and arrests can dismantle trafficking networks, butneither addresses the demand that keeps the market moving. The fight againstdrugs therefore stretches well beyond the desert routes where shipments areintercepted: it reaches into families, schools, prisons and communities, wherepreventing the next user can matter as much as stopping the next shipment.

Read more: Iraq fights back against synthetic drug flood engulfing the Middle East

Written and edited by Shafaq News staff.

Shafaq News

The Iraqi Badia —the arid steppe that fringes the country's western andsouthern deserts— is one of the largest tracts of ground the state has to keepwatch over, and one of the emptiest. It runs unbroken across three provinces,from Rutba in the far west of Al-Anbar, through the desert of Najaf, down toNuqrat al-Salman in Al-Muthanna.

Paved roads are few, and the security posts that do exist sit far apart,separated by distances a patrol cannot close quickly. Holding it means coveringland measured not in neighborhoods but in tens of thousands of squarekilometers, with a thin line of troops, berms, trenches, and aircraft.

In Rutba, which spans roughly 90,000 square kilometers against theSyrian and Saudi borders, the district's qaimaqam, Imad al-Dulaimi, tellsShafaq News that the security picture has held steady for years, with raids andsweeps continuing and the frontier tightly monitored through the deployment ofBorder Guard forces and coordination among various security formations. Anyactivity detected, he adds, involves small groups of three or four peoplerather than organized movements.

Part of what makes that possible has less to do with troops than withpeople. Along the desert's edges, herders and residents move only through fixedpoints, where their names are logged and they are screened, and where, byal-Dulaimi's account, they double as “informal eyes” for the security agencies.It is a pattern that repeats east across the Badia: at Najaf's desert margins,nine crossings tie the sand to the city, and anyone entering to graze, farm, ortravel has a file opened recording where they live and how they were vetted. Interrain where a fixed post cannot see past the next rise, the movement of civiliansbecomes its own form of surveillance.

Read more: Iraq’s western desert from ISIS hideouts to new security challenges

In Najaf, the line secured by state forces is marked by a trench andberm stretching about 155 kilometers, with fixed posts along its length, weeklypatrols, and monthly inspection rounds, according to Hadi al-Khafaji, chief ofstaff of the Imam Ali Combat Division within the Popular Mobilization Forces(PMF). The desert basin behind it covers about 38,000 square kilometers, itseastern flank held by his forces and its western flank, along the Saudi border,by the Border Guard.

Farther south, in Al-Muthanna, the burden falls to the Badia OperationsCommand under Major General Imad al-Maliki, which —according to a securitysource, the anonymity routine for Iraqi military matters— fields three brigadesto secure the Nuqrat al-Salman and Basiya deserts along with the al-Shabakastretch belonging to Najaf, leaning on armed and reconnaissance aircraft towatch ground its units cannot permanently occupy.

Taken together, the official account is one of stability maintained bypresence: hold the line, screen the crossings, patrol what you can, fly overthe rest.

That is where the reassurance meets its limit. Speaking with ShafaqNews, Khaldoun Hazem, an independent security analyst, does not dispute thatthe pieces are in place; he questions whether presence, by itself, amounts tocontrol. “There is no such thing as absolute security,” he says, “and gaps areinevitable; smugglers and militants make a living finding them along bordersand in open desert.”

The command in al-Muthanna he calls a genuine and overdue addition,filling a gap between existing operations in al-Jazira, al-Anbar, and Karbala.But the gap was real because the ground had gone under-watched for longstretches, he says, and serious infiltrations had happened there, includingaccounts that the area had previously been used to launch drones towardneighboring countries. In his view, establishing a command alone would notaddress what the area needs most: sustained intelligence and continuoussurveillance rather than simply deploying more personnel to remote positions.

His prescription is drones over troops. Unmanned aircraft, he argues,track more ground, more precisely, and unsettle anyone trying to move throughit simply by being overhead, work that ground units strain to do acrossdistances this large and for periods this long. He wants squadrons attached toarmy aviation and put to more than military use: watching the borders, chasingsmugglers, guarding the oil lines that cross the emptiness. As for the groupmost associated with the desert, he places it elsewhere, “not primarily in thisstretch but in Wadi Hauran toward Tharthar,” a long desert valley whose ravineshave long given fighters cover, terrain he calls vulnerable andunder-resourced.

What Hazem is describing is a different way of holding the same ground,not a longer line or a bigger garrison, but eyes that stay up when the patrolsgo home, and intelligence that reaches a post before a threat does. Between the90,000 square kilometers of Rutba, the 38,000 of the Najaf basin, the155-kilometer berm, and a new command in the south, the Iraqi desert remainsone expanse under many hands. The forces on it can say, accurately, that theline has held. Whether holding the line is the same as holding the desert isthe part no one has settled.

Read more: ISIS regroups in Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon: a new strategy?

Written and edited by Shafaq News staff.

Shafaq News

Iraqi journalists arefacing growing difficulties in obtaining official information as severalministries and government institutions lack designated spokespersons and someofficials decline to comment, forcing reporters to rely on leaks andinformation circulating on social media.

A draft Right ofAccess to Information Law, approved by the Council of Ministers and referred toparliament, remains under discussion as lawmakers consider amendments to someof its provisions. The legislation aims to strengthen transparency and allow citizens,journalists, and researchers to request official data, but has not yet takeneffect.

Interviewed by ShafaqNews, Wissam al-Mulla, a member of the Alliance for the Defense of Freedom ofExpression in Iraq, described the absence of official spokespersons at manyministries as a major obstacle for journalists seeking information from governmentinstitutions and other organizations.

“Some officialspokespersons refuse to give statements and rely solely on written releases,”al-Mulla noted, pointing to “excessive bureaucracy within governmentinstitutions.”

Al-Mulla alsoidentified the lack of laws protecting journalists and guaranteeing transparentaccess to information as a major challenge. He argued that some provisions ofthe current draft could restrict journalists and potentially expose them toimprisonment.

“Parliament shouldconsult journalists and civil society organizations before passing thelegislation and amend provisions that could restrict access to information.” Healso urged ministries to appoint official spokespersons to improve transparencyand limit the spread of inaccurate or misleading information on social media.

Alaa Najah, anacademic at the University of Iraq’s College of Media, told Shafaq News thatprevious governments had faced disputes over the Right of Access to InformationLaw and that its passage would give journalists a stronger basis for obtainingofficial information.

Journalists underprevious governments faced “fierce attacks” from officials, ministers, and somelawmakers, including lawsuits and efforts to silence the media.

According to Najah,the absence of reliable information creates major difficulties for newsorganizations, particularly as social media and digital news outlets haveexpanded.

Read more: The New era of control: Can Iraq's free press survive its politically-tainted rulers?

Media professionalKhattab Adel said withholding information from journalists has pushed newsagencies and correspondents to rely on what is known as “circulatedinformation,” a term that has become increasingly common. In an interview withShafaq News, he linked the lack of professional communication betweenjournalists and ministry spokespersons to the “spread of rumors anddifficulties in field reporting.”

Investigativejournalist Hassan al-Shannoun described obtaining information from officialsources and securing documents needed for journalistic work as increasinglydifficult. “Even obtaining simple information has become a challenge and anobstacle for journalists,” he noted, adding that requests sometimes requirelengthy rounds of calls, official correspondence, and long periods of waitingwithout receiving a response.

Speaking to ShafaqNews, Al-Shannoun argued that the problem reflects an administrative culturethat continues to treat information as something that can be withheld ratherthan as a public right and a tool for transparency.

“Journalism cannotperform its watchdog role if obtaining information is difficult,” al-Shannounargued, adding that transparency cannot be achieved without clear and rapidchannels for accessing official information.

Read more: Rights groups challenge Iraqi bill curbing access to information

Written and edited byShafaq News staff.

Shafaq News

Iraqi Prime Minister Ali Al-Zaidi reached the 100-day markon Friday, August 21, facing a series of longstanding crises that successivegovernments have struggled to resolve, from weapons control and corruption tooil exports, water shortages and public finances.

The milestone offers an early test of whether thegovernment's stated priorities can translate into measurable results. Hiscabinet also remains incomplete. Nine of its 23 ministries, including defense,interior and planning, are still without permanent ministers and remain underacting ministers amid political disputes over candidates and power-sharingarrangements.

Despite the incomplete cabinet, the Council of Ministersapproved a 2026-2029 government program containing 139 priorities across 14sectors and 13 major legislative measures. The program is built around thestated goal of establishing a "stable state, productive economy andbalanced partnerships."

The scale of the agenda highlights the government'sambition, but it also underscores its central challenge: Iraq's most difficultproblems require decisions that carry high political, economic, and securitycosts.

Weapons and Sovereignty

The government's most politically sensitive challenge is itseffort to place all weapons under state authority. Al-Zaidi has set September30 as the deadline for completing the process of bringing all weapons understate control, coinciding with arrangements for the end of the GlobalCoalition's military mission. The Coordination Framework, which brings togetherIraq's main Shiite political forces, agreed in principle to place weapons understate control. The dispute centers on implementation, guarantees and timing.Proposals have included negotiations with Iran-aligned armed factions overarrangements for withdrawing heavy weapons and placing them in state-controlledstorage, in an effort to avoid an internal confrontation.

Speaking to Shafaq News, Khaled Walid, a member of theReconstruction and Development Coalition led by former Prime Minister MohammedShia Al-Sudani, said that weapons control, the withdrawal of foreign forces andprotection of Iraq's territorial integrity will be the “key measures by whichthe government is judged in the months ahead.”

Washington-based political analyst Ramadan Al-Badran saidAl-Zaidi inherited challenges accumulated over years while also confronting newpressures created by regional developments. 

Read more: Iraq's disarmament deadline pits Baghdad against Iran-aligned factions

Al-Badran told Shafaq News that the prime minister is"trying to lay the right foundations" based on national, regional andinternational consensus. He also credited the government with tackling issuesthat previous administrations had not addressed with the same level ofseriousness, particularly corruption and weapons control.

But progress on these fronts remains difficult to measure.The government has established a policy direction, yet implementation willdepend on political consensus, institutional capacity and the willingness ofpowerful actors to accept greater state control.

Diplomacy as Crisis Management

Al-Zaidi has also intensified Iraq's regional andinternational diplomacy, travelling to the United States, Iran, and Turkiye,while pursuing broader outreach to Arab states to strengthen Baghdad's ties andshield Iraq from wider confrontation.

The Washington visit resulted in 48 agreements and memorandaof understanding with US and international companies and institutions, coveringenergy, investment, infrastructure, technology, healthcare and other sectors.

In Tehran, discussions focused on regional de-escalation andBaghdad's potential role as a channel for dialogue, alongside energy,agriculture and bilateral cooperation.

Read more: Iraq and the Mecca Defense Pact: Strategic neutrality or growing isolation?

Oil: The Immediate Economic Test

Oil exports remain the government's most pressing economicvulnerability. Disruptions to Iraq's traditional export routes, combined withtensions between Iran and the United States and instability around the Straitof Hormuz, have added pressure to public finances that remain heavily dependenton oil revenues.

Lawmaker Uday Al-Zamili told Shafaq News that the oil exportcrisis still lacks "effective solutions," arguing that the governmenthas so far relied largely on proposals and arrangements whose details have notbeen fully presented to parliament. 

Al-Zamili also sought details on how the Iraqi-Turkisharrangement would work to export around one million barrels per day throughTurkish ports, saying parliament needed greater clarity over Iraq's financial returnsand whether the arrangement could also advance other bilateral issues,including water and trade. 

Read more: Iraq-US investment deals depend on implementation, experts say

The issue is particularly sensitive because oil revenuesdirectly underpin salaries and public spending. On August 17, Al-Zaidi held anexpanded meeting with oil-sector officials and the oil and finance ministers,calling for urgent measures to address export routes and the crisis's effects.

The challenge goes beyond maintaining production. Iraq mustalso ensure that it has reliable routes to international markets and sufficientfinancial flexibility to withstand disruptions.

Iraqi oil shipments are already moving through theIraq-Syria border crossings, providing Baghdad with an overland alternative toits traditional export routes. In early May, Iraq launched its first crude oilshipment through the Rabia–Al-Yarubiyah crossing, sending an initial 70 tankertrucks toward regional markets. Subsequent shipments ranged from 15 to 40tankers a day.

Reform Beyond Oil

At the same time, the government is seeking to reduce thestate's dependence on oil by increasing non-oil revenues, reforming thebanking, tax and customs systems, and encouraging investment and private-sectoractivity.

Walid described Al-Zaidi's administration primarily as a"government managing a political, economic and security crisis,"pointing to the wider consequences of regional conflict and instability.

He said the government was looking for new ways to increasenon-oil revenues, diversify oil export routes, limit operating expenditure andreform state institutions while strengthening anti-corruption measures.

Al-Zaidi also sought during his July visits to Washington,Tehran and Ankara to keep diplomatic channels open and contain the impact ofregional tensions on Iraq. But Walid noted that the ultimate measure of thegovernment's performance will be its ability to turn plans and promises intotangible results. He identified corruption and weapons control as the twoissues likely to weigh most heavily on the government's performance through theend of the year.

Water Adds Another Pressure Point

Drought and declining water inflows have placed additionalpressure on Iraq's already vulnerable water resources. Yet Turhan Al-Mufti, theprime minister's adviser on water affairs, offers a more positive assessment,saying water conditions during the summer of 2026 are three to four timesbetter than those recorded the previous year.

Al-Mufti told Shafaq News that the government is relying onagreements with Turkiye, including a framework agreement on water and amemorandum on financing water-related projects. He explained that the twoarrangements are expected to enter into force in September and provide a basisfor more sustainable water supplies.

Read more: Iraq’s water crisis deepens: Reserves collapse, mismanagement continues

Corruption as an Early Test

The government placed corruption near the top of its agendafrom the outset. On June 28, it launched an anti-corruption campaign dubbed the“Dawn Crackdown”, and took legal and oversight measures against prominentpolitical and administrative figures, in a move supporters described asdifferent from the approach of previous governments.

The prime minister's financial adviser, Mudher MohammedSaleh, has argued that the government should not be judged simply by the numberof days it has been in office, but by the course it set from the beginning. 

Read more: Corruption arrests in Iraq pass 210 under PM al-Zaidi

Speaking to Shafaq News, Saleh said the government hadplaced anti-corruption efforts among its leading priorities and sought to movethe issue beyond political rhetoric toward institutional oversight,accountability and the recovery of public funds.

