Shafaq News- Baghdad

In a city long accustomed to masking its pain behind noise,Ronak Soza Al-Feyli opened her eyes to Baghdad as children of its oldneighborhoods know it: narrow alleys, simple games, cartoons, and children’sprograms that offered a brief escape from a harsher world she had yet tounderstand.

That world changed in 2007, when an explosion in Baghdadkilled her father. “My father’s death made me a more rebellious person,” shetold Shafaq News. The tragedy, however, was not the first for her family, whichhad already endured killings, imprisonment, displacement, and forceddeportation under the former Al-Baath regime.

For Ronak, the Feyli Kurdish cause was never an abstractconcept or a political slogan, but a lived reality marked by loss and absence,as her story continued to shape her daily life, from school experiences to thelanguage and attitudes of others. She recalled facing discrimination during herstudies, particularly during a period when the former regime promoted hostilitytoward Feyli Kurds. Even after the regime’s fall, she believes its impact haslingered in parts of society.

This awareness began early. In second grade, a teacher askedabout her ethnicity, but she remained silent and returned home afraid, shapedby the stigma surrounding Feyli identity at the time, which could lead todeportation or exclusion. While her mother urged caution, her father encouragedher to stand firm and openly affirm that she was a Feyli Kurd.

Over time, her identity evolved into a deeper human andintellectual commitment formed by education and personal experience. Mediabecame more than a profession. It was a platform to speak openly and confrontdiscrimination. She said her public presence carries responsibility, as sheseeks not only to address broader social and political issues but also tohighlight the contributions and sacrifices of the Feyli community.

Ronak produced a media segment last year on Feyli Kurdishvictims, which received wide engagement, aiming to draw attention from thepublic and decision-makers to a suffering she believes remains unresolved.

Despite growing visibility, Ronak believes the Feyli Kurdishcommunity still requires more than symbolic recognition. She called forstronger political representation and credible cultural figures who genuinelyadvocate for the cause, adding that “a single parliamentary seat does notreflect the scale of Feyli sacrifices or their historical role in Iraq.”

She also stressed the need for broader media and culturalinfrastructure, including Arabic-language satellite channels and digitalplatforms addressing Feyli issues through talk shows and documentaries, as wellas forums to revive public discussion.

Alongside her media work, Ronak has pursued music sincechildhood, integrating it into her advocacy. In 2015, she performed her firstsong at a memorial event for Feyli Kurdish victims attended by politicalfigures and a large audience.

She said authentic art emerges from reality and reflectspeople’s struggles, adding that her voice is rooted in that experience. Shetakes pride in her talent and uses it as a means of expressing her identitywith sincerity and conviction.

Shafaq News

On March 3, 2026, Iraq’s southern oilfields begangoing dark. The trigger was the closure of the Strait of Hormuz —the narrowwaterway through which roughly a fifth of global oil trade moves— but thedeeper cause had nothing to do with the strait. Baghdad had spent decadesbuilding an oil economy with a single export corridor, no tanker fleet of itsown, and no storage buffer capable of absorbing even a brief disruption. Whenthe corridor closed, there was nothing else. What followed was a crisis that Iraqhad, in every meaningful sense, already chosen.

Iraq exports approximately 93% of its crude throughterminals at Basra on the Persian Gulf. With those terminals effectivelysevered from international markets, onshore storage reached capacity withindays, forcing authorities to shut in fields across the south. National output fell from roughly 4.3 million barrels per day (bpd) in February to below 1.3million bpd the following month, and production from the main southernoilfields specifically collapsed by around 80%, to approximately 800,000 bpd.The mechanism required no complexity: when export throughput stops, storagefills, and fields shut. The architecture of dependency did the rest.

The Fiscal Trap

Iraq holds 145 billion barrels of proved crudereserves —17% of the Middle East total and 8% of the global figure. It isOPEC’s second-largest producer after Saudi Arabia. That endowment, however, hasnot produced fiscal resilience. Petroleum revenues account for more than 90% oftotal government income, and the International Monetary Fund has calculated abudget break-even price of $84 per barrel, up from $54 in 2020. The margin hasnarrowed precisely as the strategic vulnerabilities have deepened.

Oil expert Asim Jihad has put a direct figure on whatthe production collapse means in revenue terms: monthly oil income, which stoodat roughly $7 billion before the crisis, could fall below $1 billion if exportdisruptions persist —a decline of roughly 90%. For a state with no comparablerevenue source, that is a fiscal emergency with no short-term exit.

The Fleet That Was Never Rebuilt

The most immediate operational exposure is the absenceof a national tanker fleet. Iraq depends entirely on chartered vessels, meaningthat when the strait becomes hostile, shipments halt —not by political decisionbut by commercial calculation. Although Iran offered assurances that Iraqicrude could transit safely, Jihad explained that shipping companies andinsurers operate on actual risk assessments rather than declared politicalpositions. Without its own fleet, Iraq has no mechanism to act on any assurance,however sincere.

This is a self-inflicted condition with a clearhistorical origin. In the late 1970s, Iraq operated 26 large tankers withcapacities reaching 250,000 to 300,000 tons —the strongest oil transport fleetamong Arab states, exporting crude directly to Europe and Asia. The Iran-IraqWar of the 1980s destroyed most of that capacity. What followed was notreconstruction but permanent delegation: Iraq transferred shippingresponsibility to buyers through FOB (free on board) contracts managed by SOMO,the State Oil Marketing Organization, and never returned to the question offleet ownership.

Jihad clarified that the debate over rebuilding anational fleet “turned into a justification for deferring the decision ratherthan resolving it within a clear strategic vision.” Political instability andministerial turnover allowed the deferral to harden into policy by default. Theresult, in his assessment, was that “limited financial allocations to themaritime transport sector contributed to delaying fleet construction, leadingto near-total reliance on global shipping companies and reducing Iraq’s flexibilityin managing its oil exports.”

One Corridor, No Alternative

Only Saudi Arabia and the UAE possess operationalcrude pipelines capable of routing significant volumes around the strait. Apipeline from Saudi Arabia’s Abqaiq oil field to the Red Sea port of Yanbuallows Riyadh to redirect roughly one-fifth of its daily exports. The UAE’sHabshan-Fujairah pipeline can divert approximately half of its output to theGulf of Oman. Both countries built those bypasses because they calculated thatstrategic redundancy was worth the capital cost. Iraq never made that calculation—or more precisely, made it repeatedly and came up empty, which is functionallythe same outcome.

Oil expert Dhurgham Mohammed Ali told Shafaq News thatthe Strait of Hormuz is the critical chokepoint through which more than 90% ofIraq’s oil exports pass, along with the majority of its imports from Asia,meaning any disruption hits the Iraqi economy immediately and without buffer.The existing alternatives are, in his assessment, “weak and limited.”

The Kirkuk–Ceyhan pipeline, running from northern Iraqto the Turkish Mediterranean port of Ceyhan, and the Kurdistan Region’sconnection to the same route offer only a narrow margin of maneuver, and eventhat margin required direct US diplomatic intervention to unlock. The eventualbreakthrough allowed the export of around 170,000 bpd through that route:roughly 4% of Iraq’s pre-crisis production. Overland transport through Jordanand Syria, meanwhile, remains expensive and structurally incapable of meetinglarge-scale export needs.

Why Baghdad Keeps Not Deciding

Why does a country with Iraq’s endowment operate withthis level of structural exposure? Najm Abdul Tarish, economic expert andpolitical science professor at Dhi Qar University, does not soften thediagnosis: the Ministry of Oil, he told Shafaq News, “was not managed accordingto clear professional and economic foundations; It was in many cases subject topolitical balancing and internal conflicts, making it closer to an arena fordistributing spoils rather than an institution managing a sovereign resource.”

The political economy of that dysfunction has aspecific logic. Decisions requiring large capital commitments, long timehorizons, and benefits that accrue across political cycles —tanker fleetreconstruction, overseas storage, pipeline diversification— are systematicallydisadvantaged in an environment where what gets funded is what produces visiblereturns within a single budget cycle and can be attributed to a specificpolitical actor. Upstream production investment fits that profile. Exportinfrastructure, whose value is defensive and only becomes legible during acrisis, does not.

On overseas storage specifically, Abdul Tarish notedthat Iraq exports around 70% of its oil to Asian markets and should have had adistributed network of storage facilities in those countries for emergency use.Saudi Arabia holds an estimated 140 million barrels in external storagecapacity; Iran, through floating storage, maintains roughly 190 millionbarrels. Iraq holds nothing equivalent. That absence, he argued, “reflects aclear deficiency in managing the oil resource, particularly given the heavy relianceon maritime export through sensitive corridors like the Strait of Hormuz.”

The pattern is not new. After the 2014 oil pricecrash, emergency reform discussions multiplied across Baghdad’s ministries.When prices recovered, the discussions dissolved. Each crisis generates thesame cycle: alarm, contingency proposals, and then —once the immediate fiscalpressure eases— a return to structural inaction. The March 2026 disruptionreproduced that cycle in accelerated form: emergency meetings were convened,contingency plans drafted, and progress stalled as government formation negotiationsconsumed the political bandwidth that infrastructure decisions require.

“As long as the Ministry of Oil remains subject topolitical balancing, with no genuine expertise or sound governance, Iraq willremain unable to manage its resources properly, despite holding oil potentialthat could have placed it in a far more stable and influential position inglobal markets,” Abdul Tarish concluded.

What a Solution Requires

The technical components of a solution are neitherobscure nor beyond Iraq’s financial means. Overseas storage in Asiandestination markets —where 84% of the crude that moved through the Strait ofHormuz was destined in 2024 —would shift Iraq from a seller dependent oncontinuous throughput to a market actor capable of absorbing short-termdisruptions. A rebuilt tanker fleet would restore basic logistics autonomy. TheBasra–Aqaba pipeline, long discussed and never built, would run from Iraq’ssouthern oil hub to Jordan’s Red Sea port, providing an export route thatbypasses the Gulf entirely.

Iraq’s actual response to the Hormuz closureillustrated how far the country sits from any of those structural solutions.Economic analyst Mohammed Al-Hassani told our agency that exporting oil viafuel tanker trucks through Syrian territory to the Baniyas refinery, withconvoys reaching 180 trucks, “is considered an immediate, limited-impacttreatment, given its high operational cost and the negligible quantities thatcan be transported compared to daily Gulf export volumes.” The improvisationcontained the immediate damage without touching the underlying architecture.Al-Hassani concluded that Iraq’s handling of the crisis “was limited tocontaining consequences through temporary solutions, without any fundamentaltreatment that guarantees the sustainability and stability of its oil sectorover the long term.”

Dhurgham Mohammed Ali framed the post-crisisobligation plainly: route diversification is no longer an option but “aneconomic and security necessity.” The Basra–Aqaba pipeline is the priority. Thefinancing mechanisms exist. The demand from Asian buyers for a diversified,secure supply is real and commercially motivating. What has been absent—consistently, across administrations that understood the problem— is thepolitical commitment to treat export infrastructure as a national priorityrather than a deferrable line item, and the institutional continuity to executeacross more than one budget cycle.

The March 2026 crisis has made the cost of thatdeferral concrete and measurable in a way that policy assessments could not. Acountry that funds the overwhelming share of its government through a singlecommodity, exports that commodity through a single corridor it cannot defend orbypass, and lacks the storage or fleet to buffer any interruption, is notmanaging an oil sector. It is running a structural fiscal emergency on a slowtimer —and the timer has now, at least once, gone off.

The oil is Iraq’s. The conditions under which itreaches markets are largely not, and that gap, after decades of deferreddecisions, is now a live crisis rather than a theoretical one.

Read more: Iraq's energy vulnerability: When a petro-state has no buffer

Written and edited by Shafaq News staff.

Shafaq News

The latest round of negotiations between Iran and the UnitedStates ended without an agreement early Sunday after more than 20 hours ofdiscussions, casting uncertainty over the diplomatic track and promptinganalysts to warn of a heightened risk of military escalation.

The talks, held in Pakistan, were described by officials asthe highest-level direct engagement between Washington and Tehran since 1979.Both delegations departed without a breakthrough. Iranian Foreign Ministryspokesperson Esmaeil Baqaei said following the collapse that "diplomacywill not end," without elaborating on a timeline for resumed contact.

US Central Command announced late Sunday that it would beginenforcing a ban on all maritime traffic to and from Iranian ports, asignificant escalatory step aligned with earlier statements from the USpresident.

Former US Assistant Secretary of Defense forPolitical-Military Affairs Mark Kimmitt confirmed to Shafaq News that acontingency plan toward Iran was now in effect. "This question is nolonger relevant," Kimmitt said, referring to speculation aboutWashington's next move. "Trump executed a Plan B —the embargo of thestrait."

Sticking Points

According to diplomatic leaks cited in multiple reports, thetalks stalled over three central issues: Iran's nuclear program, particularlyuranium enrichment; its regional influence through the Axis of Resistance; andthe strategic status of the Strait of Hormuz, including maritime transit andassociated fees. Diplomatic sources described the outcome as "partialunderstandings without real progress."

Patrick Clawson, Research Director at The WashingtonInstitute for Near East Policy, told Shafaq News the prospects for a return tonegotiations are poor. He said mediators may be able to arrange a second roundof talks but warned that the outlook is unfavorable and that the risk of areturn to fighting is considerable. Clawson attributed this to the absence ofany follow-up framework and the failure of either side to present the sessionas part of an ongoing process. He also noted that the two sides had not reachedagreement on the basic scope of the ceasefire, including how many ships maytransit the strait and whether the truce extends to Lebanon. On the nuclearfile, he pointed to a missed opportunity for compromise, including a potentialIranian commitment to suspend enrichment for a defined period.

Read more:Multiple actors, one battlefield: Iraq since the US-Israel-Iran war began

Two Paths for Washington

Malik Aziz Francis, a member of the US Republican Party,outlined two options facing Washington. The first is escalation through maximumpressure: tightening oil and banking sanctions, enforcing a maritime blockade,and pursuing Iran's international isolation. Francis told Shafaq News thisapproach reflects the thinking of circles close to the administration, whichview economic pressure on Iran as the fastest route to concessions. He warned,however, that this path carries the risk of broader regional confrontation,particularly if it affects Strait of Hormuz transit.

The second option, Francis said, centers on containmentthrough indirect diplomacy, maintaining communication channels, avoidingmilitary escalation, and deferring a decisive resolution. He cautioned that theabsence of dialogue significantly increases the risk of war, and noted thatfactions within Washington continue to advocate for keeping diplomatic channelsopen, even informally.

Firas Elias, an academic specializing in Iranian affairs, toldShafaq News the region has entered a delicate transitional phase, characterizedby the absence of a clear US strategic vision for next steps, noting thatWashington is operating within a two-week ceasefire window set to expire onApril 21.

Elias said intensified diplomatic maneuvering is likelyduring this period, potentially led by Pakistan or other intermediaries. He didnot rule out increased US pressure, including limited military measures or acalibrated strike intended to demonstrate resolve, while assessing thatWashington is unlikely to pursue full-scale military action.

Read more:US-Iran war threatens Iraq’s fragile stability

The Strait of Hormuz

Iranian political analyst Saleh Al-Qazwini described theStrait of Hormuz as Tehran's primary source of leverage in the standoff. Hetold Shafaq News that the United States and its allies are seeking to reopenthe strait without making concessions, while Iran is conditioning therestoration of maritime access on a cessation of hostilities. Al-Qazwiniassessed that military efforts to force open the passage would not succeed inremoving Iranian control, a position that reflects Tehran's stated posture butremains contested by US and allied officials.

The two-week ceasefire between the United States and Iran,brokered by Pakistan, is set to expire April 21. Both sides have expressedwillingness for a second round of negotiations, and Pakistan has indicatedreadiness to host further talks, though no date or framework has been formallyannounced.

Written and edited by Shafaq News staff.

Shafaq News

Wadi Al Salam Cemetery, 180 km southwest of Najaf,stretches across roughly 10 square kilometres (1,485 acres) and holds anestimated 5 to 6 million graves, making it the world’s largest cemetery. Formore than 1,400 years, people have been buried here continuously, creating asprawling city of the dead that grows alongside the Iraqi province.

Its significance comes from the nearby shrine of ImamAli Ibn Abi Talib, the Prophet Muhammad’s cousin and the first Shia Imam.Millions of Shia Muslims see burial near him as the ultimate spiritual honor,and visitors arrive from across Iraq and the Shia world, hoping to secure aresting place in this sacred ground.

The cemetery preserves layers of history. Graves fromcenturies past stand beside more recent burials, and the site is believed tocontain the tombs of ancient prophets, including Hud and Saleh, figuresrecognized in both Islamic and biblical traditions. Over time, these layershave created a living archive of Iraq’s spiritual memory.

Custodians, local religious authorities, and Najafmunicipality workers coordinate daily burials, care for graves, and guidevisitors. Their work keeps the vast cemetery functional, maintaining orderacross the millions of graves that stretch as far as the eye can see.

Visitors encounter a striking mix of graves, fromsimple markers to elaborate mausoleums adorned with inscriptions, tiles, andreligious symbols. Together, they reflect centuries of social, cultural, andeconomic diversity, offering a visual history of the people buried here.

Religious practice thrives alongside the burials.Families and pilgrims come to pray, honor ancestors, and perform rituals,especially during major Shia occasions such as Ashura and Arbaeen. The cemeteryhums with devotion, blending faith and memory with the continuous cycle ofburials.

