ISIS regroups in Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon: a new strategy?

Shafaq News

ISIS remains active across the Syria–Iraq and Syria–Lebanon border belts, primarily through dispersed sleeper cells that stage low‑signature attacks to prove presence, test security responses, and cultivate new recruitment streams.

Recent field reporting and official statements point to a tactical adjustment: fewer mass‑casualty operations, more pinprick bombings, assassinations, and roadside attacks in remote terrain—especially the Syrian Badia, the Deir ez‑Zor countryside, and eastern Hasakah—along with infiltration corridors that abut Iraq and, to a lesser extent, Lebanon’s rugged frontier. Coalition and local security services warn that pressure lapses could open space for an escalation.

From territorial defeat to cellular reconstitution

Since the loss of its territorial “caliphate,” ISIS has relied on clandestine networks and permissive geography: the Badia’s vast desert, the Hamrin and Makhoul ranges in Iraq, and rugged cross‑border wadis (Valleys) and smuggling paths.

Monitoring by independent conflict trackers and local security partners shows an oscillating tempo of ISIS activity in 2025, including IED attacks in Syria’s Suwayda periphery (May 22 and 28), a pattern consistent with a desert‑to‑south connective strategy linking the Badia to restive southern pockets.

The Rojava Information Center likewise recorded recurring, small‑unit attacks and counter‑raids in northeast Syria, underscoring the group’s reliance on covert cells rather than territorial control.

Where The Threat Concentrates

Observers tracking regional security continue to place ISIS activity in:

-Syria’s Badia and eastern axis (Deir ez‑Zor/eastern al‑Hasakah), where cells exploit desert cover and local grievances.

-Iraq’s border‑adjacent deserts and mountain belts (notably Hamrin), intermittently targeted by Iraqi forces with US support to blunt planning hubs.

-Syria–Lebanon borderlands and nearby rural zones, where security vacuums and smuggling economies enable facilitation and recruitment attempts.

In June, US Central Command said it supported six D‑ISIS operations (five in Iraq, one in Syria), killing or detaining operatives and disrupting weapons caches—an indicator of continued, intelligence‑driven pressure against small nodes rather than large formations.

Capacity, Finance, And Intent

A combined picture from the Global Coalition statements, financial‑crime bodies, and UN reporting highlights three structural pillars of ISIS resilience in 2025:

-Cellular persistence and prison risk: Coalition partners stress the need to hold pressure on ISIS attack planners and facilitators, while analysts continue to flag detention‑facility vulnerabilities and cross‑border recruiting as latent accelerants if security coordination weakens.

-Adaptive financing: The Financial Action Task Force’s July 2025 review points to diversified, small‑scale channels—including informal value transfer, family networks, and micro‑donations—suited to a dispersed insurgency. Cutting these streams matters as much as clearing cells on the ground.

-Operating concept: Independent assessments describe a strategy centered on rural sanctuaries, IED warfare, targeted killings, and opportunistic infiltrations—especially along ground lines of communication linking the central desert to Syria’s south and the Iraqi frontier.

Scale Of The Network

A Shafaq News review of Syrian and Lebanese interior ministry reporting, along with Iraqi intelligence inputs, found 150–200 small ISIS sleeper cells active along the Syria–Lebanon borders and the Syria–Iraq border region by mid‑2025. This range aligns with the pattern observed by independent trackers: numerous micro‑cells with limited headcounts, designed to be replaceable and hard to roll up in a single sweep.

How ISIS Is Changing The Fight

Counterterrorism specialist Samer al‑Homsi told Shafaq News that sleeper cells “still pose a real threat despite security blows,” noting the shift to small‑scale bombings and assassinations and emphasizing the need for sustained intelligence fusion and counter‑radicalization work to undercut recruitment pipelines. His assessment tracks with coalition practice in 2025: fewer large‑unit raids, more precision arrests based on human and signals intelligence, and continuous partner‑force mentoring.

Reactions And Security Posture — Iraq, Syria, Lebanon

Partnered raids and precision strikes continue to target desert nodes and mountain hideouts in Iraq—especially in Hamrin—to disrupt planners and safehouses before they can scale operations. The focus remains interdiction and denial, not area holding.

In Syria, alongside SDF‑led and local‑authority operations in the northeast and center‑south, periodic sweeps in Homs and Badia‑adjacent areas have netted suspected ISIS operatives since January. Arrest and interdiction notices from local authorities and conflict monitors reinforce the “small, many, mobile” threat profile.

Meanwhile, authorities in Lebanon reported rolling arrests and foiled plots in mid‑2025, including the July 24 announcement that the Lebanese Army dismantled an ISIS‑affiliated armed cell allegedly planning attacks. This follows earlier warnings about recruitment attempts leveraging border‑community hardship and online propaganda.

Key 2025 Cases: Illustrative, Not Exhaustive

-January (Syria/Homs countryside): Security services detained multiple ISIS suspects and seized arms—part of early‑year sweeps that prioritized weapons interdiction and cell mapping.

-Spring–early summer (Syria, Suwayda periphery): Two late‑May IED attacks demonstrated ISIS’s ability to re‑activate southern cells along routes linking the Badia to the south.

-June (Iraq/Syria theaters): CENTCOM reported six partnered D‑ISIS operations, with deaths and detentions of operatives and the recovery of weapons.

-July (Lebanon): The Lebanese Army announced a takedown of an ISIS‑linked cell as authorities pursued recruiters targeting economically vulnerable communities.

-Late July (Raqqa region): Internal Security Forces in northeast Syria reported arresting nine alleged ISIS “mercenaries” from sleeper cells in Raqqa and its countryside.

Holding The Line

The Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS reiterated in June 2025 that it is sustaining pressure through partner‑enabled operations and synchronized stabilization assistance, messaging that complements on‑the‑ground raids and interdictions. UN Security Council experts and Security Council Report briefings continue to warn that ISIS’s regional risk endures—even as global focus pivots to other theaters—if counter‑terrorism coordination and detention‑facility security are not maintained.

Why Now: The Enablers Isis Is Exploiting

Three drivers recur across official and open‑source assessments in 2025:

-Economic stress and governance deficits in border peripheries, which create openings for logistical facilitation and micro‑financing.

-Fragmented security control across desert and rural belts that straddle administrative seams, where response times are slower and terrain favors small cells.

-Prison and camp vulnerabilities (Syria’s northeast remains a focal point), where attempted breakouts or insider recruitment could quickly change the threat scale if guards and funding are stretched.

What Might Happen Next

If pressure eases, ISIS would likely attempt a multi‑pronged uptick: (1) more IED and assassination campaigns against local officials and security personnel in Syria’s east and central belts; (2) cross‑border facilitation aimed at reviving networks in Iraq’s deserts and mountain ranges; and (3) sporadic recruitment or facilitation efforts in Lebanon’s frontier areas.

The center of gravity remains local: small, resilient clusters linked by couriers, online handlers, and informal finance—hard to eradicate, but containable with relentless, intelligence‑led pressure and sustained stabilization aid in vulnerable districts.

Written and edited by Shafaq News staff.