At 100 days, Al-Zaidi's government has set out an ambitiousagenda and taken on several politically sensitive issues, but its mostconsequential tests lie ahead. Completing the cabinet, bringing all weaponsunder state control, securing reliable oil-export routes, protecting publicfinances and turning anti-corruption measures into sustained institutionalaction will determine whether the government's first year delivers lastingchange.

The central question is: can Al-Zaidi build the politicalconsensus and institutional capacity needed to address them?

Written and edited by Shafaq News staff.

Shafaq news

Nearly 20 months after the fall of Bashar al-Assad'sgovernment on December 8, 2024, relations between Iraq and Syria are movingfrom a period of anxiety and caution toward a new phase marked by greatercommunication and pragmatism.

The relationship has never followed the pattern ofnormal ties between neighboring states. Throughout its history, Iraq-Syriarelations have been shaped by complex political and security calculations, withtheir trajectory repeatedly changing according to the balance of power andcircumstances in both countries.

The rise of Ahmad al-Sharaa to the Syrian presidencyinitially became one of Baghdad's main sources of concern. Yet contacts betweenthe two countries soon began at the intelligence level, taking an increasinglycontainment-oriented approach. Gradually, Iraq's rhetoric shifted fromexpressing multiple security and political concerns toward cautious,incremental engagement.

The evolution can be seen in the changing language ofNouri al-Maliki, head of the State of Law coalition. On February 19, 2025,al-Maliki held al-Sharaa responsible for killings and destruction that hadaffected Iraqis in previous years. Less than a year later, on February 4, 2026,he described al-Sharaa as a brother and said he was prepared to establishbilateral relations with Damascus if he won the elections. At the same time, hedirectly accused Bashar al-Assad of having "exported terrorism" toIraq throughout his years in power.

The shift does not mean that all differences havedisappeared. Rather, it reflects Baghdad's growing assessment that engagementwith Damascus is becoming necessary to address shared security, political andeconomic interests.

Over the past year and a half, several major issueshave begun to shape the relationship: security cooperation, the Kurdish issue, judicial coordination, and economic ties, particularly oil transportation. Thelatter has gained additional urgency amid the crisis created by the closure ofthe Strait of Hormuz during the ongoing US-Israeli war with Iran, the route formost of Iraq's seaborne crude exports.

A Relationship Still Marked by an Imbalance

Despite the expanding contacts, the road betweenBaghdad and Damascus is not yet free of obstacles. The imbalance in officialvisits remains particularly visible.

Iraqi officials have made a succession of visits toDamascus, including National Intelligence Service chief Hamid al-Shatri,Foreign Minister Fuad Hussein, Kurdistan Region President Nechirvan Barzaniand, most recently, Supreme Judicial Council President Faiq Zidan.

Syrian official visits to Baghdad, by contrast, haveremained limited. They have largely consisted of two visits by Foreign MinisterAsaad al-Shaibani in 2025: one ahead of the Arab Summit hosted by Baghdad andanother during the summit itself.

Al-Sharaa has not yet visited Baghdad, for reasonsthat remain present on both the Iraqi and Syrian sides. One of the mostprominent has been the Iraqi political debate over whether to host the Syrianpresident.

Recent developments, however, suggest that this phasemay increasingly belong to the past. The succession of high-level visits, mostrecently Zidan's trip to Damascus, points to a relationship moving toward amore regular institutional framework.

Faiq Zidan's Visit: Important, But not Enough

The visit by Zidan carries particular significancebecause it expanded bilateral engagement into the judicial sphere.

Baghdad-based political analyst Sabah al-Akaili saidthe visit was important, but it should be followed by reciprocal visitsinvolving security, economic, and political officials. “Iraq and Syria need toconsolidate balanced relations at a time when the region is going through acritical phase.”

He pointed to the historical relationship between thetwo countries and their mutual interests as reasons for greater coordination.

ISIS detainees transferred to Iraqi prisons were amongthe main issues discussed during the meetings, alongside judicial and legalcooperation, the exchange of expertise, transitional justice, transparency,combating corruption, and other shared judicial cases.

Read more: From Syrian prisons to Iraqi provinces

The ISIS file naturally occupies a central position inthe judicial track. Iraq holds around 7,000 members of the organization, withat least 3,000 of them being Syrian nationals.

Al-Akili argued that coordination over trials,transfers, and legal procedures has become both a security and judicialnecessity. The issue also extends to the possibility that individuals wanted byIraqi courts may be present inside Syria.

Baghdad's Fears: A Historical Backdrop

Iraq's concerns have been deeply connected to itsroughly 600-kilometer border with Syria.

For many Iraqi officials, the collapse of al-Assad'sgovernment presented the possibility of a new security vacuum that could beexploited by ISIS cells and other armed groups to carry out attacks in bothcountries.

Al-Sharaa's background added another layer to thoseconcerns. His previous association with al-Qaeda in Iraq under the name of AbuMohammad Al-Joulani became a major point of anxiety among Iraqi political andsecurity circles. Baghdad was also concerned about the fate of Syrian prisonsand camps holding ISIS members and their families in northeastern Syria.

Another factor was the presence of Iraqi armedfactions and their networks inside Syria. The fall of al-Assad raised questionsabout what would happen to existing arrangements of influence and regionalsupply lines.

During the initial period, Baghdad therefore adopted ahighly cautious position. It did not rush toward full political recognition ofthe new reality in Damascus, instead monitoring the behavior of the new Syrianadministration while seeking answers about border security, terrorism, and thefuture of detainees.

On December 26, 2024, just 18 days after al-Assad'sfall, National Intelligence Service chief Hamid al-Shatri arrived in Damascusat the head of a senior delegation to meet the new Syrian administration. Itwas the first major and direct Iraqi contact with the new authorities whileformal political relations between Baghdad and Damascus remained largelyfrozen.

The visit was more than a brief security contact. Itcarried messages concerning border control, preventing armed groups fromentering Iraq, the fate of ISIS members, and the prisons holding them. Theatmosphere was so tense at the time that al-Sharaa's reception of al-Shatrisparked widespread debate after the Syrian president was seen carrying hispersonal weapon.

On April 25, 2025, al-Shatri returned to Damascus atthe head of a broader Iraqi government delegation that included officials fromthe Border Forces, the Border Crossings Authority and the ministries of oil andtrade. The agenda was no longer limited to security. Both sides discussedcounterterrorism, trade and the possibility of re-exporting Iraqi oil throughSyrian ports on the Mediterranean.

The Iraqi tone gradually changed, while Syriancommunication with Baghdad also expanded.

On August 28, 2025, al-Shatri made a third visit toDamascus and met al-Sharaa. Their discussions covered border security,counterterrorism, and the situation of the Iraqi community in Syria.

Meanwhile, the issue of ISIS families in al-Hol campmoved toward a solution. Iraq received most of the families transferred fromthe camp and continued to place them in social reintegration programs.

During his visit to Baghdad on March 14, 2025,al-Shaibani met Iraqi officials and said the new Syrian administration wantedto strengthen relations with Iraq, cooperate to prevent foreign interference,and confront the challenges of reconstruction.

Expanding Contacts: Energy Diplomacy?

The clearest expansion of the relationship came onJune 29, 2026, when Foreign Minister Fuad Hussein visited Damascus in his firstofficial trip to Syria. He met al-Sharaa at the People's Palace, withdiscussions focusing on strengthening bilateral relations and coordinatingpositions on shared challenges.

A week later, Iraq and Syria held their first publiclyannounced border meeting between their border forces in the al-Qaim area. Themeeting addressed mechanisms for field coordination, information sharing, andcontrol of the border strip.

Energy cooperation had already begun developing on aparallel track. On March 31, 2026, the first shipments of Iraqi oil weretransported by tanker trucks through the al-Waleed border crossing towardBaniyas. On April 1, the first convoys carrying Iraqi fuel oil crossed throughal-Tanf toward Baniyas.

The discussion subsequently expanded to therehabilitation of the historic Kirkuk-Haditha-Baniyas pipeline, with US supportfor the project and Iraqi-Syrian talks on expanding its capacity.

The project has acquired additional importance asregional tensions threaten conventional export routes. Diversifying Iraq'saccess to Mediterranean markets could provide Baghdad with an alternative toroutes exposed to disruption around the Gulf.

Al-Akaili described the energy file as activated butstill "below the level of ambition." He argued that continuinginstability around the Strait of Hormuz makes cooperation with Syria on oilexports more urgent, while stressing that such cooperation requires clearagreements between the two countries.

Nechirvan Barzani's Role

The visits by Iraqi officials to Syria have beenaccompanied by another important channel: the engagement of Kurdistan Region ofIraq President Nechirvan Barzani, whose role has built on previous meetings andcontacts between Erbil and Damascus.

On April 17, 2026, he met al-Sharaa on the sidelinesof the Antalya Diplomacy Forum. Their discussions covered relations among theKurdistan Region, Iraq, and Syria, particularly in the economic and tradefields. They also discussed regional developments, the situation of Kurds andother communities in Syria, and the agreement between Damascus and the SyrianDemocratic Forces (SDF).

Days earlier, on April 6, al-Sharaa had spoken bytelephone with Barzani, discussing regional developments, Iraqi-Syrianrelations, and the situation of Kurds and other communities in Syria. Al-Sharaaalso condemned attacks targeting the Kurdistan Region amid the US-Israeli warwith Iran.

On August 3, Barzani traveled to Damascus and metal-Sharaa, further reinforcing the emerging channel between Erbil and theSyrian capital.

Kurdish politician Abdul-Salam Barwari, speaking toShafaq News, said Barzani could play a role in easing tensions that accompaniedthe arrival of Syria's new authorities.

"Iraq and Syria are neighbors and must try tofind harmony, because each needs the other," Barwari said, noting that thecircumstances surrounding the arrival of the new authorities in Damascus hadcreated tensions inside Baghdad.

"Barzani is capable of helping ease thesetensions," he added, stressing that Barzani's movement between Erbil,Baghdad and Damascus could help open the way for more reciprocal visits.

Barwari also identified the Baniyas pipeline,counterterrorism, and Iraqi-Syrian coordination as among the issues connectedto this broader diplomatic track.

Barzani's engagement has also extended beyondrelations between Erbil and Damascus. As previous Shafaq News interviews withobservers have highlighted, northeastern Syria places three principal actors inthe same equation: Damascus, Syrian Kurdish forces and Baghdad, alongside theUnited States, Turkiye and other regional actors.

By hosting SDF commander Mazloum Abdi and maintainingcontacts over the future of the SDF, Erbil has sought to help prevent theprocess of integrating Syria's civilian and military institutions from turninginto another confrontation.

The position emerging from Barzani's diplomacy restson a clear formula: a unified and stable Syria, while safeguarding the rightsof Kurds and other communities, Barwari affirmed.

A New Phase

Syrian researcher Ahmad Kamel believes that thedevelopments cannot be separated from the political changes that have takenplace in both countries.

Syria, he observed, has entered a new era, while Iraqis also experiencing a significant political transition. Kamel noted that thecurrent Iraqi government led by Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi, as well as theprevious government of Mohammed Shia al-Sudani, had sought to establish goodrelations with Syria. Iraq's new government was sworn in under al-Zaidi in May2026.

"The success of the new Iraqi government inplacing weapons under state control and ending the phenomenon of armed militiaswill put Iraq before a new phase.”

He indicated that Damascus is responding positively toBaghdad's outreach and seeking a relationship based on common interests and themanagement of shared risks.

"Damascus is returning the greeting with an equalor better one."

"Relations are becoming institutionalized, butremain asymmetric, cautious and incomplete," he added, linking thedevelopment to what he described as a new economic geography in the region.

Kamel contended that Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Jordan andTurkiye could together form an alternative network to maritime corridors thatare increasingly exposed to risk.

Kamel pointed to increased truck traffic between Iraqand Syria and efforts to rehabilitate oil pipelines as evidence that “what wasmerely a political concept has begun turning into economic realities.”

Read more: Syria’s calm: An end to threat or a start of a complex security phase for Iraq?

Written andedited by Shafaq News staff.

Shafaq News

Iraqis are asking chatbots for homework help and running government errands through their phones –in a country where the power still cuts out most summer afternoons. Artificial intelligence has arrived well ahead of the infrastructure meant to carry it.

As Baghdad pushes its digital transformation forward, AI has become a test of whether Iraq can modernize its institutions fast enough to keep pace with a technology already reshaping the world. The country sits 107th in the Government AI Readiness Index 2025, and its problem is not access to the tools, but building the foundations to use them.

Readiness takes more than software. Countries reap AI's benefits only when reliable infrastructure meets clear regulation, capable institutions, and professionals who can fold the technology into daily operations without sacrificing security, accountability, or public trust. Iraq's score (40.91 out of 100) reflects weaknesses that run through its entire technological landscape. Government databases are fragmented, coordination between institutions is thin, and many public bodies still lack the digital plumbing that advanced AI requires.

Dr. Safad al-Shammari, head of the Baghdad Foundation for Digital Communication and a professor of digital media at the University of Baghdad, told Shafaq News that AI is already woven into daily life, "from smartphones and major institutions to warfare."

For al-Shammari, the pace of that change raises questions that reach beyond the technology. As machines take on work once considered uniquely human —writing, analysis, judgment— the debate over how people and technology coexist only intensifies. Yet he also sees real opportunity for countries trying to modernize. Smart systems, he noted, are already sharpening disease detection and treatment in healthcare, while AI-driven tools are tailoring lessons to individual students.

Read more: Brainpower and bytes: Iraq's race for AI supremacy

The Government AI Readiness Index grades countries on digital infrastructure, innovation capacity, human capital, and regulatory preparedness. Iraq lags on all four. Haider Najm al-Alaq, spokesman for Iraq's Communications and Media Commission, said successful adoption depends on modern technology, sound regulation, and professionals capable of managing systems that grow more complex by the year. “Getting there will demand investment in data centers, cloud computing, and telecom networks, along with expanded training and AI instruction built into the education system.”

Technology alone, though, will not decide the outcome.

Dr. Muslim Abbas, an academic and researcher in media and digital studies, argued that adoption hinges on how institutions work, not on the hardware they buy. Many Iraqi bodies still run on outdated administrative systems, he said, adopting AI through one-off initiatives rather than strategies designed to overhaul public administration. Platforms are multiplying, but without integrated databases and modern administrative structures, much of AI's promise stays out of reach.

That institutional weakness sits atop a shakier physical layer. For years, the government has widened digital governance through platforms like the Ur e-services system, which now delivers hundreds of services across ministries and state institutions. Paperwork, administrative procedures, and public transactions are steadily moving online as Iraq tries to close a long-standing gap in e-government.