As Najaf’s population expands, the cemetery grows withit. NASA satellite imagery reveals tens of thousands of new graves added eachyear, while reports estimate roughly 50,000 burials annually. The pressures ofurban expansion highlight the delicate balance between the city of the livingand this vast city of the dead.

During the COVID-19 pandemic, Wadi Al Salam reflectedthe crisis sweeping Iraq. Special areas were designated for victims, producinga noticeable rise in burials and establishing the cemetery as a central site ofnational mourning.

The layers of continuous burials have transformed Wadi al-Salam into a living part of Najaf—simultaneously a sacred space, ahistorical archive, and a functioning cemetery where faith, history, and urbanlife converge without pause.

Read more: Discover Iraq: Najaf, a city of dust and divinity

Written and edited by Shafaq News Agency.

Shafaq News

Nizar Amedi'selection as Iraq's sixth president on April 11 settled one constitutionalquestion and opened a harder one. The 227 out of 329 votes that carried him tothe Palace of Peace were a cross-sectarian coalition demonstrating, in publicand on the record, that it has the numbers to claim the premiership. The blocsthat boycotted read the session the same way, and Iraq's next political battlebegan the moment the vote was counted.

Under Iraq'spost-2003 constitutional architecture, the presidency is a gatekeeper ratherthan a seat of power. Its occupant holds limited executive authority butperforms a pivotal function: once elected, the president formally tasks thelargest parliamentary bloc with nominating a prime minister —the Shiite figurewho will actually govern. Therefore, the real prize in Saturday's session wasthe political signal embedded in who showed up, who stayed away, and what thatalignment portends for the premiership contest now formally underway.

The Man and theMoment

Amedi, born inAl-Amediya in the northern province of Duhok in 1968, is a figure whose careerhas been built inside Iraq's presidential institution rather than above it. Amechanical engineering graduate from the University of Mosul, he served aschief of staff to three consecutive presidents —the late Jalal Talabani, FuadMasum, and Barham Salih— before heading the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan's(PUK) political bureau in Baghdad. He later served as environment ministerbefore resigning in 2024 to focus on party work. His profile is that of aninstitutional insider: a man who knows how the presidency is operated fromwithin, who has navigated its relationships with Baghdad and Erbil acrossmultiple administrations, and who carries no political weight heavy enough tothreaten the factions that backed him.

That profilewas precisely what made him viable. In a political moment defined by competingambitions and external pressure, Amedi's election represented alowest-common-denominator consensus —not the most powerful candidate available,but the most acceptable one to a coalition with incompatible objectives. Iraq'spost-2003 tradition reserves the presidency for a Kurdish figure, most oftenfrom the PUK. That convention was held on Saturday. What did not hold was anyillusion that the presidency resolved the deeper impasse.

The CoalitionThat Voted —and What It Was

The 227 votesthat secured Amedi's election in the second round did not emerge from a unifiedpolitical project. They were assembled from blocs whose common ground beginsand ends with opposition —even implicit opposition— to the candidacy of formerPrime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, formally nominated by the Shiite CoordinationFramework —Iraq's largest parliamentary bloc— for the premiership in January2026.

The attendingcoalition spans Iraq's three main political communities. On the Shiite side,al-Sudani's Reconstruction and Development coalition, which won 46 seats inNovember's elections, formally endorsed al-Maliki as the Framework's nominee whilesimultaneously positioning al-Sudani for a second term— a dual track thatSaturday's session brought into the open. The Sadiqoun movement —political wingof Asaib Ahl al-Haq, an Iran-aligned paramilitary force— contributed 27 seats,with Ammar al-Hakim's al-Hikma Movement and Hadi al-Amiri's Badr Organizationadding 18 seats each. On the Sunni side, Mohammed al-Halbousi's Taqadum partydelivered 33 seats. The PUK's 15 seats completed the Kurdish share.

The compositionmatters because it is cross-sectarian on both sides of the divide. The blocsthat attended were not a Shiite majority forcing a Kurdish figurehead through—they were a Shiite-Kurdish-Sunni coalition operating against aShiite-Kurdish-Sunni opposition.

The oldanalytical shorthand that frames Iraq's political deadlocks as sectariancollisions does not apply here. Both camps carry multi-ethnic credentials. Whatseparates them is competing calculations about who controls the nextgovernment.

The blocs thatstayed away delivered an equally clear message. Al-Maliki's State of Lawcoalition, holding 29 seats, boycotted the session outright —a refusal toparticipate in a political exercise from which it had been effectivelyexcluded. The Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), the largest Kurdish bloc in parliamentwith 26 seats, also stayed away, having demanded that its own candidate,Foreign Minister Fuad Hussein, be installed in the presidency race. The al-AzmAlliance, a Sunni bloc with 17 seats that had publicly declared its support foral-Maliki's premiership bid in January, joined the boycott as well.

The al-AzmAlliance's position contains an internal contradiction worth flagging. Itslawmakers had previously declared al-Maliki "the best option for Sunnisbefore Shiites at this stage," yet boycotted a session whose outcome —ifit produced a functioning government coalition— would marginalize preciselythat candidacy. The boycott was a refusal to lend legitimacy to acoalition-building exercise conducted on terms set by its rivals.

Raadal-Dahlaki, an Al-Azm Alliance parliamentarian, told Shafaq News that theobstruction of the presidential session had nothing to do with Kurdishdisagreements and everything to do with "political conflicts amongblocs" over the premiership. His framing confirmed that the session'spresidential vote was a proxy battlefield for a premiership contest that hadbeen building since January.

The Framework'sFracture —and the Constitutional Bind It Creates

The ShiiteCoordination Framework, which holds about 185 of parliament's 329 seats,remains constitutionally positioned as the body Iraq's new president must taskwith nominating a prime minister. That designation has not changed. What haschanged is that a significant portion of the Framework's own membership has nowparticipated in a political exercise that directly challenges the nominationthe Framework formally issued in January.

The Frameworknominated al-Maliki on January 24, but Al-Hakim and Al-Khazali expressedreservations privately, Al-Ameri's Badr Organization voiced hesitation, andAl-Sudani's camp endorsed al-Maliki, but quietly floated alternative names,including parliamentary bloc leader Bahaa al-Araji. None of these objectionswere formalized publicly —the Framework maintained surface cohesion whilefracturing beneath it.

The April 11session ended that pretense, and the Framework is now split between the blocsthat participated in Saturday's coalition and those that did not, and it isformally being tasked with a premiership nomination that the blocs cannot agreeon.

CF member AbuMithaq al-Masari told Shafaq News that even if Amedi formally tasks al-Malikiwith forming a government, securing parliamentary confidence would not beautomatic, warning that political legitimacy requires broad consensus ratherthan numerical advantage alone. "The government will not pass if it failsto secure agreement," he said.

A source closeto Sunni political forces echoed the warning, telling Shafaq News that if theprime minister-designate fails to win support across parliamentary blocs, theconstitutional deadline could expire without a confidence vote, forcing apolitical reset.

External Vetoand the al-Maliki Equation

Al-Maliki'scandidacy has been shaped as much by external as by internal opposition.Washington formally conveyed its objections through US envoy Tom Barrack duringa visit to Baghdad, and President Donald Trump publicly criticized al-Maliki's2006–2014 tenure —a period marked by the sectarian consolidation of stateinstitutions and the eventual collapse of Iraqi security forces before ISIS in2014. A US State Department spokesperson told Shafaq News that during thattenure, Iraq "descended into poverty and total chaos."

Iran, whoseinfluence over Iraq's Shiite political landscape runs deep, has a moreambiguous position. Tehran views al-Maliki as a known quantity whose earliertenure, despite its failures, maintained Iraq's alignment with Iranian regionalinterests. But Iranian-aligned factions within the Framework, includingSadiqoun and elements of Badr, participated in the coalition that voted forAmedi, suggesting that Tehran's preference for al-Maliki is neitherunconditional nor capable of overriding the internal arithmetic of its Iraqipartners.

The Frameworkhas publicly insisted the premiership is "a purely Iraqi matter" andthat external pressure will not determine its nominee. Whether that positionholds as US pressure intensifies and the coalition assembled on April 11consolidates around an alternative candidate will define the next phase ofnegotiations.

What Cannot BeDeferred?

Amedi now facesthe constitutional sequence that his election triggered: The Framework formallytasked by the Parliament Speaker to nominate a prime minister within 15 days,then, after approval, the new premier has 30 days to present a cabinet andsecure a parliamentary confidence vote. In practice, that timeline has neverbeen met in Iraq's post-2003 history. The more immediate political reality isthat the Framework's two factions —those who voted on Saturday and those whoboycotted— must either reconcile around a single nominee or one side mustprevail.

The attendingcoalition controls approximately 155 to 160 seats. The boycotting coalitioncontrols approximately 110 to 115 —precisely the blocking third that, under theFederal Supreme Court's 2022 quorum ruling, can deny a confidence vote if itholds together.

Al-Maliki'scamp has demonstrated both the will and the arithmetic to do so. The coalitionthat elected Amedi has demonstrated the same capacity in reverse. Iraq'sgovernment formation process has entered a phase in which neither side cangovern without the other, and neither side has yet offered the other a reasonto concede.

The country atthe center of these negotiations cannot afford to wait. Iraq's caretakergovernment —legally barred from passing budgets, signing major contracts, orapproving structural spending— is responsible for the salaries, pensions, andwelfare payments of more than nine million people. More than eight billiondollars in infrastructure contracts sit frozen. The political class hasproduced a system in which the costs of deadlock fall on citizens and theincentives for resolution fall on no one.

Amedi entersthe presidency understanding its limits better than almost anyone in Baghdad.Seventeen years inside the institution taught him how it is managed. The harderlesson —how to use it to break a deadlock whose architecture benefits the veryforces he must now negotiate with— has no precedent in Iraq's post-2003 recordto draw from.

Read more: Iraq Government Formation: The Constitution that cannot enforce its own deadlines

Written andedited by Shafaq News staff.

Shafaq News (Updated on Apr. 14, at 16:50)

On a morning approximately ten days ago, parents in theShoraw neighborhood of Kirkuk, a disputed oil-rich province in northern Iraqclaimed by both the federal government in Baghdad and the Kurdistan RegionalGovernment, began receiving alarming messages: a local education institution—Othman Faraj School— had been renamed on Google Maps to "IranianConsulate."

By the time administrators confirmed the label was false,the damage was done. Parents rushed to collect their children, phones floodedthe school's front desk, and a neighborhood was gripped by fear it could notimmediately explain or disprove.

In a separate case, locals told Shafaq News that a studentrenamed his own school on the same platform to "American MilitaryBase" —an act described as a prank that nonetheless generated identicalanxiety.

Together, the two cases have exposed what digital safetyspecialists, security analysts, and technology experts describe as a criticaland unaddressed vulnerability: the open-editing architecture of major mappingplatforms creates conditions for rapid, low-effort misinformation withimmediate physical consequences in conflict-affected environments.

Fear on the Ground

"As a parent, it was very unsettling," said UmmAhmad, a mother of a Grade 6 student at Othman Faraj School, whose account wasposted publicly on social media. "We suddenly started hearing that ourchildren's school was labeled on Google Maps as the Iranian Consulate, andeverything changed almost immediately. People in the neighborhood becameanxious, and there were safety concerns, especially given the tensions in theregion."

She described a school administration overwhelmed by acrisis not of its making. Some parents rushed to collect their children early,while others kept calling the administration to understand what was happening.The staff tried to reassure families, but were also visibly distressed. Heraccount was consistent with the broader pattern of panic documented by ShafaqNews in the days following the incident.

The fear, she said, was specific: that a false digital labelcould attract real-world attention to a building full of children. "Whensomething like that appears publicly, especially in a sensitive place likeKirkuk, it creates real fear for families."

Mohammad Musa, a Kirkuk resident, told Shafaq News thephenomenon had moved beyond any single incident. The appearance of militarylabels near homes and schools generates panic regardless of whether theunderlying claim is verifiable. "Just seeing the name of an armed group ona map near your house can cause real fear, especially under currentcircumstances," he said.

Militarily Irrelevant, Socially Damaging

Security and technical experts consulted by Shafaq News wereconsistent on one point: the manipulated labels carry no meaningful militaryintelligence value. Saif Ra'ad, a security analyst, said the edits appeared toserve comedic rather than operational purposes. "The information is falseand cannot be used as targets," he told Shafaq News, explaining thatmilitary institutions operate from verified intelligence supported by aerialand satellite reconnaissance —not open internet data.

Ra'ad added that content published on mapping applicationsis passed through a comprehensive intelligence filter before any operationalconsideration, making direct reliance on such data “functionally impossible forserious actors.”

Technology specialist Ihab Annan reached a similarconclusion from a different angle. State-level security institutions, he toldShafaq News, do not rely on public mapping applications because they possessproprietary systems of considerably greater precision, typicallysatellite-linked. He noted that some open-source data may be cross-referencedagainst verified intelligence, but the primary infrastructure is entirelyseparate from consumer platforms.

Annan observed, however, that complete avoidance of digitaltracking is nearly impossible given the degree to which modern devices areintegrated with platforms such as Google, whose algorithms continuously collectand process location data.

Read more: Fake war, real impact: How AI-generated content is reshaping public perception in Iraq

A Failure of Digital Infrastructure

Dr. Mohammad Awada, founder and CEO of AwadaTech, aLebanon-based technology firm specializing in AI solutions, smart systems, andschool management platforms, told Shafaq News that the open-editing model usedby platforms such as Google Maps introduces elevated risks in conflict-affectedenvironments that do not exist to the same degree in stable contexts.

"In conflict zones, digital information is not neutral—it can shape behavior on the ground," Dr. Awada said. In stable settings,user-generated edits can improve platform accuracy. In politically volatileareas, the same openness becomes a vector for misinformation.

The risks he identified include low verification thresholdsthat allow false labels to propagate rapidly, the deliberate misidentificationof locations— what he termed the weaponization of digital geography— and amoderation time lag that is particularly consequential in fast-moving securitysituations.

The educational consequences, Dr. Awada said, are immediateand multi-layered. When a school is falsely labeled as a military or diplomaticinstallation, even briefly, students experience fear and confusion, parentswithdraw their children, attendance drops, and administrative staff are forcedto manage a crisis they did not create. “This is a failure of the digitalecosystem to protect physical learning spaces.”

On the question of accountability, Dr. Awada saidresponsibility is shared but asymmetrical. Platforms such as Google bearprimary responsibility because they control data verification systems,moderation speed, and escalation mechanisms. In high-risk regions, he argued,platforms should apply stricter validation layers for sensitive sites,including schools, hospitals, and government facilities.

National regulators carry secondary responsibility and candefine legal thresholds and establish reporting channels, but their influencedepends on enforcement capacity and meaningful cooperation from globaltechnology companies. Educational institutions themselves are reactive actorswith no ability to control platform infrastructure.

"Digital infrastructure is now deeply embedded inphysical safety, but governance has not kept pace."

Read more: AI reshapes Iran-Israel-US conflict as cyber warfare expands

A Legal Gray Zone —With Exceptions

According to Shafaq News's review of Iraqi legislation,falsely labeling a civilian location as a military or security installation ona public digital platform may constitute a punishable offense under existingIraqi law. In the absence of a comprehensive cybercrime statute —a draftInformation Crimes Law remains pending— Iraqi authorities have applied IraqiPenal Code No. 111 of 1969, specifically provisions in Article 433 and relatedsections against spreading false information and threatening public order, tocases involving digital misinformation.

Misleading information that links a civilian area tomilitary or security targets may additionally be deemed an offense affectinginternal or external state security under the same code. Shafaq News's reviewfurther identified Anti-Terrorism Law No. 13 of 2005 as a potential legalavenue if false labeling is deemed to have caused public panic or facilitated acriminal act —though application at that threshold would require prosecutorialdetermination.

The legal exposure is more clearly defined in the KurdistanRegion of Iraq, where the Kirkuk incident occurred. Kurdistan Region Law No. 6of 2008 explicitly criminalizes the use of the internet to spread falseinformation, with penalties ranging from six months to five years inimprisonment —providing a more specific legal framework than exists at thefederal level.

An Institutional Response — Partial but on Record

Raoof Mohyiddin, head of the Supervision Unit at the KirkukEducation Directorate, confirmed in a press brief that educational authoritiesnotified both the provincial police command and the Iraqi National IntelligenceService of the incident to track down those responsible. "Strict legalmeasures will be taken against those involved in this act, which endangered thelives of hundreds of students and spread terror among families," Mohyiddinsaid.

The Kirkuk Education Directorate followed the securityreferral with a formal directive to all school principals across the province,instructing them to monitor their institutions' names on search engines anddigital mapping platforms “on a continuous and periodic basis,” and to reportany manipulation immediately to prevent recurrence.

The response, while meaningful at the provincial level,exposed the boundaries of institutional reach. The Communications and MediaCommission, Iraq's principal federal body for overseeing digital and mediacommunications, issued no public statement, no regulatory guidance, andreceived no documented complaints in connection with the incidents, accordingto a review of its official website and social media accounts. The gap betweena provincial education authority acting and a national digital regulator remainingsilent defined the limits of Iraq's institutional response.