The shift has coincided with a surge in connectivity. The Ministry of Communications counts 21.4 million internet subscribers, while mobile subscriptions have overtaken the country's population of 45 million, a measure of how completely Iraqis have come to depend on their phones.

But access has outpaced quality. Speeds remain uneven, especially outside the big cities. Figures from Ookla and DataReportal put Iraq's median fixed broadband between roughly 34 and 42 Mbps through 2025, with mobile speeds ranging from 36 to 56 Mbps. For ordinary users, that means slow downloads and dropped connections. For AI, it is a far steeper barrier.

Read more: Internet in Iraq: Snail-speed service, high costs, and digital divide

Advanced models run on enormous computing power and constant data processing. Training and operating them requires steady electricity, fast networks, industrial cooling, and data centers built to carry heavy workloads around the clock. Dr. Haider Shallal Metaab, an academic specializing in media studies, said weak infrastructure is among the main reasons Iraqi institutions have not gone further with AI.

"Limited data center capacity, cybersecurity vulnerabilities and gaps in communications networks continue to affect organizations' ability to manage large volumes of data and deploy advanced systems," he said.

Power is the chronic weak point, particularly in summer when demand spikes. Aging transmission lines and reliance on imported energy strain the grid further. "Even brief power interruptions can disrupt AI computations, affect data processing and increase operating costs, making reliable electricity as important to artificial intelligence as software itself," Metaab said. Without stable power and resilient networks, he argued, Iraq's AI efforts will stay boxed into a handful of institutional projects.

The foundation is not only physical. Iraq also has to grow the talent to run and advance these systems, and part of that work has started in its universities.

The University of Baghdad opened Iraq's first College of Artificial Intelligence for the 2025–2026 academic year, with programs in biomedical applications, AI systems engineering, big data, and data science. Interest has climbed fast; admission thresholds topped 96 percent in several departments.

Read more: Iraq’s higher education enters the AI era: Promise and obstacles

The appetite reflects a wider shift in a labor market tilting toward technology careers. Iraq has one of the region's youngest populations, nearly 60 percent of its roughly 45 million people are under 25, which keeps relentless pressure on the economy to generate skilled jobs for the graduates entering the workforce each year.

Producing graduates is only half the problem. Specialists, who spoke to Shafaq News, agree that broader adoption will also mean retraining the existing workforce, especially in government and in businesses expected to build the technology into their operations. Skills in data analysis, AI management, and cybersecurity will matter more as organizations move from experimenting with digital tools to depending on them.

For now, Iraq's economy still lacks a mature AI industry to absorb its graduates, and many of its most skilled professionals continue to leave for opportunities abroad. Startups in fintech, software, and digital services have grown, particularly in Baghdad and parts of the Kurdistan Region, where innovation hubs have gained ground in recent years. Even so, the ecosystem is small, only a few dozen startups are building AI products.

Adel al-Ghurairi, a professor of digital media at the University of Baghdad, told Shafaq News that AI, deployed well, could drive gains across industry, energy, and agriculture, supporting sustainable development and helping cut pollution. But he warned that automation cuts both ways: “heavier reliance on intelligent systems could erode traditional jobs and deepen digital unemployment, hitting hardest in the administrative and repetitive roles most exposed to it.

Read more: The new blackmail in Iraq: AI and the exploitation of women

Iraq's position comes into sharper focus alongside neighbors that have moved more aggressively to build AI ecosystems. Over the past decade, several Gulf states have treated the technology not as a standalone initiative but as a pillar of their economic and governance strategies, pouring money into infrastructure, regulation, and partnerships with global tech firms.

The United Arab Emirates has put AI at the heart of its economic diversification, backed by sovereign wealth, advanced infrastructure, and ties to companies like OpenAI and Nvidia; it ranked 13th globally in the 2025 index, the highest in the Middle East and North Africa. Saudi Arabia, 22nd, has invested heavily through its Vision 2030 agenda, while Qatar, 32nd, has leaned on research institutions, innovation hubs, and university partnerships.

The difference is not only money. These countries spent years assembling the infrastructure, institutions, and rules that AI adoption depends on. Iraq is still laying groundwork its neighbors finished long ago, work that will demand sustained investment, coherent policy, and long-term planning, along with stronger networks, more capable institutions, and a workforce able to put the technology to use.

"Artificial intelligence is advancing regardless of national readiness," OpenAI chief executive Sam Altman once observed. Iraq's task is to make sure the country advances with it, rather than watching from behind a grid that still can't stay on.

Written and edited by Shafaq News staff.

Shafaq News

For generations, Iraqis seeking answers about marriage, children or difficult decisions might have turned to women who read fortunes from coffee cups or used books and dictionaries as forms of divination.

Now, the ritual has moved online.

Across TikTok and other social media platforms, Iraqi women are turning traditional fortune-reading into live-streamed services, answering questions about relationships and major life decisions for fees ranging from 5,000 dinars (about $3.80) to 100,000 dinars (about $76).

For some practitioners, what began as curiosity has become a source of income. “I didn’t practice dictionary readings professionally, and I never thought of it as a way to make money,” Lama Mohsen, who has been offering readings on social media for around two years, told Shafaq News. “I started out of curiosity, reading for relatives and friends. But as more people began asking me, it gradually became regular work.”

The questions she receives are rarely trivial, Mohsen said. Most concern marriage, separation, reconciliation or moving to a new home. Some clients return for another reading when the first answer is not what they hoped to hear.

Old Practice, New Platform

The shift marks a striking change in how a longstanding popular practice reaches its audience. Where readings traditionally took place face to face, with lengthy conversations before an interpretation was offered, social media has reduced the process to a livestream: a viewer submits a question and receives an answer on screen.

Growing demand has also expanded the range of services. Alongside traditional forms of divination using dictionaries, some practitioners now offer tarot readings and astrology-related content.

Sultana Hamid, who has hosted readings on social media for several years, distinguishes tarot from astrology, saying tarot uses a deck of 78 symbol-rich cards selected during a reading, while astrology draws on birth information and the 12 zodiac signs.

For Yusr Malik, however, dictionary-based readings remain more appealing. “The dictionary is one of the popular tools deeply rooted in the minds of women and girls, and they trust it,” she told Shafaq News.

Malik said her TikTok livestreams have attracted a large following and provided her with a steady income.

Seeking Certainty in Uncertainty

The popularity of the services may be about more than predicting the future. Ruqaya Fouad, a regular viewer of TikTok fortune-reading streams, said she turns to them when struggling with difficult decisions.

“Sometimes the khira helps relieve our uncertainty,” she said. “Especially when we are uncertain and cannot make a decision, we turn to the dictionary to try to find some clarity.”

Whatever the method, Fouad said, the answers can have a psychological effect during difficult periods, providing a sense of clarity when circumstances feel uncertain.

Researcher Hassan Abdul Samad cautioned, however, against allowing such readings to determine consequential decisions.

Read more: The fortune-tellers: Spinsters' way of trapping young men into marriage

Some people rely entirely on the result of a khira rather than assessing their circumstances realistically, he told Shafaq News. While a reading may ease psychological pressure for someone struggling with a difficult choice, major decisions should ultimately be based on careful consideration and realistic judgment.

What was once a largely private encounter has acquired a new audience, business model and platform. The dictionary and tarot deck remain much the same; the fortune teller is now on the other side of a smartphone screen.

Written and edited by Shafaq News staff.

Shafaq News

Iraq is entering a period of heightened tension as September 30, 2026approaches, the deadline set by the State Administration Coalition, whichbrings together the country's leading Shiite, Sunni and Kurdish politicalforces, to bring all weapons under state control.

The deadline comes amid diverging positions among armed factions, withsome supporting the principle while others rejecting it. Tensions have alsointensified following increasingly sharp rhetoric from Kataib Hezbollah in itslatest statement against Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi.

Two competing positions drive the crisis. Baghdad maintains that controlover weapons is a sovereign state responsibility, while several armed factionsinsist that any discussion of their weapons must be tied to the withdrawal ofUS and Turkish forces, the dissolution of the Peshmerga, and an end to"foreign domination over Iraqi decision-making."

Several questions remain unanswered in Iraq: Could the crisis move frompolitical tension to armed confrontation? And what impact will external actors,from the United States to Iran, have on the dispute?

Former State of Law Coalition lawmaker Arif al-Hamami calls thesituation critical as regional and international pressure builds, calling forthe weapons issue to be addressed without "imposition or threats."

In an interview with Shafaq News, al-Hamami says "everyone supportsupholding the law and placing weapons under state control," but anysolution must weigh the range of security threats facing Iraq, among them theactivities of Iranian Kurdish opposition groups operating from Iraqi territory,the presence of Turkish forces, and wider regional developments.

He proposes folding the armed factions into the Popular MobilizationForces (PMF), the state-linked security body —a step that would, in practice,formalize much of their existing footprint, since most of the factions alreadyfield brigades within the PMF.

Al-Hamami also expresses confidence in the "ability of the leadersof the Coordination Framework to contain the crisis" and hopes the Shiitereligious establishment in Najaf, Ayatollah Ali Al-Sistani, will intervene"to end the dispute."

Read more: Jurf al-Sakhr and Iraq's push to disarm factions

The Religious Establishment's Position

Debate over a possible role for the religious establishment draws onprevious positions by al-Sistani regarding state control over weapons.

On April 11, 2024, during a meeting with the UN secretary-general'srepresentative in Najaf, al-Sistani stressed the need to prevent foreigninterference, uphold the authority of the law, and place weapons under statecontrol.

On June 26, 2025, his representative in Karbala, Abdul-Mahdial-Karbalaei, renewed the call for the state to hold a monopoly on arms,foreign interference to be prevented, and the law to be upheld amid themilitary escalation between Iran and Israel at the time.

More recently, in May 2026, reports emerged that Patriotic ShiiteMovement leader Muqtada al-Sadr and Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi had askedal-Sistani to issue a new religious ruling titled "Placing Weapons UnderState Control." According to those reports, the move sought to providereligious cover for efforts to end the presence of weapons outside officialinstitutions.

No such ruling has been issued so far.

Read more: Iraq and the Mecca Defense Pact: Strategic neutrality orgrowing isolation?

Diverging Positions

The positions of the various parties remain complicated. The governmentmaintains that any armed activity outside the state framework after September30 will be dealt with according to the Anti-Terrorism Law, while Iraq's fourtop state authorities remain committed to disarming groups outside the state.

In contrast, Kataib Hezbollah, Harakat al-Nujaba, and Kataib Sayyidal-Shuhada insist on retaining their military capabilities. Other factions,including Asaib Ahl al-Haq and Kataib Imam Ali, have taken steps to bring theirarmed activities under state authority.

The government has also begun taking practical steps, including forminga committee to address the situation in Jurf al-Sakhr in Babil province. Thepanel includes representatives from the ministries of Interior, Justice andAgriculture, as well as the PMF.

These moves have coincided with serious security incidents, most notablya drone attack on 17 August targeting the private office of Kurdistan Region ofIraq (KRI) Prime Minister Masrour Barzani, along with the residence of theintelligence chief.

The KRI's Counter-Terrorism Service said the two explosive-laden droneswere launched from Iranian territory, though it offered no supporting evidence.Iran rejected the accusation: Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi called the attack"reckless" and warned Kurdish authorities against "false-flagploys" designed to sow discord between the two neighbors, affirming thatTehran's ties with the Kurdistan Region remain friendly. No Iraqi armed factionclaimed responsibility.

Read more: Days to disarm Iraq's factions: deadline or negotiable ceiling?

Escalation and Factional Demands

The latest escalation also came when Abu Mujahid al-Assaf, a securityofficial with Kataib Hezbollah, warned that "patience is running out"over the government's "provocative and irresponsible actions,"threatening a response based on the principle of "an eye for an eye, andthe aggressor is the wrongdoer."

The group has set three conditions for any talks with the governmentover the weapons issue: the complete withdrawal of US forces and guaranteesthat they will not return; an end to what it describes as American dominationof Iraq's political and economic decisions; and the withdrawal of Turkishforces from northern Iraq and dissolution of the Peshmerga.

The conditions sharply widen the gap between the factions and Baghdadand could complicate efforts to reach a negotiated settlement.

Kataib Hezbollah issued the statement days after an unannounced visit toBaghdad by Esmail Qaani, commander of Iran's Quds Force, on August 10. Iraqisources told Shafaq News that the visit addressed the weapons issue and thatQaani urged the factions not to surrender their weapons for now, while avoidingconfrontation with the government and seeking a political settlement.

Meanwhile, some political forces have sought to keep the crisis withinthe political sphere to prevent it from developing into an armed confrontation.Signs of such a possibility emerged following the arrest of a PMF officer, whowas subsequently handed back to the PMF following rapid political intervention.

The Dialogue Track

Nouri al-Maliki, head of the State of Law Coalition, said the committeeformed by the Coordination Framework to address the issue of state control overweapons would begin its work soon in coordination with the government toestablish appropriate mechanisms for implementation.

His position is significant partly because of its timing. During ameeting with US Chargé d'Affaires in Baghdad Joshua Harris, al-Maliki stressedthat the issue should be addressed through "dialogue andunderstanding," while emphasizing that the state and its constitutionalinstitutions must remain the ultimate authority over security and militaryaffairs.

Hadi al-Ameri, leader of the Badr Organization, called on all sides toexercise restraint and avoid inflammatory statements. He expressed confidencein the "good intentions" of the prime minister and faction leaderswhile warning against steps that could give external actors grounds tointerfere in Iraqi decision-making.

A US Perspective

In an interview with Shafaq News, Former US Department of Defenseofficial David Des Roches views the establishment of a deadline as "apositive step," but warns that resistance from factions “taking ordersfrom Iran” rather than Iraq could prove "potentially lethal."

The central question, he argues, is whether the Iraqi state is preparedto confront "the Iranian agents in its midst," or whether it willaccept a compromise that amounts to "a new validation of an unacceptablestatus quo."

In Des Roches' assessment, "Iraq is not a sovereign nation"and does not appear ready to confront the internal forces he believes arenecessary to establish full sovereignty. He argues that maintaining "athinly-veiled Iranian presence" may be politically acceptable, but wouldnot be sufficient to lift restrictions on bank transfers and other mechanismsIran uses to evade international and US restrictions, particularly as "theIranian economy continues to crater."

If armed factions refuse to disarm, Des Roches believes Iraq will either"continue to be a partially sovereign nation" or face "a periodof civil war against Iranian proxies," adding that "there really isno other way." He also expects the KRI to "continue to have its owndynamic, separate from the rest of Iraq."

Separating the Two Tracks

In August 2026, the State of Law Coalition reportedly proposedseparating the US withdrawal timetable from the process of disarming the factions,according to a Coordination Framework source who spoke to Shafaq News. Underthe proposal, a transitional period would provide time to build confidence andreassure parties opposed to disarmament.

These concerns coincide with the process of ending the GlobalCoalition's mission in Iraq, scheduled to be completed on September 30, 2026.Factions determined to retain their weapons have cited this deadline as acentral justification for maintaining their military capabilities.

That raises a fundamental issue: Would confrontation at that pointbecome inevitable if the factions refuse to surrender their weapons?

Confrontation or Integration?

Independent politician Aaed al-Hilali describes the approaching deadlineas making the issue "highly complicated," but does not believe armedconfrontation is inevitable.

Speaking to Shafaq News, al-Hilali argues that Iraq's securityinstitutions are more experienced and capable of managing crises. He alsobelieves political forces understand that any internal confrontation wouldrepresent a loss for everyone and could trigger economic and institutionalfallout.

"The real danger is not the weapons alone, but the crisis of trustbetween the state and the factions and linking the weapons issue to thequestion of the foreign presence," he explains, stressing that "apurely security-based approach could be a gateway to escalation, and armedconfrontation must be the last option, not the first."

Political analyst Mujashaa al-Tamimi shares this assessment, consideringthe risk of confrontation real but not inevitable. " Iraq has theinstitutional, legal, and security levers to contain escalation, provided thereis a unified government position and no rush to use force," he told ShafaqNews.

For al-Tamimi, the core of the crisis lies in the state's ability toturn disarmament into a phased process negotiated through law and politics,supported by broad backing. He also warns that rejection of the decision bysome factions, combined with rifts inside the government or the securityestablishment, could turn the dispute into open fighting, threatening thecountry's stability.

Security expert Safaa al-Aasam almost completely rules out aconfrontation between the government and the factions.

"There is no armed faction prepared to harm the country's securitybecause they are sons of Iraq," he told Shafaq News, arguing that thedispute is political rather than an indication of an impending armedconfrontation.

He regards placing weapons under state control as a "populardemand" and points to the religious establishment's position that thereshould be a single authority holding weapons.

In his assessment, the dispute is likely to be resolved throughpolitical agreements involving government positions, integration into stateinstitutions, or arrangements under which the weapons would be brought underthe authority of official security institutions.

Read more: Iraq's September deadline undercuts armed factions' case for weapons

Written and edited by Shafaq News staff.

Shafaq News

Jurf al-Sakhr, a largely depopulatedfarming district in northern Babil province, has returned to the center ofIraqi politics as Baghdad presses armed groups to place their weapons understate control before a September 30 deadline. More than a decade after it wasretaken from ISIS and renamed Jurf al-Nasr, the district’s residents are stilldisplaced, and parts of the district remain under the control of factionswithin the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF), the state-linked, mostly Shianetwork of armed groups formed to fight ISIS in 2014.

The dispute now runs on two tracksat once. One is humanitarian: thousands of families who fled a decade ago havenever been allowed home. The other is strategic: the same closed zone has beennamed in successive official reports as a base for armed factions and a targetof foreign airstrikes.

A Strategic Pocket South Of Baghdad

Jurf al-Sakhr sits roughly 60kilometers southwest of Baghdad and about 13 kilometers north of the town ofal-Musayyib. Its orchards, irrigation drains, and waterlogged flats are hard topolice, and it straddles routes linking the capital to central and southernIraq, including the Shia holy cities of Karbala and Najaf, and to Al-Anbarprovince in the west.

That geography made the area asecurity problem long before ISIS. After the 2003 US-led invasion, the districtfell inside what Iraqi forces called the Triangle of Death, the farming beltdirectly south of Baghdad, taking in Mahmoudiyah, Latifiyah, and Yusufiyah andreaching Iskandariya and Jurf al-Sakhr, where al-Qaeda and other armed groupsexploited the terrain during the sectarian war. The same name is now also usedfor a separate northern zone across Diyala, Kirkuk, and Saladin provinces.

When ISIS swept through in 2014,Jurf al-Sakhr became one of its footholds in northern Babil, and displacementbegan even before the fight to retake it; the Iraqi Red Crescent Societyreported in May 2014 that roughly 900 families had already fled areas tied tothe district.

From Battlefield To Sealed Zone

The turning point came that autumn.An operation known as the Ashura offensive began on October 23, 2014, drawingIraqi forces and PMF factions, and the district was retaken within days. Iraqiauthorities argued at the time that leaving ISIS in place there would havethreatened the approaches to Karbala, Najaf, and Babil.

Recapture did not reopen it. Theforces and factions that fought there stayed, and Jurf al-Sakhr hardened into aclosed military zone where the armed factions maintained a dominant securitypresence. Several groups controlled it in the early years, among them KataibHezbollah, one of the most powerful Iran-aligned factions inside the PMF.

Hassan Fad'am, a former member ofparliament for Babil and a leader in the al-Hikma movement of Ammar al-Hakim, aShia political bloc that maintains no armed factions, says more than 70 percentof residents left during ISIS rule rather than after liberation, and thattroops who entered afterward found the district "fully mined andbooby-trapped." Clearing it, he argues, would require extensive technicalwork and government resources, and the case should not become a sectarian orpolitical weapon. Residents and opponents of the factions counter that aclosure now approaching twelve years exceeded any demining rationale and becamea permanent military and political fact.

Read more: Days to disarm Iraq's factions: deadline or negotiable ceiling?

Twelve Years Of Displacement

Government figures over the past twoyears show the displacement crisis remains, though the numbers shift with eachregistration cycle. Iraq's Ministry of Migration and Displacement said in May2024 that about 6,000 displaced families from Jurf al-Sakhr had yet to return.

For those still out, the lossextends beyond housing. Political researcher Abdul Qader al-Nayel says someresidents have spent close to a decade in displacement camps, pointing to theBzeibez camp in Al-Anbar province, which he estimates now holds between 1,360and 1,400 families. Most were farmers, he notes, and many now depend on aidafter losing their land and orchards, with years of displacement taking agrowing toll on families and children's access to basic services.

Read more: What happens to Iraq's armed factions after September 30?

A Wider Map Of Areas Outside StateControl

Security sources describe Jurfal-Sakhr as one of several areas where the state's authority remains limited.One source told Shafaq News that close to 20 armed groups and factions holdterritory where the army and police are kept out, and security cordons areimposed by the factions themselves. Another source pointed to weapons workshopsand depots inside several of them, said to hold drones and Iranian medium- andlong-range missiles, along with unofficial prisons and detention sites.

In Iraqi commentary, these placesare often called the depopulated, or "dark," cities. Their combinedpre-displacement population, according to figures provided by the securitysource, is put at around 1.25 million people, almost all Sunni, now spreadacross 13 camps in Al-Anbar, the outskirts of Baghdad, Saladin, and Nineveh,and across Erbil, Al-Sulaymaniyah, and Duhok in the Kurdistan Region. Together,the zones cover more than 3,000 square kilometers. Besides Jurf al-Sakhr, theyinclude parts of al-Musayyib and the area east of Latifiyah in northern Babil;al-Awja, and the outskirts of Tikrit in Saladin; and stretches of Al-Anbar andNineveh that run to the Syrian border.

Senior Sunni politicians havedescribed Jurf al-Sakhr in blunt terms. Muhammad al-Halbousi, head of Taqadum,the largest Sunni party, called it a camp for the armed factions that “no oneis able to enter.”

Read more: Iraq's September deadline undercuts armed factions' case for weapons

A Site Linked To Weapons And Strikes

What sets Jurf al-Sakhr apart fromother cases of post-ISIS displacement is the military activity reported insideit. In 2018, Reuters reported, citing Iranian officials and Iraqi and Westernintelligence sources, that Iran had moved short-range ballistic missiles toIraq and named the district among sites said to be used for storage. Laterreports pointed to workshops said to be developing missiles and drones, claimsthat have deepened the secrecy around the area without independentconfirmation.

The district has also been struckrepeatedly. Sites inside it were hit in a US strike in January 2024, and againon July 30, 2024, when the PMF Commission said four of its members were killedin three strikes on one of its positions; Washington described that strike asdefensive, launched after it detected preparations for an attack on US forces.Two further rounds of airstrikes hit PMF sites in the district on February 28and March 31, 2026; reports attributed those to the United States and Israel,though neither formally claimed responsibility.

A Symbol In Iraq's SectarianPolitics

Over the years, the district hasbecome shorthand for Iraq's wider Sunni-Shia and state-versus-faction disputes.In 2017, the Babil provincial council voted to pursue political actors whodemanded the return of the displaced, while Sunni politicians kept pressing forit. In April 2023, the head of the Sunni-led Sovereignty Alliance (Al-Siyada),Khamis al-Khanjar, declared, "We will pray in Jurf soon," a referenceto the residents' return that drew a sharp rejection from faction leaders, whowarned against readmitting people they accuse of ISIS ties.

That accusation is what makes theissue so combustible, since almost any statement about Jurf al-Sakhr can beread along sectarian lines. Fad'am warns against turning it into a sectarian,political, or media issue, arguing that such framing has itself blockedreturns.

“Years in the camps have bred a deepsense of grievance and weakened residents' trust in the state, makingreconciliation harder the longer it lasts,” Al-Nayel adds.

Read more: Jurf Al-Sakhar: A decade on, Iraq's displaced still barred from return

The Government's Next Move

The latest return to prominence istied directly to Baghdad's push for a state monopoly on weapons. The governmentof Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi, who took office in May 2026 backed by the StateAdministration Coalition, a grouping of Sunni, Shia, and Kurdish parties, andwith US support, has set September 30 as the deadline for armed groups to bringtheir weapons under state control, a date that also marks the scheduled end ofthe US-led coalition's mission in Iraq. Government spokesman Haidar al-Aboudihas said any weapons outside state institutions after that date will be treatedunder the law, including counter-terrorism law. Kataib Hezbollah is among thefactions that have tied the future of their weapons to the withdrawal offoreign forces.

Against that backdrop, a governmentcommittee grouping the interior, justice, and agriculture ministries with thePMF Commission has begun fieldwork in Jurf al-Sakhr, where Kataib Hezbollahcontrols security in parts of the area. The broader plan relies on restrictingaccess to sensitive sites rather than conducting direct raids, in an effort toavoid armed confrontation.

The competing readings persist.Babil provincial council member Mohammed al-Mansouri frames the question not asa choice between reopening the district and keeping it closed, but as a duty toreturn residents while safeguarding the province, noting that Babil haspreviously been attacked from areas near the district.

Security expert Sarmad al-Bayatiargues the issue has been left unresolved so long that it has taken “on thequality of a myth, thickened by years of political and media claims,” and saysany settlement must begin by bringing the federal government, the securityservices, the factions, and the residents to one table to fix the area's legaland security status before mapping a route home.

For now, any path toward resolvingJurf al-Sakhr runs through the committee's work and the Sept. 30 deadline,after which al-Aboudi says weapons held outside state control will be subjectto legal action.

Written and edited by Shafaq Newsstaff.

Shafaq News- Baghdad

A group of Iraqi lawmakers submitted a formal request toParliament Speaker Haibet Al-Halbousi to place a proposal to freeze provincialcouncils and their budgets for the current term on the agenda of the nextparliamentary session.

Reviving one of Iraq's most contentious debates overdecentralization, signatories based their request, submitted Sunday, on Article20/First of the Governorates Not Organized in a Region Law No. 21 of 2008 (asamended), along with provisions addressing council accountability in cases ofserious breaches of duty or violations of the constitution and law, as well ascouncils' subjection to parliamentary oversight, according to a document seenby Shafaq News.

The petition seeks to freeze provincial councils rather thandissolve them, since their existence is protected by the constitution andcannot be ended through this mechanism alone, MP Hamed al-Fatlawi told ShafaqNews, pointing to the previous suspension of councils after they exceeded theirelectoral term.

Al-Fatlawi acknowledged that with roughly one year and twomonths remaining in the current term, “freezing the councils now would raisegreater legal and political complications,” particularly since the sittingcouncils resulted from direct elections. Amending the provincial councils’ lawto grant governors broader powers, freeing them from council-imposedconstraints, represents the better long-term solution, he said, though “thecurrent financial crisis and weak council performance are strengthening callsfor a freeze.”

“Budgets allocated for provincial development andministerial projects have not translated adequately into results on theground,” al-Fatlawi said, accusing councils of “enabling corruption and thedistribution and sale of quotas and positions, which affects public funds andproject implementation.”

He doesn’t expect passage to be easy, however, predictingthat Iraq's ongoing financial crisis could eventually force reconsideration ofwhether upcoming provincial council elections can even be held if sufficientliquidity is unavailable.

Read more: Iraq’s Provincial Councils: Dysfunctional return deepens public disillusionment

This parliamentary push comes as Iraq's government spendingfaces severe strain: recent figures show monthly salary obligations at roughly7.8 trillion dinars (approximately $5.95 billion), while the government needsaround 10.8 trillion dinars (approximately $8.24 billion) monthly to covertotal salaries and public expenditures.

MP Mohammed Khalil goes further than the freeze proposal,arguing that abolishing provincial councils is both a popular demand and atimely necessity. Councils have become a source of "legislativedisruption" within the administrative structure, he told Shafaq News,consuming budget funds without achieving their intended purpose.

“Originally meant to deliver services to citizens, thecouncils became an additional layer obstructing the executive branch and anarena for political interests,” Khalil argued. He stressed that oversight toolsare no longer confined to local councils given the existence of the Board ofSupreme Audit, the Federal Commission of Integrity, and other regulatorybodies, making him favor ending the councils outright rather than a temporaryfreeze.

Citing the earlier experience of dissolving districtcouncils, Khalil said that eliminating provincial councils could similarlyremove “an excess layer from the administrative structure.”

Read more: Why Iraq’s provincial councils are struggling to deliver

Article 116 establishes that Iraq's federal system consistsof a capital, regions, decentralized provinces, and local administrations,while Article 122 grants provinces not organized into a region broadadministrative and financial powers under the principle of administrativedecentralization. The same article states that the election and powers ofprovincial councils and governors are to be regulated by law, and thatprovincial councils are not subject to the control of any ministry, operateindependently, and maintain their own finances.