Shafaq Newsput three questions to Google in writing: whether the platform operates adedicated moderation mechanism for location edits that falsely designatecivilian sites as military or security installations in conflict zones; whatits standard response time is for reversing such edits once reported; andwhether it applies heightened oversight to user-submitted changes in regionsexperiencing active armed conflict. Google's response addressed none of thethree directly. The company said it relies on automated systems, expertanalysts, and community reporting to identify and remove content that violatesits policies. It confirmed that the edits in question had been taken down —withoutdisclosing when, by whom, or why the removal was triggered, or whether any ofthe specific safeguards Shafaq News asked about exist.

There is no comprehensive global framework specificallyaddressing geospatial misinformation in conflict zones. General platformcontent moderation policies exist, but are not tailored to geographicsensitivity. Existing digital safety frameworks, including UNESCO guidelines onrisk environments, do not address mapping systems at the operational levelrequired. Crisis-response mechanisms, where they exist, remain ad hoc ratherthan institutionalized, according to Shafaq News's review.

A Temporary Label, a Permanent Question

The labels at Othman Faraj School and the unnamed schoolhave since been corrected on the platform. No arrests have been publiclyannounced in connection with either incident, despite the referral to policeand intelligence services, and no federal regulatory action has been announced.The national authorities did not even issue public guidance to citizens on howto report or respond to similar manipulations.

A temporary mislabel in a conflict setting is not a minortechnical glitch. It is, as Dr. Awada framed it, “a potential security incidentwith educational, social, and institutional consequences,” and as the Kirkukcase demonstrates, the systems designed to prevent or correct it have yet tocatch up.

Written and edited by Shafaq News staff.

Shafaq News

Iraq'sparliament is 70 days past the constitutional deadline to elect a president,with a new session set for April 11, and whether it produces a result oranother postponement, the constitution offers no answer for what happens if itdoes not.

This is notan anomaly. It is the operating logic of post-2003 Iraqi governance.

Since thefall of Saddam Hussein, Iraq has formed ten governments, none on schedule. Theshortest delay —the 2014 government of Haider al-Abadi— took 131 days,compressed by international pressure and the existential emergency of ISIS'sadvance on Baghdad. The longest, the 2022 government of Mohammed Shiaal-Sudani, required 382 days, passing through armed clashes, the storming ofthe heavily fortified Green Zone, which houses diplomatic buildings, and thewholesale withdrawal of Muqtada al-Sadr’s movement bloc (The Sadrist) fromparliament. The current impasse, at 148 days since the November 2025 electionsand counting, sits closer to the norm than the exception.

Read more: A political norm shaping Iraq’s governments

"Since2003 until today, governments have not actually stabilized, except for the 2006and 2010 administrations," political analyst Daoud al-Halfaya told ShafaqNews, referring to Nouri al-Maliki's two terms, themselves born of prolongeddeadlock. The pattern, al-Halfaya argued, is not accidental: "Successivegovernments have been staffed not with strong national figures but with weakones, undermining the capacity for decisive decision-making and any prospect ofinstitutional stability."

Theconstitution mandates that a president be elected within 30 days ofparliament's first session. That session convened on December 29, 2025. Thedeadline passed on January 29, 2026, unmet and unremarked upon by anyenforcement mechanism, because none exists. What followed was a constitutionalcrisis in the legal sense, but at the same time, it is something morecorrosive: a constitutional norm treated, by all parties, as optional.

Thearchitecture of that weakness was partly assembled by judicial fiat. On March25, 2010, the Federal Supreme Court issued Decision No. 25/Federal/2010, rulingthat the constitutional term "largest parliamentary bloc" could refereither to the list winning the most seats in an election, or to a coalitionassembled inside parliament after results were ratified. The practical transferredthe right to form a government away from Ayad Allawi, whose Al-Iraqiya List hadwon the most seats, and toward al-Maliki, who had not.

The rulinghas reverberated through every government formation since. It is widely seen ashaving eroded public reverence toward both the constitution and the court,precisely because it appeared to subordinate electoral outcomes topost-election political maneuvering.

Iraq'sSupreme Judicial Council President, Judge Faiq Zaidan, has himself acknowledgedthe damage, describing Article 76 of the constitution as among its mostcontentious provisions. A literal reading, he has argued, would restrict the"largest bloc" designation to whichever list won the most votes;allowing post-election coalitions to claim that status distorts voter intentand undermines legitimacy.

Read more: Iraq’s Parliament “Largest Bloc”: A Renewed Struggle over Power

Ihsanal-Shammari, head of the Iraqi Political Thinking Center, told Shafaq News that"a serious error was committed in 2010 in interpreting the largestbloc," and that the Federal Court's ruling must be reconsidered. al-Shammariagree with Judge Zaidan, calling for a constitutional amendment or revision ofparliamentary bylaws to prevent further cycles of delay.

Al-Shammarialso identifies the emergence of rival Shia leaderships as a compoundingfactor: "Shia parties have always disagreed over who assumes thepremiership and how ministerial portfolios are distributed, and the rise of newpolitical leaderships has complicated matters further, because these figuresthreaten traditional hierarchies —leading to maneuvers around the largest bloceven when it commands genuine popular support."

Aqeelal-Rudaini, spokesperson for former Prime Minister al-Abadi's al-Nasrcoalition, is more direct: "Quota politics, internal power struggles,political money and influence among parties, and the presence of weaponsoutside state authority have all contributed to delaying governmentformation." The last item on that list —armed factions operating beyondthe reach of the state— is not a peripheral concern. It is a negotiatingvariable.

Accordingto Al-Shammari, the regional interference [especially from the United Statesand Iran] sometimes prevents government formation outright or places a veto on aspecific candidate, directly affecting the parliamentary confidence vote."Al-Rudaini also stressed that "every ethnic community and political bloccarries regional influence behind it, and this damages Iraq's national interestwhile deepening internal divisions."

Al-Halfayaframes the consequence plainly: political competition has shifted to"competing for the backing of external powers rather than policyprograms," removing national interest from the calculus entirely.

Thetwo-thirds quorum requirement for the presidential vote, imposed by the FederalSupreme Court since 2022, has made the calculus more punishing still. Any bloccontrolling more than a third of parliament's 329 seats holds effective vetopower over the entire process —the so-called "blocking third." Whatwas designed as a consensus mechanism has become, in practice, a tool forextraction: no presidency, no prime ministerial mandate, no government, untilthe holdouts are satisfied.

In anattempt to break the pattern, the Speaker warned MPs this week that absencesfrom the April 11 session would be formally recorded and penalized with aone-million-dinar (approximately $763) salary deduction —the first-timeattendance at a presidential vote has carried any stated consequence. In apolitical economy where ministerial portfolios are negotiated in billions, thefigure measures the distance between the penalty available and the stakes beingprotected.

The cost ofthis paralysis goes beyond politics. Economist Nabil al-Marsoumi has warnedthat Iraq faces a salary shortfall of five trillion dinars (approximately $3.8billion) for May, the result of declining oil revenues compounded bydisruptions in the Strait of Hormuz. "Iraq requires more than ninetrillion dinars (approximately $6.87 billion) monthly to cover public sectorsalaries and social welfare," al-Marsoumi told Shafaq News, "and anyshortfall hits citizens directly."

A caretakergovernment, legally prohibited from passing budgets, signing major contracts,or approving structural spending, cannot address the gap. Caretakerrestrictions have separately frozen between eight and ten billion dollars incontracts spanning infrastructure, water, and services, with over 6,000administrative decisions in suspension.

Read more: Parliament paralysis: Divisions and pressure expose Iraq’s fragile system

The 220lawmakers who signed the petition demanding the April 11 session representgenuine pressure from within the legislature. Pressure, in Iraq's post-2003political grammar, is not the same as accountability. The constitution setsdeadlines, but does not punish those who miss them. Neither legal mechanismcompels parliament to convene, nor court have the authority —or theinstitutional standing— to enforce compliance. Al-Shammari's prescription,shared by Judge Zaidan, is a constitutional amendment or revision ofparliamentary internal rules. Those proposals have circulated in various formssince 2010 and have not advanced.

The FederalSupreme Court has scheduled its own ruling on the constitutional implicationsof the missed deadline for April 14, three days after parliament's session. Thecourt will interpret the violation only after the political class has alreadyattempted to move past it, a sequencing that captures, with accidentalprecision, how Iraq's institutions relate to its constitution: commentaryfollows action; accountability trails power.

Iraq'spolitical class has not failed to build a government. It has succeeded,repeatedly, in building a system in which not building one is a viable—sometimes optimal— political strategy.

Written andedited by Shafaq News staff.

Shafaq News

Hours remainbefore the expiration of the latest deadline set by US President Donald Trumpfor Iran to agree to terms that would reopen the Strait of Hormuz —thestrategic waterway through which roughly a fifth of global oil passes. Thedeadline, set for 8:00 PM Eastern Time Tuesday, or 3:00 AM Wednesday Baghdadtime, marks the end of a pressure campaign that has run parallel to 39 days ofactive US-Israeli military operations against Iran, launched on February 28,2026.

Since then,Iraq has been struck daily by drones and missiles targeting military,diplomatic, and vital installations, as armed factions aligned with Iran'sso-called Axis of Resistance have claimed operations against American interestsinside Iraq and beyond its borders. Ten analysts and officials spoke to ShafaqNews. Their assessments converge on one conclusion: the war is not ending soon,and Iraq is paying a compounding price.

No Deal, NoClear Endgame

Firas Ilyas,professor of political science at the University of Mosul, said Washington hasentered the conflict without a defined objective. "There is an Americanorientation toward continuing the war without setting clear ceilings," hesaid, adding that Trump's repeated deadline extensions reflect "an absenceof a clear vision for the war's final objective," Ilyas argued that Tehranhas succeeded in managing time and raising the cost of confrontation, steeringthe conflict away from the swift resolution US planners had anticipated andtoward a prolonged war of attrition with growing potential to become anextended regional crisis.

Mujashaaal-Tamimi, a political analyst based in Iraq, said Iran will not capitulateunder pressure but will not seek full-scale confrontation either. "Iranwill rely on absorbing pressure through multiple tools —diplomatic, economic,and military— while using its regional allies to raise the cost ofconfrontation without entering an all-out war," he said, adding that Tehranwill seek to maintain a delicate balance between avoiding economic collapse andpreventing major escalation, while keeping the door to negotiation open.

Suhadal-Shammari, a researcher in political affairs, said the deadline pointssimultaneously toward two directions. "It may open the door to mediationefforts in the coming days, but it is at the same time an indicator that theUnited States is moving toward escalation —and possibly targetinginfrastructure, particularly power generation facilities." She assessedthe gap between the two sides as deep, with Iran insisting on its right toenrich uranium while Washington seeks to impose strict conditions, anddescribed the prospects for an agreement as limited given the currenttrajectory.

Iran'sPosition: The Deadline Is Illegitimate

Iranianpolitical analyst Saeed Shawerdi argued that Tehran views the deadline asfundamentally unreasonable. "Iran sees this deadline as illogical, becauseit is based on imposing conditions by force, in exchange for the threat of destroyingsources of life, which Tehran considers war crimes," he said.

Shawerdi addedthat Iran will not yield to this pressure, that its position will remain one ofdefense and response, and that the war has demonstrated internal Iraniancohesion contrary to US expectations.

Salehal-Qazwini, a researcher specializing in Iranian affairs, explained thatWashington is seeking to apply increasing pressure to force Tehran to changeits regional policies, but cautioned that Iran "will not accept, after allthese sacrifices, to be turned into a failed state." Whether the warcontinues or stops, he said, depends on Iran's capacity to endure and respond—and the energy file will remain directly tied to Tehran's position under thatpressure.

Read more: Long war with Iran: A dangerous repetition of history, but with even less preparation

The Strait, theOil, and the Global Fallout

Ramadanal-Badran, a political analyst based in Washington, pointed out that theclosure of the Strait of Hormuz represents the single most consequential factorin the current phase of the conflict. "Preventing the movement of exportshas led to a significant imbalance in market equilibrium," he said,warning that the impact will not be immediate alone but may extend into themedium and long term —particularly if escalation continues and attacks on oilinfrastructure in the region persist.

Al-Badran alsocautioned that Iraq faces compounded challenges, with production halted and oilfields and installations damaged, potentially reducing the country's productivecapacity well beyond the short term.

Ahmed FouadAnwar, professor of Modern Hebrew and Zionist Thought at the University ofAlexandria, described the repercussions of the current war as unprecedented,coming at a moment when the global economy has not yet recovered from theeffects of the COVID-19 pandemic and the war in Ukraine. He said that theclosure of Hormuz and strikes on oil installations in Iran and Gulf states havehad direct global consequences —including in countries such as Egypt, which hasbeen forced to implement energy rationing measures. “Gulf states have been thehardest hit, due to the destruction of oil infrastructure and the disruption ofexports.” Anwar drew a historical parallel to the aftermath of the 1956Tripartite Aggression —the joint British, French, and Israeli militaryoperation against Egypt— when new powers emerged at the expense of traditionalones, suggesting the current conflict may similarly accelerate shifts in theregional and global balance of power.

Iraq'sFractured Decision-Making

Beyond theregional military calculus, analysts told Shafaq News that the war has exposeda structural failure at the heart of Iraq's political and securitydecision-making. Politicians and observers describe this as one of the mostdangerous periods Iraq has faced since 2003, with warnings that the country risksbecoming an arena for the settlement of international accounts.

Imranal-Karkoshi, a member of the State of Law Coalition led by former PrimeMinister Nouri al-Maliki, insisted that Iraq's constitutional framework remainsintact. "The decision of war and peace rests with the Iraqi parliament,which is the exclusively authorized body for that," he told Shafaq News,adding that the government is working to "consolidate the foundations ofpeace" and that the international community bears responsibility for preventingIraq from being turned into a battleground.

But researcherssay the constitutional picture and the operational reality divergesignificantly. Nawal al-Mousawi, a researcher in political affairs, pointed outthat while the government holds the legal authority to deploy security forcesand take necessary measures, it is "constrained to a degree" by thenature of a political system built on consensus. "The real knot," shesaid, "lies in the absence of a unified political decision to confront allparties carrying weapons —particularly those that hold representation withinstate institutions themselves."

Firasal-Muslimawi, spokesperson for the Reconstruction and Development Bloc led bycaretaker Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani, added a further dimension bystressing that the government is currently operating in a caretaker capacityunder exceptional regional circumstances, functioning with only half itsministerial cabinet, including the absence of a defense minister —a portfoliocurrently administered on an acting basis. Al-Muslimawi said these conditionsmake it urgent to form a fully empowered government capable of addressing theescalating challenges, while stressing that al-Sudani "is making everyeffort to control the security situation and spare Iraq the dangers ofwar."

The governmentformation process itself remains stalled. The Coordination Framework —theumbrella body of Shiite political forces— formally nominated Nouri al-Malikifor prime minister on January 24, opening negotiations over the new government.But the process has been held up by disagreements over the election of apresident, the constitutional prerequisite for tasking the largest bloc'scandidate with forming a government. A political source told Shafaq Newsearlier that the Coordination Framework had agreed to defer the final decisionon the prime ministerial candidate until after the regional war concludes.

A SharplyDifferent View from Washington

FromWashington, a distinctly different assessment of the conflict's trajectoryemerged. Tom Harb, head of the American Middle East Coalition for Democracy anda prominent Republican Party figure, said that the Iranian regime now faces anunavoidable confrontation with Trump's fifteen conditions, and that failure tocomply will open the door to military operations targeting Iran's strategicdepth.

Harb said theUS administration is betting on changing the regime's behavior, but warned thatif Iranian provocations continue, striking infrastructure will be firmly on thetable. "If the regime does not respond to President Trump's conditions,targeting the economic and military joints of the state will become a means offorcing it to submit— and this will serve the stability of Arab states andIsrael alike."

Asked aboutwarnings from US legal experts that striking civilian facilities in Iran couldconstitute war crimes, Harb drew a parallel to the Second World War, when theAllies bombed the infrastructure of major cities to bring down dictatorialregimes, arguing that ideologically entrenched systems cannot be neutralizedwithout dismantling their operational capabilities.

He dismissedIranian threats of triggering a third world war, "Where is this war? Andwho will come to support Iran? No one. The prestige of Iranian military power,built over 35 years, has evaporated. All they have left are imprecise rockets,while the West and the United States possess an arsenal capable of sustainingwar for months and years."

Harb assessedthat any military conflict would not exceed 60 days, with the possibility of a30-day congressional extension, suggesting that strikes on infrastructure wouldgive the Iranian people "a new spirit" to rise against the regime.

Read more: US-Iraq security agreements keep failing: The PMF, dual loyalty, and Baghdad’s sovereignty deficit

Shafaq News

Since the outbreak of hostilities between the UnitedStates, Israel, and Iran on February 28, 2026, the Kurdistan Region of Iraq hasabsorbed approximately 650 missiles and drone strikes, killing 16 people andwounding roughly 100 others. Legal analysts and regional experts increasinglyargue that the near-total absence of claimed responsibility is not a byproductof regional chaos —it is the strategy.

The drone that struck Kurdistan Region PresidentNechirvan Barzani's residence in Duhok on March 28 bore no flag. No factionclaimed it; no official investigation acknowledged it. That silence isconsistent with every other major incident in a campaign documented by ShafaqNews across all four provinces of the Kurdistan Region through Tuesday, April7, at 10:00 a.m. —documentation that came at a cost. KRG authorities imposedmedia restrictions on strike sites, prohibiting photography in the immediate aftermathof attacks, and many incidents were recorded not from the strikes themselvesbut from the debris they left behind.