In Babil, council member Hussein al-Dahmoushi argued thatcouncils, if functioning properly, can achieve their intended purpose. Heacknowledged to Shafaq News, however, that their current state resembles"clinical death" due to political quota-sharing and violations oflaws, regulations, and instructions. “Freezing council operations may bepreferable if this situation persists,” al-Dahmoushi noted, provided theirpowers and duties are transferred to a regulatory body under law to avoidcreating a gap in oversight and local administration.

Fellow Babil council member Mohammed al-Mansouri called theclosure of "quota-based" provincial councils an urgent nationalnecessity, describing them as having lost independent will and decisiveauthority, merely carrying out what is dictated to them.

In Karbala, council member Mohammed al-Masoudi rejected theparliamentary push altogether, arguing that collecting signatures to freezecouncils constitutes a constitutional violation, since the constitution and lawestablished their existence and legitimacy.

Karbala's provincial council plays a genuine oversight role,holding officials accountable and identifying citizens' problems and solutions,al-Masoudi told Shafaq News, suggesting some lawmakers' motives may bepolitical. He noted that councils cost the state only limited sums compared tothe salaries, allowances, protection details and expenses of parliament membersand the three presidencies.

Provincial councils have not had a short history in Iraq.The first were elected on January 30, 2005, during the transitional period,before the 2005 constitution took full effect and before the Governorates NotOrganized in a Region Law No. 21 of 2008 was enacted. Elections followed onJanuary 31, 2009, after the permanent constitution and decentralization lawwere in place, then again on April 20, 2013. Local elections were thensuspended for years until parliament halted council operations in 2019 amid theOctober protest movement. Councils were re-elected on December 18, 2023, withthe new bodies beginning work in early 2024.

Read more: Iraq’s protests after Tishreen: A system that learned how to contain the street

Researchers and observers interviewed by Shafaq News arguethe provincial council crisis cannot be separated from Iraq's broaderdecentralization crisis. Councils were meant to serve as a pillar fortransferring decision-making and resources from Baghdad to the provinces, butthe experiment has faced years of problems involving powers, funding, andoverlap with federal ministries. Legislators attempted, particularly through2013 amendments to the provincial councils law, to transfer service-relatedpowers from federal ministries to the provinces, but implementation faced majordifficulties due to conflicting authorities and weak coordination and funding.

Councils in many provinces instead became arenas forpolitical bargaining and quota-sharing, while local government formationstalled for extended periods in some provinces due to political rivalries. Thisproblem resurfaced after the 2023 elections in several provinces, with localgovernment formation delayed by competition over positions and influence,turning local elections into a barometer of central political balances morethan a genuine local contest over services and administration.

Political analyst Mujashaa al-Tamimi supports ending thecouncils, arguing current calls deserve serious backing, particularly amid thefinancial crisis. Provincial councils have, in many cases, shifted from a toolfor improving local administration into an additional layer of bureaucracy andpolitical bargaining, al-Tamimi told Shafaq News, pointing also to suspicionsof extortion, interference in provincial affairs, and waste of public funds.

In an interview with Shafaq News, Alaa Najah, anotherpolitical analyst, cautioned against reducing the issue to a matter ofspending, arguing that discussion of freezing provincial councils should not bereduced to a cost-cutting measure or a fix for weak performance, since theissue is tied to the broader concept of administrative centralization and therelationship between central and local government. Elected councils should notbe abolished simply due to weak performance, he added, but should insteadundergo evaluation, accountability, auditing and reform.

If weak councils or members implicated in corruption areidentified, the appropriate response is opening investigations and holdingthose responsible accountable, not resorting to abolition or suspension as afirst option, Najah said, while also declining to defend councils simplybecause they are elected. He noted the reverse question is equally legitimate:what have these councils delivered, what has been spent on them, what impacthave their decisions had, and what project delays have resulted from disputesbetween councils and governors?

Najah suggested provincial councils may represent an"excess layer" under the current model, particularly given theexistence of governors, state departments, and elected members of parliamentrepresenting each province. The core problem, he concluded, lies not merely inthe councils' existence but in how they operate, the scope of their powers, thelevel of oversight and accountability applied to them, and the nature ofreforms needed within the local governance system.

Written and edited by Shafaq News staff.

Shafaq News

Salem (pseudonym) thought he had finally made it. The Iraqi man, now inhis 50s, had found a good job in Germany, secured a home and managed toovercome an addiction that had once troubled him.

For the first time in years, his life appeared to be settling intosomething close to normal, with the routine and stability that suggested thehardest part of starting over might be behind him.

Then his job began to unravel.

Read more: Lost in translation: Iraqis, foreign workers struggle toadapt

The first signs, according to Barbel Dromann, the German woman whoaccompanied Salem during that period, came with a dispute at work. His employerbelieved that a man living in Germany without his family could work Saturdaysand put in extra hours. Salem wanted something different: limits on his workinghours and time for a life outside work.

The disagreement gradually spread. His German-language skills came undercriticism, and he was accused of not making enough effort to learn newvocabulary. The physical effort he put into his work no longer seemed to bevalued as it once had been. Misunderstandings accumulated, followed by periodsof sick leave, until he eventually lost his job.

For Salem, the loss went far beyond the disappearance of a paycheck. Hisposition in Germany became more precarious, and he faced the possibility ofbeing returned to Iraq before eventually leaving Germany for Britain.

His story stayed with Dromann, not necessarily because it was the mosttragic among the experiences she witnessed, but because it showed how quickly ahard-won life can begin to come apart. A job, a home, and years of effort toovercome addiction and establish a new future had given Salem something thatlooked like stability. None of it, however, could guarantee that the stabilitywould last.

Read more: Foreign workers flood Iraq: A threat to local jobs

Salem was one of around 13 refugees who eventually became part ofDromann's life after she began assisting people arriving in Germany in 2017.Some found employment and completed vocational training. Others struggled withloneliness, addiction, or psychological difficulties. Some connections grewclose and lasted for years; others ended unexpectedly, leaving her withdisappointment and, at times, doubts about whether her generosity had beentaken for granted.

Over those years, her understanding of what it means to build a futurein a new country became more complicated. A work contract can show that someonehas entered the labor market, just as a professional qualification, residencepermit or language certificate can mark another step forward. But none of thosemilestones necessarily reveals what happens when the working day ends, and aperson returns to a home where nobody is waiting, while relatives thousands ofkilometers away may not fully understand what that new existence feels like.

For Dromann, that realization began with a chance meeting.

She is 64, a mother of three, and lives with her husband in a city inNorth Rhine-Westphalia. Her own experience with a physical disability had madeher particularly aware of the challenges faced by people in difficult socialcircumstances.

Her direct involvement with refugees, however, began in 2017, whenGermany was still dealing with the consequences of one of the largest waves ofasylum applications in its modern history.

More than 1.16 million first-time asylum applications were registered inGermany in 2015 and 2016, according to data from the Federal Office forMigration and Refugees, as the country became one of the main destinations forpeople fleeing wars and unrest in the Middle East and Asia.

Dromann's story began after a service at her Protestant church, whereshe encountered a group of refugees discussing their experiences. She and herhusband offered to assist anyone who needed guidance with everyday life inGermany or support navigating everyday life in an unfamiliar country.

A week later, they met two men, one from Afghanistan and the other fromIran. Both were living in accommodation centers and hoping to move intoindependent housing, but neither could do so at the time. They were learningGerman without knowing exactly what would come after their language courses,while also trying to make sense of German procedures and the distanceseparating them from the families they had left behind.

Read more: The shifting sands of hope: Iraqi migrants find new paths

When Christmas arrived, Dromann invited the two men to her home. It wasthe first time either had seen a decorated Christmas tree or sat around a tablewith a local family.

“Both men came from families with seven children,” she recalled. Thesense of family and security they had known was now far away.

The Dromanns could not recreate what had been left behind, but theycould offer a small piece of familiarity. They invited the men to meals,assisted with everyday needs, and even lent them a car when they needed to movetheir belongings. What began as occasional contact gradually became a bond inwhich the couple watched the two men move, step by step, into circumstancesthat had once seemed difficult to imagine.

The Iranian man eventually left the accommodation center and beganvocational training in metalworking. The Afghan man, with support from Dromannand her husband, found training in electrical work and later secured avocational training position in Dortmund after a long struggle with theofficial procedures surrounding his move.

Both men completed their training, found jobs in their respective fields,and later obtained additional professional qualifications. From the outside, itwas a success story.

But the more time Dromann spent with them, the less complete thatdescription appeared. Once the working day ended, the loneliness could return.

“Life does not end with work and earning money,” Dromann explained. Herfamily had grown close to the two men, but even that closeness could notcompletely replace the relatives they had left behind.

That experience shaped the way she came to view employment. A job canprovide income and routine, while vocational training can open a path toward amore secure future. Work can also place people among others, give their days astructure, and create opportunities to use German in situations that cannot bereproduced entirely inside a classroom.

As word of the couple's efforts spread through the refugee community inWerne, more individuals entered their lives. Over the years, Dromann and herhusband came into contact with around 13 refugees, helping some find betterhousing and assisting others with applications, residence permits orextensions.

The paperwork, however, was often the easiest part to understand.

Some of those Dromann met arrived in Germany struggling withpsychological difficulties linked to experiences in their home countries,including political or religious pressures and difficult family circumstances.Those problems could become particularly difficult in the evening, when theactivity of the day ended, and there was nobody nearby to talk to.

A phone call could connect someone with relatives back home, but itcould not necessarily bridge the gap between what those relatives imagined andwhat the person was actually experiencing in Germany.

“Long periods of waiting can deepen that isolation,” Dromann noted.Rather than leaving refugees outside the labor market for extended periods, shebelieves they should have faster opportunities to learn German or enteremployment while continuing their language education. “Language is also learnedwhen a person interacts with people and works with them.”

Read more: Iraq’s unemployment crisis: A European solution?

For Dromann, employment therefore serves a social purpose as well as aneconomic one. The workplace offers not only income but contact with otherpeople, a daily rhythm and repeated opportunities to communicate in a newlanguage.

She also believes boredom and isolation can contribute to addiction,pointing to German programs that support people dealing with alcohol addiction,including services offered in languages such as Persian.

At the same time, she recognizes that entering the labor market is notalways straightforward. Germany places considerable emphasis on certificatesand documents proving professional qualifications, leaving people who arrivewithout credentials recognized in Germany and who have limited German-languageskills at a particular disadvantage.

The refugees' circumstances eventually became part of the Dromanns' own,bringing moments of satisfaction but also financial and emotional strain.“Success stories gave us the strength to keep going,” she recalled, while thedifficult cases could consume much more energy.

“Psychological problems, painful personal experiences and repeatedvisits to immigration, employment and health authorities sometimes left myhusband and me awake through the night,” she remembered.

Today, she feels relieved that many of those they supported are livingin safe circumstances and no longer need their direct involvement. She stilllikes to know where they live and whether they are doing well, even though notevery connection survived.

One of the most painful breaks involved the Afghan man who had beenamong the first refugees to enter the family's life in 2017. Their relationshipcontinued for years, until his wife arrived in Germany. The couple visitedDromann's home once, and after that, contact stopped.

The disappearance of a relationship that had meant so much to her waspainful enough. Over time, however, Dromann also began to wonder whether shehad been taken advantage of. Her assistance had sometimes involved much morethan time and advice: she and her husband had spent money furnishing homes,provided transportation, and contributed to the cost of driving licenses.

Those experiences eventually made her reconsider the boundaries of whatshe could provide. There were also moments when cultural differences becamemore difficult to navigate.

She recalls feeling uncomfortable when some of the young refugees calledher “Mama,” although she understood that the term may have reflected an attemptto create a sense of closeness. She also refused when some young men asked herto help them find women to marry.

By then, the people she had met could no longer be placed neatly into asingle category. Some had found their footing; others remained vulnerable. Someconnections had deepened; others had faded.

Dromann said the years had given her something more complicated: a closeview of individual lives in which employment, language, legal status andprofessional qualifications could open doors, but could not by themselvesdetermine whether someone felt at home on the other side.

Written and edited by Shafaq News staff.

Shafaq News

In one of three southern Lebanese villages chosen to test expanded statecontrol, residents share a respect for the Army, and little else about whatsecurity should now mean.

Ibrahim came home to Srifa after the latest ceasefire in a car weigheddown with everything his family had carried into displacement. The southernLebanese village was not the one they had left. His two-story house had beenleveled during the war. "I came back with my family and everything weowned, but there was no home to come back to," Ibrahim told Shafaq News.

He cleared what he could from the rubble and began looking for somewhereelse for his family to live. It was not easy. Thousands of residents werereturning at once, and the wartime destruction had sharply cut the village'shousing stock. Compensation had reached no one, he said, and he saw little signthat help was near. "Now, all I am thinking about is how I can get my homeback. Who will pay me?"

His uncertainty runs through everything unfolding in Srifa, a village inthe Tyre district that has become one of three pilot zones in southern Lebanon,alongside Froun in the Bint Jbeil district and Zawtar al-Gharbiyeh in theNabatieh district. The arrangement is meant to strengthen the authority of theLebanese state and to ensure the designated areas are free of weapons held byHezbollah, the Lebanese Shiite movement that operates both as a political partyand an armed force.

On Srifa's streets, where a municipal official says roughly 90 percentof an estimated 8,000 residents have come back, the experiment has opened aharder debate than the one it was designed to settle. Residents respect theLebanese Army without exception. What they cannot agree on is what the Army isthere to do.

Read more: Lebanon's Hezbollah shifts from battlefield to political fight over weapons

A Pilot Zone Where Little Has Changed

Srifa was never occupied by Israeli forces, and the Army did not arrivefor the first time under the new arrangement. Soldiers were in the villagebefore it was designated a pilot zone, and little has changed since, amunicipal official told Shafaq News.

At least two Army checkpoints operate in Srifa now, and patrols movethrough the streets. Soldiers sometimes stop vehicles and ask foridentification, but residents interviewed by Shafaq News said no private homeshad been searched.

Hassan, 18, displaced to Mount Lebanon during the war, sees the Army'spresence as protection. "I hate war. We got nothing from it. I want theArmy here because I want the village to be safe," he said. His friendJawad measures security differently. "It is our duty to stay here anddefend our land. Instead of guarding Israel, the Army should cooperate with theresistance so Israel withdraws from our villages."

Asked whether they would let soldiers into their homes if a searchbecame necessary, the two friends answered without hesitation and in oppositedirections. "Yes. I have no problem with that," Hassan said. Jawad:"Absolutely not. I would never accept anyone entering my house to searchit."