Of 652 total drone and missile strikes recorded sinceFebruary 28, nearly 80 percent targeted Erbil alone. Al-Sulaymaniyahabsorbed 106, Duhok 25, Halabja 2, and Raparin 1. Geographic concentration ofthis specificity points to a hierarchy of targets, which is precisely whatinternational law requires investigators to establish when building a warcrimes case.

Christian Peacemaker Teams, a monitoring organizationwith field personnel embedded across the Region, documented 474 attacks throughApril 5, recording 14 killed, 93 wounded. Erbil's Governor Omed Khoshnaw hasseparately confirmed that his province alone has faced more than 500 dronestrikes since February 28.

Read more: Drone attack on Nechirvan Barzani: Message at the peacemaker’s door

According to CPT's breakdown, the IranianRevolutionary Guard Corps directly executed 179 of the documented attacks,while 295 were carried out by Iran-aligned armed factions operating insideIraq, groups that occupy the legal grey zone between state proxy andindependent actor, a distinction carefully cultivated over years of Iranianinfluence architecture in the country.

The claiming pattern is itself the architecture. Iranhas acknowledged strikes on Iranian Kurdish opposition sites; affiliatedfactions have claimed attacks on US-linked targets. Yet both Iran and thosefactions have denied any involvement in the strike on President Barzani'sresidence in Duhok and publicly condemned it, and Barzani himself noted thatIran struck a Peshmerga headquarters in Erbil by mistake. Attacks on oil fieldsand civilian infrastructure remain in a separate category of contested ambiguity.What gets owned and what gets disowned tracks precisely with legal anddiplomatic exposure: responsibility is asserted where it signals deterrence,and withdrawn where it would trigger accountability.

Political analyst Hussein al-Kanani situates thecampaign within the broader regional conflict, arguing that the US use of Iraqiairspace to strike Iran has generated reactive strikes from multipledirections. Speaking to Shafaq News, he considers military base strikes"foreseeable" within that logic, while drawing a sharper line atconsulates, oil fields, and civilian structures, targets he describes asunjustified, and potentially exploited by third parties seeking to implicateIranian-aligned factions. Whether or not that reading holds, it names theprecise mechanism international lawyers flag as the campaign's central legalobstacle: what is known in international law as plausible deniability —thedeliberate use of front names, unknown media facades, and absent officialclaims to sever the evidentiary link between perpetrator and act.

Read more: Iraq's air defense: US vetoes, Russian limits leave Baghdad exposed

The casualty profile strains that ambiguityconsiderably. Among the 16 dead are six Peshmerga from the Kurdistan Region'sFirst Region Command in the Khalifan area, one Asayish security officer killedat Erbil International Airport, six Peshmerga affiliated with Iranian Kurdishopposition parties across Erbil, Sulaymaniyah, and Baashiqa, two civilians, andone French soldier, killed in Erbil on March 12. This reflects specificstrategic interests: suppressing Iranian Kurdish opposition movements, degradingKurdistan Region security infrastructure, and applying pressure on Westernmilitary presence without triggering a formal state-level response. Theprecision of the victim profile is itself evidence against randomness.

International legal experts note that repeatedpatterns in targets, tactics, and weaponry can constitute circumstantialevidence sufficient to anchor an international investigation even withoutdirect attribution. The principle of command responsibility, which holds seniormilitary and political figures liable for crimes committed by forces undertheir effective control, regardless of whether explicit orders were issued,means that the absence of claimed responsibility only lengthens the chain oflegal accountability.

The legal framework is substantial, if as yetuntested: the strikes violate the principle of distinction enshrined in theGeneva Conventions, which prohibits targeting civilian persons and objects. Theassault on the US consulate breaches the Vienna Convention on ConsularRelations. The use of imprecise weaponry in populated areas constitutes anindiscriminate attack under Article 51 of the First Additional Protocol. Noneof these violations is subject to statutes of limitation.

Iraqi Foreign Minister Fuad Hussein described thestrike on Barzani's residence as "a serious indication of the consequencesof failing to take firm measures in response to previous attacks," astatement that functions as much as an indictment of Baghdad's prior inactionas a condemnation of the strike itself.

Political analyst Kazem Al-Yawar argues that what isunfolding exceeds scattered security breaches. Speaking to Shafaq News, hedescribes the strikes as targeting "all vital joints" of the Region—energy infrastructure, airports, military sites, and civilian residentialbuildings— a breadth of targeting that, in his assessment, reflects deliberatestrategic logic rather than operational spillover. Responsibility forprotecting Iraqi sovereignty, Al-Yawar states, rests with the federal government,making effective coordination between Baghdad and Erbil, particularly along theIranian and Turkish borders, not a political preference but a constitutionalobligation the current campaign has exposed as unmet.

He also characterizes the attacks as "a clear andflagrant violation of Iraqi sovereignty, UN principles, and internationallaw," noting that Iraq holds the legal standing to file complaints beforethe UN Security Council and pursue compensation claims for documented damages—an avenue the parallel legal tracks now underway in Baghdad and Erbil appeardesigned to activate.

Read more: Between war and neutrality: Kurdistan navigates US-Iran confrontation

Legal expert Mohammed Jumaa has argued that strikes onthe Kurdistan Region are classifiable as terrorist acts under Iraqi anti-terrorlegislation. "The law focuses on the nature and impact of the act,particularly when it spreads fear or targets civilian environments, rather thansolely on the identity of the perpetrator."

Shafaq News has learned that Iraqi authorities and theKurdistan Regional Government are pursuing three parallel legal and diplomatictracks: forensic documentation through analysis of recovered drone debris,formal complaints to the UN Security Council, and legal classification ofperpetrators as terrorist entities with an emphasis on command responsibility.Physical evidence recovered from strike sites can establish weapons provenancein ways that override claimed or disclaimed responsibility, the point at whichthe fog of deliberate ambiguity begins to lift.

Read more: Iraq’s neutrality fades: Formal war involvement draws closer?

Political analyst Ali Al-Baidar links the strikes onoil infrastructure to consequences that extend well beyond the security domain.He explained to Shafaq News that attacking the energy facilities, thatrepresent vital infrastructure on which economic and livelihood stabilitydepends, “disrupts services, deepens crises, and directly threatens the safetyof civilians and workers,” placing the attacks in tension with theinternational humanitarian law principles of distinction, proportionality, andprecaution, all of which obligate parties to a conflict to avoid strikes ofthis kind.

Al-Baidar is nonetheless precise about the limits ofcurrent analysis: "final legal characterization remains contingent oninvestigation" —a reminder that evidentiary clarity must precede legaljudgment, however strong the circumstantial case.

The killing of a French soldier in Erbil has receivedless international attention than its diplomatic weight warrants. Francemaintains military personnel in Iraq as part of the Global Coalition; an attackthat kills a coalition soldier is an attack on that coalition's operationalpresence and its tolerance for ambiguity. That no government has formallyattributed the March 12 strike, and that no serious diplomatic rupturefollowed, reflects how thoroughly the deniability architecture has beenabsorbed into international calculus.

The Kurdistan Region is the terrain on which aspecific legal and political gamble is being tested: that sustained ambiguitycan insulate the authors of a systematic campaign from the consequencesinternational law was designed to impose. The forensic documentation underway,the UN complaints being prepared, and the debris being catalogued in Duhok andErbil constitute the counter-argument —that patterns speak when perpetratorswill not.

Whether international institutions prove willing tohear them is what this campaign will ultimately answer.

Read more: US-Iraq security agreements keep failing: Baghdad’s sovereignty deficit

Written and edited by Shafaq News staff.

Shafaq News

On the runway in Erbil of Iraqi Kurdistan,Kurdish-inspired collections have shown that fashion in Iraq can speak withconfidence, color, and cultural depth. Events such as Kurdistan Fashion Week,along with international appearances by Kurdish designers, have offered aglimpse of what Iraqi design can achieve when talent finds a stage.

Kurdish traditional clothing, known for its layeredfabrics, vibrant colors, intricate embroidery, and wide belts worn over longdresses, has long been a symbol of identity and celebration. Designersincreasingly reinterpret these elements into contemporary pieces, blendingheritage with global fashion trends.

One of the clearest examples came from Kurdishdesigner Lara Dizeyee, whose collection “Enchanted Milan” drew attention atMilan Fashion Week last year. Over nine months, she created 30 pieces inspiredby Kurdish history and culture, weaving in themes linked to Nowruz, the Kurdishand Persian New Year, symbols from Roj Hilat (Eastern Kurdistan, largely inIran), and legendary figures such as Shah Zanan, or Ishtar, an ancientMesopotamian goddess. Her goal, she said, was to immerse Milan in Kurdish colorsand stories.

That visibility, however, remains the exception ratherthan the rule.

Across Iraq, fashion design continues to survive morethrough personal determination than institutional support. Designers work in afragmented environment shaped by weak official backing, limited exposure,rising material costs, and the absence of a professional body that canrepresent the sector and protect standards.

Saeed Al-Obaidi, a designer and faculty member atBaghdad’s College of Fine Arts, one of Iraq’s main academic art institutions,said the problem begins with a basic confusion over who counts as a designer.In his view, the role has increasingly been taken over by tailors who canproduce garments but lack the academic and artistic training that fashiondesign requires.

He described the discipline as one built on complexdetails, yet in Iraq, the distinction between tailoring and design has becomeblurred. As a result, “many of those now presented as designers are neitheracademics nor professionals, while trained talent is receiving little mediaattention and gradually disappearing from view.”

That weak visibility is compounded by the lack ofprofessional organization. Without a dedicated union or strong institutionalframework, Iraqi designers often work in isolation, with few channels todevelop their careers or market their work. Al-Obaidi said most local fashionshows remain basic and popular in style, falling short of internationalstandards, with the notable exception of some elite events staged by the IraqiFashion House, a state-run institution founded in the 1970s.

The market itself also remains narrow, as demand isstill centered largely on traditional garments such as dishdashas andjellabiyas —loose-fitting robes commonly worn across the Middle East— leavinglimited room for broader experimentation in contemporary fashion. Al-Obaidisaid his faculty is trying to widen public understanding of design throughworkshops and by bringing in international designers, in an effort to build amore professional culture around the field.

Even when Iraqi designers are invited abroad, the costof participation can be prohibitive. Travel, accommodation, models, andphotographers all have to be covered personally, making international exposuredifficult for all but a small number of designers. According to Al-Obaidi, mostsimply cannot afford it.

For those working behind the scenes of the industry,the obstacles are also practical. Nour Hadi, who works in fashion management,said Iraq does not produce thread locally, forcing designers to rely onimported fabrics and materials purchased in foreign currency. “That raisesproduction costs and adds pressure to an already fragile sector.” She alsopointed to weak public confidence in local products and the lack of financialsupport for fashion entrepreneurs.

In the Kurdistan Region, the scene appears moreactive, but it is not free of the same structural problems. Designers therestill depend heavily on imports from Turkiye and China, while outdatedproduction facilities and small-scale workshops limit the ability of localbrands to compete more broadly.

Yet the Kurdistan experience also offers a clue towhat could work for Iraq as a whole: cultural identity can be a strength whenpaired with visibility, investment, and professional support. Kurdish heritagehas already given designers a distinct language that resonates beyond the localmarket.

“The wider Iraqi fashion scene has no shortage oftalent, but until that talent is backed by stronger institutions, betterresources, and clearer recognition of design as a profession, much of it willremain stitched in isolation,” Al-Obaidi concluded.

Written and edited by Shafaq News staff.

Shafaq News

On March 26,Iraq and the United States announced the formation of a High Joint CoordinationCommittee, committing both governments —in the official language of the JointOperations Command— to "intensify cooperation to prevent terroristattacks, ensure Iraqi territory is not used as a launching point foraggression, and keep Iraq outside the scope of the ongoing military conflict inthe region, with full respect for its sovereignty."

Within hours,US airstrikes struck Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) positions in Wasitprovince —and before the night was over, Iraqi armed factions hit US facilitiesacross Iraq, including in Baghdad and Erbil. More strikes from both sidesfollowed the next morning.

The speed ofthe collapse reflected a structural problem that predates the current conflictand has outlasted every bilateral security framework Baghdad and Washingtonhave signed since 2003: the Iraqi state does not exercise full authority overall armed actors operating under its nominal command, and Washington has neveraccepted the distinction Baghdad insists upon —that the PMF is a stateinstitution entitled to sovereign protection, not an Iranian proxy subject tomilitary targeting.

The currentUS-Israel war on Iran, which began on February 28, has also forced this probleminto full view.

Read more: Iraq’s neutrality fades: Formal war involvement draws closer?

A FrameworkBuilt On Shifting Ground

The newcommittee is the latest iteration of a security architecture rooted in the 2008Strategic Framework Agreement (SFA) and the Status of Forces Agreement (SFO)—treaties that established the terms of US military presence in Iraq and havegoverned bilateral cooperation ever since. Successive arrangements followed:the July 2021 Strategic Dialogue, a Higher Military Commission formed in2023–2024, and, most recently, a new bilateral security agreement proposed byIraq in 2025 —confirmed publicly by Iraqi Defence Minister Thabet Al-Abbasi,who described it as establishing "a lasting security partnership and deepintelligence cooperation." As of late March 2026, the proposal remainsunder review by the Trump administration, with no official US confirmation ofreceipt or negotiation.

Each of theseframeworks rested on the same core assumption: that Baghdad, as the sovereignauthority, could enforce the terms to which it was agreeing, but encounteredthe same obstacle.

The PMF, knownin Arabic as Al-Hashd Al-Shaabi, sits at the center of that obstacle. Formed in2014 following the fall of Mosul and a religious decree by Grand Ayatollah Alial-Sistani calling on Iraqis to defend their country against ISIS, the forcewas formally incorporated into the Iraqi Armed Forces by parliamentary law in2016 and placed under the authority of the prime minister as commander-in-chiefof the armed forces. With approximately 165,000 fighters, it is one of thelargest components of Iraq's security architecture —and the most politicallycontested.

The LoyaltyThat No Law Has Resolved

Many of thePMF's most powerful brigades —grouped under the Islamic Resistance in Iraq,most notably Kataib Hezbollah and Harakat Hezbollah Al-Nujaba, both designatedas terrorist organizations and sanctioned by the United States— operate underthe doctrine of Wilayat al-Faqih, the principle of clerical guardianship thatplaces ultimate political and religious authority in the hands of Iran'ssupreme leader. Several factions have declared their allegiance publicly.

It is a dualloyalty that no prime ministerial decree, parliamentary law, or bilateralsecurity framework has managed to dissolve. A reform bill introduced in March2025 —specifically designed to consolidate command authority over the PMF underthe prime minister and reduce the force's exposure to external influence—failed to pass. The political coalition required to enact it does not exist:the factions whose external loyalties the bill sought to curtail hold enoughparliamentary weight to prevent their own reform.

Ahmed Youssef,a political analyst, told Shafaq News that the involvement of armed factions inthe current conflict "has created a reality outside the state's authority—one that reflects neither government policy nor public interest." Thatreality, he said, predates the current war.

Read more: Iran–US talks and future of Iraqi armed factions: Sovereignty vs. Resistance

Al-Sudani'sDiminishing Margin

Caretaker PrimeMinister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani has maintained Iraq's neutrality position withconsistency under conditions that would strain any government. Airstrikes onPMF positions —condemned by al-Sudani as "systematic aggression"—have hit facilities across at least seven provinces since February 28, killingclose to 170 fighters by late March according to Iraqi health authorities andPMF statements. Simultaneously, the US chargé d'affaires and Iranian ambassadorwere summoned to the foreign ministry, a formal complaint was filed with the UNSecurity Council, and al-Sudani reiterated that decisions of war and peace belongexclusively to the Iraqi state.

None of italtered the trajectory. Iran-aligned factions continued strikes on US-linkedtargets across Iraq —including a drone attack on Baghdad International Airportthe same night the coordination committee was announced. The pattern is one ofcontinuous exchange between two armed actors operating inside Iraqi territory,with the state registering objections it cannot enforce.

The fracturewithin Iraq's political landscape sharpens the picture. Hussein al-Sheehani, amember of the Sadiqoon bloc— the political wing of Asaib Ahl Al-Haq, one of themost powerful Iran-aligned PMF factions— called for restraint while warningthat US strikes represent a "serious escalation" capable oftriggering responses beyond control.

Speaking toShafaq News, Al-Sheehani acknowledged the pressure on factions, pointing outthat past experience had shown “a consistent pattern of the United Statesacting unilaterally and outside agreed rules of engagement.” Even so, “factionsmust exercise self-restraint…patience and deference to the state remain thebetter course to keep Iraq from being pulled into a regional conflict.”

ProtectingIraqi sovereignty, he added, must be a shared priority, and dialogue the onlyviable path through the current period.

The tension inthat statement captures al-Sudani's daily reality: a faction that sits insidehis political coalition, draws a state salary, and answers to a foreignclerical authority simultaneously reserves the right to act outside hisauthority.

Hassan Fad'amof the Shiite Wisdom Movement (Al-Hikma) —a faction closer to al-Sudani'scentrist position —went further, rejecting neutrality and arguing that Iraqshould align politically with Iran.

“Since the waron Iran began, Iraq had played an essential role through diplomatic efforts toprevent the country from being drawn into the conflict, but unfortunately, wecame under bombardment, and our security forces suffered casualties," hetold Shafaq News.