Read more: South Lebanon framework: What we know so far

Respect Army, Disagree Over Mission

That divide cuts across generations. Ali, around 21 and displaced tonorthern Lebanon during the fighting, welcomed the Army's expanded presencewhen he returned, saying it made him feel safer and drew him closer to theLebanese state.

Hanaa, 44, sees it almost inversely. "The Army should be defendingLebanon, not guarding Israel's interests," she said. Hanaa lost her sonduring the war, after he stayed in Srifa rather than leaving with otherdisplaced residents.

For Abu Hussein, state authority and Hezbollah are not necessarily atodds. "We respect the Lebanese Army, but there must be cooperation betweenthe Army and the resistance so Israel leaves our land," he said.

The split runs even between siblings. "The Army should not juststay here," said Zainab. "Either it acts, or it should leave."Her sister Khadija answered her directly: "No, the Army should stay.Others should leave." She praised how the soldiers treat residents andrespect their privacy.

Taken together, the interviews resist any tidy reading of Srifa as avillage that simply accepts or rejects the pilot-zone model. Among those whospoke to Shafaq News, respect for the Army was close to universal. Thedisagreement lay in the harder questions beneath it: who should providedeterrence, what the Army should be expected to do, and how far state authorityshould extend in the drive to make the village weapons-free.

Shafaq News asked Hezbollah for its position on the pilot-zonearrangements in Srifa; the group declined to comment. Residents seen assympathetic to Hezbollah nonetheless spoke of respecting the Army andcooperating with soldiers. There is no visible armed Hezbollah presence onSrifa's streets.

Read more: Israel reshapes southern Lebanon: Displacement and settlement fears

Weapons-Free, But Safe?

Strip weapons from the village, and a further problem remains, one thatmay decide whether residents judge the experiment a success. What does aweapons-free village get in return?

Those interviewed doubted that the arrangement, on its own, could keepfuture Israeli attacks away. The doubt matters more in Srifa precisely becausethe village was never occupied. In places where an Israeli withdrawal offers animmediate, visible measure of progress, residents have something concrete topoint to. Srifa has no such marker, and it is testing whether expanded Lebanesestate control can, by itself, become long-term security.

The stakes extend beyond the village. Israeli officials have tied widerpullbacks from positions in southern Lebanon to progress on disarmingHezbollah, while the United States has backed both the pilot-zone mechanism andthe expansion of Lebanese military authority. For Srifa's residents, thediplomacy comes down to a plainer worry about whether they can rebuild withoutlosing everything a second time.

Read more: Beirut’s southern suburb empties overnight: Stories of displacement under fire

Home, But Not Rebuilt

The war is hard to leave behind when its wreckage is still the view fromthe window. A municipal official told Shafaq News that the war damaged around550 buildings in Srifa, with 350 destroyed and another 200 partially damaged.

Some families whose houses were destroyed are sheltering in schools.Others remain displaced elsewhere in Lebanon or abroad. In some cases, severalfamilies share a single home because they have nowhere else to go. Electricityand water, according to the official, run only part of the time. Much of thedebris has been cleared, but damaged buildings are still part of the landscape.

The economic ground is no steadier. Mustafa,54, once ran a shop in thevillage; it was destroyed. For now, he will not reopen it. "Why would Irebuild if another war could come and destroy everything again?" he said.Reconstruction takes money, and confidence that what is rebuilt will still bestanding next year. Residents say compensation has yet to reach those who losthomes, and few expect it soon. Families are physically back in Srifa, butwithout the homes and businesses they left with, and without much certaintyabout what comes next.

Read more: Israel's war fell on Christians and Shiites in Southern Lebanon with no distinction

Whether They Can Stay

The residents disagreed about Hezbollah's weapons, the Army's mission,the prospect of searches, and what a real defense of southern Lebanon wouldlook like. On one point, their answers converged. "I don't believe thiswas the last time," one resident said of the possibility of another war, afear that every resident interviewed by Shafaq News expressed, whatever theirpolitical differences.

That shared doubt may be the most consequential test the pilot-zoneexperiment faces. The state can set up checkpoints, widen patrols, and pushweapons out of public view, and still not answer the thing residents actuallyuse to measure security, which is whether they can stay.

For Ibrahim, that begins in the ruins of his house. For Mustafa, itdecides whether a shop is worth reopening. Hassan and Jawad have already turnedit into rival ideas of how their village should be defended.

Srifa may be one of three villages chosen to test a new security orderfor southern Lebanon. For the people who have come back to it, the concern ismore immediate: whether coming home this time can finally mean staying.

*Lebanon and Israel signed the “Framework Agreement” on June 26,establishing pilot zones where the Lebanese Army would assume control afterarmed groups are disarmed and their infrastructure dismantled.

Read more: Ceasefire without sovereignty: Lebanon's fragmented power blocks peace with Israel

Written and edited by Shafaq News staff.

Shafaq News

As a newsecurity order takes shape across the Middle East, Iraq has stayed outside theMecca Joint Defense Agreement signed on August 7 by Saudi Arabia, Turkiye, andPakistan, despite sitting at the geographic center of the region the pact ismeant to defend. Baghdad's absence raises a question its own divided politicalclass has yet to answer: is this deliberate neutrality, or the drift of a stateno longer able to act as a reliable partner?

The pact didnot emerge in a vacuum. It is a direct product of the war that erupted when theUnited States and Israel struck Iran on February 28, and of the retaliationthat followed: Sauditerritory was hit repeatedly by Iran, by the Houthis in Yemen, and byShia armed groups operating from Iraqi soil. That last detail moves Iraq fromthe margins of this story to its center: the territory of a state professingneutrality has already been used to strike one of the pact's architects.

Read more:38 years on: Iraq still divided over Iran war victory anniversary

What thethree signatories built in response is a mutual-defense guarantee of unusualweight. The agreement commits them to treat an armed attack on any one as anattack on all —a NATO-style clause binding a top oil exporter, NATO'ssecond-largest military, and the only nuclear-armed Muslim state. Together theyfield roughly 1.4 million active personnel, some 3,400 aircraft, 6,000 tanks,and more than 340 naval assets, according to the 2026 Global Firepower Index.Nor is the pact a one-off: it builds on the Saudi–Pakistan strategic defenseagreement signed in Riyadh in September 2025, the product of nearly a year ofnegotiation.

Riyadh hasseparately backed a multinational maritime initiative to protect shippingthrough the Red Sea, the Gulf of Aden, and the Strait of Bab el-Mandeb. Iraqicrude does not travel those routes; its exports leave through the Gulf and theStrait of Hormuz, but the distinction only sharpens Baghdad's exposure: theHormuz corridor sits squarely inside the Iran confrontation, and disruptionalong any of these waterways moves the global oil price that funds theoverwhelming majority of Iraq's budget. On none of the arrangements now formingto protect them does Iraq hold a seat.

Iraqconfronts these arrangements from a position of institutional fragility that ismore than rhetorical. The government of Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi was swornin on May 14 as the youngest premier in Iraq's history and the firstnon-politician to hold the office. It took power with only a partial cabinet:parliament could not agree on the interior and defense portfolios, leaving thecountry weighing whether to join a collective defense pact without a confirmeddefense minister to assess it. The symbolism is difficult to overstate.

Not everyonereads Iraq's absence as a failure. Amer al-Fayez, head of the IraqiParliament's Foreign Relations Committee, sees no cause for alarm. "Everyagreement has its own circumstances and reasons," he told Shafaq News,noting that the Mecca pact concerns its three signatories, who did not invitethe wider region to join. Baghdad, in his account, can pursue security andeconomic cooperation with neighbors on its own terms without binding itself toany bloc, and prefers arrangements that lower tensions to alliances that forceit to pick a side.

Given thatIraq maintains working ties with Iran, Turkiye, the Gulf states, and the UnitedStates at once, joining a collective defense structure could carry consequenceswell beyond the treaty text.

Politicalresearcher Khaled al-Ardawi argues the reality is less flattering. Iraq, hetold Shafaq News, still lacks a coherent foreign policy it can implementconsistently, leaving it in a "gray zone" of international relations."The Iraqi government is not fully capable of making an independentforeign decision on political, security and defense issues without taking intoaccount the positions of external parties."

He tracesthe constraint to internal division, institutional weakness, corruption, andthe presence of weapons outside state control —a reference, above all, to thePopular Mobilization Forces (PMF), the Iran-aligned paramilitary umbrella whosefactions the government does not fully command. Those same conditions, henotes, make regional and major powers reluctant to sign long-term defenseagreements with Baghdad in the first place. The paradox is sharp: Iraq mayavoid alliances to preserve flexibility, yet its divisions are precisely whatdeter others from treating it as a dependable partner.

Read more: Days to disarm Iraq's factions: deadline or negotiable ceiling?

Politicalresearcher Adel al-Ghariri locates the roots deeper in the past. The US-ledinvasion of 2003, the collapse of the security system in 2014 and the rise ofISIS, and the long contest over the shape of the state pushed Iraq away fromits Arab surroundings and hollowed out its capacity to act as a central playerin regional security. The drift toward sub-state loyalties and the spread ofarms beyond state control, he told Shafaq News, "have made Iraqi politicaldecision-making more complicated." He sees possibility in the al-Zaidigovernment, but frames the objective carefully: positioning Iraq betweencompeting regional poles rather than inside any one of them.

Turkishanalyst Jawad Gok notes that entering a collective military framework now coulddrag Baghdad into conflicts it has no interest in joining, at a moment of acutefriction involving the Gulf and Iran, and Turkiye and Israel. "Iraqcurrently tends toward bilateral agreements of a developmental and economicnature rather than collective military strategies," he said, adding thatany decision to join new security arrangements "requires time to assesstheir future and whether they will serve Iraqi interests."

Read more: Iraq under regional pressure as neighbors threaten to strike Iran-aligned factions

Abu Bakral-Deeb, director of the Arab Thought Development Forum for Research, reads thesame caution as the product of overlapping US, Iranian, Turkish, and Arabinterests inside Iraq, a crowded field in which any visible tilt invites areaction, and in which armed factions add a further layer of sensitivity.

Non-alignmentbuys diplomatic room, but al-Deeb is blunt about its price. Integrated airdefense, intelligence sharing, maritime coordination, and large-scale jointexercises are increasingly being built without Iraq, and staying outside thosenetworks “risks leaving Baghdad to develop its defenses more slowly than itsneighbors, and to react to regional shifts rather than shape them.”

The cost isnot abstract in a region where security now travels with energy and trade. Asingle disruption in the Red Sea or the Gulf can move oil markets within hours;Saudi Arabia's July agreement to supply the internationally recognized Yemenigovernment with up to $150 million in oil derivatives for electricity andessential services shows how tightly security, energy, and development havefused. Iraq's absence from the security layer does not exempt it from theeconomic consequences.

Yet distanceis not the same as irrelevance. A recent assessment by Pakistan's Institute ofStrategic Studies casts Iraq not as an arena for others' competition but as adiplomatic actor, an energy player, and a bridge across the region's economicmap —a country whose ability to keep channels open to Tehran, the Gulf,Washington, and Ankara at once could be turned into leverage and even amediating role.

Read more: Al-Zaidi at the White House: A sustainable partnership or continued crisis management?

What mostanalysts agree on is that the choice cannot be deferred indefinitely. Al-Fayez holds that Iraqcan strike security and economic agreements based on national interest; Gokcounsels patience before committing to untested alliances. For al-Ardawi, noneof it is possible until Baghdad rebuilds its decision-making from within:addressing the divisions, institutional weakness, corruption, and unregulatedweapons that keep partners at arm's length. Al-Deeb offers not membership inany bloc, but "flexible security partnerships" with Egypt, Jordan,the Gulf states, and Turkiye across counterterrorism, border security,cybersecurity, and energy infrastructure —cooperation that stops short ofanything that could read as aimed at a third state— paired with sustainedinvestment in Iraq's own forces, air defenses, and military industries.

Thetrajectory suggests the window for that kind of deliberate, à la carteengagement is narrowing as the region's blocs harden around it. Iraq can stillchoose to make its neutrality a tool. But a state that cannot yet name its owndefense minister will struggle to persuade anyone that its absence from theregion's new alliances is a strategy rather than a symptom, and the longer thequestion goes unanswered, the more the answer is settled by others.

Read more: Iraq’s PM al-Zaidi offers Tehran and Washington a corridor, not a battlefield

Written andedited by Shafaq News staff.

Shafaq News

Drones,missiles and shelling struck Iranian Kurdish opposition bases and Peshmergapositions across Iraq's Kurdistan Region between July 17 and August 12, killingat least nine people and wounding at least eight.

Iran claimedresponsibility for part of the campaign, while other strikes were launched frominside Iraq or remain unattributed, according to Kurdistan Region PrimeMinister Masrour Barzani and statements from the targeted parties.

The basesstruck belong mainly to Iranian Kurdish opposition parties —Kurdistan Toilers'Party (Komala), the Kurdistan Democratic Party of Iran (KDPI), the KurdistanFreedom Party (PAK), and the Khabat Organization of Iranian Kurdistan— armedgroups opposed to Tehran that hold positions in Erbil and Al-Sulaymaniyah provinces.Erbil also hosts United States sites, including a US consulate, while thePeshmerga, the official armed forces of the Kurdistan Region, maintainpositions in the areas targeted.

The Human Toll

All nineconfirmed deaths occurred in a single strike. On July 17, missile fire hit aKomala position at Zargwez, near Al-Sulaymaniyah, killing nine oppositionfighters, according to the group. Five days later, an attack on a PAKheadquarters wounded six of its members.

Between July 27and August 12, Shafaq News documented two people wounded, both Komala membershurt in a missile strike on August 11.

Read more: Two weeks of attacks on Iraqi Kurdistan, Iran claims US damage

Two Phases OfStrikes

Between July 17and 25, Shafaq News recorded close to 20 strikes divided along two targetlines: bases of Iranian Kurdish opposition parties in Al-Sulaymaniyah andwestern Erbil, and US-linked sites around Erbil. Air defenses associated withthe US consulate intercepted drones over Erbil on several occasions, withdamage limited to falling debris and small vegetation fires, according to theUS-led Global Coalition against ISIS and Kurdistan security sources.

ErbilInternational Airport stayed open throughout. PAK accused Iran of using whitephosphorus munitions in a drone strike on one of its bases west of Erbil andcalled for an international investigation.

Between July 27and August 12, Shafaq News documented at least 10 distinct attack episodes.Seven of them targeted Iranian Kurdish opposition organizations, two struckPeshmerga positions at Tekeran on July 28 and Tasluja on August 2, and onestrike near Jasana Cave in Al-Sulaymaniyah province on August 1 hit anunidentified target.

Weapons AndLocations

Drones were thedominant weapon. Shafaq News counted at least 21 across the period: four onJuly 27, three on July 28, one on July 29, five in two July 31 attacks, two onAugust 1, two on August 2, and four on August 12. Iran used an unspecifiednumber of additional drones on August 8. Three missiles were confirmed in theAugust 11 strike, a possible fourth struck Mount Haibat Sultan on July 27, andthe weapon used against the Peshmerga at Tekeran was not specified.

Several strikeshit evacuated or lightly occupied sites, and material damage was reportedrepeatedly at party headquarters, camps, and nearby buildings. On July 31, asuicide drone struck the Khabat Organization headquarters at Topzawa, along theErbil–Makhmour road, and guards failed to bring down one aircraft with lightweapons.

Iran's ClaimsAnd Attribution

Iran wasexplicitly identified as responsible for the August 8 drone strikes on Komalapositions near Al-Sulaymaniyah and the August 11 missile strike on Komalaheadquarters in Alana Valley, north of Erbil. Most earlier attacks were notattributed to a specific perpetrator.

On July 25,Iranian army spokesperson Mohammad Akraminia said Iranian forces had destroyedUS infrastructure in the region. "Especially in Erbil, Iraq, almost all ofAmerica's infrastructure has been destroyed, and the counter-revolutionaryforces are unable to operate," he said in remarks reported by Iranianmedia, using Tehran's term for the Iranian Kurdish opposition.

Tasnim, a newsagency close to the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), attributed a firein Al-Sulaymaniyah to projectiles fired from Iran. The KRG and the main Kurdishparties blamed Tehran directly and called on it to halt the attacks.

PM Barzani saidin a TV interview that some attacks had originated inside Iraq, includingdrones launched from the direction of Mosul, and later stated that the widercampaign had come either directly from Iran or from armed groups operating onIraqi territory.

IranianBrigadier General Mojtaba Jafari claimed on August 3 that the Iranian army's23rd Airborne Special Forces Brigade had carried out 14 ground operations inErbil and Al-Sulaymaniyah, killing and capturing opponents. Iran gave no dates,locations, or casualty figures, and Iraqi and Kurdistan Region authorities didnot confirm the claim, which cannot be reconciled with the documented attackrecord.

Iraqi FactionsDeny Involvement

TwoIran-aligned Iraqi armed factions rejected any role in the strikes. On July 17,Kataib Sayyid al-Shuhada denied that any attack had been launched from Iraqiterritory. "There were no operations launched from Iraq toward Erbil, andno resistance faction carried out any action of this kind," spokesperson Kazemal-Fartousi told Shafaq News.

On July 25,Saraya Awliya al-Dam rejected reports linking it to the Erbil attacks as falseand intended to sow confusion, according to its military spokesperson, AbuMahdi al-Jaafari.

Former seniorPeshmerga official Jabbar Yawar has named Kataib Hezbollah, Kataib Sayyidal-Shuhada, the Imam Ali Brigades and Harakat al-Nujaba among Iraqi groupsinvolved in the wider campaign, citing the Nineveh Plains, areas around Kirkukand Saladin as launch zones. These groups did not comment on the allegations.

The WiderCampaign

The July andAugust strikes form part of a longer conflict. Barzani told Al Jazeera that theKurdistan Region had endured more than 1,000 missile and drone attacks over thecourse of the wider war, launched either directly from Iran or by armed groupsinside Iraq, and said the Kurdistan Region would not be drawn into theconflict, adding that it had raised its lack of air defenses with internationalpartners, including the United States.

The KDPI hassaid more than 145 missiles and drones struck its facilities since February 28,and Komala has reported more than 102 since the same date. Those cumulativefigures cover the broader campaign and are not part of the count for July 17 toAugust 12.

Read more: Who is striking Iraqi Kurdistan? New drones deepen an unanswered question

Shafaq News

Power innorthern Iraq has never been fully one-sided. For more than two decades, thebalance between Baghdad’s authority and the Kurdistan Region’s autonomy hasshifted through wars, negotiations, constitutional disputes, and politicalcrises. At times, federal institutions have extended deep into Kurdish areas;at others, Erbil has exercised self-rule resembling many functions of a state. Theresult is neither a fixed division of power nor a settled constitutionalarrangement, but a constantly renegotiated relationship.

Today, theKurdistan Region operates its own parliament, security forces, and executiveinstitutions while maintaining direct relations with foreign governments andinternational energy companies. Its leadership negotiates with Baghdad overbudgets, natural resources, and disputed territories, while also navigating theinfluence of neighboring states that shape Iraqi politics.

Theseinstitutions were not created through constitutional design alone. Theirfoundations rest on decades of armed struggle, internal Kurdish rivalries, andrepeated moments when the Iraqi state fractured or transformed. More than threedecades after self-rule first emerged in northern Iraq, the Kurdistan Regionremains one of the Middle East’s most developed examples of autonomousgovernance.

Boundariesof Identity

Along-delayed census conducted in 2024 and released in 2025 recorded Iraq’spopulation at roughly 46 million, placing the Kurdistan Region at just over 14%of the national total. Rather than settling disputes between Baghdad and Erbil,the figures became part of them, fueling debates over budgets, resources, andfederal entitlements.

Estimatesplace Iraq’s Kurdish population between 6.5 million and 8.5 million, while theKurdistan Regional Government (KRG) puts the figure at around 6 million. Thegap reflects decades of displacement, shifting front lines, migration, and theunresolved status of mixed territories where Kurds, Arabs, Turkmen, and othershave long lived together.

Languagefurther illustrates the Kurdistan Region’s internal diversity. Kurmanjidominates in Duhok and parts of Erbil, while Sorani shapes political discourseand administration in al-Sulaymaniyah and much of the capital. Both dialectshold official status within the same institutions, each carrying distinctcultural and historical experiences.

As formerIraqi President and late Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) leader JalalTalabani once observed, “Our strength lies in our unity, not in uniformity.”The observation remains central to Kurdish political life, where cohesion hasdepended less on homogeneity than on managing differences without fracturingthe political space.

Thisdiversity extends beyond language. Most Kurds in Iraq are Muslim, the majoritySunni, though Feyli Kurds are largely Shia. Alongside them, Yazidi, Christian,and Shabak communities remain woven into the social fabric, particularly in thedisputed areas. Their vulnerability became clear in 2014, when ISIS sweptacross northern Iraq, collapsing local security structures and displacingentire communities.

The UnitedNations Commission of Inquiry on Syria and Iraq later concluded that ISIS’scampaign against Yezidis in Sinjar “may amount to genocide,” citing masskillings, abductions, and systematic sexual slavery. The finding made Sinjarone of Iraq’s most sensitive post-ISIS flashpoints, where security, governance,and the return of displaced residents remain unresolved among Baghdad, Erbil,and local actors.

The KurdistanRegion’s three main cities developed distinct roles. Erbil became theadministrative center of the KRG and expanded after 2003 into a hub fordiplomacy, investment, and governance. Al-Sulaymaniyah developed a strongcultural and political identity shaped by a more competitive politicalenvironment and a diverse media landscape. Duhok, near the Turkish border,evolved into a commercial gateway linking Iraq to regional trade routes.

Kirkuk,however, best illustrates Iraq’s unresolved territorial disputes. Rich in oiland marked by ethnic diversity, it has remained contested since 2003. Article140 of the Iraqi Constitution outlined a process of normalization, a census,and a referendum to determine its status, but implementation stalled. Thebalance shifted in 2017 when Iraqi federal forces retook the city after theKurdish independence referendum, altering territorial realities between Baghdadand Erbil.

During thatperiod, then-Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi framed Baghdad’s position inconstitutional terms. “The constitution is our reference point for unity andstability,” he remarked, noting that territorial disputes are also disputesover authority, legitimacy, and competing visions of the state.

Read more: Iraq’s population surges past 46M: Burden or opportunity?

Born fromFriction

What is nowthe Kurdistan Region did not emerge through administrative design or anegotiated federal arrangement. It developed through a long historical processin which Kurdish identity in Iraq was shaped by the collapse of empires, therise of Arab nationalism, and successive governments in Baghdad that equatedunity with centralization. Rather than producing a gradual political project,these pressures steadily transformed grievance into organized nationalmobilization.

Under thelate Ottoman Empire and the subsequent British Mandate, Kurdish-inhabited areasin northern Iraq were incorporated into a state that did not reflect Kurdishpolitical aspirations. The creation of the modern Iraqi state in 1921 placedthese regions under Baghdad's authority, establishing a tension that enduredfor decades. Kurdish demands for autonomy surfaced repeatedly but becameintertwined with broader struggles over state-building and territorial control.

By themid-20th century, Kurdish politics had evolved into organized movements. Thefounding of the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) in 1946 under Mullah MustafaBarzani marked a turning point from fragmented resistance to an organizedpolitical and military movement. Even then, relations with Baghdad alternatedbetween negotiation and conflict, often breaking down when the centralgovernment sought to reassert control by force.

This cyclebecame a defining feature of modern Iraq. Periods of state weakness enabledKurdish movements to expand, while renewed central authority pushed them backinto rebellion, with Baghdad consistently portraying Kurdish autonomy as achallenge to Iraq's territorial integrity rather than a political demand withinthe state.

Therelationship deteriorated further after the Baath Party consolidated power inthe late 1960s and 1970s. As the Iraqi state became more centralized andmilitarized, Kurdish regions were drawn into prolonged conflict. Efforts tonegotiate autonomy collapsed amid deepening mistrust, giving way to renewedmilitary campaigns against Kurdish strongholds.

A majorturning point came with the 1975 Algiers Agreement between Iraq and Iran, whichended Tehran's support for Kurdish insurgents. The accord triggered the rapidcollapse of the Kurdish uprising, forcing the large-scale withdrawal anddisplacement of fighters and civilians. For Kurdish leaders, it underscored alesson that would shape future strategy: external alliances could shiftabruptly, transforming the internal balance of power.

Rather thanbringing stability, the agreement ushered in a new phase of repression. Kurdishpolitical aspirations endured but were repeatedly forced underground as Baghdadexpanded its coercive power. During the 1980s, particularly throughout theIran-Iraq War, Kurdish areas became one of the principal theaters of Iraq'sinternal conflict.

The violencereached its peak with the Anfal campaign in the late 1980s. Under SaddamHussein, Iraqi forces targeted Kurdish rural communities through massdisplacement, village destruction, and large-scale killings. Human Rights Watchestimates that between 50,000 and 100,000 Kurds were killed, while around200,000 were displaced across northern Iraq and into neighboring countries. The1988 chemical attack on Halabja became the campaign's most internationallyrecognized symbol, killing thousands in a single assault.

Rather thanextinguishing Kurdish aspirations, Anfal strengthened them, transforming theKurdish cause into one rooted in collective memory and growing internationalattention. By the end of the 1980s, Kurdish politics had been reshaped bymilitary defeat and demographic upheaval, setting the stage for autonomy toemerge not through negotiation with Baghdad, but through the weakening of theIraqi state.

Read more: Faili Kurds: Decades of injustice VS. Iraq’s struggle to reconcile with its past

Rules ofCoexistence

Thatopportunity arose after the 1991 Gulf War, when Iraq's defeat and the ensuinguprisings created a political vacuum across much of the country. In the weeksthat followed, Kurdish fighters and civilians rose against Saddam Hussein'sgovernment. Iraqi forces initially crushed much of the uprising, sendinghundreds of thousands of Kurds toward the borders with Turkiye and Iran in oneof the region's largest humanitarian crises.

Internationalpressure soon prompted the United States and its allies to establish a no-flyzone north of the 36th parallel, effectively preventing Baghdad fromreasserting full control over much of northern Iraq.

For thefirst time in Iraq's modern history, Kurdish parties found themselves governingterritory beyond Baghdad's control. Independence was never formally declared,nor was autonomy negotiated with the central government. Instead, self-ruleemerged because of war.

Baghdad andthe Kurdish leadership viewed the new reality through very different lenses.Saddam Hussein maintained that Iraq would remain "one Iraq,"rejecting any arrangement that could diminish the authority of the centralgovernment. Kurdish leaders, meanwhile, increasingly focused on buildinginstitutions capable of governing the territory under their control rather thansustaining a purely armed movement.

Thattransition became visible in 1992, when the Kurdistan Region held its firstparliamentary elections. Presenting the vote as a step toward democraticlegitimacy, then-PUK leader Jalal Talabani argued that "Westerngovernments will be encouraged and persuaded to deal with the realrepresentatives and listen to the real voice of the Kurdish people." Theelections produced the Kurdistan National Assembly and marked the beginning ofinstitutional politics in the Region.

The KDP andthe PUK quickly emerged as the dominant political forces, but they governedseparate areas and built parallel administrations, security forces, andeconomic networks. Even while negotiating with Baghdad, KDP leader MasoudBarzani maintained that Kurdish aspirations centered on meaningful autonomyrather than separation, arguing that Kurdistan would remain "part ofIraq" if genuine self-government could be guaranteed.

Thosedifferences eventually spilled into open conflict. By the mid-1990s, rivalrybetween the two parties had developed into a civil war that divided theemerging autonomous Region into competing administrations. Control over bordercrossings, customs revenues, government institutions, and political legitimacybecame as important as military gains on the battlefield.

The fightingslowed only after the 1998 Washington Agreement, brokered by the United States.Although it did not eliminate political rivalry, it established rules forcoexistence and gradually reduced the conflict between the two parties.Describing the agreement, then-US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright calledit "a new and hopeful chapter," adding that Washington viewed Kurdishreconciliation as a step that would strengthen stability in northern Iraq andthe broader Iraqi opposition to Saddam Hussein.

By the early2000s, the Kurdistan Region had acquired many of the characteristics of afunctioning state. It operated its own security forces (Asayish), managedschools and public services, collected revenues, and maintained limitedeconomic ties through cross-border trade. Legally, it remained part of Iraq. Inpractice, however, Baghdad exercised little influence over daily life in theRegion after years of sanctions had weakened the central government.

Read more: Into 2026, Baghdad and Erbil face the same disputes—with higher stakes

Unresolvedon Paper

The US-ledinvasion in 2003 did more than topple a government. It dismantled the state'score structure and left its institutions to be rebuilt from scratch. For Iraq'sKurds, the fall of Saddam Hussein ended decades of coercion, but it also openeda period of uncertainty over what autonomy would look like in a country stillbeing rebuilt.