“We side withthe wronged party, which is our neighbor Iran, and we must stand with itpolitically, in the media, and on humanitarian grounds —and that is the roleIraq has played since the battle began."

That voice doesnot come from the resistance factions. It comes from the moderate wing ofIraq's Shiite political establishment, and it illustrates precisely how narrowthe coalition available to the caretaker premier actually is.

What TheCommittee Cannot Fix

The High JointCoordination Committee retains value as a diplomatic channel, a mechanism forcommunicating red lines, registering objections, and preserving the formalarchitecture of the bilateral relationship. Counterterrorism cooperation,intelligence sharing, and advisory roles continue. If the broader regionalconflict de-escalates, the committee may provide a usable diplomatic off-ramp.

Its limits arestructural. Washington does not distinguish between the PMF as a stateinstitution and the PMF as an Iran-aligned network when selecting targets.Baghdad insists on that distinction when filing protests. The agreementrequires both parties to act based on Iraqi sovereignty —a sovereignty that oneparty treats as incomplete and the other cannot fully exercise.

That is thecontradiction the committee was built to manage not to resolve.

Every securityframework between Baghdad and Washington has eventually run into that wall. Themore consequential measure of this conflict, whenever it ends, will be whetherthe wall itself is any closer to being addressed. The failed reform bill, theunresolved factions, the publicly declared external loyalties: none of that haschanged. Until it does, the next framework will face the same fate as everyprevious one.

Read more: Why Iraq’s PMF disarmament is a different battle from Lebanon’s Hezbollah

Written andedited by Shafaq News staff.

Shafaq News (Updated at 19:44)

Since February28, 2026, when a US-Israeli military campaign against Iran began, Iraq hasbecome one of the most active fronts in the resulting regional confrontation.Strikes, drone attacks, and rocket barrages have hit targets across FederalIraq and the Kurdistan Region, drawing in state-sanctioned armed factions, US andWestern military installations, energy infrastructure, diplomatic facilities,and civilian landmarks.

Iraqiauthorities have confirmed at least 108 people killed since the escalationbegan, among them civilians, PMF members, Iraqi Army soldiers, and KurdishPeshmerga fighters. Responsibility for individual incidents is confirmed insome cases, contested in others, and entirely unclaimed in several. Whatfollows is a systematic account of what has been struck, by whom, and what isknown.

Read more: US-Iran war threatens Iraq’s fragile stability

PopularMobilization Forces

The PopularMobilization Forces (PMF), a state-sanctioned umbrella of predominantly Shiitearmed factions formally integrated into the Iraqi state security structure,have sustained some of the heaviest losses since the escalation began.

The deadliestconfirmed strike hit a PMF position at Habbaniyah Base in Al-Anbar province,killing Al-Anbar operations commander Saad Dawi and 14 fighters. Total casualtyfigures from the incident reached as high as 30, though that number remainsunconfirmed. The strike formed part of a broader pattern of precision attackson PMF positions in Baghdad, Babil, Diyala, and Saladin provinces, withmultiple hits on storage sites, command points, and logistics routes. Secondaryexplosions at several sites were consistent with the detonation of weaponsstockpiles, according to accounts from security sources and faction-affiliatedoutlets.

Hadi Al-Amiri,head of the Badr Organization — one of the PMF's most prominent constituentfactions —placed the total number of PMF members killed or wounded at more than160 since February 28. No party has claimed responsibility for the strikes onPMF positions. PMF-affiliated factions have attributed them to the UnitedStates and Israel, framing them within the broader Iran conflict. NeitherWashington nor Tel Aviv has confirmed involvement.

US Military andDiplomatic Installations

Americanfacilities in Baghdad have faced sustained targeting throughout the escalation.The Diplomatic Support Center at the base near Baghdad International Airport—formerly known as Victoria Base— and the US Embassy compound in the Green Zonehave been repeatedly struck by rockets and one-way attack drones. Air defensesystems intercepted incoming projectiles in several incidents; in others,strikes landed within or near facility perimeters, causing damage andtriggering lockdowns and movement restrictions, according to security sourceswho spoke to Shafaq News.

In theKurdistan Region, US military facilities in Erbil and Al-Sulaymaniyah provinces—including areas near Erbil International Airport and Harir Base, both of whichhost American troops— have been struck by drones and, in some cases, rockets.

The IslamicResistance in Iraq (IRI) —an umbrella network of Iran-backed Shiite armedfactions— has claimed primary responsibility for these operations. SinceFebruary 28, IRI-affiliated factions have claimed nearly 450 attacks targetingUS military facilities across Iraq and the wider region. Groups operating underthe IRI banner, including Kataib Hezbollah, Saraya Awliyaa Al-Dam, and HarakatAl-Nujaba, have released statements through affiliated channels presenting theoperations as a sustained campaign linked to the US-Israeli war on Iran.

Saraya AwliyaaAl-Dam alone claimed 136 operations over a 22-day period, including 31 inBaghdad and 55 in the Kurdistan Region, according to statements from the group.The group additionally cited operations in Syria, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, andJordan.

US officialshave attributed the attacks broadly to Iran-backed armed groups withoutconsistently naming specific factions, and have warned of potential responsesif targeting of US personnel and installations continues. Most incidents didnot result in confirmed American casualties, though material damage andelevated alert levels have been documented across US facilities.

Read more: Iraq's air defense void: How US vetoes, and Russian limits leave Baghdad exposed

PeshmergaHeadquarters

The mostserious single incident in the Region involved ballistic missile strikes onPeshmerga positions in Soran, Erbil province, causing 36 casualties, includingsix deaths, according to the Kurdish Security Forces. The strikes damagedfortified positions, storage sites, and logistical nodes.

KurdistanRegion President Nechirvan Barzani subsequently stated that Iranian officialshad acknowledged the Soran strikes as a mistake, expressed regret, and pledgedan investigation. The Kurdistan Regional Government said it was awaiting theoutcome of the inquiry.

A separatefacility in Iraqi Kurdistan housing a joint Peshmerga-French forces in theMakhmour area was attacked on March 12, killing one French soldier. Franceconfirmed both the attack and the fatality.

Read more: Drone incidents reported across 14 Iraqi provinces in latest escalation

Iranian KurdishOpposition Groups

Facilities belongingto Iranian Kurdish opposition parties based in the Kurdistan Region have alsobeen struck. Sites related to the Democratic Party of Iranian Kurdistan (PDKI),the Kurdistan Freedom Party (PAK), and the Komala Party were targeted in Erbiland Al-Sulaymaniyah provinces, including in Koya. The strikes hit commandcenters, residential compounds, and training facilities.

The targetedgroups accused Iran of carrying out the attacks, describing them as part of aneffort to suppress opposition activity operating from Iraqi territory. TheIslamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) —Iran's elite military force—claimedresponsibility for the strikes, stating it had targeted sites linked to what itdescribed as hostile groups allegedly preparing cross-border operations.

PAK's spokesperson Khalil Naderi said the attacks causedfive fatalities among the Kurdish parties as well as material damage to partyheadquarters, civilian homes, and personal property.

Read more: Iraq’s neutrality fades: Formal war involvement draws closer?

Civilian andSymbolic Targets

The regionalescalation has extended beyond military and paramilitary sites to targets withcivilian, symbolic, and diplomatic significance.

A hotel inErbil was struck by drones, with some reports indicating American soldiers werepresent at the facility at the time of the attack, according to sources whospoke to Reuters. The hotel's name was not confirmed.

Al-RasheedHotel in Baghdad —located inside the Green Zone and a frequent lodging pointfor foreign diplomats and media— was struck by a drone on March 16. Iraqiauthorities confirmed the attack and stated there were no casualties.

The formerUnited Nations headquarters in Baghdad was also targeted by drone attacksduring the escalation period. No additional details on casualties or damagehave been confirmed.

The UAEConsulate General in Erbil has been a recurring target since February 28. Boththe UAE and Iraqi authorities have confirmed the attacks. No party has claimedresponsibility.

Infrastructureand Maritime Targets

Baiji Refinery—Iraq's largest oil refinery, located in Saladin province— and the KaniQirzhala Warehouse were targeted during the escalation, according to sourceswho spoke to Shafaq News. Casualty figures, damage assessments, and thespecific dates of both incidents remain unconfirmed.

Two oil tankerswere sabotaged near Iraqi waters off Basra in March 2026— one of themMaltese-flagged— in attacks using drones or explosive boats. One foreign crewmember was killed, and 38 others were rescued, according to security officialsat the Iraqi port. No party has claimed responsibility for the maritimeattacks.

Erbil's energyinfrastructure was also targeted with a barrage of drones. No casualty figureswere immediately confirmed from that incident.

Scope of theEscalation

The incidentsrepresent a partial picture of an ongoing and still-expanding confrontation.Iraqi health authorities place the confirmed death toll at a minimum of 108across all categories —civilians, PMF members, Iraqi Army soldiers, andPeshmerga fighters. Hundreds of additional claimed attacks remain unverified,and casualty figures in several incidents are subject to further confirmation.

Written andedited by Shafaq News staff.

Shafaq News-Baghdad

Attacks launched byarmed factions from Iraqi territory toward neighboring countries, particularlySyria and Kuwait, have prompted a joint statement from six Arab states urgingBaghdad to halt the operations, according to official statements.

Recent developmentsshow that these attacks have expanded beyond military targets to includecivilian infrastructure, as reported by Kuwaiti authorities, despite claims bythe factions that their operations are limited to US military facilities.

Saudi Arabia,Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Qatar, and Jordan urged the Iraqigovernment "to take immediate measures to halt attacks carried out byfactions, militias, and armed groups from Iraqi soil toward neighboringstates." They emphasized the need to safeguard fraternal ties and preventfurther escalation. Baghdad responded by calling on any party with evidence tosubmit it.

Regional Escalationand Official Stance

Syrian politicalanalyst Ahmed Kamel said the strikes primarily undermine Iraq, explaining thatthe missiles used are limited in scale and impact, often hitting non-criticallocations, "but place Iraq at risk of being drawn into the conflict."

Researcher ZiadAl-Arrar stated that Iraq has moved beyond serving as a transit arena and hasbecome "an active party" in the war. He anticipated that shellinglaunched from Iraqi territory toward a base in Syria would carry consequencesfor relations between Baghdad and Damascus, as well as for broader regional andinternational assessments of Iraq's position.

"The Iraqigovernment is striving to avoid direct involvement, describing the country asbeing in a sensitive position," Al-Arrar noted, adding that efforts by thegovernment and political actors to distance Iraq from the conflict facesignificant challenges, given the ongoing confrontation between the UnitedStates and Israel on one side and Iran on the other, alongside the alignment ofarmed factions with Tehran and growing Arab criticism of attacks targetingneighboring countries from within Iraq.

The escalationintensified following the outbreak of US-Israeli hostilities with Iran onFebruary 28, when multiple Iraqi factions affiliated with the so-called"Islamic Resistance" entered the confrontation, carrying out dozensof operations against US positions inside Iraq and across several Gulf states,in addition to Jordan.

In a televisedinterview, Iraqi Foreign Minister Fuad Hussein reaffirmed the government'srejection of Iraq becoming a party to the conflict, while acknowledging thatthe country has turned into an open arena for multidirectional fire. He saidIraqi airspace has become a corridor for US and Israeli strikes against Iran,as well as for Iranian strikes toward other destinations, "placing Iraqamid a conflict it did not initiate."

Read more: Tehranvs. Baghdad: Iraq’s armed factions face a strategic recalculation

Armed Factions'Perspective

Figures close tothe factions present a different account, asserting that Iraq is implementingmeasures to secure its borders. Moein Al-Kadhimi, a leader in the BadrOrganization, stressed that the government has deployed security forces alongthe Syrian frontier, pointing to movements by ISIS within Syrian territory andthe presence of foreign bases.

Speaking to ShafaqNews, Al-Kadhimi described attacks targeting Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF)positions as unjustified, adding that some strikes originate from inside Syria.He called on the Syrian government to curb suspicious movements near the borderand prevent their use in ways that threaten Iraq's security.

Legal Implications

Iraq's SupremeJudicial Council President Faiq Zaidan on Friday warned that unilateraldecisions by armed factions on war and peace could produce what he called"serious consequences," describing such actions as a breach of theconstitution.

Zaidan noted thatArticle 61 (Ninth) restricts the declaration of war to a formal processinvolving the Presidency, the prime minister, and a two-thirds parliamentarymajority. Actions outside this framework, he said, undermine governance andweaken the rule of law.

"Attempts byarmed groups to engage in combat decisions independently pose a threat tosovereignty and stability," Zaidan cautioned, highlighting the risks offragmented authority and the potential to draw Iraq into conflict withoutnational consensus. He also warned that "bypassing elected institutionscould erode public trust and expose Iraq to international repercussions."

Politicalresearcher Abdul Qader Al-Nayel highlighted a further legal dimension, statingthat Iraq's constitution prohibits the use of its territory to launch attacksagainst neighboring states, while Article Nine bans the formation of armedgroups outside the defense and interior ministries.

Al-Nayel noted thatIraqi law classifies such armed groups as terrorist entities, with penaltiesreaching capital punishment for using Iraqi territory to carry out attacks onneighboring countries. He warned that the continuation of these operations withoutdecisive government deterrence places Iraq in a precarious internationalposition, and cautioned that targeted countries retain the right underinternational law to pursue sources of fire.

Iraq as a ConflictArena

Political analystAhmed Al-Hamdani told Shafaq News that the current situation reflects Iraq'slongstanding role as a battleground for regional rivalries, describing it as avenue for settling scores. He noted that Iraqi forces deployed along the Syrianborder have come under bombardment by US or Israeli forces, while instabilityacross the border continues to threaten Iraq's security environment.

Zaidan concluded bycalling for stronger state control over arms and reinforced constitutionalinstitutions to safeguard stability and national sovereignty.

Read more: Iraq’s neutrality fades: Formal war involvement draws closer?

Shafaq News

The closure of the Strait of Hormuzhas slowed e-commerce across Iraq, prolonging delivery times, raising costs,and forcing a growing number of customers to cancel online orders.

Shadha Abdul Karim, who operates anonline store through social media, described mounting shipping setbacksaffecting orders routed via the Strait, leading to widespread cancellations.

“Customers are entitled to canceland receive full refunds if orders are not delivered on time,” she informedShafaq News, adding that higher shipping costs under current conditions are likelyto erode profits, while noting that she had kept prices low to attract buyers.

“I regret that not all customersreceived their orders on time, but this was beyond my control. I contactedaffected clients to explain the hold-ups caused by the exceptional situation,”she explained.

Similar concerns are being reportedby other sellers. Hala Hamid, another online retailer, pointed to the broaderimpact on supply chains, particularly imports from global platforms such asChina’s Shein.

“The closure has led to noticeabledelays in shipments due to disruptions in some sea and air routes, as well ashigher transport costs, which in turn affected delivery schedules,” she noted.

Read more: Iraq's energy vulnerability: When a petro-state has no buffer

Economists indicate that thefallout extends beyond logistics. The Strait of Hormuz, a key passage forglobal energy flows, plays a central role in shaping shipping costs, inflation,and trade patterns worldwide.

Economic expert Mustafa Al-Farajnoted that e-commerce depends heavily on speed and affordability, making itparticularly sensitive to disruptions in major shipping routes.

“Higher oil prices immediatelyincrease shipping and transport costs, whether by sea or air, which raises theprices of goods sold online and reduces consumers’ purchasing power,” herelayed to Shafaq News, adding that disruptions in supply chains from Asia,especially China and India, are likely to slow delivery times, weakening a keyadvantage of online shopping.

Al-Faraj also pointed out thatmajor e-commerce companies may scale back promotions or transfer higher coststo consumers, with emerging markets like Iraq feeling the effects more sharplydue to heavy reliance on imports.

In parallel, economic expert AliDadoush pointed to a wider chain reaction tied to currency stability andfinancial flows. “Any disruption in maritime traffic through the strait willincrease shipping costs and prolong delivery timelines, which directly affectsonline markets through higher prices, reduced product variety, and longerdelivery times,” he explained to Shafaq News.

He added that declining oilrevenues could pressure exchange rates and limit dollar liquidity, increasingimport costs and weakening purchasing power. Stricter controls on foreigntransfers could also disrupt digital payments, potentially reducing onlinetransactions and pushing some consumers back toward cash.

“The overall impact points tostagflation, with a contraction in e-commerce volumes alongside rising pricesand declining consumer confidence,” he concluded, noting that while limitedopportunities may emerge for local e-commerce growth, they are unlikely tooffset short-term pressures without broader policy support.

Written and edited by Shafaq Newsstaff.

Read more: Hormuz lockdown: Iraq’s economic lifeline under threat

Shafaq News

Iraq is facingmounting security and economic risks as the ongoing US-Israeli war against Iranexpands across the region, threatening to unravel Baghdad’s fragile stability,according to the US magazine Foreign Affairs.

Iraq had avoideddirect involvement in the conflict following the October 7, 2023, attacks,maintaining a delicate balance between Tehran and Washington. However, ForeignAffairs noted that this strategy is now under severe strain, as Iran-backedIraqi armed groups have launched hundreds of attacks on US bases, while Iranianstrikes have targeted sites in the Kurdistan Region and key oil facilities.

The United Stateshas responded with airstrikes on infrastructure and commanders linked toIranian-aligned factions, raising the risk of direct confrontation on Iraqisoil. The escalation has also affected Iraq’s political and economic stability,as the country’s parliament remains unable to form a government capable ofaddressing the crisis.