Unlike therest of the country, the Kurdistan Region did not start from zero. By 2003, italready had a functioning parliament, security forces, and an administrativesystem that had taken shape during years of de facto autonomy. That head startwould prove decisive as Baghdad's new political order began to take shape.

Oil quicklybecame one of the defining fault lines. Iraq holds an estimated 145 billionbarrels of proven reserves, while Kirkuk alone contains around 9–10 billionbarrels and had once produced roughly 500,000 barrels per day before 2003. TheKurdistan Region, for its part, has claimed reserves of more than 45 billionbarrels of oil equivalent, along with 25–30 trillion cubic feet of natural gas,figures that remain disputed by Baghdad.

The 2005Constitution gave that reality formal shape. It recognized the Kurdistan Regionas a federal entity, with its own parliament and control over internal securitythrough the Peshmerga, a force estimated at between 120,000 and 200,000fighters. But recognition on paper did not settle the question of power.Instead, it left it unresolved.

Control overterritory, oil, and revenue remained contested, nowhere more than in Kirkuk.Article 140 of the Constitution laid out a process to resolve the status ofdisputed territories through normalization, a census, and a referendum. It wassupposed to be completed by the end of 2007. It never was.

Kirkuk, withits oil fields and strategic location, became the clearest expression of thedispute. Control over production and export routes turned hydrocarbons into apolitical dividing line running through the center of Iraq's federal system.

By the late2000s, that divide had hardened. The Kurdistan Region began signingproduction-sharing contracts with international oil companies, includingExxonMobil, Chevron, and TotalEnergies, while Baghdad rejected them asunconstitutional. At the same time, Iraq's federal oil exports —averagingbetween 2.5 million and 3.5 million barrels per day— remained under the controlof the State Organization for Marketing of Oil (SOMO).

The resultwas two parallel systems operating within one country. Hussain al-Shahristani,Iraq's oil minister at the time, argued that "oil revenues constitute morethan 90% of Iraq's federal budget, and therefore cannot be fragmented withoutthreatening state cohesion." Kurdish leaders viewed the issue differently.Masoud Barzani, then president of the Kurdistan Region, countered that "Wecannot exercise real autonomy if it does not control its own economicresources."

Over time,Erbil began to function more like a regional capital than an administrativecenter within a federal state. More than 30 foreign diplomatic missions openedrepresentative offices there, and international companies began dealingdirectly with Kurdish authorities. It also maintained close securitycoordination with the US, particularly during the fight against ISIS after2014. General Raymond Odierno, who commanded American forces in Iraq, describedthe Peshmerga as "the most reliable security partner in Iraq during theearly stabilization phase."

As Iraq'spolitical system stabilized unevenly, relations between Baghdad and Erbilsettled into a familiar pattern: cooperation when necessary, confrontation whenit mattered. Jalal Talabani once characterized federalism as "the systemdesigned to hold the country in place, and at the same time, the one that keptexposing its fault lines."

Read more: Kurdistan Region’s political deadlock: Impact and perils

A Hard Check

By the endof the war against ISIS, the Kurdistan Region had reached its strongestposition since 2003. The Peshmerga held Kirkuk and other disputed areas,Western governments relied heavily on Kurdish forces on the ground, and inErbil there was a growing belief that Iraq's balance of power had shifted inways Baghdad could no longer reverse.

Kurdishleaders moved to test that assumption in 2017. On Sept. 25, voters across theKurdistan Region took part in an independence referendum. More than 90% backedseparation from Iraq. The leadership framed the vote as a mandate to opennegotiations with Baghdad, not as a unilateral declaration of independence."We want to know the will of our people," Masoud Barzani, head of theKDP, remarked ahead of the vote, adding that "a serious dialogue will soonbegin."

Baghdadviewed the move differently from the outset. Then-Prime Minister Haideral-Abadi rejected the referendum as unconstitutional and made it clear that"the unity of Iraq and the Constitution are not subject to discussion orcompromise." Regional powers quickly aligned with Baghdad. Turkiye andIran opposed the vote, warning it could destabilize borders and encourageseparatist movements across the region.

Whatfollowed shifted rapidly from politics to force. In October of the same year,Iraqi federal troops advanced into disputed territories, with Kirkuk at thecenter of the operation. Kurdish forces withdrew from the city within hours,ending more than three years of control. The speed of the retreat underscored ahard limit in Kurdish leverage. Gains achieved on the battlefield during thewar against ISIS had not translated into political recognition orconstitutional change. The United States, while praising the role of thePeshmerga, also urged Kurdish leaders to postpone the referendum, warning itwould deepen tensions with Baghdad and complicate the wider campaign againstISIS.

Inside theKurdistan Region, the consequences were immediate. Baghdad disrupted budgettransfers, trade routes came under pressure, and the loss of disputedterritories —especially Kirkuk— reduced both revenue and political leverage.The political unity that had carried the referendum soon began to fray, aslong-standing differences between the KDP and the PUK resurfaced.

The voteitself remained politically significant even after its failure. For many Kurds,it marked a rare and overwhelming expression of support for independence. ForBaghdad, it reinforced a long-held position that Iraq's federal system couldaccommodate Kurdish autonomy but not unilateral moves toward sovereignty.

In themonths that followed, Baghdad and Erbil gradually returned to negotiations, butunder altered conditions. The agenda shifted away from independence and towardpractical disputes —budgets, oil exports, and the administration of disputedterritories— within the constraints of Iraq's federal framework.

Read more: Kurdistan’s 10th cabinet: Interlocking alliances and persistent political differences

Stalled andStrained

The mostpersistent fault line remained the federal budget. Transfers from Baghdad toErbil have been delayed, reduced, or used as leverage in disputes over oilexports and internal revenue collection, turning fiscal policy into a centralinstrument of political bargaining.

That disputeis inseparable from Iraq's unresolved energy governance. The Kurdistan Regionrelies heavily on oil revenues generated through its own contracts and exportchannels, while Baghdad insists on federal control over all national resources.As a result, Kurdish oil exports through the Kirkuk-Ceyhan pipeline to Turkiyeremained suspended for more than two years, tightening fiscal pressure on Erbiland deepening disputes over who controls production and revenues. The haltfollowed arbitration rulings and escalating disagreements between Baghdad andErbil over export authority, contracts, and payment mechanisms.

In 2025,both sides reached an understanding to resume exports under federalsupervision. The arrangement returned crude sales to SOMO, with revenues tiedto budget transfers and salary payments in the Kurdistan Region. The dealrestored limited export flows after a prolonged shutdown but left the coreissues —control, contracts, and constitutional authority— unresolved.

Read more: Six months of stalemate: Kurdistan’s government formation crisis deepens

Inside theKurdistan Region, domestic politics add another layer of strain. Politicalrivalry between the two main Kurdish parties —KDP and PUK— continues to shapegovernance. Following the October 2024 elections, in which the KDP won 39 seatsand the PUK secured 23 in the 100-member parliament, efforts to form agovernment stalled. Lawmakers briefly convened on Dec. 3, 2025, but failed toelect a speaker or move forward with cabinet formation, leaving the legislatureat a standstill.

Beyondinternal politics, the Kurdistan Region operates within a complex regionalenvironment shaped by overlapping external interests. Relations with Turkiyeare anchored in economic interdependence and security concerns tied tocross-border militant activity. Relations with Iran are influenced by geographyand Tehran's political influence within Iraq's broader Shiite politicallandscape. Engagement with the United States continues, though primarilythrough advisory and coordination roles rather than long-term securityguarantees.

Despitethese pressures, Erbil retains a degree of external agency that is unusual fora sub-state entity. It is within this condition of managed ambiguity —whereautonomy is preserved but continuously tested— that the broader trajectory ofIraq's Kurdish experience converges.

Read more: The Kurdish rebellion dissolves: Turkiye’s century-old equation evolves

Read more: Iran's Kurds straddle between inclusion and autonomy

Read more: Kurds in Syria: From marginalization to a defining political force

Written andedited by Shafaq News staff.

Shafaq News- Baghdad

Iraq's Coordination Framework, the alliance of Shiiteparties that has run the country since 2022, is weaker today than at any pointsince it was assembled. It is also, for now, the only game in Baghdad, and thatpairing —a governing bloc losing its grip while facing no one able to take itsplace— explains more about where Iraqi politics is heading than any singlequarrel inside it.

The Framework was not designed to be a party, or even apermanent coalition. It formed in 2021 for one purpose: to prevent Muqtadaal-Sadr, the populist Shiite cleric whose list had won the most seats, frombuilding a majority government that would have pushed the Iran-aligned partiesout of power. Isam al-Faili, a professor of political science at Baghdad'sMustansiriyah University, describes an alliance that carried an unclear labelfrom the day it was born and has only ever been a gathering of forces thatagree on very little.

Read more: Explainer: Iraq’s Coordination Framework and Its Rise to Power

Hostility to al-Sadr supplied the glue. When he walked away,the glue began to dry. How this alliance holds, or frays, is not a domesticcuriosity: it governs a major oil producer, sets the terms of Baghdad'sdealings with both Washington and Tehran, and now holds the fate of the armedgroups through which Iran projects power across the region.

Al-Sadr's exit is also the reason the Framework looks socommanding today. He boycotted the November 2025 election outright, and in hisabsence the Framework's constituent parties returned to the field and claimedroughly 175 of parliament's 329 seats, well above the 130 or so they controlledafter the Sadrists quit parliament in 2022. They reached that total by runningapart rather than together —Nouri al-Maliki's State of Law, Qais al-Khazali'sSadiqoon, Ammar al-Hakim's National State Forces, and Mohammed Shia al-Sudani'sReconstruction and Development each contested separately and allied withothers.

Analysts have labeled the tactic-controlled fragmentation:split to harvest the maximum number of seats under an election law theFramework itself redrew to reward large lists, then regroup afterward to namethe prime minister and parcel out the ministries. It worked cleanly, and inworking it exposed the trait that now defines the alliance. The Framework cancoordinate with precision when the prize is seats, and hardly at all once thequestion becomes what to do with them.

Read more: Exclusive: Coordination Framework split into three factions over armed groups

What holds it together has narrowed to a single sharedinterest: keeping hold of the state and everything attached to it —the offices,budgets, and patronage that have organized Iraqi government since the USinvasion in 2003. The discipline this generates is real and easy to underrate.Framework leaders do not turn on one another in public, and when the blocissues a collective position, none of them steps out to disown it. That theparties ran as separate lists and then reassembled without a public rupture isitself evidence of coordination, not decay. The unity is genuine at the levelof the statement, even when it dissolves the moment anyone tries to act on it.

Nowhere is the discipline clearer than in how the Frameworkpicks prime ministers, and nowhere is its dysfunction clearer either.Installing al-Sudani in 2022 took just over a year, the longestgovernment-formation deadlock since 2003. Once in office, he tried to grow abase of his own, and by November 2025 his list had finished first, yet theFramework still refused him a second term, with corruption files trailing himas he was eased aside.

Read more: The Shiite Coordination Framework: Can govern Iraq, but cannot agree on a prime minister

Haitham Numan, a professor of political science at Britain'sUniversity of Exeter, reads that arc as a lesson the bloc teaches its ownpremiers: reach for independence and you become a target.

The search for al-Sudani's successor then stalled for fivemonths. It broke only when US President Donald Trump moved against al-Maliki'sbid to return, threatening to cut security cooperation and freezing dollartransfers to Baghdad until the Framework dropped him. The compromise thatemerged was Ali al-Zaidi, a businessman with no party, no faction, and nopolitical record, chosen because he alarmed no one.

Al-Zaidi was sworn in on May 14 with only 14 of 23 ministersapproved; the interior and defense portfolios, the core of the securityestablishment, sat empty amid disputes the bloc could not settle. Al-Failinotes that even al-Zaidi was not a settled choice until the final moment. Therelationship between the government and its makers is one of mutual dependencerather than separation; the Framework keeps producing weak premiers because aweak premier is the only kind all of its members will tolerate.

There is one dispute this method cannot swallow, and it isthe one now pressing hardest on the alliance. Several Framework members are notonly political parties; they also command weapons. Al-Amiri's Badr Organizationis among the largest factions inside the Popular Mobilization Forces, thestate-funded umbrella of mostly Iran-aligned armed groups; al-Khazali's AsaibAhl al-Haq fields both lawmakers and fighters; the Hoqooq movement is widelyunderstood as the political face of Kataib Hezbollah. So when the Frameworkauthorized al-Zaidi in early June to bring all weapons under state control,presenting the step as a sovereign national decision, some of the figuressigning off were being asked to take apart the very source of their leverage.

Al-Faili observes that arms are handled case by case ratherthan by any collective ruling of the bloc, and events bore him out within days.Asaib Ahl al-Haq and Kataib al-Imam Ali announced they would place theirbrigades under state authority; Kataib Hezbollah and Harakat al-Nujaba refused,with Kataib Hezbollah professing support while insisting on keeping its dronesand missiles. The same fault line runs through the half-empty cabinet, wherethe security ministries remain contested precisely because they decide whocommands the men with guns.

Driving all of it is outside pressure, Washington's envoyTom Barrack, the frozen dollar transfers, and a September 30 deadline afterwhich unlicensed weapons are to face legal action. The word both camps reachfor is sovereignty, though they mean opposite things by it: for the state-firstparties it describes a government monopoly on force, and for the resistancefactions it describes defiance of American power.

The timing sharpens everything. A year after the war thatleft Iran badly weakened and stripped of its allies in Syria and Lebanon,Tehran now leans on Iraq as its most dependable partner, exactly as Baghdad isbeing pushed to disarm the groups that anchor that relationship.

Abbas Ghadir al-Jubouri, a researcher on Iraqi politicalaffairs, argues that what looks like erosion is political repositioning ratherthan retreat, and that the Framework remains the government's sponsor withal-Zaidi its chosen product. On the matter of form, he is right; nothing on thehorizon is poised to unseat the alliance. Numan's reading runs deeper anddarker: the Framework stands at its weakest and still rules, held up less byits own strength than by the absence of any figure able to unify the Shiitehouse, offering what he calls protocol cover in place of real political cover.Both descriptions hold at once. The Framework is not going to dissolve, and itis not going to be replaced. What is draining out of it is substance.

The September 30 deadline puts to the alliance the questionits whole design was meant to avoid. A coalition assembled to share power canabsorb almost any disagreement that money and offices are able to settle.Whether it can survive being asked to surrender the weapons that make some ofits members powerful in the first place is the test it has spent four yearsavoiding, and the one it can no longer postpone.

Written and edited by Shafaq News staff.