The report warnedthat continued escalation could drag Iraq deeper into conflict, creating acycle of retaliation that may damage US-Iraq relations and push the countrytoward renewed instability after years of relative recovery.

To continuereading, click here.

Shafaq News

By Ali Hussein Feyli

As we look through the window of the forty-sixthanniversary of the great tragedy that struck the Feyli Kurds, we find ourselvesfacing a moral, national, and political obligation that goes beyond merelycommemorating the victims, for this anniversary must not be allowed to become acold date on the calendar of annual observances.

The history of the Feylis is not merely a tragicnarrative written between the claws of forced displacement and the nooses ofexecution. It is a living document of struggle, a page “stained with blood” inan existential conflict that has yet to end. Today, that struggle centers onthe essence of “identity” and the restoration of “full citizenship.”

Over the past decades, the Feyli Kurdish cause hasbeen confined to the framework of “mourning gatherings” and emotional rhetoric.They have been treated as a group historically crushed between the hammer ofnationalism and the anvil of sectarianism. Yet the bitter truth is that“silence” has been the real killer of this cause, transforming a complex issueof human rights and national existence into a mere administrative filegathering dust in the corridors of government bureaucracy.

Today, the message addressed to the nationalconscience must be decisive: it is no longer acceptable for the Feylis toremain on the “margins as victims,” nor to be viewed as a lingering crisisawaiting patchwork solutions, but rather to be recognized as genuine partnersin shaping the country’s future and in decision-making centers. The time hascome to liberate laws from the constraints of “inactive texts” and turn theminto tangible realities, as in political practice rights are not grantedthrough pleading but secured through effective pressure and the assertion ofpresence.

The major turning point lies in the rise of the thirdand fourth generations of Feyli Kurdish youth, equipped with the tools of themodern age, including living languages and digital technologies, and bestpositioned to break the walls of silence. These generations hold a historicopportunity to internationalize the file of “genocide” in human rights forums,moving it from the realm of deferred political promises into binding legalcases.

Silence at this moment is not an option; it ispolitical suicide. History does not favor those who remain mere spectators totheir own suffering. This anniversary is an opportunity to confront thelegislative and executive authorities with clear, documented language,compelling them to acknowledge that what occurred was a systematic attempt touproot an authentic community from its historical homeland.

A nation that does not give due respect to the bloodyhistory of its components will never taste stability. When national discourseremains silent about the suffering in Badra, Gassan, Kut, Mandali, Khanaqin,Zurbatiyah, Baghdad, and beyond, it effectively grants a green light for theobstruction of justice and the erasure of collective memory.

In conclusion, we do not consider this anniversary anoccasion for mourning, but the inauguration of a new phase of legal struggle toaffirm identity. The Feyli Kurds are not merely a part of this homeland; theyare a “beacon of resilience” and living witnesses to the vitality of theKurdish nation and the Iraqi people. We are here because our roots run deep inthis land, and we will not allow silence to diminish our national dignity.

This article was originally written in Arabic.

Shafaq News

Iraq is caught between two forces it cannot confront: theairpower of its nominal protector, and the political cost of seeking protectionelsewhere. As American and Israeli strikes against Iran-aligned targets insideIraqi territory multiply, Baghdad's air defense vacuum has shifted from along-acknowledged liability into an acute national security emergency —onewhose resolution is blocked, analysts say, by the very alliance architecturemeant to guarantee Iraqi sovereignty.

On Wednesday, Iraq's Ministry of Defense confirmed that astrike on the Habbaniyah military clinic and an engineering unit left sevensoldiers dead and thirteen wounded —the latest in a pattern of aerial attacksthat have hit Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) positions across al-Anbar,Baghdad, Babil, Kirkuk, Nineveh, Diyala, and Saladin provinces sincehostilities between the United States, Israel, and Iran erupted on February 28.Dozens of casualties have accumulated. And on the ground, a second threat isstirring in the space the strikes have opened.

A Structural Defense Deficit

Retired Major General Jawad al-Dahlaki, a Baghdad-basedsecurity and strategic analyst, frames Iraq's predicament with unusualbluntness. "Iraq has no air control and no effective ground-baseddefenses," he told Shafaq News, a deficit he traces not to negligence butto architecture.

The first jaw of the trap is contractual. Iraq'sStrategic Framework Agreement (SFA) with the United States and the GlobalCoalition was designed, in part, to guarantee Iraqi sovereignty and securitycooperation, but it does not constitute a formal air defense support. Thatguarantee has become a legal and political paradox: the threat now comes fromthe guarantors themselves.

The second jaw is technological. Iraq's air defense corpshas submitted detailed proposals for early warning systems and advanced missilebatteries. Washington has blocked them according to a military official whospoke to Shafaq News anonymously, including requests routed through South Korea, a US ally, to reduce the political friction of a direct American sale.The reasoning, al-Dahlaki explained, is twofold: fear that sophisticated airdefense technology could fall into the hands of Iran-aligned factions operatinginside Iraq, and concern that effective Iraqi air defenses would shield Iranianassets during periods of American-Israeli escalation against Tehran.

The logic is coherent from Washington's perspective. FromBaghdad's, it is a structural veto on sovereignty.

Read more: Kurdistan Region records 470+ attacks, 107 casualties since Feb 28

ISIS and the Security Vacuum

The military consequences of this vacuum extend beyondthe strikes themselves. Al-Dahlaki warned that ISIS fighters have begun movingin western Iraq, exploiting the repositioning of security forces displaced byrepeated aerial bombardment —an assessment aligns with broader patternsreporting on ISIS opportunism in ungoverned spaces. Attempts to strike Baghdadprisons holding senior ISIS leadership —with the apparent aim of freeing them—have also been reported.

This is the understated dimension of the current crisis:the degradation of Iraq's fixed security infrastructure by airstrikes iscreating operational freedom for a third actor that neither Washington norTehran wants discussed in this context. The air war, in other words, has aground dividend and ISIS is collecting it.

The Cost Equation and the Alternatives

The financial architecture of modern air defense makesIraq's position even more precarious. Intercepting a drone that costs a fewthousand dollars requires a missile like the PAC-3 MSE, priced at $4.1 millionper round. The math of attrition favors the attacker at every exchange ratio.

Cheaper alternatives exist and have been documented.Germany's IRIS-T SLM system runs between 150 and 200 million euros per battery—expensive, but within reach for a state managing substantial oil revenues.South Korea's Cheongung-2 (M-SAM) offers interceptors at one to two milliondollars each, providing credible low-tier coverage against drones andshort-range missiles. The heavy American systems —THAAD and Patriot— remainnecessary for protecting large strategic assets but are neither politicallyavailable nor economically viable as Iraq's primary defense layer.

The options exist. The access does not.

Moscow and Beijing: The Corridor Washington Is Closing

Inside the Iraqi parliament, a faction of legislatorstied to the Shiite Coordination Framework— the dominant political blocgoverning Baghdad— has concluded that the answer lies east. Mukhtar al-Mousawi,a senior member of the Badr Organization led by Hadi al-Amiri and a key figurewithin the Framework, put the position directly: "It is illogical toimport defense systems from the United States to target its own aircraft. Wemust turn toward the Russian or Chinese axis." He acknowledged immediatelythat "Washington is placing a veto on this path."

The statement is politically significant less for what itproposes than for what it reveals: that Iraq's governing coalition —not itsopposition— is openly articulating alignment with Moscow and Beijing as anational security necessity.

Iraqi lawmaker Miqdad al-Khafaji of the Hoqooq bloc, thepolitical wing of Kataib Hezbollah, revealed last week that legislators aregathering signatures to summon caretaker Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudaniand his security ministers for an emergency session, framing the currentsituation as "a real state of war with America and Israel." Aseparate legislative initiative is advancing to pass a law specifically fundingair defense procurement —a mechanism designed to create statutory pressure foraction that executive negotiations have failed to produce.

Whether these maneuvers translate into actual procurementis a different equation. Russia's calculus, according to Asif Melhem, directorof the JSM Research Center in Moscow, is more constrained than Baghdad'sparliamentary rhetoric suggests.

Read more: ISIS detainee transfers: “Third-generation” threat puts Iraq’s security to the test

Moscow's Arithmetic

Melhem argues that the current conflict —which he framesas targeting Iranian and by extension Russian-Chinese regional influence— hasconcentrated Russian strategic attention on Iraq as "the gateway to WestAsia." But Russian willingness to arm Baghdad has hard limits."Russia can offer a great deal," he told Shafaq News, "butwithin a precise equation: it cannot provide weapons that constitute a directstrategic threat to America in Iraq right now. What it can offer is defensivedeterrence."

That means systems like the S-400, which are capableenough to constrain American air operations, are off the table, at leastpublicly, because Moscow cannot absorb the diplomatic cost with Gulf states andTurkiye, whose relationships Russia has carefully maintained throughout theUkraine war and its regional spillovers. Electronic warfare systems anddefensive missile batteries occupy a middle ground where Russian engagement ispossible, but only if packaged in a way that does not visibly antagonizeRiyadh, Ankara, or Abu Dhabi.

The corridor toward Moscow is real. It is also narrow,conditioned, and subject to Russian interests that do not perfectly align withIraqi ones.

Read more: Iraq’s neutrality fades: Formal war involvement draws closer?

Washington's Conditional Offer

The American position is neither purely permissive norsimply obstructionist — it is conditional, and Baghdad finds the conditionsequally unsatisfying. Retired Colonel Myles B. Caggins, former seniorspokesperson for the Global Coalition, confirmed to Shafaq News that theNational Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2026 includes provisionsstudying the deployment of air defense systems in Iraq, alongside $212.5million earmarked for Iraqi force training and equipping.

Caggins directed his sharpest language not at Baghdad'sprocurement gaps but at the factions creating the threat environment:"Iran-aligned militias operating outside the law continue to launchrepeated attacks, keeping civilians in constant fear." He noted that theKurdistan Region alone has absorbed more than 400 rockets and drones since theconflict began, causing an estimated one billion dollars in lost oil revenuesand millions more in infrastructure damage, and called on Congress toimmediately fund anti-drone and missile defense technology sales to theKurdistan Region specifically.

Washington's emerging posture appears to differentiatebetween the Iraqi state and Iraq's Iran-aligned armed factions as it isoffering defensive support to one while continuing to strike the other. For agovernment in Baghdad that cannot operationally or politically separate itselffrom the PMF, this distinction offers little practical relief.

A Sovereignty Bind without an Answer

What emerges from the accumulated positions ofal-Dahlaki, Melhem, Caggins, and the parliamentary voices represents asovereignty crisis with no visible exit. Iraq cannot accept American airdefense terms without legitimizing the strikes. It cannot turn to Russiawithout triggering American countermeasures and regional complications. Itcannot legislate its way to air cover. And it cannot leave its skies openwithout watching ISIS reconstitute in the security gaps the bombardmentcreates.

The strategic trap al-Dahlaki describes is, at its core,a trap of alignment —the price Iraq pays for being simultaneously the host ofAmerican forces, the political home of Iranian-backed factions, and thegeographic center of a regional war it did not choose and cannot exit. Everyweapons decision Baghdad faces is also a declaration of whose side it is on.

That is a paradox Iraqi politics has spent two decadesrefusing to answer cleanly. The open sky above Habbaniyah suggests the cost ofambiguity is rising.

Read more: How the Iran–US–Israel war exposes Iraq’s defense paralysis

Written and edited by Shafaq News staff.

Shafaq News

The United States is moving to control global oil flows through the Strait of Hormuz amid its war with Iran, a strategy that could reshape regional dynamics and push Tehran toward structural breakdown, political analyst Frank Musmar told Shafaq News.

Read more: AI reshapes Iran-Israel-US conflict as cyber warfare expands

After nearly a month of Operation Epic Fury, with no truce in place and shipping through the strait disrupted, US deployments continue to expand. Amphibious forces led by USS Tripoli, USS New Orleans, and USS San Diego have entered the Arabian Sea alongside Marine units, special forces, and elements of the 82nd Airborne Division. A second formation led by USS Boxer has departed San Diego. US Central Command says roughly 50,000 personnel are now deployed in the Middle East, including the USS Abraham Lincoln carrier strike group.

According to Musmar, that buildup is not just about firepower, but also positioning. Kharg Island handles around 90 percent of Iran's oil exports, and the Strait of Hormuz carries roughly a fifth of global oil consumption. Washington is working to control these chokepoints, particularly to restrict oil flows to China, as part of a broader strategy that extends well beyond any temporary ceasefire, he added.

As a result, Brent crude has climbed from around $70 before the war to above $100, peaking near $126, in what the International Energy Agency described as one of the largest supply shocks in modern oil markets. Musmar argued that President Donald Trump's shifting ceasefire deadlines –extending a March 21 ultimatum to April 6, citing progress in talks– were calibrated in part to manage those price swings. Tehran, however, denied any negotiations were taking place and described the move as an attempt to manipulate energy markets.

Read more: Long war with Iran: A dangerous repetition of history, but with even less preparation

Inside Iran, leadership losses and operational decentralization are straining command structures, with Iranian officials, including Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi, acknowledging that some units are now operating under decentralized authority. Musmar argued these dynamics could drive a deeper structural breakdown.

Regionally, the conflict has revived discussions around collective maritime security, including what Musmar described as an "Arab NATO" concept, alongside efforts to secure transit through the strait and develop alternative export routes.

“Taken together, these trends point toward a potential reordering of energy control and regional influence, with Iran's leverage over global shipping likely to weaken under sustained pressure,” Musmar said.

For Shafaq News, Mostafa Hashem, Washington, D.C.

Shafaq News

The house was empty when the drone hit. No guards in the wrong place, no staff caught in the blast. By the grim arithmetic of the Middle East, that counts as luck. But what arrived at Nechirvan Barzani's residence in Duhok on that quiet holiday was not really a weapon. It was a message —and the message was not addressed to a building. It was addressed to an idea.

The Man the Drone Was Looking For

Barzani, 64, is the President of the Kurdistan Region of Iraq, the autonomous northern territory that has functioned, since the 1990s, as the most stable corner of one of the world's most unstable countries. He is not a general. He is not a firebrand. In a political landscape populated by men who speak in ultimatums, he has built his career on the quieter arts of negotiation, back-channel diplomacy, and the strategic management of impossible relationships.

His family name is the most powerful in Kurdish politics —his uncle, Masoud Barzani, led the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) for decades and remains a towering figure in the movement. But Nechirvan carved his own reputation as something rarer in the region: a pragmatist whom opposing sides, including Tehran, Ankara, Paris, and Washington, could still call. That is not an accident. It is the result of years of careful positioning, and it is precisely what made him a target.

Read more: Beyond the Chaos: How Nechirvan Barzani is Redefining Kurdish Diplomacy

Kurdistan's Impossible Geography

The Kurdistan Region of Iraq is not a country, though it sometimes functions like one. It has its own parliament, its own army —the Peshmerga— its own flag, and its own foreign relationships. But it sits inside Iraq's borders, squeezed between four neighbors: Turkiye to the north, Iran to the east, Syria to the west, and the rest of Iraq to the south— each of whom has, at various points in history, viewed Kurdish autonomy as either a threat or a tool.

It also hosts American military assets. That fact, which Erbil did not entirely choose and cannot entirely undo, places the region directly in the crosshairs of any confrontation between Washington and Tehran. When the US and Iran fight —through proxies, missiles, and pressure —Kurdistan absorbs the shockwaves, whether it wants to or not.

This is the geography Barzani has spent years trying to navigate. His doctrine, stated plainly and repeatedly in recent months, has been one of deliberate neutrality: Iraqi Kurdistan will not be a staging ground for anyone's war. It will not be a base for attacks on Iran. It will not take sides. It will talk to everyone and shoot at no one.

It is a doctrine that is very easy to state and very hard to maintain —as the events of the past weeks have made brutally clear.

War Arrives at the Doorstep

The regional escalation that forms the backdrop to this attack has been building for months, accelerating sharply as US-Israeli military pressure on Iran intensified and Iranian-backed armed factions across Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon recalibrated their posture in response. Iraq, and Kurdistan specifically, became caught in the middle of this war as US facilities came under fire hundreds of times —a familiar position, but one that has grown significantly more dangerous.

Days before the drone struck Barzani's home in Duhok, Iranian ballistic missiles hit Peshmerga military positions in Soran, in the Kurdistan Region's northeast. Six fighters were killed, and thirty more were wounded. Tehran subsequently acknowledged the strike, described it as an error, and promised an investigation —an unusual admission that reflected the diplomatic sensitivity of hitting Kurdish forces that Iran does not consider enemies.

Barzani's response to Soran was telling. He condemned the strike directly, calling it an unprovoked, aggressive attack. But within the same breath, he reaffirmed that Kurdistan posed no threat to its neighbors and that he remained in contact with Iranian officials. It was a careful line to walk —firm enough to satisfy his own constituency, restrained enough not to slam shut the doors he had spent years keeping open.

Then the drone came to Duhok.

Reading the Message

No group has claimed responsibility for the attack on Barzani's residence. That silence is itself significant. In the current regional environment, the most capable actors when it comes to precision drone strikes inside Iraqi Kurdistan are Iranian-backed factions that operate with considerable autonomy across Iraq —groups that exist in a complex relationship with Tehran, sometimes acting on orders, sometimes acting on initiative, and sometimes acting in ways that embarrass their patrons.

Barzani himself was careful not to point fingers publicly. But he was also careful to make clear that this was not a private matter. Speaking to the Rudaw media network, he framed the attack explicitly as a political and security development with national implications —not just for Kurdistan, but for Iraq as a whole. His argument was pointed: when armed groups feel empowered to strike the residence of a regional president without fear of consequence, the problem is no longer one of personal security. It is a problem of state authority, of deterrence, and of what kind of country Iraq is becoming.

The Condemnation That Wasn't Supposed to Come

The local and international reactions to the attack were swift and, in their breadth, politically revealing. French President Emmanuel Macron called Barzani directly to condemn the strike. Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan expressed support for Kurdistan's security. Iraqi caretaker Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani, along with a broad spectrum of Iraqi political leaders —Shia, Sunni, and Kurdish— issued condemnations that pointed, however carefully, toward the same conclusion: this attack was not just against a man or a building, but against the idea of functioning political order in Iraq.

But the condemnation that stopped observers cold came from an unexpected source.

The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) —Iran's most powerful military institution and the primary patron and organizer of armed factions across Iraq— issued a statement condemning the drone attack on Barzani's home as a "terrorist act." The IRGC described it as part of broader efforts to undermine regional peace, stability, and cooperation, and pointed blame toward what it called the enemies of the region— namely, the United States and Israel.

This is remarkable because the IRGC is not a conventional military force. It is the ideological and operational arm of the Iranian state's regional forces, with deep organizational ties to the very factions most likely to have the capability and motivation to carry out a strike like this one. When the IRGC condemns an attack, and simultaneously blames Washington and Tel Aviv for it, it is performing a very specific kind of political theater— one that says: we did not do this, and whoever did was working against our interests.

Whether that is true or not, the political fact of the condemnation is significant in itself. It means that Tehran —even the institution most invested in pressuring Kurdistan through its network of armed proxies— calculated that publicly standing against this attack served its interests better than silence. That calculation only makes sense if Barzani represents something that Iran, too, cannot afford to lose: a channel, a buffer, a line of communication that still works when others have gone dead.

The Limits of Neutrality

Ali Hussein Feili, a former member of the Kurdistan Parliament, put the political stakes plainly. The attack, he argued, was not an accident of timing or targeting. It was a deliberate signal, “to declare the end of the diplomatic era and replace it with the logic of coercion and chaos.”

The fact that Barzani survived, he noted, does not diminish the message. If anything, it clarifies it. “The goal was not assassination but a warning to the region's most visible advocate of restraint that restraint itself is now a vulnerability.”

That reading might be aligned with the broader pattern of how this regional conflict has evolved. In earlier phases and now, the Islamic Resistance in Iraq has largely targeted military installations, US bases, and Israeli-linked infrastructure. The escalation toward political figures and civilian symbols of governance marks a qualitative shift: one that suggests either a deliberate strategic choice to widen the target set, or a loss of centralized control over who can be struck and when.

Iraqi political analyst Mithal al-Alusi captured something of this anxiety when he warned of “the maneuvering of political mercenaries in the region,” suggesting that the attack may reflect internal score-settling as much as external pressure. “Weak actors lashing out at those who have, in their eyes, been too accommodating, too diplomatic, too willing to talk to the wrong people.”

Professor Dana Mawlood, CEO of the Vision Education Foundation, framed it in terms of what is ultimately at stake: the attack was not just against Barzani personally, but against the meaning of the state itself —against the principle that political leaders and institutions deserve protection, and that those who threaten them will face consequences.

What the Drone Actually Hit

In the end, the drone did not find Nechirvan Barzani. But it found something else —and damaged it.

For months, Barzani has been the living embodiment of a proposition: that a small, landlocked, politically exposed region can survive a regional war by being genuinely useful to everyone and threatening to no one. That it can keep its borders open, its channels active, its neutrality credible. That diplomacy, even in wartime, is not naivety but strategy.

The attack on his home is a direct challenge to that proposition. It says to Erbil and Baghdad that there is no diplomatic insurance policy that places you beyond reach. That in the current moment, the peacemakers are targets too.

Whether Barzani’s doctrine survives this test will depend on two factors: his own resolve and whether regional and international actors who condemned the attack are willing to back their words with something more durable.

Read more: Nechirvan Barzani: A quiet architect of Kurdish statecraft

Written and edited by Shafaq News staff.

Shafaq News

Less than a month after the outbreakof the conflict involving the United States, Israel, and Iran, Iraq has shiftedfrom a position of observation to becoming an active arena of confrontation.Despite this, analysts and observers interviewed by Shafaq News say Iraq’spolitical and diplomatic posture still demonstrates an ability to containescalating regional tensions.

Since the start of the war, theIraqi government has firmly maintained that decisions on war and peace restexclusively with the state, in accordance with the constitution and the law. Ithas been warned that any unilateral military action by armed factions orexternal actors constitutes a clear violation of sovereignty and threatensnational stability. This position faces increasingly complex and overlappingfield developments. Armed factions have intensified domestic attacks andclaimed strikes on US bases in neighboring countries. At the same time, Iranhas carried out strikes against US positions and Iranian Kurdish oppositiongroups based in the Kurdistan Region, while the United States and Israel havetargeted sites and headquarters of the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF), a state-affiliated paramilitaryumbrella group, across Iraq.

Fragile Stability

Researcher and Academic HaiderShallal said Iraq is “walking a tightrope between escalation and containment,”relying on a delicate balance in its foreign policy to avoid sliding into openconfrontation. In an interview with Shafaq News, he attributed this approach toIraq’s sensitive geopolitical position and the far-reaching consequences thatany broad escalation could have on regional stability, particularly globalenergy security.

Shallal added that political will atthe domestic, regional, and international levels still leans toward containingtensions. He noted that this aligns with ongoing regional diplomatic efforts,including initiatives led by Turkiye, aimed at de-escalating the conflict andreturning parties to dialogue.

Researcher and academic Alaa Najahsaid the risk of involvement in conflict is not measured solely by the presenceof tensions, but by how they are managed. He described the current pattern as“controlling escalation rather than igniting it,” placing Iraq within a“defensible margin.”

Najah, speaking to Shafaq News,added that the multiplicity of international and regional partners generates aform of indirect deterrence, as the interests of various actors converge toprevent a collapse in stability. However, he warned that “the real challengelies not in conventionalwar, but in low-intensity escalation and indirect conflicts that may takesecurity or economic forms.”

Read more: Iraq's energy vulnerability: When a petro-state has no buffer

Beyond Neutrality

Ahmed Al-Yasiri, head of theArab-Australian Center for Strategic Studies, noted that Baghdad haseffectively moved beyond neutrality, though it has not entered the conflict asa direct combatant.

“Iraq has become a theater ofconflict rather than a fighting party, which is more dangerous because itcombines external targeting with internal division,” he told Shafaq News,adding that Iraqi sovereignty is being violated “from all directions.”

Al-Yasiri noted that this situationprompted the Iraqi government to take an “exceptional decision” earlier thisweek to grant security forces the authority to respond and defend themselves,reflecting a shift in the rules of engagement.

Political Survival

From London, Haitham Al-Haiti,professor of political science at the University of Exeter, stated that Iraqipolitical leaders, particularly within Shiite factions, “may not want to go farwith Iran, but are compelled to be part of the battle.”

He attributed this to the view that“a collapse of Iran would pose an existential threat to its political future,especially amid political fragmentation and corruption”. As a result, theseforces face limited options. According to Al-Haiti, the United States isunwilling to tolerate pro-Iran factions or the continued presence of the PMF, pushing thesegroups toward a “limited conflict” to preserve their political survival.

Recent Iraqi government decisionsclearly reflect this paradox. While authorities have granted security forces,including the PMF, the right to respond, they have simultaneously stressed theneed to confine weapons to state control, pursue attacks on diplomaticmissions, and reject the use of Iraqi territory to launch attacks onneighboring countries. These measures are seen as an attempt to containpressure from armed factions while avoiding confrontation with the UnitedStates.

Read more: How the Iran–US–Israel war exposes Iraq’s defense paralysis

Risk of War

The head of Iraq’s Supreme JudicialCouncil, Judge Faiq Zidan, warned against the dangers of an uncontrolled slidetoward war, describing the declaration of war as one of the most serioussovereign decisions due to its significant political, military, and legalconsequences. He stressed that unilateral decisions in this regard weaken stateauthority and undermine the rule of law.

Amid these developments, Najahoutlined three paths to avoid escalation: strengthening positive neutrality inforeign policy, reinforcing the domestic front institutionally and in terms ofsecurity, and expanding multilateral diplomatic engagement.

Al-Yasiri emphasized that diplomacymust remain “balanced and professional,” aimed not only at avoiding war butalso at mitigating its impact by managing the complex relationship betweenTehran and Washington and using internal pressure tools, such as religiousauthorities, to restrain armed factions.

The challenges extend beyondsecurity into political and economic domains. Iraq, which depends on oil for 90percent of its revenues, faces mounting pressure due to the closure of theStrait of Hormuz and attacks on key oil fields, including Majnoon, Rumaila, andKirkuk, further complicating the economic situation.

This economic strain coincides withcoordinated diplomatic pressure from six Arab countries, Saudi Arabia, theUnited Arab Emirates, Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrain, and Jordan, which called onBaghdad on Wednesday to take immediate measures to halt attacks by armedfactions on neighboring states. They said the use of Iraqi territory as alaunch point for such attacks constitutes a violation of UN Security CouncilResolution 2817.

Within this landscape, the Kurdistan Region remains a significant factor in the balance of power due to the presenceof international military bases and Iranian opposition groups. The Region has witnessednear-daily strikes, underscoring its strategic sensitivity, while continuingefforts to maintain stability and avoid direct escalation.

Written and Edited by Shafaq News Staff.

Shafaq News

Artificialintelligence is rapidly transforming the confrontation involving Iran, theUnited States, and Israel, shifting the center of gravity from conventionalfirepower to data dominance and algorithmic speed. AI-assisted targeting inGaza, escalating cyber exchanges and waves of misleading content online suggestthat modern conflicts are increasingly decided by who can process, control, andweaponize information in real time.

AI TargetingAnd Battlefield Transformation

Military andcybersecurity experts say the fusion of artificial intelligence with cyberwarfare has compressed decision-making cycles, lowered operational costs, andblurred lines of responsibility — raising the risk of miscalculation amongalready volatile actors.

For decades,military operations relied on intelligence gathering that could take days orweeks to process. Today, AI-powered surveillance systems and data platformsreduce that timeline to minutes — sometimesseconds — enabling near-instantoperational decisions.

Alaa Al-Nashouexplained that this transformation extends beyond weapons to the structure ofcommand itself. “Cyber warfare has become the form of conflict that states areactively developing,” he told Shafaq News, noting that decision-making isincreasingly driven by real-time data flows and automated analysis.

This shiftmarks a departure from the mass troop deployments that defined earlier wars,Al-Nahou pointed out. Instead, militaries now rely on drones, sensor networks,and AI-assisted targeting systems capable of delivering precision strikes withlimited manpower.

At the core ofthis transformation are AI-powered decision-support systems designed to processvast streams of intelligence and convert them into actionable targets.

MohammedMandour pointed to platforms such as the US Project Maven, which analyze droneimagery, signals intelligence, and human reporting to generate what are knownas “target banks.” These systems apply machine learning to detect patterns andidentify objects at a speed far beyond human capacity.

Similar toolshave reportedly been used by Israel, including systems such as Gospel (Habsora)and Lavender, to process intelligence and produce target lists at scale duringoperations in Gaza and beyond.

“These systemsmean that AI is no longer just an analytical tool —it is part of thedecision-making process itself,” Mandour said, highlighting how tasks oncerequiring large teams of analysts can now be executed by integrated systemswithin a fraction of the time.

Yet thisacceleration carries risks. Analysts warn that heavy reliance on automatedsystems may increase the likelihood of targeting errors, particularly whenalgorithms operate on incomplete or biased data. In high-pressure environments,human operators may defer to machine-generated recommendations —a phenomenonknown as “automation bias”— potentially amplifying mistakes rather thanpreventing them.

While AI isredefining battlefield operations, its most disruptive impact may lie in theexpanding cyber domain.

Cyber WarfareAnd Asymmetric Strategies

Iran’s approachdiffers from its adversaries. Rather than competing directly in high-end AIinfrastructure, Tehran has focused on integrating cyber capabilities, low-costdrones, and digital disruption tactics into a hybrid strategy.

Sanctions andinfrastructure limitations have constrained Iran’s access to advancedtechnologies, but the country has leveraged its long-standing cyber expertiseto offset these gaps. Iranian-linked operations have targeted foreigncompanies, digital platforms, and critical infrastructure in response toattacks attributed to the United States and Israel.

This modelreflects a broader strategic adaptation for Iran despite US sanctions: combiningtechnological tools with asymmetric tactics to maintain operational relevancedespite resource constraints.

For analysts,the most disruptive impact of AI lies in how it reshapes the tempo andeconomics of conflict.

Ali Metwallysaid artificial intelligence has made cyber operations “faster, cheaper, andeasier to scale,” allowing actors to conduct complex attacks with fewerresources.

Processes thatonce required extensive manpower —from intelligence collection to phishingcampaigns— can now be executed rapidly and with greater precision. “As aresult, attacks are no longer isolated incidents but part of a continuous,low-level confrontation.”

At the sametime, AI expands what experts describe as the “gray zone” —a space wherehostile actions remain below the threshold of open war. “Attribution becomesmore difficult, enabling states and non-state actors to operate with plausibledeniability. This ambiguity increases the risk of escalation, as responses maybe based on uncertain or misinterpreted signals,” Metwally explained.

The InformationBattlefield And Escalation Risks

Beyond thebattlefield, artificial intelligence is reshaping the information environmentitself.

The currentconflict has seen a surge in AI-generated content across platforms such as X,TikTok, and Facebook, where fabricated videos, altered images, and recycledfootage circulate alongside authentic reporting. In some cases, real contenthas been dismissed as fake, while synthetic media has been presented asevidence —blurring the line between fact and fabrication.

This dynamiccreates a parallel “information battlefield,” where perception becomes ascritical as physical outcomes. States and affiliated actors use AI to influenceadversaries and to shape domestic and international narratives.

As artificialintelligence accelerates decision-making, it may also compress the timeavailable for diplomacy and de-escalation.

Fasterdetection and response systems can trigger rapid retaliation cycles, leavinglittle room for verification or political intervention. In such an environment,even minor incidents —whether cyber intrusions or misidentified targets — couldescalate into broader confrontations.

Some analystswarn that the integration of AI into military systems risks creating a feedbackloop in which machines operate at speeds that outpace human oversight. Thisraises concerns about accidental escalation, particularly in regions such asthe Middle East, where multiple actors operate in close proximity, and tensionsremain high.

Conflict isincreasingly taking shape across networks, data streams, and digital platforms,where algorithms can influence outcomes before conventional forces are evenengaged. Military advantage now depends less on numerical strength and more onthe ability to process information, interpret signals, and act with speed andprecision.

This shiftplaces growing pressure on political and military leadership, as faster systemsleave narrower margins for verification and restraint. In a region alreadydefined by overlapping rivalries and fragile deterrence, even limited incidentsin cyberspace or misinterpreted data could trigger wider escalation.

Written andedited by Shafaq News staff.

Shafaq News- Washington

Speculations about an imminent ground landing on Iran’sKharg Island should be treated with restraint, a US lawmaker stated onSaturday, indicating that Washington’s current approach remains focused onextracting concessions from Tehran rather than pursuing the overthrow of itssystem.

Speaking to Shafaq News, Rob Arlett, a former official inUS President Donald Trump’s election campaign, described Kharg Island as aneconomic pressure point viewed in Washington as a means to weaken Iran’smilitary posture and negotiating leverage.

He pointed out that the US strategy does not revolve around usingenergy assets as a direct tool to pressure China, adding that any impact onChinese energy security would likely be an unintended consequence rather than aprimary objective.

‘’The broader regional dimension reflects a calibratedapproach,’’ he noted, rejecting the view that Israel is pursuing a policy aimedat exhausting Gulf States alongside Iran. Instead, available indicationssuggest that the focus remains on disrupting the network of Iranian influenceacross the region, rather than targeting Gulf countries as parallel objectives.

Arlett further observed that Gulf States are bearing theimpact of the escalation, citing their public condemnations of Iranian attackson regional infrastructure as evidence of their vulnerability within thecurrent environment.

Assessing Iran’s likely response, he warned that any strikeon Kharg Island could trigger a wide asymmetric reaction, including intensifiedmissile and drone activity across multiple fronts, attempts to disrupt maritimetraffic in the Strait of Hormuz, and increased pressure through allied groupsin the Red Sea, alongside potential targeting of energy and desalinationinfrastructure in Gulf countries.

Despite these risks, Arlett maintained that the US approachremains centered on “coercive behavior change,” aiming to curb Iran’s nuclearand missile programs and limit regional threats, rather than openly pursuingregime collapse.

Moreover, he acknowledged that sustained pressure on Iran’sleadership and oil infrastructure could generate internal strain, potentiallycontributing to gradual instability and structural weakening over time.

For Shafaq News, Mostafa Hashem, Washington, D.C.

Read more: Iraq's energy vulnerability: When a petro-state has no buffer

Shafaq News

When the Israel-US-Iran conflict erupted in late February 2026 and Hormuz tightened, Iraq's oil production collapsed from 4.3 million barrels per day to 1.3 million, within weeks. Exports fell below 800,000 barrels. The country began losing $128 million daily, not because the oil ceased to exist, but because there was no alternative route to move it.

A state deriving 93% of its budget from a single commodity found itself simultaneously unable to export that commodity, unable to generate electricity without Iranian supply, and without a strategic reserve to draw from. Three structural failures converged at the same moment, and Iraq had no instrument to offset any of them.

The conflict is the trigger. The vulnerabilities predate it by years.

One Exit, No Contingency

Iraq's southern terminals at Basra are wholly dependent on Hormuz passage. That dependence is not a discovery of this crisis, it has been a feature of Iraqi export infrastructure for decades. The Kirkuk-Ceyhan pipeline running north through Turkiye exists as a theoretical alternative, but it has a long history of operating well below its design capacity of 1.6 million barrels per day. It was largely idle from 2014 following militant attacks, shut again by an arbitration dispute in March 2023, and partially restarted in September 2025 at only 38,000 barrels per day. As of mid-March 2026, Iraq's Oil Minister Hayan Abdul Ghani confirmed that hydrostatic testing on the rehabilitated line's final 100 kilometers was still ongoing, with projected initial throughput of 200,000 to 250,000 barrels per day once operational. No southern bypass was ever developed. No route with Red Sea access was brought to scale.

When Hormuz became a contested waterway, Iraq's entire export architecture had a single functional exit, and that exit was the problem. The Eco Iraq economic monitor places the daily revenue loss at $128 million. These figures do not reflect geopolitical shock alone. They reflect an infrastructure deficit that left Iraq with no contingency.

"Iraq cannot be considered an absolute beneficiary of rising prices," says international economics professor Nawar Al-Saadi. "Its exports pass through the Gulf, any threat to navigation in the Strait of Hormuz disrupts exports and dramatically raises their cost. Iraq loses even as prices rise."

One Third of the Grid, Imported

Economic analyst Safwan Qusay puts it plainly, "A third of Iraq's energy supply is tied to Iran. Any disruption will create a major crisis, especially with summer approaching and demand rising."

In 2024, Iraq flared 18.2 billion cubic meters of gas, 12% of the world's total, ranking third globally behind Russia and Iran. That same year, it consumed 19.7 billion cubic meters of gas, of which 7.8 billion were imported from Iran. Iraq is, in other words, burning a volume of gas roughly equivalent to what it imports from a foreign grid. According to the Baker Institute, the 18 billion cubic meters flared in 2023 alone was sufficient to generate approximately 33 gigawatts of electricity, far exceeding Iraq's current generation deficit. Caretaker Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani acknowledged publicly that Iraq flares 1,200 million standard cubic feet of gas per day while importing 1,000 million from Iran, at a cost of at least $4 billion per year.

Iraq has received substantial oil revenues continuously since 2005. In two decades, it did not build sufficient domestic generation capacity to supply its own population. The electricity shortage has driven public protests, prompted parliamentary investigations, and featured in IMF and World Bank assessments for over a decade. What the current crisis has done is transform a chronic governance failure into an acute national security liability, one now fully exposed weeks before peak summer demand.

Qusay warns of a compounding risk: if Iranian energy infrastructure is struck, demand for Iraqi petroleum derivatives could surge to feed Iran's domestic market, triggering shortages and price spikes inside Iraq itself.

The Price Rise That Bypasses Iraq

Brent crude was trading above $101 per barrel in late March 2026. Under normal conditions, that would give Iraq a direct fiscal buffer against regional instability. Instead, the price signal and the export channel have broken down in parallel, eliminating the one dynamic that would ordinarily absorb the impact of a Hormuz disruption.

"This isn't just about oil prices, it's about global supply security," says Al-Saadi. "Any threat to the Strait means an immediate shock to markets: rising shipping and insurance costs, slower global growth, and a wave of instability that could extend far beyond the Gulf." Markets analyst Tony Sycamore, quoted by Reuters, described Trump's ultimatum as "a ticking time bomb" that could trigger free-falling stock markets and sharp oil price spikes.

Iraq's oil revenues accounted for 92% of total budget revenue in the first half of 2025. At that level of fiscal concentration, an export contraction of this magnitude does not produce a contained economic problem, it generates pressure across the full range of state expenditure, from civil service salaries to infrastructure financing to essential commodity imports. The daily loss is a measure of fiscal stress in a state with no alternative revenue base and no buffer to draw down while the disruption persists.

Emergency Proposals

The interventions now being advanced by Iraqi analysts are technically sound: establishing strategic petroleum reserves, diversifying electricity imports from Turkiye and Jordan, building local generation capacity, distributing stockpiles across dispersed sites. They are also, without exception, proposals that have appeared in Iraqi government planning documents, international financial institution reports, and parliamentary committee recommendations over the past fifteen years. Iraq's oil minister pledged in late 2022 to end all gas flaring within four years. Senior officials affirmed in May 2024 that Baghdad aimed to eliminate flaring by 2028, a goal preceded by a series of missed deadlines stretching back years.

The infrastructure these proposals describe was not built during a sustained period in which Iraq held the revenues, the institutional frameworks, and the documented international guidance to build it. Iraq collected more than $87 billion in federal budget revenues in the first eleven months of 2025 alone, with oil accounting for nearly 88% of the total. Cumulative oil revenues since 2005 run conservatively into the hundreds of billions. The structural deficiencies now costing the country millions every day were each identified, and in several cases specifically budgeted for during that period. They were not addressed.

Reckoning That Outlasts the Crisis

This conflict will reach some form of resolution, through negotiation, military conclusion, or exhaustion of one or both parties. Qusay's preferred scenario is a de-escalation initiative: a pause on strikes against Iranian energy infrastructure in exchange for reopening Hormuz, at minimum during a ceasefire window, "to prevent the region from becoming a global energy blackout zone where prices skyrocket and Middle East supply stops entirely."

But when the guns fall quiet, the structural condition this crisis has laid bare will not disappear with them. A single regional disruption simultaneously halted Iraq's export capacity, severed a third of its electricity supply, and exposed a fiscal architecture with no shock absorbers. That did not happen because the crisis was unusually severe. It happened because Iraq was unusually exposed.

The data required to understand how Iraq arrived at this position -two decades of oil revenues, incomplete infrastructure investment, and deferred reform across multiple governments- exists and is on the public record. The operative question, once the immediate emergency recedes, is whether Iraq's institutions will finally subject that record to the scrutiny this moment demands, or file the emergency proposals away until the next crisis makes their absence measurable again.

Written and edited by Shafaq News staff.

Shafaq News

By David L. Phillips*

It is a common misconception that George W. Bush launched the Iraq War in 2003 without a plan for stabilization. In reality, the issue was not a lack of planning, but rather a deliberate disregard for it. Neo-conservatives within the Bush administration sidelined the "Future of Iraq Project" because they found its warnings inconvenient and its projected difficulties too daunting to acknowledge.

As a member of the State Department’s Near Eastern Affairs Bureau at the time, I witnessed this comprehensive effort firsthand. The Democratic Principles Working Group was tasked with drafting blueprints for federalism, de-Baathification, and transitional justice. More than 200 Iraqis across 17 working groups produced a 13-volume, 1,200-page analysis. It was a roadmap for rising from the ashes of conflict, but it was a map the administration chose not to follow.

Today, we see a dangerous repetition of history, but with even less preparation. There was no comparable planning for the current confrontation with Iran. President Donald Trump seemingly expected a "cakewalk," rushing into hostilities without engaging directly affected Iranians or establishing a clear postwar vision. Convinced that the regime would simply fold under pressure, the administration focused almost exclusively on target selection.

This overconfidence ignored critical intelligence. Despite Trump’s claims that Iran’s nuclear capabilities were annihilated following the June 2025 airstrikes, US intelligence estimates consistently suggested that Tehran was still at least a decade away from a functional weapon. Furthermore, while the Bush administration took pains to build an international coalition in 2003, Trump devalued allies —only to find himself scrambling to recruit them once Iran began to fight back with unexpected ferocity.

The administration’s failure to anticipate Iran’s regional reach has proven disastrous. Trump and Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth seemingly underestimated Iran’s willingness to strike its neighbors. In the United Arab Emirates, Iranian strikes hit Abu Dhabi, Dubai, and Fujairah, damaging oil facilities and setting the Fairmont Hotel ablaze. Missiles and drones have targeted Riyadh and the Aramco facility in Ras Tanura, Saudi Arabia, while US 5th Fleet fuel storage in Bahrain and airbases in Qatar and Kuwait have come under fire.

The escalatory spiral has even drawn in Jordan and Oman. Following an Israeli strike on South Pars —the world’s largest natural gas field— Tehran retaliated by hitting energy complexes in Qatar. Perhaps most critically, the administration failed to secure the Strait of Hormuz. With 20 percent of the world’s oil transit now blocked, the US is playing a desperate game of catch-up, deploying 5,000-pound bunker buster bombs in an attempt to reopen the waterway.

Of all the regional players, Iraq remains the most vulnerable. Sharing a 1,500-kilometer border with Iran, Iraq’s security and economy are inextricably linked to its neighbor. The Hashd al-Shaabi (Popular Mobilization Forces) has doubled in size over the last two years, now commanding a $2.7 billion budget. Dominant Shia factions like the Badr Organization and Asaib Ahl al-Haq effectively serve as the military wing of the Coordination Framework, the political alliance governing Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani’s administration.

The economic ties are just as binding. Iran supplies a fifth of Iraq's consumer goods and has long used Iraq to bypass US sanctions. With bilateral trade hitting $12 billion in 2024, the closure of the Strait of Hormuz doesn't just hurt Iran; it cripples Iraq’s national budget and its ability to pay civil servants.

The most profound miscalculation, however, may be a cultural one. Trump and Hegseth appear ignorant of the theological framework that drives Iranian resilience. In Shia Islam, martyrdom is not a defeat but a blessing. The Battle of Karbala in 680 AD remains the cornerstone of this identity, where Husayn’s sacrifice against injustice became an eternal symbol of struggle.

It is a time of intense devotion and remembrance that reinforces a "resistance" mindset. By failing to understand this history, the US administration underestimated a government and a people prepared for a long-term struggle.

I fear that because of this strategic and cultural blindness, a long, grueling war is only just beginning.

*David L. Phillips is an Academic Visitor at St. Antony’s College, Oxford University. He worked with the US State Department’s Near Eastern Affairs Bureau on the Future of Iraq Project during the Iraq War.

This article has been edited to conform to Shafaq News’ editorial style.

The views expressed are the author’s and do not necessarily reflect those of Shafaq News Agency.

Shafaq News

The expandingconfrontation between Iran, the United States, and Israel has done more thandraw Iraqi territory into a regional battlefield. It has laid bare a deeperreality: Iraq currently lacks the structural capacity to enforce its ownsovereignty. Missiles and drones have crossed its airspace and struck sitesinside the country without a single confirmed interception from its defensesystem, while Baghdad has issued no clear military posture or deterrent signal.What this conflict reveals is not a temporary gap, but a systemic failurerooted in how Iraq’s security architecture has been built since 2003.

Some Iraqiofficials and political figures argue that this absence of response reflects adeliberate strategy rather than incapacity. In their view, avoiding directengagement in a confrontation between far more advanced military powers is arational choice aimed at preventing escalation. Yet this interpretation isdifficult to sustain when measured against the operational record. The lack ofeven symbolic defensive action, no interception attempts, no declared alertlevels, no public assessment of damage, suggests not restraint, but aninability to act.

DocumentedOperational Failure

Since lateFebruary, multiple incidents have demonstrated the same pattern. Drones struckradar installations at the Basra Operations Command without any recordeddefensive response. Earlier attacks targeted the Taji base near Baghdad and theImam Ali base in Nasiriyah. In each case, Iraqi authorities neither signaled ashift in military posture nor outlined a response plan.

These incidentspoint to a critical absence: Iraq does not possess an integrated air defensesystem capable of detecting, tracking, and intercepting incoming threats. Itscurrent air force inventory, including US-supplied F-16 fighter jets, FrenchCaracal helicopters, and South Korean T-50IQ aircraft, was not designed forsustained airspace control or missile defense. There is no unifiedcommand-and-control network linking these assets, and no operational surface-to-airmissile system of modern standard.

Politicalanalyst Ahmed al-Hamdani summarized the reality bluntly: “Iraqi militarycapabilities have no meaningful role in this conflict, because the countrypossesses neither the aircraft nor the air defense components required to bringdown hostile projectiles or enforce its own airspace.” The events of recentweeks have reinforced that assessment.

StructuralConstraints, Not Just Neglect

The roots ofthis deficit are not limited to underinvestment or mismanagement. Iraq’spost-2003 security model was built primarily to address internal threats,particularly insurgency and terrorism, rather than external defense. Thatdesign has left the country ill-prepared for conventional or hybrid warfareinvolving drones and precision-guided munitions.

Externalconstraints have compounded the problem. Security expert Ali al-Maamari pointsto the 2008 US–Iraq Strategic Framework Agreement as a factor shapingprocurement decisions. According to his assessment, Iraq’s defense acquisitionshave largely been channeled through US-aligned systems, “limitingdiversification and complicating efforts to develop an independent supplychain.”

At the sametime, Iranian influence within Iraq’s political and security institutions introducesa parallel constraint. Tehran’s network of allied factions operates withinIraq’s system, creating incentives to prevent the emergence of a fullyautonomous Iraqi military posture that could restrict their operational space.Al-Maamari argues that this dual pressure has left Iraq unable to convert itsformal sovereignty into effective strategic autonomy.

It could beargued that Iraq’s limitations stem primarily from internal fragmentation,including corruption and institutional inefficiency. These factors areundeniably significant. Yet repeated procurement failures and external vetodynamics suggest that domestic dysfunction alone does not fully explain thescale of the capability gap.

SpendingWithout Capability

Iraq allocatedapproximately $21.6 billion to its defense sector in 2024, a figure that raisesa more difficult question: how has a budget of that scale failed to produceeven a minimal air defense capability?

Politicalscience professor Issam al-Feyli of Al-Mustansiriyah University estimates that,after accounting for salaries, pensions, and maintenance, Iraq’s effectiveinvestment in modernization amounts to roughly one percent of the combinedmilitary development spending of its immediate surrounding: Iran, Turkiye,Saudi Arabia, and Israel. Each of those maintains integrated air defensesystems and, in most cases, domestic production capacity for drones andadvanced weapons.

Iraq’sprocurement record reflects repeated breakdowns. Efforts to acquire SouthKorea’s M-SAM-II air defense system were never completed. Other deals with theCzech Republic and Pakistan collapsed. Analysts attribute these failures to amix of corruption, political interference, and competing external pressures.

Al-Feyli notesthat Iraq’s position is uniquely vulnerable: “It exists within a profoundlyunstable geostrategic environment, surrounded by states whose militarycapabilities exceed its own by orders of magnitude, and that are, at theircore, competing for influence over Iraq itself.”

FragmentedDecision-Making

The militarygap is reinforced by political fragmentation. Security analyst Dr. Ahmedal-Sharifi highlights two interconnected failures: the absence of a cleardeterrent posture from civilian leadership, and the inability of militaryinstitutions to execute coordinated responses.

Thisfragmentation became particularly visible when armed factions launched attacksin the Kurdistan Region, where US forces were consolidating ahead of a plannedwithdrawal. Rather than presenting a unified national stance, segments ofIraq’s political leadership justified the attacks, framing US forces aslegitimate targets regardless of the federal government’s agreements.

Al-Feyliobserved that this response reflected a deeper problem: “Some parties effectivelyendorsed the bombardment without acknowledging that those forces werewithdrawing under a federal agreement.” The issue, he suggests, is not a policydisagreement but a fundamental lack of consensus on what constitutes Iraq’snational interest.

CapabilityVersus Perception

According tothe 2026 Global Firepower Index, Iraq ranks sixth in the Middle East in termsof military strength. However, this ranking is based on aggregate indicatorssuch as personnel numbers and equipment inventories, not on operationalintegration or readiness.

Iraq fieldsapproximately 193,000 active personnel and 100,000 paramilitary forces, alongwith a mix of Soviet-era and Western equipment. Yet the absence of anintegrated air defense system, combined with fragmented command structures,significantly reduces the effectiveness of these assets.

Even if Iraqpossessed more advanced systems, it is not certain that it could fundamentallyalter the outcome of a confrontation involving technologically superior powers.However, the issue is whether Iraq can impose any cost at all or assert basiccontrol over its territory. At present, the evidence suggests it cannot.

StrategicChoices Ahead

As theSeptember 2026 deadline for the withdrawal of US forces approaches, Iraq facesa narrowing set of strategic options. Broadly, three paths are emerging. Thefirst is continued reliance on external security arrangements, particularlythose tied to the United States. The second involves partial realignment towardregional powers, a move that carries its own risks of dependency. The third,and most challenging, is the pursuit of an autonomous deterrence capabilitybuilt on internal political consensus and institutional reform.

None of theseoptions can succeed without addressing the core issue: Iraq’s strategic problemis the absence of political cohesion and autonomy required to translate thoseresources into effective power.

The currentconflict has exposed these vulnerabilities in real time. Airspace violationswithout interception, strikes without response, and a fragmented politicalreaction have together provided a documented record of a state that remains,despite its formal sovereignty, unable to defend its own territory.

Read more: Iraqi Army after US-led Coalition withdrawal: Can Baghdad achieve full military sovereignty?

Written andedited by Shafaq News staff.